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 This dissertation explores the implementation of American policy in postwar Germany 
from the perspective of military government officers and other occupation officials in the Land 
of Bavaria. It addresses three main questions: How did American military government officials, 
as part of the institution of the Office of Military Government, Bavaria (OMGB), respond to the 
challenges of the occupation? How did these individuals interact with American policy towards 
defeated Germany? And, finally, how did the challenges of postwar Germany shape that 
relationship with American policy? To answer these questions, this project focuses on the actions 
of military government officers and officials within OMGB from 1945 through 1949.  
Operating from this perspective, this dissertation argues that American officials in 
Bavaria possessed a complicated, often contradictory, relationship with official policy towards 
postwar Germany. Early in the occupation, Bavarian military government challenged or worked 
to mitigate the effects of American policy that promoted a harsh, deconstructive peace. At other 
times, however, military government officials implemented official policy, simply adapting it to 
the circumstances of postwar Bavaria. Policy implementation in Bavaria, therefore, was not a 
straight-forward matter, but was characterized by a series of challenges that complicated 
attempts to turn official directives and plans into reality. 
Ultimately, this dissertation operates on the belief that it is vitally important to understand 
the challenges associated with policy implementation, particularly if nation-building remains a 
part of American foreign policy in the future. Future policy should be based on an accurate 
understanding of past experiences, including the role of low-level officials in implementing 
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 When the Second World War ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, Germany remained a 
nation-state in name only. Millions of German soldiers and hundreds of thousands of German 
civilians lay dead after nearly six years of war. German government, even at the local levels, had 
ceased functioning. German cities lay in ruins, subjected first to years of strategic bombing at the 
hands of the Western Allies and then serving as the battleground in the final death throes of the 
Nazi regime. The German economy ground to a standstill, the basic economic infrastructure of 
the state wrecked by war. Many Germans faced defeat with a profound sense of apathy as their 
once proud nation lay at the mercies of the victorious Allies. And from north to south and east to 
west, the armies of the Allied powers occupied the entire territory of their great enemy. The 
racial dictatorship of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany was finally defeated. 
 Seventy-two years later a liberal, democratic Germany forms the core of a liberal, 
democratic Europe, which leads to the question: How did this astounding transformation take 
place? Obviously, the German people played a most important role in transforming first West 
Germany during the Cold War and then all of Germany. Germany became a liberal, democratic 
state because its people embraced this new vision. Historians of the occupation of West Germany 
by the American, British, and French allies stress the importance of military and civilian elites in 
crafting occupation policy that eventually sought the reconstruction and democratization of their 
zones of occupation. Yet these are not the only answers and they overlook an important truth: the 
actions of the Allied soldiers tasked with carrying out the occupation were just as important. 
Within the American zone, and particularly in Bavaria, the ability of military government 
officials to adapt policy to meet their circumstances and their empathy for the German people 
helped make the occupation a success. 
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It is the objective of this dissertation to bring these officials to the fore and to correct the 
imbalance in the historiography that favors elite-centric policy narratives of military government. 
As such, it will tell an institutional history, yet one from a different perspective. It explores the 
American occupation of Bavaria from the perspective of the Office of Military Government for 
Bavaria (OMGB) and the individuals charged with implementing occupation policy in the 
southern German Land. American policy towards defeated German, as developed in 1944 and 
1945, created greater hardship for an already traumatized, injured, and hungry German populace. 
In Bavaria, these policies had the potential to cause a major humanitarian crisis, including 
starvation, economic stagnation, and political upheaval. Ultimately American policymakers 
reversed their course in early 1947, embracing reconstruction and economic recovery, which 
culminated in the announcement of the Marshall Plan in 1948.  
However, the reversal of harsh American policy was not merely a top-down imposition 
by policymakers in Washington, Berlin, and Frankfurt. Instead, it first emerged out of the 
complex relationship that low-level military government officers (MGOs) in Bavaria possessed 
with American policy throughout the occupation period. These officials, this dissertation argues, 
at times worked to mitigate the effects of U.S. policies towards Germany and even pushed back 
against policy directives from their superiors, particularly during the first two years of the 
occupation. Yet at other times, MGOs worked within the confines of official policy, at most 
adapting the official position to the circumstances of their locale. Scenes of total devastation and 
interactions with Bavarians of all stripes – government officials, civilians, and even former 
soldiers – made OMGB officials and MGOs located in Bavarian communities sympathetic to the 
plight of the German populace. These individuals worked to feed the German people and restart 
economic life during the first eighteen months of the occupation, often challenging the 
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deconstructive tone of early American policy towards Germany. After warding off starvation and 
economic catastrophe, military government focused its attention on the challenges of 
democratization and the early Cold War. While American officials more commonly followed 
policy in these fields, they also adapted them to the circumstances that characterized their local 
and regional offices.  
Beyond growing sympathy for the German population, a quick realization of the limits on 
military government shaped how American military government officials at the Kreis (county) 
and Land levels interacted with U.S. policy in Bavaria. The culture of military government 
developed during the interwar and wartime Army called for a hands-off approach to military 
governance and emphasized pragmatic approaches to solving the issues that would plague 
postwar communities. This culture of self-imposed restraints simultaneously encouraged 
pragmatic solutions that challenged American policy but also limited the ability of MGOs to 
mitigate the effects of those punitive policies. Additionally, the relatively small number of 
trained military government officers and the OMGUS belief that Germans should assume 
responsibility for their country as rapidly as possible meant that military government in Bavaria 
depended on the work of local German officials. Many of these officials sought reconstruction, 
not the punitive policies of the United States, which added another early challenge to the 
American approach towards Bavaria. This reliance on local officials further limited the authority 
of military government and led to significant clashes between Americans and Bavarians over 
U.S. policies in the Land. Overall, however, MGOs recognized the limits on their authority and 
worked within those limits during their interactions with American policy throughout the 
occupation. 
Historiography of the Occupation 
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 Almost immediately, the Army’s occupation of Germany attracted the attention of 
authors, whether former military government officials, historians, or academics from other fields. 
The earliest analysis of the occupation often came from disgruntled American officials. These 
former military government officers launched withering attacks against the American occupation 
and its supposed violation of American war aims and the Potsdam Agreement. Many of these 
officers served in the intelligence or information control divisions of military government, 
bastions of liberal, reform-minded MGOs who favored major structural reforms in Germany. 
Saul Padover, who served as an intelligence officer in Germany, criticized the occupation for 
what he saw as its half-hearted attempts at denazification and democratization.
1
 Similarly, Arthur 
Kahn launched a broadside against military government for its betrayal of democratization 
efforts, the Potsdam Agreement, and the Soviet alliance. Kahn’s sense of betrayal remained 
strong for decades, so much so that he published another book sixty-five years later to build upon 
his original argument.
2
 Written for a public audience, these earlies histories sought change in 
American policy towards Germany. For Padover, Kahn, and several other former military 
government officers, the United States too quickly abandoned the aims of denazification, 
demilitarization, and democratization in the name of fighting the Cold War.
3
 
Other literature, however, took a more academic approach to the occupation. Still often 
written by participants in American military government, these early works explored the 
                                                 
1
 Saul K. Padover, Experiment in Germany: The Story of an American Intelligence Officer (New York: Duell, Sloan 
and Pearce, 1946). 
2
 Arthur D. Kahn, Betrayal: The American Occupation of Germany (New York: Independence Publishers, 1949); 
Kahn, Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944-1946 (University 
Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004). 
3
 For additional memoirs or contemporary accounts of the occupation see Julian Bach, America’s Germany: An 
Account of the Occupation (New York: Random House, 1946); Richard E. Berlin, Diary of a Flight to Occupation 
Germany, July 20 to August 27, 1945, German Under Reconstruction, Digital Collections, University of Wisconsin-
Madison Libraries; Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950); Carl J. 
Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart & company, Inc., 
1948); Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1964). 
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bureaucratic structure of OMGUS and U.S. policy surrounding occupation.  Foremost among 
these writers was Harold Zink, who spent time in Germany as a civil affairs officer and the chief 
historian of OMGUS.  In two separate books, Zink argued that policymakers in Washington 
failed to provide sufficient guidance to General Lucius D. Clay, the American military governor, 
and the other occupation officials.  As a result, these officials were forced to either implement 
half-thought-out policies or improvise on the fly.
4
  Considering this severe limitation, Zink 
believed that OMGUS officials did as good of a job with the occupation as could be expected. 
Additionally, Zink argued that American military government played a key role in the successful 
democratization of Germany. In many ways, Zink’s early work set the framework for the first 
phase of the historiography of the occupation. High-level policy debates and the significant 
American impact on Germany formed the major analytical discussions during this first phase.
5
  
 Other scholars soon picked up on Zink’s theme and repeatedly castigated Washington for 
its failure to provide any coherent policy towards Germany.  Manuel Gottlieb’s The German 
Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis argued that tensions between the victorious Allies and 
divided opinions in Washington contributed to a disjointed occupation policy that reflected the 
views of the numerous agencies involved in occupation policy formation.
6
  Meanwhile, Franklin 
Davis extended his critique to the planning of the occupation.  According to Davis, “the pursuit 
of military triumph naturally took precedence and priority over the problems of occupation 
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 Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: Macmillan, 1947); Zink, The United States 
in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: D. Van Norstad, 1957). 
5
 Eugene Davidson’s The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1959) adopted the same critique that military government lacked clear policy guidance from civilian 
officials in Washington. Davidson continued his focus on high policy by examining how the occupation fit within 
the international political context, arguing that what happened in Germany was connected with events in China, 
Korea, and other theaters of the early Cold War. 
6
 Manuel Gottlieb, The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis (New York: Paine-Whitman, 1960). 
6 
 
which were only dim shadows beyond the victory beacons.”
7
  As a result there was little 
consideration of potential policies for an occupied Germany and the lack of guidance, with the 
exception of the generally vague JCS 1067, continued after Germany’s surrender.  Like Zink, 
Davis attributes the success of the occupation to the flexibility of Clay and his subordinates. 
 The emphasis on the lack of policy guidance continued for almost two decades until John 
Gimbel published the first major challenge to this thesis in 1968.  The changing actions of 
OMGUS, he argued, did not reflect policy ambivalence from Washington but a “broad range” of 
American interests.  Americans, Gimbel writes: 
were…interested in seeing to their own continued security, bringing about the 
economic rehabilitation of Germany and Europe, and guaranteeing the 
continuance of free enterprise.  They wanted to frustrate socialism, to forestall 
Communism, to spare American taxpayers’ money, to counteract French plans to 




While not always stated interests, they influenced American policy throughout the occupation.  
Gimbel was one of the first historians to have access to the records of OMGUS and he makes a 
persuasive argument about American policy towards Germany.  Nevertheless, his work remained 
focused on policy debates and elites almost exclusively. The implementation of such policy or 
the relationship between military government officials in the field and the larger military 
government bureaucracy remained largely unexplored. 
The high-level, policy-centric methodology continued through the 1970s and early 1980s.  
John Backer’s work on the occupation highlighted American efforts to “prime” the German 
economy for recovery before the introduction of Marshall Plan funds into Western Europe.  
While the remnants of the harsh peace proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau 
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 Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Came as a Conqueror: The United States Army’s Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967), 20. 
8
 John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968), xiii. 
7 
 
continued for several years, Backer argued that “most of the OMGUS staff was actively engaged 
in the reconstruction of the German economy from a starting point close to zero…”
9
  Other 
policies such as denazification and democratization remained important, according to Backer, 
but the overriding concern of military government elites was the revival of economic activity in 
Germany.  When JCS 1779 – which called for a “soft peace” towards Germany – replaced JCS 
1076 in July 1947 as official American policy very little actually changed in Germany, since 
Clay and his officials had actively worked for the reconstruction of the German economy since 
1945.  And when the Marshall Plan finally began pumping money into Western Europe, Backer 
contended that widespread recovery was possible because of the early efforts of American 
military government officials in priming the economic engine of Germany.   
In his preface, Backer writes that he sought to describe the reconstruction of the German 
economy “as observed from its working level.”
10
  Backer, in many ways, succeeds in his attempt.  
The examination of important agencies such as the Joint Export Import Agency highlighted some 
of the difficulties in priming defeated Germany’s economy.  Yet his study remains focused 
largely on the agencies and elites at the highest level of the American military government 
infrastructure and does not delve into the question of how occupation soldiers at the lowest levels 
of the military government hierarchy implemented that policy, approached issues like economic 
reconstruction, or interacted with the larger bureaucracy of military government. 
In American Policy and the Division of Germany Bruce Kuklick again examines the 
occupation through the lens of elite-level policy, with the focus on the role of American 
reparations policy in driving the division of Germany.  According to Kuklick, “a hostile and 
belligerent American attitude, on the one hand, and an unrealistic attitude, on the other, were 
                                                 
9
 John H. Backer, Priming the German Economy: American Occupational Policies, 1945-1948 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1971), 125. 
10
 Ibid., vii. 
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responsible for the partition of Germany and perhaps for the rigid division of Europe.”
11
  The 
United States refused Russia’s quite reasonable demands for reparations because many 
policymakers did not want the country to pick up the tab for Germany’s reparations and because 
economic issues like reparations were viewed as one the most important source of leverage over 
the Soviet Union.
12
  Kuklick’s work clearly belongs to the revisionist school on the origins of the 
Cold War.  However, he downplays the influence of events in Germany on American policy.  
The total destruction experienced by Clay and the Army worked its way back to Washington and 
convinced many that a punitive peace – which would be necessary to satisfy Russian reparations 
demands – would not work, even for a year or two.  Additionally, in trying to explain the 
division of Germany in 1949, Kuklick downplays to larger Cold War context.  One issue alone 
did not contribute to the division of Germany or the hardening of relations between the U.S. and 
the USSR. 
Edward Peterson’s work The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory also 
viewed the occupation from a policy perspective.  The occupation succeeded, Peterson argued, 
when the Americans transitioned from policies of “interference” to those of “noninterference.”  
Indeed, “the occupation worked when and where it allowed the Germans to govern 
themselves.”
13
  While Peterson remained focused on American policy, he did begin to move 
away from the elites of OMGUS by using a series of case studies to examine the implementation 
of policy in Bavaria.  In particular, he cast his attention on the military government detachments 
stationed in the Bavarian cities of Augsburg, Nuremberg, Friedberg, and Eichstätt.  He 
                                                 
11
 Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia Over Reparations (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 2. See also John H. Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1978). 
12
 Kuklick, American Policy, 135 & 137. 
13
 Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1977), 10. 
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concluded that Washington’s “personalities and institutions were ill adapted to deciding on a 
Germany policy”
14
; that American officials in Bavaria tried to follow historical tradition and let 
Bavarians do things their own way; and that at the local level a wide variety of approaches 
revealed the idiosyncrasies of trying to run an occupation with less than adequate training and 
local knowledge. Ultimately, Peterson argues that the occupation had little impact on Germany.  
There was significant continuity from the Weimar Republic and the occupation was soon 
“largely irrelevant to its goals.”
15
 This demonstrated a notable break from scholars like Zink, 
who had maintained that the United States exerted significant influence on postwar Germany.  
For Peterson, the American occupation was simply not that important.  Peterson looked beyond 
the upper echelons of OMGUS and examined local conditions and thus expanded the scope of 
the historiography for later historians.  Additionally, he signified a new development in the 
literature: a questioning of the American impact on Germany.  Yet policy remained the primary 
analytical framework of the historiography. 
Paul Gulgowski adopted a similar perspective to Peterson, arguing that military 
government, outside of General Clay’s office, was largely ineffective and beset by bureaucratic 
feuds. According to Gulgowski, the total picture was “one of rival authorities, conflicting 
objectives, lack of expertise, erroneous perceptions and inadequate intelligence” at all levels of 
the occupation. Policymakers in Washington quarreled amongst themselves, high-level OMGUS 
officials feuded with their Allied counterparts and regular Army commanders, and rivalries 
characterized the relationship between local military government and tactical commanders.
16
 
Gulgowski set out to capture military government’s relationship with American policy 
                                                 
14
 Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, 20. 
15
 Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, 339 & 350. 
16
 Paul W. Gulgowski, The American Military Government of United States Occupied Zones of Post World War II 
Germany in Relation to Policies Expressed by its Civilian Governmental Authorities at Home, During the Course of 
1944/45 Through 1949 (Frankfurt-am-Main: Haag und Herchen Verlag GmbH, 1983), 393-394. 
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throughout OMGUS. He largely succeeded at describing the policy debates among high-level 
American officials in both Washington and Germany, yet he did not adequately explore the 
relationship MGOs and other low-level bureaucrats possessed with U.S. policy. Instead, policy 
remained the purview of elites, particularly General Clay, and it was Clay alone who eventually 
altered American policy towards Germany. 
Elite-level policy debates remained the dominant framework for Carolyn Eisenberg’s 
Drawing the Line. Examining the decision-making process in Washington and at OMGUS 
headquarters in Germany, Eisenberg argued that that the division of German “was fundamentally 
an American decision.”
17
 Civilian officials, particularly those in the State Department, saw a 
reconstructed Germany as the key for the postwar recovery of Europe and the creation of a 
liberal international world order. At first these officials – individuals like Dean Acheson, Averell 
Harriman, and John Foster Dulles – hoped for a unified Germany and cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. However, as relations between the former allies deteriorated, Eisenberg explained, 
American policymakers embarked on the path that led to division, such as the fusion of the 
American and British zones, ending reparations shipments from West Germany, and insisting 
that the American position on German issues was nonnegotiable. General Lucius Clay and Army 
officials within military government initially resisted the push for division, believing that an 
agreement could be reached with the Soviets. Clay and military government, however, joined 
their civilian counterparts on the path towards division after the failure of the Moscow Council 
of Foreign Ministers in April 1947. Ultimately, Eisenberg argued, mounting fear of Soviet 
aggression and the pursuit of American interests, at least as articulated by these policymakers, 
led to the American decision to divide Germany. 
                                                 
17
 Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9. 
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Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, however, scholars challenged the focus on American 
policy debates and elite-centric narratives. Instead of solely focusing on U.S. policy, these 
writers explored the impact of the occupation on the politics, culture, and society of the Federal 
Republic. Such as perspective had long been a minor focus of the policy-centric literature, with 
many Americans arguing that the United States exercised significant influence, yet it was not the 
main focus of analysis. For this expanded focus, the fundamental question was whether the 
American occupation reinforced continuity from the Weimar era or forged significant change in 
Germany. In many ways, Edward Peterson bridged the gap between the policy-centric analysis 
and the new focus on the occupation’s impact. He saw significant continuity due to the 
ineffectiveness of American policy that did not recognize the limits of military government at the 
local levels of Germany. Army officials may have tried to influence Germany, but the limits of 
their power, and the strength of their German counterparts, prevented any notable change. 
In the field of reeducation and democratization, James Tent identified a similar 
phenomenon in his work Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-
Occupied Germany. According to Tent, the American embarked on an ambitious program of 
reeducation in an attempt to denazify and democratize their zone of occupation. The American 
effort, however, quickly floundered: 
Marked differences in educational traditions, the imperfect meshing of education 
functions with the military bureaucracy, a general lack of recognition…of the 
complexity, subtlety, and commitment that reorientation programs would require, 
and an underestimation of the diversity of needs and expectations within Germany 
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 James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 12. 
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As a result, conflicts between American occupiers and German educators erupted over a variety 
of reeducation programs, including the structure of the German educational system. The 
Americans saw the German system as insufficiently democratic and sought reforms borrowed 
from their own system of public education. German officials, intellectuals, newspapers, and the 
public defended their traditions and resisted the efforts at reform. Ultimately, the Americans did 
not fully “reeducate” the German populace, but settled for something akin to “reorientation.” In 
Tent’s analysis, then, the American impact on Germany, while greater than that described by 
Peterson, was limited. Some reforms occurred in the education system, such as free text books, 
but continuity largely ruled throughout the American zone. 
 For Rebecca Boehling, however, American actions in postwar Germany actively limited 
the prospects of democratic reform and encouraged continuity with pre-Nazi political 
institutions. In A Question of Priorities, Boehling described a fight between the efforts of 
reformers, both German and American, and the actions of local military government and German 
officials more concerned with restoring order and economic reconstruction. These stability-
minded officials pressed for material recovery and bureaucratic efficiency, which left little room 
for significant democratization. The American ban on political activity, the reliance on old 
Weimar politicians, the near-obsession with efficiency, and suspicion of left-wing political 
parties, Boehling argued, favored the reestablishment of the old political order and discouraged 
the participation of reform-minded Germans. These actions ultimately meshed with the growing 
anti-communism of American policymakers and closed the door on significant democratic 
reform. According to Boehling, “[The] U.S. military, the German bureaucratic emphasis on the 
restoration of order, and the political primacy of capitalist economic recovery obstructed the 
13 
 
depth and breadth of the process of genuine democratization that many Germans had hoped for 
after the defeat of Hitler.”
19
 
 While Boehling maintained that American occupation favored continuity, Diethelm 
Prowe argued that the impact of military government was to modify democratization, not to limit 
the process. In Prowe’s eyes, previous scholars underestimated that importance of “traditional 
German political-social forces in shaping West German democracy.” Political elites, therefore, 
sought a return to power, but they had to contend with American attitudes, ideas, and actions. As 
a result, conservative German leaders had to open their old power networks to labor, refugees, 
and new entrepreneurs. This form of democratization was not a simple “restoration” of old, 
undemocratic political elites, as disgruntled reformers insisted, but an American effort a 
democratic “restabilization.” Military government did not work against democracy, according to 
Prowe, they simply shaped it differently.
20
 
 More recently, Jennifer Fay also explored the process of democratization through the 
distribution of American-made films in Theaters of Occupation. According to Fay, military 
government officials saw Hollywood features and documentaries as a way to model democratic 
life. Reflecting academic scholarship at the time, occupation officials believed that democracy 
emerged from the national character of a society. Therefore, Germans would learn about 
democracy by watching American films. The 200-plus films shipped to Germany would not 
“teach democracy per se” but serve as “democratic, even ethnographic artifacts” that would 
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demonstrate an appropriately democratic worldview.
21
 Americans, Fay contended, then expected 
their German pupils to mimic the democratic practices supposedly on display in the films. Such 
mimicry would demonstrate the successful reeducation of German society.
22
 
 Authors like Tent, Boehling, Prowe, and other scholars of the democratization campaigns 
successfully moved the literature away from a narrow focus on policy debates and the actions of 
high-level military government officials. Their focus on the impact of American actions in 
Germany, whether in the form of continuity or reform, added a new perspective to the 
historiography that had been largely absent under the focus of policy-centric histories. Scholars 
like Zink did argue that the United States played a key role in the democratization of Germany, 
for example. Yet their analysis remained superficial due to the focus on the elites of the 
American military government infrastructure. However, the interpretations of this collection of 
historians remained incomplete. Their focus on democratization efforts and the transformation of 
German society was important, but such a perspective does not capture the full scope of 
occupation work by American officials at the lowest levels of the military government 
bureaucracy. These Americans addressed the crippling food crisis, how to approach local 
reconstruction, and the impact of rising Cold War tensions. Additionally, they faced the 
challenge of navigating a complex military institution, one that often complicated their local 
tasks. As a result, they interacted with multiple aspects of American policy and responded to 
these challenges in several different ways. Tent, Boehling, and Prowe make significant 
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contributions to the literature, but they do not fully capture military government officials’ full 
interaction with American policy during the occupation.
23
 
 In the last fifteen years, meanwhile, historians embraced social and cultural history to 
explore the occupation experience of “ordinary Germans” or to study relations between Germans 
and their American occupiers. For example, Giles MacDonogh’s After the Reich set out to 
examine the so-called “brutal history” of the Allied occupation.  While the Allies helped rid 
Germany of Adolf Hitler and his cronies, MacDonogh argued that they exacted a terrible price 
on the defeated German populace.
24
  Allied soldiers, particularly the Soviets, committed 
widespread rapes against German women; life in the zones of occupation was characterized by 
physical destruction, lack of food, and extreme hardship; and the Allies ruthlessly imposed a 
sense of collective guilt on all Germans.  MacDonogh’s work provided some interesting insights 
into the harsh environment Germans encountered after 1945 and the discussion of collective guilt 
was intriguing, but his work suffered from several notable flaws, namely a lack of archival 
research, an ignorance of the historiography, and equating the isolated incidents of violence 
committed by the western Allies with the systemic violence perpetrated by the Soviets.   
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The occupation experience of ordinary Germans also included their interactions with the 
American officers and soldiers that comprised the occupying army.  Several historians have 
recently explored this relationship, often through the lens of gender and social history. Perry 
Biddiscombe, for example, examined the anti-fraternization movement among German and 
Austrian men during the American occupation.  By and large, Biddiscombe argued, “the anti-
fraternization cause was largely a gender issue, deriving mainly from male jealousy and anxieties 
about sexual control.”
25
  The liberalization of sexual mores during the Nazi era and the 
widespread rape of German women by the Allied armies, in many ways, produced a sense of 
emasculation among German men and turned the family, as “the main surviving sociopolitical 
unit” in German society, into the site of the struggle over power and control.
26
 
While Biddiscombe focused more on German gender issues, Petra Goedde explored the 
cultural and gendered history of American-German relations during the occupation in her book 
GIs and Germans.  “Within the first year of the occupation,” she argued, “American soldiers 
developed a feminized and infantilized image of Germany” in which the United States served as 
the male protector.
27
  By 1947 this idea had worked its way up to American policymakers who 
saw Germans as the victim and the U.S. as the provider.
28
  This new relationship was reinforced 
by the Berlin Blockade and the subsequent airlift which “consolidated American images of 
themselves as providers and protectors of victimized Germans.”
29
  The Soviet threat, therefore, 
operated as a justification for the new relationship that had slowly emerged since May 1945. 
Goedde’s analysis focused on the bottom-up influence on American policy towards Germany, 
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namely the informal interactions between American GIs and German women and children. These 
interactions, she contends, reshaped the image of Germany from one of masculine aggression to 
feminine victimhood. This interpretation makes an important contribution to the literature, 
showing how occupation soldiers challenged basic tenants of American policy from the 
beginning of the occupation. What it does not explore, however, is how military government 
officials, those tasked with implementing US policy, also circumvented American policy towards 
Germany. 
Additionally, recent works have also examined the occupation experience for both 
American occupation troops and the displaced persons (DPs) living in postwar Germany. In The 
Good Occupation, Susan Carruthers challenged the popular memory of post-1945 occupations, 
including Germany, that dominate American society. Instead, of an occupation based on 
American benevolence, Carruthers argued that American soldiers and civilians alike expressed 
ambivalence to the Army, suffered occupation duty through the benefits of their status as 
conquerors, and generally thought the United States was losing the occupation at the time. Many 
GIs, Carruthers wrote, “regarded the military as a custodial institution that trapped reluctant 
inmates…and subjected them to myriad [sadistic] forms of regimentation.”
30
 To make life 
bearable, these soldiers fraternized (which was soon a euphemism for sexual activity) with the 
local women and engaged in black market activity, causing widespread concern about the morals 
of the U.S. Army from civilian commentators across the Atlantic. Additionally, Carruthers 
pushed back against the narrative of American altruism towards the country’s defeated enemies. 
Instead, the work of postwar occupation “was cast in deconstructive terms that emphasized 
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dismantling and disabling enemies.”
31
 It was only with the pressures of the Cold War and the 
“domestication” of the occupation – through the arrival of wives and children overseas – that 
ultimately erased the unpopular dimensions and turned the postwar occupations into the “good 
occupation.”  
Carruthers makes an important point about the complications surrounding America’s 
post-1945 military occupations; they were not as easy as historical memory and contemporary 
politicians like to portray. However, her analysis often lumps both regular Army soldiers into the 
same category as actual military government officials. While there were undoubtedly some 
similarities between their occupation experiences, it is important to recognize the differences 
between the two groups. Whereas regular Army GIs possessed few direct responsibilities in the 
occupation of Germany, for example, MGOs were responsible for numerous tasks, such as 
implementing American policy, that occupied much of their time and produced a significantly 
different occupation experience. Occupation officials, therefore, had a slightly different 
occupation experience and it is important to explore how these Americans interacted with the 
policies they were charged with implementing. 
The plight of displaced persons and ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe has 
also received significant attention from historians in recent years, further moving the 
historiography away from a narrow focus on elite-level policy. R.M. Douglas’ Orderly and 
Humane, for example, explored the expulsion of ethnic Germans immediately after the war from 
countries in Eastern Europe, notably Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The Allies, Douglas 
argued, approved the forced population transfers but made few provisions to ensure that the 
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deportations would be “orderly and humane,” as outlined in the Potsdam Agreement.
32
 In a 
similar vein, Adam R. Seipp examined the relationship between American occupation officials, 
DPs, ethnic German expellees, and the local population in the Bavarian town of Wildfleckn. The 
overall refugee crisis, Seipp argued, was central to American occupation policies. Additionally, 
the presence of non-German DPs served as a catalyst for the integration of ethnic Germans 
expellees into the local community.
33
 Finally, Anna Holian’s Between National Socialism and 
Soviet Communism explores how the multitudes of displaced persons in the American occupation 
zone – Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews – slowly formed their own communities to defend their 
common interests and competed with each other for the attention of U.S. military government 
officials. Jewish DPs, for example, sought American help to emigrate to the United States or 
Palestine. Meanwhile, the primary concern for many DPs from areas under Soviet control was to 
avoid repatriation, often for fear of being labeled a Nazi collaborator.
34
 Taken together, Douglas, 
Seipp, and Holian represent the recent trend of much occupation scholarship to move away from 




Scholars of the other postwar occupations, too, have embraced more comprehensive 
histories of the postwar period in Germany. Norman Naimark’s pioneering history of the Soviet 
occupation, for example, examined the occupation of eastern Germany from a variety of 
perspectives. Naimark explored the systemic sexual violence towards German women that 
accompanied Soviet occupation, the Soviet use of German science, and relations with left-wing 
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political parties. In doing so, he did not focus solely on policy questions and the elites within the 
Soviet military government establishment, although he addressed the formation of Soviet policy 
in their occupation zone. Instead, Naimark analyzed the occupation experience for both Soviet 
soldiers and German civilians, examining how the two populations interacted and shaped the 
nature of the occupation.
36
 
 These new focuses in the historiography have not, however, completely relegated the old 
emphasis on policy to the back burner. Some recent scholars have re-examined American policy 
in Germany through different perspectives. Bianka Adams, for example, explored the process of 
denazification in the Bremen Enclave.  Located deep within the British zone of occupation, 
officials from both occupying armies attempted to coordinate their different denazification 
policies which only produced “fits and starts” that “undermined the legitimacy of the program.”
37
  
Ultimately, deadlines and waning governmental support meant that most Germans were 
classified as benign “followers,” even if they did not deserve such a label.
38
 
 In a similar vein, Walter Hudson’s Army Diplomacy examines how the U.S. Army 
ultimately dominated postwar foreign policy, particularly in the first two years after the end of 
the Second World War. Hudson focuses less on the implementation of American policy and 
more on its creation. The Army, Hudson argued, developed a nascent approach to military 
occupations during the interwar era based on its experiences before World War II, especially 
from the experience occupying the Rhineland during the1920s. From this experience, Army 
leadership and officers created the doctrine, training, and organization necessary to carryout 
postwar occupations. This significant organization gave the Army notable advantages in the 
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bureaucratic struggles within the U.S. government to control postwar planning. As a result, the 
Army’s vision of the occupation won out, which emphasized “military necessity” – including 
restarting local economic activity – and the desire to return control to local civilians at the 
earliest practicable movement. The Army’s dominant position meant that the postwar 
occupations, including in Germany, reflected military-oriented approaches and that U.S. policy 
“would be refracted through the army’s understanding of postwar governance.”
39
 
 The work of Adams and Hudson demonstrate that policy perspectives still offer much to 
the literature on the occupation. Adams, for example, shows how the implementation of policy 
collided with the realities of overseeing an occupation with three other victorious powers. 
American military government officials in Bremen had to reconcile American denazification 
policy with the British approach, a task that complicated an already messy situation. Similarly, 
Hudson successfully demonstrates the long-term origins of American policy towards Germany. 
Whereas many historians examined the wartime debates over occupation planning within the 
federal government, Hudson argues that the Army developed its approach to military 
occupations over several decades of study, doctrinal development, and organizational reform. 
The policy perspective, then, still offers significant room for historians to examine the postwar 
occupation. 
Nevertheless, policy studies of the occupation have largely been dominated by top-down 
methodologies. Considering the Cold War context in which many of these authors wrote, such a 
focus is understandable.  Questions of policy were of paramount importance to historians who 
sought to understand the origins of the Soviet-American conflict or who examined the history of 
the new western alliance.  The works of scholars like Davis, Gimbel, and Eisenberg skillfully 
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traced the debates in Washington, Frankfurt, and Berlin that shaped American policy towards the 
country’s defeated enemy.  OMGUS officials were often frustrated by the lack of clear-cut 
guidance from their superiors in the United States, but, as Gimbel persuasively demonstrated, 
American actions in Germany reflected a wide variety of American interests – from denazifying 
German society and ensuring the reconstruction of Europe to the quest to keep down occupation-
related costs and halting the spread of communism in Central Europe. 
Yet these elite-centric policy approaches belie the importance of the individual soldiers, 
and their supporting infrastructure, who implemented policy on the ground. They obscure the 
intricacies and challenges associated with turning general statements of policy into the concrete 
action. These top-down histories also obscure the agency of the individuals that comprised the 
lower levels of military government. Such officials can easily be painted as individuals who 
simply carried out the wishes of their high-level superiors. To be sure, scholars of the American 
occupation have embarked on case studies that have either examined the totality of the 
occupation in a single locale – such as Gimbel’s work on Marburg
40
 – or explored the impact of 
certain policies on geographical regions of the American zone of occupation.
41
 Such works are 
important to understand how individual policies were implemented or how specific locales 
responded to American occupation. What they do not do, however, is capture the full complexity 
surrounding the implementation of U.S. policy in postwar Germany. A variety of factors 
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influenced how MGOs and their superiors approached the broad outlines of American policy in 
their former enemy. Widespread destruction, economic collapse, impending starvation, 
disagreements within the Army, and German actions all complicated the process of 
implementing American policy. Additionally, occupation officials often balanced multiple 
competing policies that often required contradictory actions. These factors shaped the actions of 
MGOs throughout Germany and influenced the degree to which they followed the dictates of 
civilian officials in Washington and military officials in Frankfurt or Berlin.  
While the elite-centric policy histories lost the humanity of lower-level occupation 
officials, the works of Boehling, Goedde, and Carruthers more successfully captured the 
occupation experience of the Americans involved. In the case of Boehling, military government 
officers focused their attention on immediate economic recovery and efficiency within the 
German bureaucracy. Demonstrating their agency, Boehling argued that these MGOs gravitated 
towards the German officials they were most comfortable with, namely “apolitical” experts and 
politicians from the Weimar-era center-right. Similarly, Goedde traced the growing 
rapprochement between the United States and Germans through interactions between the 
German population and the soldiers of the occupying army. Carruthers, too, captures the 
occupation experience for American GIs, particularly their boredom and ambivalence towards 
the American mission. These histories avoid the narrow focus on policy that dominated the early 
historiography of the occupation. Yet they are not without their faults. Often these bottom-up 
approaches to the occupation too easily conflate regular occupation soldiers with the American 
officials assigned to military government. While their experiences undoubtedly overlapped, 
MGOs, and not GIs, were directly responsible for the implementation of American policy. 
Additionally, one should not lose sight of the institutional context within which military 
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government officials worked. As Walter Hudson convincingly argued, “embedding such actors 
in institutions and bureaucracies provides context to their choices and very often shows how their 
choices are intensely constrained.”
42
 Military government officials worked within such an 
institution where structure and culture constrained their actions. Finally, the desire to avoid top-
down, policy-heavy histories can ignore how the implementation of policy in postwar Germany 
was often fraught with difficulties and challenged by Americans and Germans alike. 
The historiography of the American occupation, therefore, requires a work that bridges 
the gap between elite-centric policy studies and bottom-up examinations of the occupation 
experience. It needs a work that can move beyond questions of policy debates among 
policymakers to analyze the occupation from the lowest levels of military government. At the 
same time, such a work must not ignore the issue of policy. Instead, it should examine American 
policy from the perspective of those military government officials tasked with implementing it at 
the Kreis and Land levels in Germany. MGOs, working within the institutions of military 
government, faced significant challenges that complicated the implementation of American 
policy throughout the occupation, including economic collapse, limits on their authority, and 
even growing sympathy for their defeated enemy. The implementing process was complex, 
contentious, and fraught with starts and stops. Therefore, the literature of the U.S. occupation has 
room for a history that both moves away from the top-down policy framework while also 
recognizing the important role that policy played in the day-to-day responsibilities of the 
Americans who comprised the lowest levels of the major institution of occupation. 
Project Description 
 This dissertation aims to provide that work. It will broadly address several major 
questions: How did American military government officials, as part of the institution of OMGB, 
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respond to the challenges of the occupation? How did these individuals interact with American 
policy towards defeated Germany? And, finally, how did the challenges of postwar Germany 
shape that relationship with American policy? By exploring these questions, this dissertation will 
move beyond the elites at the head of civilian agencies in Washington, D.C. and at the top of the 
military government hierarchy in Germany. It will examine the history of the occupation from 
the perspective of the Americans at the lowest levels of military government, in the vein of 
recent scholars of the occupation. However, it will not relegate policy to the backburner. Instead, 
this dissertation aims to analyze how MGOs interacted with, challenged, and implemented key 
aspects of American policy towards Germany. It is important to reclaim the agency of military 
government officials at the bottom of the American hierarchy. Their position at the bottom rungs 
of large institutions limited their power, but they also did not mindlessly implement policy 
directives. They worked within the confines of their positions to modify American policy in 
response to the challenges that characterized postwar Germany. Overall, institutions and policy 
remain important perspectives to consider, but this dissertation will move away from the top-
down approach that has characterized much of the historiography. 
To reclaim the agency of these occupation officials and to provide a more well-rounded 
view of the occupation, this project will explore the occupation from a variety of levels of the 
American occupation of Bavaria, from OMGB headquarters in Munich to local military 
government offices in small farming communities. For these units and individuals, the broad 
outlines of American policy were important, but the problems of administering defeated 
Germany were even more so. Denazification sounded like a solid policy on paper, but the extent 
to which the Nazi Party pervaded pre-1945 German society meant it was often difficult to find 
qualified individuals who were not members of the party. Similarly, the democratization of 
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Germany appeared a worthwhile goal, yet the persistent food shortages and indifference of wide 
portions of the German populace posed several problems to military government detachments. 
Additionally, the early deconstructive tone of American policy sounded necessary after two 
world wars, but the threat of economic catastrophe provided and incentive towards 
reconstruction instead. These were just a few of the many issues that complicated the 
responsibilities of occupation officials at the lowest levels of the Army’s hierarchy. By focusing 
on the day-to-day problems facing the officials charged with implementing the occupation, this 
dissertation will examine the occupation from the perspective of OMGB officials beyond the 
policy-making circles and highlight how lower ranking military government officials took the 
broad policy guidance provided by their superiors and put it into action.  
 In order to gain such a perspective, this dissertation will focus on the records of military 
government units stationed in the German Land of Bavaria. Bavaria, the largest region of the 
American occupation zone, was in many ways unique from the rest of the US zone. Bavarian 
society was predominantly Catholic and Bavarian politics were traditionally suspicious of 
centralized government. Additionally, the region lacked the concentrated industry of the British 
zone and the large-scale agriculture of the Soviet zone. Nevertheless, the focus on Bavaria allows 
for significant insight into the American occupation experience. While the Land did not possess 
industry on the scale of the Ruhr Valley, it still held significant urban centers with major 
industry, such as Munich and Nuremberg, and smaller cities, like Schweinfurt and Regensburg, 
which were key industrial targets for American bombing raids during the war. The region also 
faced the same shortages of food and fuel that plagued the entirety of the occupation for several 
years. In addition, Bavaria was, in many respects, the birth place of National Socialism and 
therefore the American attempts to democratize Bavaria can provide valuable insight into the 
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day-to-day experience with the rather frustrating policy. Finally, Bavaria’s geographic location 
within Germany presented American occupation officials with significant challenges that were 
less notable in other portions of the zone. The Land, for example, was often the first stop for 
German expellees entering the US zone from Eastern Europe, in particular Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Additionally, Bavaria shared a significant border with Soviet-occupied territory, which 
presented its own series of problems for occupation officials as relations between the former 
allies deteriorated throughout the occupation. Bavaria, therefore, promises to offer valuable 
insight into how American officials implemented occupation policy at the lowest levels of 
military government.  
 By shifting the methodological focus away from civilian and military elites, this 
dissertation is not trying to downplay their importance in shaping American policy towards 
Germany. Civilians like John J. McCloy and Army generals such as Lucius Clay undoubtedly 
played major roles in crafting the U.S. approach to its former enemy and possessed the power 
and authority to change American policy. What this project does, however, is examine how 
military government officials reconciled policy directives with the conditions experienced at the 
local level. The multitude of challenges faced by MGOs at the local level shaped how they 
responded to the policies developed by their superiors. At times these Americans implemented 
the policies as directed, yet at other times they pushed back against policy directives and tried to 
mitigate the effects of a decision made in Washington or Berlin. Beyond the debates surrounding 
policy formation, it is important to understand the factors that shape the actual implementation of 




 At the same time, this project tries to avoid some of the pitfalls of more recent 
methodologies applied to the American occupation. Histories from the past twenty years have 
excelled at moving beyond the narrow scope of top-down policy debates. They examined the 
impact of the occupation on German society, analyzed the interactions between occupiers and 
occupied, and explored the experience of occupation for all involved. Such approaches are 
vitally important to a complete understanding of the occupation. However, questions of policy – 
particularly its implementation – often receive scant attention or are relegated to the background. 
In addition, many of these works too easily conflate the experiences of military government 
officials with American GIs. Early on there was often significant overlap between the two 
populations, but as the occupation continued that common ground disappeared. Soldiers in 
combat units may have been envisioned as “ambassadors” for the United States and played a key 
role through their interactions with the German populace, but it was the MGOs who oversaw the 
implementation of American policy and dealt with occupation problems on a day-to-day basis. 
Therefore, it is important to understand how the Americans assigned to specific occupation 
duties – and not all Americans in Germany – dealt with the challenges of administering their 
defeated foe.  
This project, therefore, aims to show how the institutions of the occupation implemented 
the decisions made in Washington, Frankfurt, and Berlin. It is the challenges faced by officers 
and soldiers outside the elite levels of the Army hierarchy in defeated Germany that this 
dissertation hopes to capture. These individuals and units faced the immense task of 
implementing American policy on the ground in the face of critical shortages of food and fuel, an 
apathetic and increasingly resentful German populace, the vacillating attention of the American 
public, and the rising tensions between the former wartime allies. The destruction in post-1945 
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Germany and the necessity of effective governance forced occupation soldiers to reconcile 
general policy directives from their superiors with the necessities of administering a defeated 
nation-state at the local level. This dissertation project will explore these problems, challenges, 
and crises experienced by soldiers and units tasked with occupation duty. It will examine the 
occupation at the grassroots by focusing on one of the most important regions of the American 
zone of occupation: Bavaria. Ultimately, Americans in Bavaria filtered U.S. policy through an 
increasingly pro-German lens. Interactions with Germans of all stripes and the challenges of 
governing postwar Bavaria led MGOs to challenge the punitive aspects of early American 
policy. Additionally, military government possessed definite boundaries in postwar Bavaria – 
imposed by American policy, the challenges of postwar Germany, and the actions of officials 
and civilians throughout the Land. These boundaries then constrained the actions available to 
Americans and limited the impact of military government officials from 1945 to 1949.  
Finally, this dissertation represents, in part, a bottom-up institutional history of American 
military government in Bavaria. It focuses on the official actions of military government officials 
in the German Land, including the response to the food crisis, how to revive the German 
economy, efforts at democratization, and dealing with the early Cold War. As such, the project 
explores how military government officials, particularly at the local levels in Bavaria, responded 
to the challenges of occupying a former enemy and a devastated nation-state. Additionally, it 
examines how the institutional structure of OMGB both reacted to the postwar problems 
plaguing Bavaria and shaped the actions of low-level military government officials. This 
institutional perspective remains important. Institutions influence the context within which 
individuals move, particularly those institutions like the military. As Walter Hudson explained, 
“to ignore or to downplay institutional or bureaucratic forces is to overrate significantly the 
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ability of policymakers to act as purely rational agents and thereby to singularly control historical 
events.”
43
 If institutions constrain high-level policymakers, it is also important to explore how 
they exert pressure upon the lower-level officials charged with carrying out policy and how those 
officials can shape the institution. In this case, the emerging Cold War reinforced the importance 
of studying the U.S. Army, OMGUS, and OMGB as institutions. Throughout the standoff 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the American military, along with other key 
institutions, supported American interests as “manifestations of the power of the state.”
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Therefore, studying the American occupation from a bottom-up perspective will provide insight 
into how the major U.S. institutions of the 1940s responded to the challenges of the immediate 
postwar era. 
Chapter Overview 
 To properly understand the enormity of the task facing American units as they began the 
occupation in May 1945, the first chapter of this dissertation – “Total War, Total Destruction” – 
will provide a rich description of the devastation that characterized much of postwar Germany.  
The destruction was truly immense. In many urban centers, up to three-quarters of the buildings 
were either totally destroyed or severely damaged. Ground combat between the Wehrmacht and 
the Allied armies contributed to the destruction, but it was the Combined Bomber Offensive of 
the Anglo-American air forces that turned German cities into ruins and crippled transportation 
throughout the country. This chapter will briefly survey the conduct of the Allies’ strategic 
bombing campaign during the war. By describing the process of bombing and the destruction of 
the German cities, this chapter will set the stage for the American occupation. Many of the most 
                                                 
43
 Hudson, Army Diplomacy, 25. 
44
 Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 
Center of Military History, 2015), xvii. See also Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History, vol. 1, The 




significant problems faced by occupation units, particularly the urban food shortages, the lack of 
fuel resources, and the shortage of transportation, were the direct result of the Allied bombing 
campaign.  The bombing also contributed to the widespread apathy among many Germans, 
which military government officials had to deal with throughout the occupation. Additionally, 
this introductory chapter will explore the contours of early American policy towards Germany. 
While there was significant policy confusion throughout 1944 and 1945, the general outline of 
American policy was to impose some kind of harsh peace on the country’s defeated enemy based 
on the assumption of collective German guilt.  
 After this introductory chapter, the dissertation will move on to its main focus through a 
series of thematic chapters that will explore the Army’s occupation from a number of 
perspectives. The second chapter – titled “An Occupation of Shortages” – will focus on one of 
the most pressing issues for the American occupation force from 1945 to 1949: the significant 
shortages of food that wracked Germany in the aftermath of the war. In the aftermath of the war 
a worldwide food shortage plagued the globe, but it was especially fierce in Germany. Urban 
centers were often dangerously low on food stocks, particularly in the first year of the occupation 
and after the fierce winter of 1947-1948; at times, rations were as low as 800-1000 calories daily. 
Meanwhile, the influx of German expellees exacerbated the problem, as the population of 
Bavaria swelled past its pre-war numbers despite the cost and destruction of war. This chapter 
will examine how occupation units in Bavaria sought to cope with this crisis. It argues that 
OMGB officials and MGOs challenged the basic framework of American policy through their 
growing sympathy to the plight of the German populace. It will examine what steps these 
officials took to alleviate the food crisis and how institutional forces constrained the available 
actions. The chapter will also delve into the struggle between the Americans and the Bavarians to 
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determine the severity of the postwar food crisis. Officials from both sides competed to define 
the severity of the crisis and to develop the best response to the shortages. 
 Bavaria, in particular, promises to offer interesting perspectives into these problems. As it 
pertained to food, Bavaria was the largest agricultural region of western Germany, not just the 
American zone. Yet it still faced significant food shortages, as wrecked transportation kept food 
from reaching its major cities. To make matters worse, the arrival of tens of thousands of ethnic 
German expellees in Bavaria from elsewhere in Europe only added to the problems faced by 
American occupation officials. This chapter, therefore, will examine these problems in Bavaria, 
while also highlighting the discrepancy between a rural population that often had enough to eat 
and an urban population that often faced starvation. 
 The third chapter – “Rebuilding Bavaria” – will then explore the problems associated 
with the attempts to rebuild the shattered German economy. There has been substantial work 
done on the American reconstruction of both Germany and Western Europe as a whole and 
American policy – both emanating from Washington and from OMGUS headquarters – formed 
the foundation of such works. Historians such as John Gimbel, John Backer, and Edward 
Peterson emphasized the importance of OMGUS and its institutional creations, such as the Joint 
Export Import Agency, and policy steps like the introduction of the new currency in June 1948 
as important steps in priming the German economy. These steps laid the foundation for the true 
recovery that occurred with the introduction of Marshall Plan funds. This chapter does not seek 
to disprove such an interpretation but traces the origin of American “priming” of the Bavarian 
economy back to the earliest days of the occupation. Military government officials in Bavaria, 
witnessing the devastation of the war and its effects on the postwar economy, promoted forms of 
economic reconstruction from the occupation’s first weeks. As with the food crises, MGOs 
33 
 
challenged official American policy in the name of pragmatism and restoring the basic outlines 
of the Bavarian economy. These officials faced the challenge of reconciling policy directives 
from OMGUS headquarters, inevitably devised for the overall situation in the American zone, 
with the economic reality that existed in Bavaria. Occupation officials assigned to the major 
economic branches of American military government undoubtedly faced an unenviable task in 
their attempts to kick start the German economy. Yet the officers and soldiers at the grassroots 
faced their own challenges related to the economic reconstruction of Germany and this chapter 
will explore how these Americans responded to them.  
 Ultimately, the issue of economic reconstruction demonstrates some of the clear limits on 
military government in Bavaria. Early in the occupation the broad outlines of American policy, 
focused as it was on a more punitive peace, limited the options available to military government 
officials to address the economic crisis. MGOs sought out methods to promote recovery and 
challenge the dominant American policies, but the nature of those policies limited their options. 
Beyond that, however, American actions often exacerbated the economic problems plaguing 
Bavaria, while the determination to transfer responsibility to their German counterparts as 
rapidly as possible checked the reach of American officials. Even after policy changed, the limits 
remained for the rest of the occupation. Military government officers possessed few direct 
methods to spur economic recovery. Instead, they relied on indirect methods, such as reporting 
and persuasion, to rebuild Bavaria. Such actions proved important, but the quest for economic 
reconstruction clearly highlighted the boundaries on American military government throughout 
the occupation. 
 The fourth chapter of this dissertation – “Importing America: Reorientation and 
Democratization in Bavaria” – will address the efforts at denazification and reorientation, or 
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democratization, at local levels in Bavaria. Denazification was an important aspect of this 
process, but this chapter will focus on the more positive methods used by military government 
officials to democratize Bavaria. During the early stages of the occupation one of the most 
important aspects of democratization, at least from the American perspective, was military 
government’s youth program, German Youth Activities. Through GYA military government 
officials challenged the assumption of collective German guilt that animated early American 
policy in the country. The youth program also offered a testing ground for the major ideas and 
practices that would characterize the broader reorientation program in 1948 and 1949. By the 
time military government embarked on a full-scale democratization program in 1948 American 
policy towards Germany had embraced full-blown recovery. As a result, military government 
officials did not challenge official policy regarding reorientation to the degree they had during 
the food and economic crises of the first years of the occupation. Instead, MGOs in Bavaria 
implemented their own vision of democratization: a campaign of political modernization in 
which the Americans would tutor their inexperienced, backward German pupils. It was in the 
field of democratization that American officials most significantly abandoned their practice of 
noninterference in Bavarian affairs. This is not to say that MGOs directly controlled all aspects 
of the reorientation program; on the contrary, German officials played a key role. Instead, the 
importance placed on the program meant that American officials were more willing to take a 
more direct role in efforts to democratize the German populace than they were in their attempts 
to solve the food crises or revive economic activity in Bavaria. 
 The final chapter of this dissertation – “The Occupation in the Early Cold War” – will 
examine how OMGB officials and MGOs dealt with the deteriorating relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union and the perceived threat of communism to Bavaria. Unlike 
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the response of Americans in Bavaria to the food and economic crises of the early occupation, 
occupation officials largely reflected the attitudes of military government policymakers towards 
the Soviet Union and communism. While relations with the Soviets remained relatively cordial 
during the first half of the occupation there was little concern about the threat of communism in 
Bavaria. Instead, MGOs focused their concerns on other issues, especially the lingering influence 
of Nazism in Bavarian society. As relations deteriorated between the former allies and 
policymakers in OMGUS adopted a more antagonistic approach to the Soviet Union, however, 
military government officials in Bavaria saw communism as an increasing threat. Nevertheless, 
these MGOs retained some of the independence from policymakers that they had demonstrated 
in dealing with the food shortages and economic stagnation. Although American officials in 
Bavaria increasingly embraced anticommunism, they recognized the limited threat posed by 
communists in the conservative Land and remained focused on the threat of a Nazi revival. In 
addition, the early Cold War was a remote phenomenon for most MGOs in Bavaria. Ensconced 
in their local offices, the policy debates and crises that characterized the conflict were remote 
affairs that possessed limits direct influence on their day-to-day responsibilities as occupation 
officials. 
Conclusion 
 In the last thirty years historians have strove to reclaim the agency of individuals long 
obscured by the conflicts, social processes, and elites that shape the world and dominated written 
history. The result is social, cultural, religious, racial, political, and military histories which 
recognize the importance of previously unheralded people or groups on the major events, 
movements, and processes of global history. Additionally, recent works delve into the 
experiences of non-elites and try to view history from the bottom-up. Within military history this 
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trend has produced many different works, from popular histories about individual units in 
conflict to scholarly works that examine how combat affected American soldiers. 
 In part, this dissertation operates within that framework. It will highlight the roles played 
by occupation officials at the bottom of the military government bureaucracy, examining how 
these Americans worked within the institution framework of the occupation and implemented 
policy in Bavaria. By doing so, this project will contribute to both the scholarly literature on the 
occupation and, hopefully, provide a broader context in which non-academics view the 
occupation. The ultimate success of the occupation can obscure the challenges faced by the 
American officials tasked with implementing US policy. In an era where nation-building remains 
an important aspect of American foreign policy, it is vital to accurately understand the full scope 
of the occupation experience, not to rely on simplistic arguments that the United States 
succeeded in Germany and can therefore easily succeed in other such efforts. 
Within the field of occupation literature, along with the broader World War II and early 
Cold War historiography, this dissertation will fill an important gap within the historiography. 
Elite-centric policy histories, while fundamentally important, also obscure the agency of the low-
level officials tasked with implementing the occupation. Some policy historians like Edward 
Peterson worked to include the bottom-up perspective, but it remained a tangential part of their 
scholarship. Similarly, case studies and histories of individual policies have explored 
implementation, but have not always placed their analysis within the context of other occupation 
policies. Other historians like Petra Goedde have notably moved away from the policy 
framework. Goedde’s emphasis on cultural interactions and gendered images of postwar 
Germany demonstrated how informal relationships between American GIs and German civilians, 
especially women and children, slowly reshaped American policy towards Germany. What is 
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largely absent from Goedde’s work, however, is an analysis of how officials within military 
government itself worked within and challenged the dominant strand of American policy during 
the occupation. American soldiers and their informal interactions with the German populace 
were undoubtedly important in reshaping American attitudes, yet these were individuals outside 
the bureaucracy of military government. The actions of military government officials, tasked 
with implementing US policy, are just as important. 
This dissertation will address this important gap in the historiography. It moves away 
from the elite perspective and explores how military government officials in Bavaria interacted 
with and implemented American policy at the lowest levels of the occupation bureaucracy. As 
such, it argues that these OMGB officials and MGOs, in the first eighteen to twenty-four months 
of the occupation, challenged basic tenants of American policy towards Germany due to their 
growing sympathy for the plight of the Bavarian populace. In addition, it explores how American 
occupation officials in Bavaria responded to the challenges of postwar Bavaria, how they 
interacted with the higher levels of the military government bureaucracy, and how these 
individuals responded to the coming of the Cold War. These military government officers, from 
OMGB headquarters to the local offices in small farming communities, played a key role in 
achieving a successful occupation. While the long-term American presence in Europe and the 
actions of the Germans themselves were major factors, the persistence and adaptability of these 
officials in Bavaria contributed to the creation of a stable, democratic Germany. 
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Chapter 1: Total War, Total Destruction 
 
“Morale has reach a new low such as has not been observed since the outbreak of the 
war…Among the masses sayings are common such as: ‘The wage has gotten off the track. It got 
stuck in the dirt.’ ‘One ought to make an end, for it cannot become worse than it is now’…The 
air terror continues to be the crux in the holding of morale…” 
- German Intelligence Report, Munich, March 19441 
 
“Germany today is a country without cities. The countryside is practically untouched and in 
many spots as picturesque as ever. But in a physical and to a large degree psychological sense, 
the cities no longer exist.” 
- Julian Bach, 19462 
 
 The Germany encountered by American occupation units beginning in the late spring and 
early summer of 1945 was, in many ways, a hollowed-out shell of a nation-state, gutted and 
burned by six years of war. Within the ruins of cities like Berlin, Munich, and Nuremberg, 
American GIs stood face-to-face with the effects of modern total war: unprecedented piles of 
rubble, an economy at a standstill, nonexistent government, and a population beleaguered by six 
years of bombing and by months of fighting during the final death throes of the Third Reich. For 
many Americans on the ground in Germany the magnitude of destruction represented the 
defining physical characteristic of the defeated country for many months. A small industry even 
emerged for officers and soldiers to share the devastation with friends and family back in the 
United States. In Berlin, for example, postcards showing the damage to many famous city 
monuments and buildings such as the Reichstag were available for purchase.
3
 These postcards 
highlighted the challenges faced by these American officers and soldiers, even as they shared the 
destruction with their families back in the United States. The effects of total war, including 
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widespread destruction, would exacerbate the task of administering and rebuilding a ravaged 
nation-state.  
 Germans, meanwhile, struggled to cope with the effects of modern total war. Hundreds of 
thousands suffered through food and housing shortages. A massive coal shortage meant long, 
cold winters for the few living in undamaged buildings. Years of bombing produced an 
increasingly apathetic populace. For those who survived the war the quest for survival dominated 
all other concerns, making them largely ambivalent towards attempts at democratization and 
other occupation policies. Ruins dominated the German landscape, despite rural areas largely 
escaping bombing until the last months of the war. “The sign of our times is the ruins,” wrote 




 American occupation officials in Bavaria faced a series of monumental tasks in providing 
food, fuel, and shelter for the German populace; restarting economic life; reorientating and 
democratizing German society; and combating communism within the framework of the early 
Cold War. The enormity of the destruction in Germany after 1945 exacerbated these difficulties. 
In the less urbanized region of Bavaria, American officials still faced great challenges. The war 
brought unparalleled devastation to German people, infrastructure, and cities. Ground combat 
during the last months of the war contributed to the destruction, but it was the strategic bombing 
offensive of the Anglo-American Allies which turned Germany into a nation of ruins. German 
civilians emerged from the war psychologically distraught and numb from years living under the 
bombs. A profound sense of fatalism dominated both during and after the war. Many Germans 
concerned themselves with mere survival. Additionally, Allied bombs ravaged Germany’s 
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infrastructure, particularly the German national railroad, the Reichsbahn. Deprived of coal and 
transportation, economic life collapsed. The scenes of apocalyptic devastation in German cities 
made matters worse. Cleanup of rubble diverted resources away from other activities such as the 
distribution of food. Meanwhile, the loss of housing provided its own challenges, from Germans’ 
quest for survival to where to house the ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. All of 
these problems exacerbated the already monumental tasks faced by American occupation 
officials from 1945 to 1949. 
 Initial American policy towards their defeated enemy also posed a threat to the German 
population and a challenge to military government officials in Bavaria. Official planning for a 
postwar occupation was uncoordinated and competing government agencies offered different 
visions of what Germany should look like after the war. Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau offered perhaps the most famous, or infamous, proposal: the pastoralization of 
Germany. Convinced that German society was irredeemably militarized, Morgenthau called for 
the total deindustrialization of the country to prevent Germany from ever again waging 
aggressive war. Morgenthau’s ideas achieved a period of predominance before the end of the war 
before the Army and War Department beat them back. American policy, however, still 
envisioned a harsh peace, one that could exacerbate the problems already plaguing postwar 
Germany. 
This chapter, then, explores the devastation that characterized Germany at the beginning 
of the occupation. The Allied bombing campaign, along with ground combat, produced 
widespread physical destruction, which became the defining visual characteristic of postwar 
Germany. The devastation of total war, combined with the broad outlines of a harsh American 
policy, produced major challenges for the American military government officials tasked with 
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overseeing the occupation. It was within this context that many MGOs grew sympathetic towards 
the Bavarian population. Living amidst the ruins of a defeated nation-state, these American 
officials experienced the plight of German civilians and saw first-hand the potential 
consequences of a harsh peace. 
The Combined Bomber Offensive 
 For the first three years of the war Allied bombing against German targets proceeded in 
fits and starts. The British first tried daylight bombing, but their losses proved unsustainable. As 
a result, during 1942 the British unabashedly adopted area bombing, with the state objective of 
attacking the morale of enemy civilians. Arthur Harris, the new head of Bomber Command, 
proved a vocal advocate for the widespread destruction of German cities. In addition, a series of 
operational reforms allowed British bombers to drastically increase the tonnage of bombs 
dropped on Germany. New navigational devices and the introduction of pathfinder units made 
the task of finding enemy cities at night more manageable. Coupled with increased production of 
new heavy bombers, this allowed Bomber Command to contemplate, for the first time, the true 
annihilation of cities throughout Germany. The first thousand bomber raids in 1942, made by 
cobbling together every available bomber in the RAF, also presaged the destruction to be 
unleashed during the last year of the war. At the same time the U.S. Army Air Corps prepared 
for a campaign of daylight bombing against German industrial targets. Nevertheless, the 
bombing campaign remained largely haphazard and had yet to make any significant contribution 
to the war effort. 
In January 1943, American and British military leaders met in Casablanca to plan the 
next stage of the war against Nazi Germany. While Bomber Command had continued to perfect 
the science of city bombing and the American Eighth Air Force made its first forays against 
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fortress Europe, no semblance of a strategy guided the Allied bombing campaign. At Casablanca, 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued its first guiding directive to the Allied air commanders. 
According to the CCS, the primary objective of what became known as the Combined Bomber 
Offensive would “be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 
industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a 
point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”
5
 The dual goals of the 
strategic bombing offensive transformed the differing doctrines of the western Allies from a 
potential source of conflict into a source of virtue. Now Allied bombers would attack Germany 
around the clock, never providing German defenses and civilians with a respite from attack. Yet 
at the same time the disparate approaches of the RAF and USAAF threatened to produce 




 With the largest number of available heavy bombers in early 1943 – 515 in January – 
Bomber Command was the first to escalate its air campaign. Throughout the year Arthur Harris 
launched a series of “battles” against German cities with the goal, once again, of wrecking the 
morale of the civilian population. The Ruhr industrial region was the first target of Bomber 
Command’s wrath. From March to July 1943 the British launched 43 major attacks against the 
cities of the Ruhr totaling some 18,506 sorties. German cities suffered heavily under the weight 
of the British bombs; in two major raids Cologne received 2,200 tons of bombs, while 
Düsseldorf absorbed almost 4,000 tons in the same number of attacks.
7
 However, Bomber 
Command’s losses were slowly rising as the German night defense became ever more capable. 
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By the end of July, British losses in the so-called Battle of the Ruhr reached 872 bombers 
destroyed and 2,126 damaged – a loss rate of 4.7 percent.
8
 
 Then during the last week of July Bomber Command achieved perhaps its most morbid 
success of the entire war. In an operation codenamed “Gomorrah” by Harris, the British 
conducted a series of area raids from July 24 to August 3 against the northern city of Hamburg 
and the Americans added daylight attacks on the city’s shipyards. Over the course of the 
operation some 3,091 sorties were flown against the city, dropping an astounding total of 8,344 
tons of bombs. The culmination of the operation, however, arrived on night of July 27/28, 1943. 
Nearly 800 British bombers attacked the built-up center of the German town with incendiaries 
and blockbuster bombs to knock down any walls that might inhibit the spread of fire. The heavy 
concentration of the bombing combined with unseasonably dry weather and heavy winds to 
produce the first manmade firestorm of the war. Winds raged up to 150 miles per hour and 
fanned a fire that reached nearly 1,500°F. The raid ultimately incinerated nearly eight square 
miles of the city and killed over 40,000 German civilians. 
 At Hamburg the British, in conjunction with particular environmental circumstances, had 
nearly perfected the entire weapon system that was strategic bombing. The weapon was “not just 
a single type of aircraft, but an entire suite of planes, armaments, and bombs.”
9
 British planners 
worked on the “science” of fireraising, including the right mixture of blockbusters and 
incendiaries to create as much destruction as possible, and Bomber Command became quite 
adept at quickly destroying the heavily populated centers of German cities. More importantly, 
Hamburg represented a change, at least in part, of the rationale for area bombing. No longer were 
civilian casualties a byproduct of attempts to destroy morale. Harris now sought victory by 
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“destroying the people manning the forge” and not through a psychological shock but “through 
sustained attrition of their habitats and lives.”
10
 The line between civilian and military targets, 
already blurred by total war, became even harder to discern as Bomber Command increased the 
tempo of its area raids. 
 Buoyed by the success of the raids against Hamburg, Harris decided to launch what he 
hoped would be a decisive “Battle of Berlin.” From November 1943 to March 1944 nearly half 
of Bomber Command’s major raids – 16 of 35 – were launched against the German capital in an 
attempt to knock Germany out of the war. The British, however, could not replicate Hamburg in 
Berlin and by the end of the “battle” Bomber Command had lost 1,047 bombers in the raids 
against the German capital – a loss rate of 5.2%. The Luftwaffe’s night defenses were now 
inflicting almost unsustainable losses on the British heavy bombers. German air controllers 
learned to see through Bomber Command’s feints and night fighters now contained equipment to 
track British airborne radar. The technological edge possessed by the RAF at the start of 1943 
was now nonexistent and the result was the near defeat of Bomber Command. The British 
bombers “had smashed much of Germany’s cities to rubble, and damaged the enemy war effort. 
But it had not even come close to wrecking the German economy or morale. Instead, the attempt 
to evade German defenses under cover of darkness ended in failure.”
11
 
 While Bomber Command razed German cities at night, the U.S. Eighth Air Force finally 
began major raids over Germany during the summer of 1943. From November 1942 to March 
1943 the Eighth sent out over 100 bombers on raids just twice and in February had only an 
average of 74 planes and crews ready for operations.
12
 By the summer the Americans had 
reached enough strength to launch their first deep-penetration raids into Germany. On August 17 
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376 B-17 Flying Fortresses lifted off from their bases in Britain to attack the ball-bearing plant at 
Schweinfurt and the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg. Although considerable damage was 
inflicted at Regensburg, the strike force suffered such heavy losses – 60 bombers out of 376 lost 
in action plus many more injured – that the Eighth could not follow launch follow up raids. A 
second raid on Schweinfurt in October proved even costlier and brought American morale 
dangerously low. Its attempts at unescorted deep-penetration raids a failure, the Eighth Air Force 
would not venture far into Germany again without fighter escort.
13
 In addition, the near disasters 
of the 1943 provided another lesson: it appeared “that sometimes urban area raids could be more 
fruitful and a lot less costly than precision attacks.”
14
 Beginning in the fall of 1943 American 
bombers were directed to use radar to attack targets important to the Luftwaffe whenever 
weather made precision bombing impossible. While military targets remained the objective, 
American planners were, at the least, signaling less concern for civilian casualties by approving 
the use of less accurate radar bombing. 
 During the winter months, the Eighth Air Force continued to recuperate from its earlier 
failures and by February 1944 was again ready to launch raids deep into Germany. General 
Jimmy Doolittle, the new commander of the American strategic bombers, approved new tactics 
to take advantage of the new P-51 fighters arriving in Europe and the extended range of the P-
47s and P-38s. Fighters would now sweep ahead of the bombers, attacking any German fighters 
they saw and strafing any airfields they came across. The Eighth implemented these new tactics 
during “Big Week” in February. American and British bombers dropped a combined 19,000 tons 
of bombs in one week, including 4,000 on aircraft plants. The real value of the week, however, 
was the destruction of German planes and pilots in the air. Forced to defend its production, the 
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Luftwaffe was ravaged by the Allied fighters sweeping ahead of the bomber formations. As 
Michael Sherry observed, “now the bombing was a prod to engage the Luftwaffe, the bombers 
themselves bait to lure it into combat.”
15
 The new tactics, combined with continued attacks on 
German aircraft production, gave the Allies air superiority over Europe by May 1944. On the 
ground, Germany was now “helpless in the face of the force in the sky.”
16
 
 By late spring the Allied air forces were poised to take advantage of their newfound air 
superiority. Combined, the Americans and British possessed over 4,000 heavy bombers – 1,023 
in Bomber Command and 4,085 divided between the Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air 
Force in Italy.
17
 This bombing force capable of raining down 100,000 tons of bombs per month, 
however, was not immediately directed against Germany. Instead, the Allied bombers came 
under the direct control of General Dwight Eisenhower in preparation for the upcoming invasion 
of occupied France. A fierce debate raged within Allied headquarters over the proper use of the 
heavy bombers. American airmen under General Carl Spaatz insisted that German oil production 
should be the primary target; this would immobilize German armor and bring the German 
economy to a halt. Arthur Harris, as usual, preferred to continue the systematic destruction of 
German cities. Air Marshal Tedder and his analyst Solly Zuckerman, however, proposed a 
coordinated attack on transportation targets in France, Belgium, and part of western Germany to 
isolate northwestern France from German reinforcements. Spaatz adamantly opposed the 
Tedder/Zuckerman plan as a diversion of resources from a potentially decisive offensive against 
oil. Nevertheless, Eisenhower sided with his deputy and gave primacy to transportation targets; 
he did, however, leave room for Spaatz to launch raids against German oil at the same time. 
                                                 
15
 Sherry, Rise of American Air Power, 164. 
16
 Friedrich, The Fire, 89. 
17
 Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945: Allied Air Power and the 
German National Railway (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 67. 
47 
 
 As a result of the transportation plan, Allied bombers were largely diverted away from 
Germany in the weeks before and after the Normandy invasion. From June through August, just 
one-third of American bombs and one-sixth of British bombs fell on Germany itself and 
American raids were largely directed against oil and fuel production.
18
 The D-Day invasion and 
the original transportation plan, then, provided something of a respite for German civilians and 
cities. This relative calm would not last, however. Based on the success of the attacks against 
transportation targets in occupied Europe, particularly marshalling yards, Allied planners readied 
similar strikes against Germany. Additionally, the rapid retreat of the German armies in France 
brought Allied armies to the door of the Reich and meant that American and British bombers 
were now free to focus the entirety of their destructive power against Germany. The phase of 
apocalyptic bombing was about to arrive. 
Apocalyptic Bombing: September 1944 to Surrender 
 Although Allied bombers, particularly from Bomber Command, had brought significant 
devastation to Germany already, the widest levels of destruction came from the fall of 1944 to 
surrender in May 1945. The rapid advance of American and British armies across France in the 
summer of 1944 left Allied airmen free to focus their efforts on Germany, both in support of 
ground forces and as part of an intensified strategic bombing campaign; Germany was now 
effectively the sole focus of Allied bombers and the destruction rained down from the skies 
testified to this new phase of the war. Indeed, of all the tons of bombs dropped on Germany itself 
during the war, an overwhelming majority, 72 percent, were visited upon the country after July 
1, 1944.
19
 The astounding weight of bombs was made possible by overwhelming Allied air 
superiority, as thousands of bombers roamed the skies above Germany at will. By the end of the 
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war Bomber Command and the American air forces had piled up unprecedented levels of rubble 
and helped bring life in Germany to a halt. American occupation officials would then be forced 
to grapple with the effects of total war. 
 The oil offensive of General Spaatz and the American Eight and Fifteenth air forces 
continued throughout the fall of 1944, but it was the rising importance of transportation targets 
that ensured widespread destruction. In July and August of 1944 an average of 2,400 tons of 
bombs were dropped on transportation in Germany.
20
 Field Marshal Tedder played a key role in 
prioritizing German transportation. Tedder emphasized the destruction of marshalling yards, but 
also called for attacks on interior water transport and important rail viaducts. The bureaucratic 
skill of Tedder, combined with his good relationships with senior Allied commanders like 
Eisehower, shepherded transportation up the priority target list.
21
 While Tedder worked to 
prioritize a German transportation plan, bad weather during the late fall ensured that American 
bombers would focus transport targets. Following well-established policy, U.S. bombers used 
radar to attack targets like marshalling yards on days when bad weather prohibited precision 
raids and during the fall there was plenty of bad weather. From October through December a 
staggering 80 percent of the Eighth Air Force’s bombing was conducted via radar.
22
 As a result, 
the tonnage dropped on German transportation skyrocketed. In October alone, nearly 35,000 tons 
of bombs were dropped on transportation targets, including 18,844 tons by the Eighth Air Force 
and 4,657 tons by the Fifteenth Air Force. From November 1944 through January 1945 an 
astounding 102,796 tons were dropped on the German transportation system, particularly 
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 As will be discussed later, this mounting tonnage soon crippled the German 
railroad system and would bring economic life in Germany to a standstill. 
 Meanwhile, the British continued to pile up rubble in German cities. Arthur Harris, 
reluctant to abandon the systematic destruction of German urban areas, begrudgingly agreed to 
shift the aiming point of area raids to marshalling yards and other transportation targets. 
Regardless of the theoretical objective, Harris still hoped that area bombing would crush German 
morale. On October 13, 1944, Harris issued a directive for Operation Hurricane, a new campaign 
against the Ruhr. “In order to demonstrate to the enemy in Germany generally the overwhelming 
superiority of the Allied Air Forces in this theatre,” Harris explained, “the intention is to apply 
within the shortest practical period the maximum effort…against objectives in the densely 
populated Ruhr.”
24
 Harris’s directive launched the “Second Battle of the Ruhr,” another blitz 
against cities in Germany’s largest industrial region. During this major effort, the Ruhr was 
wrecked by 60,000 tons of bombs. Essen was attacked by 1,055 bombers on the night of October 
23-24 and by another 771 on October 25. Meanwhile, Duisburg absorbed 9,000 tons of bombs in 
a twenty-four-hour period.
25
 Despite this overwhelming onslaught and the growing American 
attacks, however, the war would continue for several more months. 
 After the turn of the calendar the rain of bombs got even heavier and, significantly, 
American air commanders increasingly flirted with idea of area bombing. The sheer size of the 
Allied bomber fleets brought an unprecedented level of destructive power into the skies above 
Germany. By early 1945 the Allies possessed a total of 10,000 available aircraft. Then on 
February 22 a total of 9,788 planes sortied against German targets; one day later another 8,400 
planes sought targets in Germany. As German historian Jörg Friedrich observed, “Nothing in war 
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The overwhelming power of these air fleets drove some American commanders to search 
for ways to end the long war with an aerial Todestoss (deathblow) in Germany, as envisioned in 
their prewar plans. The urge to end the war with a single strike against German morale became 
nearly irresistible. After all, the United States now had a major army in the field, one which had 
suffered significant casualties during the Battle of the Bulge. In many ways, “Protection of that 
army was an ethics in itself. It demanded that the air forces break the civilian will to resist in the 
hinterlands of a stormed land front. That saved bloodshed; it was humane.”
27
  
The result was a series of raids that looked much like area attacks, even though the 
proclaimed targets, at least for the Americans, were considered legitimate military targets. The 
month of February, in particular, saw three different raids that brought American air forces 
dangerously close to the British policy of area bombing in the hope of ending the war by 
breaking German morale. In Operation Thunderclap, a major attack against Berlin on February 3, 
Allied air planners hoped that one large attack on the German capital might finally break civilian 
morale. While British planes attacked at night, American bombers sortied during the day. 
General Doolittle, commander of the Eighth Air Force, did not adopt a true policy of area 
bombing, however; American crews still aimed at transportation targets in the city, not just the 
city center.
28
 Then from February 13 through 15 the Allied air forces launched one of the most 
infamous campaigns of the air war against Dresden. British bombers struck the previously un-
bombed city center at night, causing a major firestorm. American planes then attacked 
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transportation targets during the day, but the smoke from the fires made bombing horribly 
inaccurate. Killing some 25,000 German civilians, the Dresden raids were the product of what 
one historian has called “casual destructiveness.”
29
 
The final major offensive of February aimed, at least indirectly, at German morale was 
Operation Clarion. Spread over February 22 and 23, these raids attacked transportation targets 
throughout Germany, including in small, un-bombed towns that were quickly leveled by one or 
two visits from Allied bombers. American planes attacked marshalling yards, stations, bridges, 
and other transportation targets in small towns all over Germany. In addition to paralyzing 
German transport, Clarion was the last grasp for an aerial deathblow by some American 
commanders. It was hoped that bringing the air war to towns that had been previously spared 
would finally crack German morale. “With so much firepower available,” historian Ronald 
Schaffer observed, “it was easier to believe that morale bombing had failed earlier simply 
because it had not been conducted on a large enough and sufficiently widespread scale.”
30
 
Over the last four months of the war the Allied air forces unleashed overwhelming 
destructive power against Germany. From January to surrender on May 7, a total of 370,000 tons 
of bombs fell from Allied planes. In addition, bombing killed at least 130,000 people – an 
average of 1,023 per day – over the last four months of the war, compared to 127 a day during 
1944.
31
 During the final phase of Allied bombing, from September 1944 to May 1945, Allied 
aircraft, along with the effects of ground combat, turned an already damaged Germany into a 
wasteland of devastation. Under Arthur Harris the British unabashedly continued area bombing, 
even if the aiming point was different. The Americans, meanwhile, flirted with the distinction 
between precision and terror attacks. The search for an aerial deathblow combined with radar 
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bombing and the growing attacks on transportation ensured that German civilian casualties 
would rise.  
For the Germans themselves, the last months of the war were characterized by extreme 
violence, shock, and trauma. The overwhelming onslaught of Allied bombers played a key role 
in this trauma, but it also encompassed the experience of ground combat. More than one-quarter 
of German military losses in the Second World War came in 1945, the vast majority of which 
occurred as a result of fighting on German soil. Nazi leaders hoped for one final struggle that 
would either win the war or serve as a rallying cry for future generations. Hitler, therefore, 
committed the Wehrmacht to combat that served little practical purpose. As historian Richard 
Bessel observed, “The essence of Nazism had overwhelmed the ethos of the German military. 
The Wehrmacht no longer existed to win military victories but instead to sacrifice its soldiers in 
an apocalyptic final struggle.”
32
 Ground combat ultimately exacerbated the urban destruction 
unleashed by the fleets of Allied planes. Obsessed with the final struggle, Hitler declared 
numerous cities “fortresses” to be held at all costs. In Breslau, for example, 40,000 to 50,000 
poorly-trained Germans, in an exercise of futility, were ordered to defend the city against thirteen 
Soviet divisions. The resulting fighting destroyed two-thirds of the city, leveled 20,000 houses, 
and killed 16,000 Germans. Such stubbornness produced the most violent months of the war, an 
extreme violence that almost all occurred within Germany itself.
33
 Coupled with the increasing 
destructiveness of Allied bombing, the final months of the war devastated Germany and turned 
its cities into giant piles of rubble. 
Germany under the Bombs: The Devastation of Strategic Bombing 
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 The devastation unleashed by total war, and bombing in particular, had a number of 
important effects on Germany, all of which would play a key role in the American occupation. 
Bombing, obviously, exerted a considerable influence on the German population. Although 
civilian morale did not collapse under the rain of bombs as interwar theorists of strategic 
bombing had expected, the trauma of living under near constant bombardment and among the 
ruins of Germany produced an apathetic German populace concerned largely with survival, 
which exacerbated the difficulties in restarting political life in Germany after the war. In 
addition, the destruction of the German transportation system, in particular the national railroad 
system known as the Reichsbahn, led to the collapse of the German economy in early 1945 and 
would inhibit recovery for several years. Finally, the devastation of German cities posed their 
own difficulties. The sheer volume of rubble made the cities scenes of vast desolation and the 
loss of housing made it difficult to provide for the population of Germany, which rose due to the 
influx of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. For the Americans charged with 
overseeing the occupation, the devastation visited upon Germany in the name of expediency 
would make their already difficult tasks harder and would try the ability of German civilians to 
persevere amidst the wreckage of Nazi Germany. 
 Interwar military theorists like Guilio Douhet and, to a lesser extent, Billy Mitchell had 
expected civilian resistance to collapse in the face of aerial assault. After all, they reasoned, who 
could stand up to the sheer terror of bombardment from the air? However, no widespread 
collapse of civilian morale occurred among any civilian populace exposed to prolonged 
bombing. Indeed, the ability of the Germans to withstand the bombing produced a sort of awe; an 





 German historian Jörg Friedrich explained the survival of the German populace 
to the distinction between “mood” and “attitude.” According to Friedrich, “The mood in the air 
war was necessarily miserable.” However, German attitude “proved itself in the throes of 
depression. There was a silent capacity to persevere, an obduracy of the Germans as of future 
targets of air war. Civilians are stubborn.”
35
 As a result, German civilians struggled onward 
despite the near-constant threat of death from the air. By the end of the war many Germans were 
apathetic and concerned largely with survival, but they were still alive; they had survived the 
aerial apocalypse. 
 German civilians had initially greeted the onset of war in 1939 somewhat reluctantly, but 
the triumphs of 1940 and 1941 produced a sense of optimism that the war would end soon. Early 
on, while relatively unexposed to the horrors of strategic bombing, many Germans hoped to take 
the bombing as well as Londoners and other British civilians. And as bombing slowly ramped up 
in 1942 many civilians expressed dissatisfaction with the government for providing inadequate 
shelters and warning. The optimism of 1940 and 1941, however, was broken during the early 
months of 1943. News from Russia of the defeat at Stalingrad and the rising tempo of Allied 
bombing produced a growing sense of despair as the chances of victory seemingly slipped away. 
In Hamburg, soon to experience the terror of a firestorm, Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeberg observed, 
“No one beds down for sleep these days. We sit stiffly on hard chairs, ready to jump up at a 
moment’s notice, and superficial conversation barely hides the inner tension.”
36
 Despite the 
rising despair, some Germans observed the resiliency that would characterize the final years of 
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the war. “One endures everything,” Horst Lang confided in his diary. “One would even endure 
the end of the world calmly, I believe, so weary is one already.”
37
 
 Even with the Luftwaffe’s temporary victory in the fall of 1943 the mood among the 
German populace continued to decline. For many the most pressing task was simply the quest for 
survival, Überleben. Near constant anxiety from expecting the next air raid meant that few 
people got a full night’s sleep. For these civilians “the war was not fought, it was absorbed.”
38
 In 
many ways bombing drew communities together as they strove against the adversity, often 
ignoring politics. After all, as Christabel Bielenberg of Berlin noted, “The bombs fell 
indiscriminately on Nazis and anti-Nazis…”
39
 The quest for survival also produced a powerful 
desire for some sense of normalcy. As a result, Germans continued to go about their daily tasks, 
including work at war factories or standing in line for the slowly decreasing food rations. In 
addition, many Germans refused to leave their homes, even when severely damaged, and worked 
to repair them as best as possible. Ardent anti-Nazi activist Ruth Andreas-Friedrich described the 
urge to repair: 
We repair because we must repair. Because we couldn’t live another day longer if one 
forbade us the repairing. If they destroy our living room, we move into the kitchen. If 
they knock the kitchen apart, we move over into the hallway. If only we can stay “at 





Morale was fading under the onslaught of bombs, but it was not cracking. A morale 
report from Munich in March 1944 observed, “Morale has reached a low point never before 
observed since the beginning of the war…The air terror proves, as hitherto, to be the crux in the 
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 Nevertheless, living under the bombs became something of a routine for 
civilians. Although each raid carried the very real prospect of death, the tasks of taking shelter 
and then repairing damage became familiar to the residents of major German cities. Indeed, 
another report from Berlin noted that “the majority of our people are also firmly of the opinion 
that we must endure all difficulties and ‘set one’s teeth.’ One does it because one must and 
because there is nothing else to do.”
42
 At this point Allied bombing was a matter of fact and 
surviving the raids was a way of life. 
The rising fury of the Allied bombers during the last six months of the conflict, coupled 
with the horrors of ground warfare, exacerbated the quest for survival. German society 
experienced a “total dislocation of civilian life” by the end of the war. Twenty-six percent of all 
homes in Germany had been destroyed or damaged by the bombing. Nearly seven million 
Germans lost transportation to work, eighteen million lost their water service, and over twenty 
million lost their electricity during the war. Additionally, almost five million Germans had been 
evacuated from cities and now found themselves in unfamiliar locales.
43
 Due to the immense 
dislocation, many Germans became concerned solely with surviving the closing months of the 
war. “Everyone is so overcome by his own personal worries that he no longer cares about the 
fate of Germany,” observed Lili Hahn. “It is far more important that one gets something to eat, 
that shoes will last a little longer, and above all whether there will be an air raid. Will we have a 
roof over our heads tomorrow, or even be alive?”
44
 In Munich German officials reported, “The 
raids caused such physical destruction that for the majority the whole of their energy was 
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necessarily taken up in coping with elementary physical problems of existence.”
45
 Survival was 
the ultimate goal and marked a victory of sorts over the horrors of war; those who survived were 
now part of a “lucky elite.”
46
 Even the end of the war produced little reaction, so numb and full 
of “inner despair” were German civilians. As one American noted, “They were defeated, 
crushed, and in a sense relieved that the nightmare was over.”
47
 
Beyond elevating the quest for survival, the bombing also strained the foundations of 
German society. Bombed civilians often resented the un-bombed. In January 1943, the security 
police of Krefeld reported that local civilians happily received news that Allied planes bombed 
Berlin. “Without exception” the civilians of Krefeld expressed “great satisfaction that the loud-
mouthed Berliner have at last got it…” Berliners had shown little understanding for the plight of 
civilians in the Rhineland, the report continued, and Krefelders welcomed the fact that the 
capital’s residents got “a taste of how we in the west are feeling.”
48
 Additionally, Allied bombing 
facilitated an explosion of crime, particularly looting and black market activity. Desperate to 
survive in the aftermath of air raids, large swaths of the population often turned to petty theft to 
secure the basic necessities of life. The black market also exploded and undermined social 
cohesion as “it brought a further cleavage between rich and poor, Party and non-Party member, 
those who could buy and those who could not.”
49
 Ultimately, many Germans became 
increasingly individualistic and unconcerned about the rest of society. Under the bombs survival 
of one’s self and family acquired paramount importance. As a result, the “hardship and disorder” 
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The ultimate product of the bombing campaign, and the final months of ground combat, 
was a psychologically distraught and apathetic German populace. No widespread collapse of 
morale had occurred. Throughout the bombing, Germans continued to work and go about the 
daily tasks of life in the search for some semblance of normalcy; the familiar provided a way to 
cope with the horrors of total war. Civilians did not even have to be directly bombed to feel the 
impact of the raids. In the Mainfranken region of Bavaria some 46,000 evacuees damaged 
morale by spreading stories of their experiences and insisting that Allied bombers “will 
gradually…smash the cities of central Germany.”
51
 While morale did not collapse and the 
civilian population trudged through to the end of the war, most Germans experienced profound 
fatalism and apathy. For some “emotional paralysis” helped ward of the dangers of the air war.
52
 
In addition to the destruction, the passage of large fleets of Allied bombers, unchecked by the 
German Luftwaffe during the final months of the war, helped demonstrate the overwhelming 
superiority of the Allied war machine, further exacerbating the sense of hopelessness 
experienced by German civilians.
53
 Yet the German population muddled through to the end of 
the war. The price of this resiliency, reaped by American occupation officials, was a largely 
apathetic population. The war attitude carried over into the postwar years; many Germans 
remained largely concerned with survival and would show little interest in politics or the 
reorientation of German culture. 
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This apathy would be exacerbated by the destruction of the German transportation 
network and the subsequent collapse of the domestic economy. The prewar and wartime German 
economy was fundamentally based on a geographic division of labor centered on two great goal 
producing regions – the Ruhr and Upper Silesia – and was dependent on internal transportation, 
particularly the Reichsbahn, the German national railway. Both the Ruhr and Upper Silesia 
developed economic satellites that depended on the two regions for coal and basic industrial 
goods and in return provided both finished manufactured goods and food. For example, the 
Ruhr’s tributary regions stretched over western and southern Germany, including Bavaria.
54
 This 
economic division of labor was dependent on two interrelated factors: coal and transportation. 
Some 90 percent of German energy came from coal; without this vital source of energy German 
industry could not function. The distribution of coal subsequently relied on adequate 
transportation, for without transport, particularly on the Reichsbahn, the German economy would 
grind to a halt for lack of coal. The “physical embodiment of the economic division of labor” 
was the marshalling yard. It was in the marshalling yards where freight “from a host of origins 
was directed to equally numerous destinations” through a complicated and finally tuned system 
of sorting that was highly susceptible to disruption.
55
 The rising tempo of aerial attack by the 
Allies would upset this precarious system and help produce the economic collapse of Germany. 
Until the late spring and early summer of 1944 German transportation had received 
relatively light bombing and this led to few economic disruptions. The availability of transport 
helped Albert Speer rationalize and increase German war production throughout 1942 and 1943 
despite the impact of Allied air attacks. However, in the weeks and months after the landings at 
Normandy German transportation started to absorb ever larger loads of bombs as the Allied 
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bombers followed the American and British armies across France. In July and August an average 
of 2,400 tons of bombs were dropped on transportation targets in Germany, particularly on 
marshalling yards. A race began between the bombers’ ability to inflict damage on the railroads 
and the Germans’ ability to repair the Reichsbahn. The result of the rising tempo of Allied 
attacks on transport was the beginning of the coal crisis that would later bring the German 
economy to a standstill. During the summer coal car placings in the Ruhr dropped significantly 
as marshalling yards struggled to work around the Allied air attacks. As the ability to move coal 
out of the Ruhr decreased, the coal stocks in Germany’s largest industrial region began to pile up 
in the mines; hard coal stocks rose 462 percent from the previous year while brown coal 
increased by 400 percent.
56
 The bombing now interfered with the distribution of coal and 
undermined the economic division of labor. Without coal shipments, German factories were 
forced to rely on existing stocks to avoid a precipitous drop in production. This strategy, 
however, could only work for a limited period before existing stocks were exhausted and 
production ground to a halt. 
It was Tedder’s full-scale transportation offensive in late 1944 and early 1945 that 
exacerbated the early signs of crisis and precipitated the economic collapse of Germany. 
Beginning in October Allied air forces dropped ever larger tons of bombs on transportation 
targets throughout Germany, particularly the marshalling yards which controlled traffic in and 
out of the Ruhr. The key coal gateways of Geisecke, Soest, Vorhalle, Hamm, and Münster could 
barely operate under the strain of bombardment. Disruption of the marshalling yards produced a 
severe backlog of trains and inhibited the loading of freight cars. By the end of October, the 
Reichsbahn experienced a backlog of 1,155 trains per day and the situation only grew worse as 
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 Meanwhile, fewer and fewer cars were actually loaded for transport. The 
week ending on August 19, 1944, saw 899,901 car loadings throughout Germany and by the end 
of October that number had declined to 703,580. The seven days preceding December 23 
witnessed 547,309 loadings, just 60.8 percent of the August 19 figure. And by the beginning of 
March 1945 German rail traffic had nearly reached a standstill; the week ending on March 3 saw 
214,001 freight cars loaded for transport, a mere 23.8 percent of the previous August.
58
 As a 
result, the Ruhr was increasingly isolated from the rest of Germany, including its economic 
tributaries. Weapons production suffered, but more importantly the region’s pivotal role as 
energy provider for western and southern Germany was rapidly waning. The incessant bombing 
“was prying out of place the lynchpin of the Reich economy.”
59
 
Due to the collapse of German transportation, particularly the Reichsbahn, the early signs 
of a coal shortage exploded into a major energy crisis. From October 14 to December 31, 
550,000 tons of coal passed through Cologne, a mere fourteen percent of normal traffic. To make 
matters worse, coal deliveries in December, a month when demand climbed due to the onset of 
winter, dropped by 52 percent when compared to September.
60
 Meanwhile, production of coal in 
the Ruhr declined from 10,417,000 tons in August 1944 to just 4,778,000 tons in the following 
February.
61
 The mines remained largely intact; however, the inability to move existing stocks 
meant that coal continued to pile up in the Ruhr. With few places to store the excess, coal mines 
cut back on production which was further damaged by the indirect effects of bombing, such as 
worker absenteeism and work hours lost in repair efforts. As a result, the tributaries dependent 
on Ruhr coal faced economic catastrophe. Bavaria, far away from the Ruhr, saw its coal 
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deliveries drop by 50 percent in November 1944. In December a total of 590,000 tons of coal 
was required throughout southern Germany for basic manufacturing, energy, and food 
processing; actual deliveries, however, amounted to less than 190,000 tons and coal stocks 
dipped to thirteen days.
62
 The critical point had been reached by the end of December 1944 and 
early in January 1945; cities and factories were running out of coal, the lifeblood of the German 
economy.
63
 February coal deliveries totaled just 25 percent of normal and reached a meager four 
percent by the end of March. German railroads ground to a halt. In the last days of March car 
placings for the Reichsbahn amounted to a meager eleven percent of normal traffic.
64
 
The devastation of German transportation and the mounting coal crisis produced 
economic paralysis throughout Germany. Without transport and coal, postwar American 
observers noted, “orderly production was no longer possible.”
65
 As a result, all aspects of the 
German economy collapsed. Without coal German families shivered in their homes, if their 
homes had escaped destruction during the war. Devastated transportation networks meant that 
those factories which escaped destruction from the air could no longer operate for lack of energy 
and raw materials. Shuttered factories meant loss of jobs or wages for thousands of Germans and 
fewer goods to purchase for those who did manage to work. Large cities lacked basic public 
utilities, including running water and consistent electricity. To obtain water many urban residents 
returned to the old practice of acquiring water from a communal water sources. Civilians now 
got their water from public street pumps and carried it home in pails, just as their ancestors had 
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 Hans Speier, a German émigré now working for the American government, 
described the scene in Munich: 
Some shops are open, and people gather outside to look through the windows. Usually, 
these is only cheap stuff on display: a few color prints, bookmarks, little dolls made of 
rags – you can buy them if you bring some rags and thread…You can also buy postage 




In Bremen, Theodor Spitta, a 72-year old soon to be appointed mayor by the Americans, 
similarly observed, “One does not spend any money because there is nothing to buy.”
68
 
The lack of transportation also meant that official rations steadily declined. In 1942, the 
average monthly ration included 8,000 grams of bread (half a loaf per day), 1,200 grams of meat 
(approximately one-tenth of a pound per day), 600 grams of other foodstuffs, and 900 grams of 
sugar (roughly two pounds).
69
 Nazi officials continued to cut rations as the war turned against 
Germany. As the aerial offensive against transportation escalated Albert Speer gave shipping 
priority to coal and war production, relegating food shipments to a lower rung. Coupled with a 
shortage of food, the lack of transportation whittled away at the average ration although many 
Germans would look back “back to those last few days of the war found things at least adequate 
in comparison with the really fundamental shortages that came during the occupation period.”
70
 
The sting of total war continued into the postwar years as American occupation officials 
struggled to relieve a long food crisis made worse by the devastation unleashed by their bombers 
during the last months of the war. 
The economic collapse of Germany also produced a thriving black market, another 
problem that would plague occupation officials in the years after 1945. The black market 
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emerged as an important institution in wartime Germany soon after the start of the war. Many 
Germans tried to make a profit when official prices were strictly controlled and others sought out 
luxuries unavailable in the normal economy. Even before the collapse of the economy the black 
market offered more lucrative opportunities than official channels. In November 1943, for 
example, a single goose could sell for 150 marks or more.
71
 The collapse of late 1944 and early 
1945 only made the black market more appealing. Even before the arrival of occupying forces 
tobacco and cigarettes served as unofficial currency. With few possessions left, everyone “sought 
to get some small advantage out of the few material possessions remaining after all the air 
raids.”
72
 The bombing even facilitated the growth of the black market. Government payments to 
bombing victims produced a glut of Reichmarks that drove up prices.
73
 In addition, the 
destruction of transportation networks turned rural Germany, especially Bavaria, into epicenters 
of the black market. Unable to transport their products to market, farmers collected large 
amounts of food. Searching for valuable food items like eggs, vegetables, and meat, city dwellers 
then traveled to the countryside to barter with the farmers. The black market would not disappear 
easily as the shortages experienced during the war became worse during the early years of the 
occupation. 
Meanwhile, the devastation of German urban areas added to the problems of an apathetic 
populace and a collapsed economy. By the end of the war German cities were vast scenes of 
destruction, as rubble and burned out buildings became their defining physical characteristics. 
Allied bombers, particularly British area bombers, leveled large swaths of the centralized built-
up areas and housing, leaving many cities as “suburban rings surrounding destroyed cores.”
74
 In 
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city after city, scenes of apocalyptic destruction followed visits by Allied bombers. Ruins and 
rubble became the defining characteristic of many German cities. The jagged ruins of bombed 
out cathedrals, factories, and apartment buildings dominated the skylines of urban centers 
throughout Germany, from major cities like Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich to smaller cities such 
as Augsburg, Krefeld, and Würzburg. In Magdeburg piles of rubble produced “a panorama of 
gutted buildings, broad streets blocked by twisted cables and cascaded masonry.”
75
 Wherever 
one traveled in German cities, the scars of war were unavoidable. Civilians, often dressed in the 
remnants of clothes, picked through the ruins in search of fuel for fires or materials to repair their 
damaged residences. Without adequate transportation to remove it, rubble piled up in the cities 
and became de facto landmarks. As Hans Werner Richter observed of Munich, “The sign of our 
times is the ruins. They surround our lives…They are our reality.”
76
  
The urban devastation was so complete that it is difficult to fully capture. Statistics can 
start to capture the essence of the destruction, particularly the obliteration of German housing. 
By the end of the war the bombing campaign had destroyed 3.6 million dwellings in 61 German 
cities with pre-war populations over 100,000, around 20 percent of Germany’s total housing. In 
the larger cities, the destruction of housing was even greater. The 49 largest cities in Germany 
lost 2,164,800 dwellings out of a total of 5,554,500, or some 39 percent of available living 
space.
77
 In Hamburg, for example, 79.5 percent of the city’s housing stock was damaged, 
including some 49 percent totally destroyed, by the end of hostilities in May 1945.
78
 Beyond the 
devastation of urban housing, the major built-up areas of cities, so important for social, 
economic, and political life, we also progressively annihilated as major cities absorbed dozens of 
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air raids. In cities with a population over 100,000 in 1939 an average of 50 percent of their built-
up areas were destroyed, including an astounding 89 percent in Würzburg, 83 percent of 
Remscheid, and 75 percent of Hamburg. Stuttgart, the victim of 53 separate raids, saw 68 percent 
of its city center destroyed by the end of the war. The destruction of Aachen by the British in 
April 1944 demonstrated the fury unleashed against German cities, particularly in the last year of 
the war. On April 12, British bombers rained down over 4,000 high explosive bombs and nearly 
43,000 incendiaries on the city near Germany’s western border. Sixty-one percent of Aachen’s 
buildings were leveled in a single raid and six bomb craters for every 1,000 square feet testified 
to the devastating nature of aerial bombardment.
79
 
The cities of Bavaria, relatively removed from the great industrial regions of the Ruhr 
and the German capital, also experienced unprecedented levels of devastation. The Allied aerial 
armadas dropped 28,300 tons of bombs on Munich and 22,000 tons on Nürnberg. Smaller 
industrial towns like Regensburg and Schweinfurt absorbed multiple air raids, as well. Even the 
small city of Kempten in southwestern Bavaria received 500 tons of bombs of Allied bombers 
over the course of the war.
80
 Augsburg, headquarters of Messerschmitt, experienced nineteen 
total raids from Allied bombers. By the end of the war 5,090 buildings were totally destroyed or 
heavily damaged in the small city, out of a total of 16,700. Augsburg’s housing also took a major 
hit, with 16,700 total dwelling units – houses, apartments, etc. – destroyed or heavily damaged 
out of a total of 52,550. All told, bombing destroyed and severely damaged approximately 31 
percent of the city’s buildings, causing 60,000 Bavarians to lose their homes.
81
 While the 
destruction was not as apocalyptic as in the Ruhr or Berlin, Bavarian urban areas were scenes of 
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devastation. Like other German cities, ruins and rubble became the defining characteristic of 
Munich, Nürnberg, and other Bavarian cities. Hans Speier observed the ubiquitous rubble of 
Munich. “At present,” he wrote, “there is more rubble – though not destruction – in Munich than 
in Berlin. The Berliners have made notable progress in cleaning up. Munich looks less orderly, if 
that term can be applied to the German mess.”
82
 Rubble remained a defining feature of the 
Bavarian capital well into 1946. The program for an Army-sponsored Eastern mass in April 1946 
depicted major damage to the Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady) in Munich.
83
 Almost twelve 
months after the end of the war, the physical devastation of Munich landmarks was still one of 
the defining features of the city, so much so that it was reproduced on the front of an Easter 
program.  
The destruction from the war was so widespread that its traces were found outside of the 
cities as well. Smaller towns and rural areas had escaped much of the bombing until the last few 
months of the war, but still bore the scars of combat. Smaller German towns, home to perhaps a 
few small factories or minor marshalling yard, found themselves in the crosshairs as Allied 
bomber commanders searched after more targets for their expanding fleets of heavy bombers. 
Friedrichshafen, population 28,000, was home to a few minor factories producing parts for 
airplanes, tanks, and V-2 rockets. These military targets brought the fury of the air war upon the 
previously unscarred town on April 27, 1944. In just one raid half of the town was leveled, 
leaving behind 15.3 cubic meters of rubble for each resident.
84
 Even the village of Linnich, home 
to just 427 houses, received a visit from Allied bombers on October 8, 1944, just as the 
transportation offensive in Germany was moving into high gear. The village absorbed 120 bombs 
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which destroyed 40 houses, heavily damaged an additional 90, and left 180 more with some sort 
of damage. Afterwards the village “presented the same rubble-filled picture as the big cities.”
85
 
Additionally, roving Allied fighter-bombers attacked German transportation targets wherever 
they were found. As a result, bombed-out bridges, wrecked trains, and burned-out military 
equipment dotted the countryside. Walter Krause, a military government sergeant, described the 
destruction he saw traveling throughout Bavaria: 
I looked at the desolation and the ruin that had been created. Whole trains, the engines, 
the coaches, the boxcars, the equipment – all was tumbled about together like playthings 
of some unruly and destructive child, who, after having given vent to his emotions by 
annihilation, had heaped insult on the havoc he had created by shoveling stone, gravel, 




Cities and towns were now centers of unprecedented devastation, the destruction of the 
air war made worse by the horror of ground combat. The amount of rubble often beggared 
imagination. Thirty-nine cities possessed over one million cubic meters of rubble, including 55 
million in Berlin, 24 million in Cologne, and nearly 12 million in Frankfurt. Even less urbanized 
Bavaria contained mountains of rubble. Nuremberg contained 10.7 million cubic meters of 
rubble, an average of 23.5 cubic meters per resident.
87
 Düsseldorf provides yet another stark 
example of the devastation unleashed by total war. All told, the Allies dropped 18,000 tons of 
bombs on the city, which was also subjected to seven weeks of artillery fire. The war turned the 
city’s 120-million-cubic-yard volume of buildings into approximately 40 million cubic yards of 
rubble. Just four percent of the city’s public buildings and seven percent of commercial and 
residential buildings remained undamaged at the end of the war.
88
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For individuals writing seventy years later it is hard to adequately visualize the amount of 
rubble clogging German cities and to comprehend the devastation one must employ extreme 
measures. If the Cologne’s rubble, for example, was placed in a field 100 yards long and 40 
yards wide, the pile would reach 4.48 miles into the sky. Spread over one square mile the same 
rubble would form a pile thirty feet high. Even more astounding, Cologne’s rubble could build a 
wall ten yards high and two yards thick approximately 895 miles in length. Contemporary 
Germans also employed such measures to try to comprehend the vastness of the destruction. In 
Hamburg, it was estimated that if the city’s rubble was loaded into normal freight cars the train 
would reach around the earth. Bavarian officials in Munich similarly noted that their five million 
cubic meters of rubble was twice the amount of material contained in the Great Pyramid.
89
 
The destruction of German cities ultimately exacerbated many of the problems facing 
American occupation officials. Loss of housing meant that there were not enough places to house 
the Germans currently living in the American zone, let alone the steady stream of ethnic 
Germans arriving due to expulsions in Eastern Europe. Additionally, destruction of 
transportation both within and between cities made the distribution of food and coal particularly 
problematic, exacerbating the already severe shortages. Many German civilians also remained 
rather apathetic and struggled to come to grips with the devastation of their cities and homes. In 
1947 Hans Werner Richter said of the ruins, “They are the outer symbol of the inner insecurity of 
the people of our age. The ruins live in us as we in them.”
90
 Similarly, Joachim Günther of 
Hannover noted, “Ruins stand next to ruins and summer-clad people pilgrim among them as 
though they no longer took notice of them any more… For the destructions themselves there is 
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no correspondence to a life with feelings for the visitor who is not accustomed to their view. 
They surpass the breadth of one’s spiritual reactions and leave one almost passive.”
91
  
The extreme devastation of German cities – the ruins and the rubble – starkly symbolized 
the major challenges facing American occupation officials as they entered Germany, and 
Bavaria, in 1945. Devastated by years of aerial bombardment and then often fought over, 
German cities remained cities in name only. Lacking basic utilities, sufficient food, and adequate 
housing, cities brought unprecedented challenges to occupation officials. Economic life was 
nonexistent. Bavarians lived in whatever could pass for homes, dwellings often missing windows 
or sporting large holes in the roof. Working amidst piles of rubble and the gaping ruins twentieth 
century metropolises, military government officers saw first-hand the plight of the Germans who 
still eked out a life in the ruins of their society. Surrounded by the effects of total war, many 
MGOs experienced profound sympathy for the plight of Bavarian civilians, increasingly saw 
them as victims, and worked for their benefit. 
Creation of American Policy 
 The greatest obstacle for American MGOs, however, was the general attitude of 
American policy towards Germany during the first year and a half of the occupation. By the time 
the occupation started, the belief that Germany should be subjected to a harsh peace prevailed 
among key segments of the American administration and, significantly, among the American 
public. War Department policymakers crafted potential escape hatches from U.S. policy, but the 
overall tone remained one of a harsh, vindictive peace towards Germany. In postwar Germany, 
such a peace threatened to send the German populace hurtling towards catastrophe. 
 For much of the war President Franklin Roosevelt was not interested in early planning for 
the postwar occupation. Instead, the president obsessed with winning the war first. Roosevelt 
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expressed his disdain for postwar planning to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. “I dislike making 
detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy,” he wrote. “Much of this is dependent 
on what we and the Allies find when we get into Germany – and we are not there yet.”
92
 Despite 
Roosevelt’s lack of interest, however, occupation planning occurred, although much of it was 
highly fragmented and characterized by sharp divisions between administration conservatives 
and liberals. The earliest planning for the postwar occupation occurred within the Army and the 
War Department. During the interwar era the Army, drawing on its experiences in the Rhineland 
occupation after 1918, studied military government. In Field Manual 27-5 the Army set forth the 
essential conditions for military government, namely the primacy of wartime objectives over 
longer-term “political” ones, the predominance of military necessity, and the total authority of 
the commanding officer. Additionally, the manual called for the early return of power to local 
governmental authorities. To train military government officers the War Department established 
the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia and then created the Civil 
Affairs Division to defend military viewpoints in occupation planning. Throughout its postwar 
planning, the Army was relentlessly focused on military objectives in any occupation, a process 
that produced “limited, backward focused” plans that were “often unhelpful to the military 
governors who would be responsible for executing postwar governance.”
93
 Meanwhile, the State 
Department also conducted its own postwar planning, much of it based on the assumption that 
the German economy was vital to the recovery of Europe. 
 The plans of the Army and the State Department, despite their limits, attracted the 
opposition of administration liberals, most notably Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau. 
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During a visit to London in 1944 Morgenthau acquired a copy of SHAEF’s Handbook for 
Military Government. The Handbook foresaw many of the postwar problems that would plague 
Germany and emphasized pragmatism in military government. For example, while it 
acknowledged that Nazi influence should be removed from the German administration, the Army 
authors emphasized that “the first concern of M.G. will be to see that the machine works 
efficiently” and “it may not be possible to eliminate every Nazi from every position of 
responsibility at the very outset.” Similarly, the Handbook argued that the MGO’s “main and 
immediate task” was “to get things running, to pick up the pieces, to restore as quickly as 
possible the efficient functioning of German civil government in the area for which you are 
responsible.”
94
 Upset by the apparent ease with which the Army was preparing to treat Germany, 
Morgenthau shared the Handbook with Roosevelt. Angered at not being consulted on postwar 
planning, the president complained to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, “This so-called 
Handbook is pretty bad… [and gave] the impression that Germany is to be restored just as much 
as the Netherlands or Belgium.”
95
 
 Buoyed by Roosevelt’s displeasure, Morgenthau and the administration’s liberals now 
jumped into the fray of postwar planning. For the liberals, the most important goals of the 
occupation should be the obliteration of fascism and German militarism. Morgenthau, therefore, 
proposed major deindustrialization of Germany, particularly the Ruhr Valley. The Treasury 
Secretary’s arguments derived from the belief of inherent German aggression. Unless the country 
was deindustrialized, Morgenthau believed, it was likely to rearm and start a third world war.
96
 
Morgenthau’s proposals gained significant support from Roosevelt, who also “harbored a private 
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preference for a draconian peace.”
97
 At the Quebec Conference of September 1944 Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill even approved a draft of the so-called Morgenthau Plan that called for the 
“pastoralization” of Germany. After the plan was leaked to the press, however, it received 
negative coverage and the president tried to walk back his support for Morgenthau by telling 
Stimson that he never really meant to completely deindustrialize Germany.
98
 
 After the Morgenthau Plan leaked, the War Department, through Assistant Secretary of 
War John J. McCloy, tried to keep Morgenthau away from their postwar planning. McCloy 
consulted with the Treasury Secretary as he drafted JCS 1067, the Army’s initial occupation 
guidance to General Dwight Eisenhower, but tried to limit his ideas. Ultimately, JCS 1067 was a 
typical bureaucratic policy document. Without clear high-level policy goals provided by the 
administration, the Army focused on short-term goals.
99
 Nevertheless, the document contained 
draconian language similar to the Morgenthau Plan. For example, it directed that military 
government would “take no steps looking toward the economy rehabilitation of Germany, or 
designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.” Additionally, the directive prohibited 
any actions “which would tend to support basic living conditions…on a higher level than that 
existing” in any neighboring Allied countries. In final form JCS 1067 also possessed several 
“escape hatches” for high-level military government officials; for example, economic 
reconstruction was allowed only to meet the needs of the occupying army or to prevent “disease 
and unrest” that could endanger American forces.
100
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Yet despite these escape hatches, the document shared a similar tone with Morgenthau’s 
proposals. After the Morgenthau Plan leaked the Roosevelt administration never disavowed the 
plan publicly. As a result, many Americans, and much of the world, assumed that the United 
States was preparing for a harsh, vindictive peace in Germany. Once JCS 1067 was finally 
released to the public in October 1945, the document was therefore interpreted within this 
context. Many Americans expected the Army to enforce a harsh peace and any divergence from 
those expectations during the first eighteen months of the occupation produced a negative 
reaction in the United States. The War Department may have crafted loopholes in the document, 
but the underlying tone remained and American policies still possessed the ability to cause 
significant harm to Germany. The seriousness of the postwar situation in Germany meant that 
indifference, not even ambivalence, could cause great harm. Without active American help, 
German officials stood little chance of solving the monumental crises facing their country.
101
 
Indeed, a vocal contingent of Army and military government officials embraced the harsh 
tone of American policy towards Germany. The intelligence and information control branches of 
military government, in particular, contained many liberals and German experts whose primary 
concern was the eradication of Nazism and militarism from German society. These officials also 
embraced the idea of collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi regime and believed that 
the civilian population must suffer some kind of penance for their acquiescence.
102
 Herman 
Kahn, an intelligence officer with the Army’s Psychological Warfare Division, explained, “With 
my intense hostility against the Germans, I gazed with satisfaction at the vast acres of rubble in 
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the cities and felt not pity for the misery of people huddling in bunkers by the thousands.”
103
 Saul 
Padover made a similar observation after witnessing the destruction of the ancient city of 
Münster. The rubble, Padover wrote, “was not an inappropriate monument to a land that had 
dedicated itself to the worship of force.” Similarly, the devastation of Nürnberg – “the shrine of 
Nazism” – “made one feel that there was justice on earth.”
104
 Kahn and Padover captured the 
underlying tone of American policy as publicly propagated by Morgenthau and the 
administration’s liberals: Germany was irredeemably militaristic and required a draconian peace 
to prevent the country from causing yet another global war. JCS 1067 possessed some “escape 
hatches” from high-level military government officials, but the public expectation of a harsh, 
vindictive peace was set.  
However, various aspects of postwar planning instilled an emphasis on pragmatism at the 
local level within military government. Prewar planning, particularly Field Manual 27-5, placed 
overwhelming emphasis on “military necessity.” Additionally, the instruction at the School of 
Military Government emphasized that military government officials should be apolitical and 
occupy a supervisory role. MGOs “would not rule, they were taught, so much as exercise 
oversight: they would constitute an administrative carapace stretched over preexisting local 
arrangements.”
105
 In a similar vein, SHAEF’s Handbook unabashedly called for a pragmatic 
approach to the postwar occupation, placing efficiency as the most important goal of the MGO, 
not denazification, deindustrialization, or democratization. As a result, the emerging culture of 
military government emphasized pragmatism above virtually all other considerations. If forced to 
choose between the enforcement of denazification or avoiding starvation amongst the defeated 
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populace, this approach encouraged MGOs to prevent starvation since it would serve military 
necessity and protect occupation troops from any potential unrest. Therefore, there was an 
emerging disconnect between the pragmatic Army approach and the much harsher language of 
American policy. This disconnect quickly emerged in Bavaria as MGOs in the Land sought ways 
around the negative proscriptions of US policy towards their defeated enemy. If military 
necessity demanded it, military government officials looked to disregard or circumvent 
American policy.  
Conclusion 
 The American soldiers and officers tasked with implementing the occupation of 
Germany, and Bavaria more specifically, faced a hard challenge made even more difficult by the 
destruction unleashed as a result of total war. American and British air forces, in search of 
victory through air power alone, unleashed unprecedented destructive power against Nazi 
Germany in the form of Flying Fortresses, Liberators, and Lancasters; leveling large swaths of 
the nation-state they would soon occupy. What began as the only means available for Britain to 
hit back against Germany and demonstrate its commitment to the war spiraled into a war of near 
apocalyptic devastation as thousands of Allied bombers roamed the skies above Germany to 
annihilate industry and to bring the horrors of war to the front door of tens of millions of 
Germans. Years of aerial assault wrecked much of German industry and burned out the centers 
of major urban areas; yet the German economy had not collapsed. The transition to the 
transportation offensive in the last months of 1944 finally precipitated the economic collapse 
long envisioned by air power theorists. As the Reichsbahn ground to a halt, coal, the lifeblood of 
the economy, disappeared from the market and pushed Germany towards economic chaos. By 
late winter and early spring of 1945 Allied air power had finally destroyed the German economy 
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in all but name. Coupled with the devastation of the German populace and their cities, the 
economic collapse demonstrated that total war wrought total destruction.  
In city after city and town after town piles of rubble, burned out houses, and mangled 
railways presented vistas of seemingly endless destruction. It was this destroyed nation-state that 
American occupation officials, at least in part, were ordered to administer and later rebuild. The 
devastation unleashed by the war, and particularly the Allied air offensive, made their tasks all 
the more difficult. Devastated infrastructure and limited transportation made it difficult to restart 
the economy and distribute basic necessities of life, which were scarce enough already. Burned 
out city centers and the loss of housing meant that few Germans had a shelter over their heads, a 
problem made worse by the influx of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. As a result, 
most Germans were concerned with merely surviving in the harsh postwar years. Beaten down 
by years of bombing, fatalistic and apathetic civilians hunted for food, clothing, and housing 
wherever it could be found. Concerned largely with survival, American officials would find 
many Germans uninterested in their programs of reorientation and democratization.  
The American occupation of Germany in general, and Bavaria more specifically, cannot 
be understood without some appreciation for the devastation unleashed by total war. In a twist of 
irony, Americans had to deal with the effects of their own bombing offensive. The bombing had 
destroyed Germany’s economy, devastated its cities, and bombarded the populace into apathy. 
Now American occupation officials in Bavaria had to face the challenges unleashed by total war. 
The chapters that follow explore these challenges and how Americans, along with Germans, 
responded to the destruction of total war to lay the foundation for a new Germany. 
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Chapter 2: An Occupation of Shortages: Managing the Food Crises of Postwar Bavaria 
 
“The population frequently complains of the fact that certain goods are to be had only 
theoretically, but cannot in reality be bought anywhere…” 
- Herr Weiss, Munich City Councilor, 11 November 19461 
 
“But events in the past few weeks have indicated that there is no assurance that you will get your 
1800 calories or your 2000 calories throughout the winter and spring unless consumers, 
merchants and government move quickly and energetically to carry out the programs of food 
collection and food distribution.” 
- Kenneth W. Ingwalson, November 19482 
 
 
 When American armies entered Bavaria in the spring of 1945 they encountered a region 
gripped by near paralysis. Years of attacks from Allied bombers, followed by months of ground 
combat, devastated the normally rich German Land. Wrecked factories and bombed-out 
buildings littered the urban landscapes of Munich, Nuremberg, and other small cities throughout 
Bavaria. The transportation networks, so thoroughly pulverized by Allied bombers during the 
last nine months of the war, were barely operational. Coal, the foundation of the German 
economy, was everywhere in short supply. The Bavarian economy was essentially at a standstill. 
These were problems that plagued American military government throughout the occupation. In 
the early years, the negative aspects of American policy exacerbated the crisis. Even as the 
occupation continued and US policy shifted from retribution to reconstruction, the economic 
problems remained a persistent thorn in the side of American officials. The crippling shortages 
of food, however, remained the most pressing challenge facing Americans during the first years 
of the occupation.  
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Bavaria, the closest region to a “breadbasket” in Western Germany, continued to produce 
significant quantities of grain, potatoes, and meat in 1945. Yet this production was a drop in the 
bucket compared to the exploding needs of postwar Bavaria. For starters, the ruined 
transportation networks meant that little of the food produced made it to the regions in desperate 
need of supply, particularly the large cities. Additionally, the Bavarian population was actually 
larger in 1945 than it had been in 1939, despite the toll of war. Displaced Persons (DPs) from all 
over Europe, civilians evacuated from cities elsewhere in Germany, and refugees who had fled 
the Red Army all crammed into Bavaria in 1945. Bavarian food production, which had not been 
enough to feed Bavaria before the war, now strained to feed millions of additional mouths. And 
within two years a new group of people would further strain the Bavarian food supply: ethnic 
German expellees from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Finally, as the Western Allies moved 
towards unification of their zones, Bavaria was called upon to help feed other regions of Western 
German such as the industrialized Ruhr Valley. 
American policy, however, exacerbated these problems. Determined that defeated 
Germans not live better than the liberated peoples of Europe, the United States, in conjunction 
with the other Allies, insisted that German food and fuel be shipped to countries like the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Although the War Department defeated Henry Morgenthau’s 
most radical ideas about the de-industrialization of Germany, the general sentiment of a harsh 
peace remained, especially among Washington decision-makers. In addition, anti-German public 
sentiment in the United States ensured that policymakers in OMGUS avoided anything that 
resembled pro-German attitudes. Julian Bach, a reporter for the military periodical Army Talks, 
observed of high-level military government officials: “They are hyper-sensitive for fear of being 
branded ‘soft’ by the press and public in the U.S., when, in reality…the Occupation is more 
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severe than many of its critics suspect.”
3
 As a result, General Lucius Clay and other high-ranking 
officials at OMGUS requested food imports for Germany but insisted that they were only 
emergency measures to prevent widespread disease and unrest. 
Bavarian agriculture struggled to keep up with the postwar challenges but often failed to 
do so. The result was a series of major food crises from 1945 through 1947. Even as the situation 
improved during and after the summer of 1948 and American policy transitioned from punitive 
to positive, the supply of food remained one of the major focuses of American occupation 
officials. Americans like George Quarles and Kenneth Ingwalson – who ran the Food, 
Agriculture, and Forestry Division of the Office of Military Government for Bavaria for much of 
the occupation – struggled repeatedly with the crises. From early concerns about feeding the 
recently defeated enemy to conflicts with Bavarians over how best to solve the food problems, 
American officials experienced profound challenges with feeding occupied Bavaria. However, 
growing sympathy with the plight of German civilians led OMGB officials and MGOs to 
challenge the basic framework of American policy. Convinced that the negative features of US 
policy towards Germany would produce undue suffering, American officials in Bavaria worked 
within the confines of that policy to mitigate its worst effects. Despite their efforts, the 
Americans faced significant resistance from Bavarians at all levels, who were reluctant to let 
their occupiers control their planting patterns, their delivery of food to market, or how much food 
would be shipped to other Länder. The challenges of the early years, however, did not disappear 
with the reversal of American policy in 1947 and 1948. Bavarian resistance to military 
government direction remained formidable and the United States’ open commitment to 
reconstruction could not change the structural issues that still plagued Bavaria. As a result, food 
problems, although significantly reduced, plagued Bavaria throughout the rest of the occupation. 
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Initial Crisis, 1945-1946 
 Before the end of the war in Europe, high-ranking American commanders had anticipated 
a European-wide food shortage. In January 1945, General Dwight Eisenhower’s headquarters 
issued a ration scale for occupied Germany before American forces even occupied large swaths 
of the country. Above all else, Eisenhower ordered, levels of consumption by Germans were not 
permitted to exceed consumption in the liberated territories of Western Europe. Once the 
liberated populations received their rations, the average German citizen would receive 1,550 
calories a day. Heavy workers could receive up to 2,800 calories, expectant mothers 2,700 
calories, and children aged three to five 1,250 calories. Early orders also emphasized the 
importance of turning responsibility for food distribution overt to German officials as rapidly as 
possible. Following Eisenhower’s order that German authorities were “responsible for the 
maintenance or re-establishment of the German food distribution and rationing system,” General 
Omar Bradley reinforced the importance of transferring responsibility to local Germans as 
rapidly as possible. Military units could facilitate the movement of rations, if necessary, Bradley 
explained, but regional administrations, under the supervision of military government 
detachments, would retain primary control. Army officials, uncomfortable with running an 
occupation, clearly sought to transfer authority to Germans and limit their own responsibilities.
4
 
Perhaps most importantly, these orders reflected the prevailing sentiment of American policy, 
such as it existed in early 1945. While Eisenhower’s order anticipated feeding the German 
populace, it also maintained a vindictive tone. Germans would not starve to death, but they 
would also not be treated with the same magnanimity directed towards the liberated peoples of 
Europe. 
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 Despite the anticipation of a potential food shortage, occupation authorities were 
unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis throughout all of Germany. German agriculture was 
wrecked by the war, especially the American and British strategic bombing offensive. The 
bombing campaign crippled the production and distribution of artificial fertilizer throughout 
Germany, which curtailed the production of German agriculture. The application of nitrogen 
fertilizer in all of Germany, for example, fell from approximately 563,000 tons in 1938/1939 to 
105,000 tons in 1945. The utilization of phosphate fertilizer plummeted from 588,000 tons to 
36,400 tons over the same period. As a result, German farms produced significantly less food in 
the aftermath of the war than before the conflict. Yields of food grains, such as wheat and barley, 
throughout Germany dropped from a 1934 to 1938 average of 2,000 kilograms per hectare to 
1,500 in 1945. Similarly, in the American zone production dipped from an average of 1,860 
kilograms per hectare to 1,520. The production of potatoes also experienced a noticeable decline. 
From 1936 to 1940 the average harvest yielded 49.8 million tons of potatoes. The harvest of 
1944 to 1945, however, produced just over 38 million tons.
5
 
 The result were alarmingly low rations throughout Germany at the end of the war, a 
situation that worsened by the end of 1945. A ration in the Rhineland, for example, averaged 
1,150 calories and in Hesse the average ration was a mere 804 calories. In Munich, meanwhile, 
the official ration in May 1945 was a mere 900 calories. Even though they had expected a crisis, 
the severity of the food shortages took American commanders by surprise. As early as May 16, 
Eisenhower cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, “In view of the critical food 
situation in Germany, it is necessary for me to take timely action to meet emergency condition.” 
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To ward of starvation, he requested authority to distribute imported foodstuffs as the situation 
required. The CCS approved the importation of wheat and by early June American officials 
optimistically predicted that the imports “should be adequate to prevent starvation.” 
Nevertheless, the situation remained bleak. The liberated territories, displaced persons, and 
prisoners of war all received rations before German civilians. As a result, actual consumption by 
the average German was well below the 1,550 calories per day approved by Eisenhower. To 
make matters worse, the destruction of transportation networks made the distribution of food 
difficult and some Americans worried that “unless food is forthcoming from the Russian zone, 
overseas imports will again have to be resorted to during the 1945-46 consumption season to 
avoid disease and unrest.”
6
 Poor transportation also produced another problem throughout the 
American zone of occupation: the uneven distribution of food. By the end of October, German 
farmers and their families were expected to consume a total of five of the available eleven trillion 
calories in the coming months. As a result, fourteen million Germans not living on farms were 




 The crippling food shortages even extended into American-occupied Bavaria, the richest 
agricultural region in western Germany. Like elsewhere in occupied Germany, official rations, 
already low at the end of the war, dwindled during the summer months, while actual 
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consumption by Bavarians was even lower. At the end of the war Bavarians received 1,300 
calories per day through official channels, including 1700 grams of bread, 250 grams of meat, 
and 3 kilograms of potatoes each week. However, due to shortages and transportation problems 
the civilian Bavarian Food Office reduced that number to 1,100 calories for the first ration period 
of the occupation. Bavarians now received official rations of just 1050 grams of bread, 200 
grams of meat, and 2 kg of potatoes each week. Actual distribution, however, averaged a meager 
900 to 1,050 calories per person per day. Food supplies were so low early in the occupation that 
on May 18 the city of Munich possessed a miniscule five-day supply of food. Captain Ralph 
Cole, writing to military government headquarters in Munich, reported that Bavarian officials 
planned to raise the official ration to 1,400 calories during the summer months, mostly due to an 
increase in the bread ration.
8
 Cole’s report was proved correct, when the official ration was 
raised to 1,550 calories on July 11. Yet raising the official ration did not solve the food shortages 
plaguing all of Bavaria and most civilians never received the entirety of their rations. Instead of 
1,550 calories, most Bavarians received a mere 850 to 1,100 calories through official channels.
9
 
 The immediate crisis moderated somewhat during the late summer and early fall months 
as the 1945 harvest made its way to market, but American officials were quick to understand the 
severity of the food shortages. In August, the Civil Affairs Section of the 3
rd
 Army reported “that 
current rations were so low as to endanger the success of Military Government...”
10
 Starving 
Bavarians, many Americans realized, would not be receptive to the ideas of democracy or could 
                                                 
8
 “Part I: Food Situation in Bavaria,” 2 July 45, Appendix B to “Field Trip,” 14 July 45, to Col. Omer W. Herrmann, 
from Capt. Ralph A. Cole, Pg. 1, Laender – Food & Agriculture Folder, Box 1087,  368: Foreign (Occupied) Area 
Reports, 1945-1954, RG 407, NARA; “Annual Historical Report for Military Government SK-LK Munich,” 3 July 
46, to Director, OMGB, from Lt. Col. Eugene S. Keller, Pg. 124, Historical Reports 1945-1948 Folder, Box 406, 
669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260,  NARA. 
9
 Historical Report, July 1945, G-5 Section, 3
rd
 US Army, Pg. 11,  G-5 Section, Reports of Operations, 9 May 45-30 
November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Reports of Operations, 1945-1946, RG 338, NARA. 
10
 Historical Report, August 1945, G-5 Section, 3
rd
 US Army, Pg. 25, G-5 Section, Reports of Operations, 9 May 45-
30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA. 
85 
 
threaten the safety of occupation forces in the Land. Americans also discovered that Bavaria’s 
position as the richest agricultural region in western Germany posed unique challenges. 
Although the Land was a major agricultural region, it was less than ninety percent self-sufficient 
and still counted on the import of foodstuffs to feed its population. In occupied Germany, 
however, Bavaria took on a new role as an exporter of food which “jeopardized” its own food 
supply.
11
 Called upon to feed other regions of Germany, such as the industrialized Ruhr Valley, 
Bavarians now had less food for themselves. 
 The approach of winter during the last months of 1945 exacerbated the food shortages in 
Bavaria. In Munich, the population rose steadily as civilians who fled Allied bombing returned to 
what was left of their homes and as refugees from the east arrived in the city. The number of 
residents entitled to food rations rose from 611,000 in October to 622,000 in November and 
continued to climb of the next several months. As the population increased, the food supply grew 
more acute. The already limited food supply had to feed increasing numbers of mouths. To make 
matters worse, the short-term improvement of the summer months slowly evaporated during the 
fall. In October, the arrival of cattle to stockyards and slaughterhouses in Munich declined 
significantly and only forty percent of the meat ration could be distributed. The supply of milk 
and butter also decreased and the fat ration was lowered to 300 grams per week. The supply of 
grain to the city was so limited that all breweries were ordered to cease production of beer on 
October 15. As Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Keller explained, “The critical food situation 
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required that all available barley be used for bread making.”
12
 Beer, that staple of the Bavarian 
diet, was sacrificed in the name of feeding starving civilians. 
 The severe food shortages throughout Germany produced several effects among the 
civilian population. Most notably, Germans suffered from the meager rations available in the 
months after the end of the war. Hans-Erich Nossack, a struggling German author, described the 
food shortages to a friend in November. It was two months since he saw any potatoes and the last 
time he ate any vegetables, aside from the odd cabbage and turnips, was in May. “It’s a cruel life 
of starvation,” Nossack explained, “I can assure you.”
13
 The result for Nossack and millions of 
other Germans was an enfeebled civilian population, particularly as the winter months 
approached. By the end of October, General Lucius Clay warned that nearly sixty percent of the 
population of the U.S. zone lived on a sub-standard diet. A sample of employed German men 
crossing the Rhine for work revealed that eighty-seven percent were underweight. Similarly, a 
group of 295 children examined in Frankfurt revealed that eighty-two percent showed “some 
signs of malnutrition” and forty-eight percent were “definitely undernourished.”
14
 Mortality 
rates, particularly among infants, soared. In July 1945, the infant mortality rate in Berlin reached 
record highs, with some reports indicating sixty-five deaths out of every one hundred births.
15
 
 As a result of the shortages and rising mortality rates, American officials faced a 
weakened population, particularly in the cities. Without adequate food, industrial laborers could 
not perform their work, at least to the expectations of military government officers. “Heavy 
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workers” received extra rations, yet workers often smuggled the extra food out of factories or 
mines to feed their families. The result was a vicious economic cycle. Lacking sufficient coal, 
economic activity was minimal and damaged food production; the lack of food then led to 
underfed miners who mined less coal.
16
 Non-workers, meanwhile, struggled with the basic quest 
for survival. Not allocated extra food, most urban residents barely survived. To stretch their 
rations as far as possible, Bavarians often improvised and new cooking techniques proliferated to 
conserve food. The preface to one cookbook, for example, listed a variety of ration-saving 
practices, from cutting the fat from fatty meat and browning the meat in its own fat to cleaning 
used baking fat by pouring it hot into cold water and then removing the impurities.
17
 
 While urban Bavaria went hungry, rural communities experienced less of a crisis and 
American MGOs maintained a tone of cautious optimism. They were concerned about the 
shortages, but believed they could be survived. In the rural Kreis of Wolfstein, Captain Raymond 
Douglass complained of “practically no stocks of flour products” at wholesale dealers on 
November 30, while made it difficult to fulfill ration requirements. But just three days later 
Douglass struck a more positive tone. The food situation in Wolfstein, he explained, “remains 
fairly good in comparison with most of Germany.”
18
 Additionally, the official ration slowly 
increased, despite the shortages plaguing Bavaria. The results of nutritional surveys conducted in 
rural Bavaria reinforced American optimism. The “nutritional status” of German civilians in 
Aschaffenburg and Bamberg was “excellent.” Civilians under the age of forty met American 
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standards for body weight and those over forty reached ninety-three percent of the American 
standards. The surveys also uncovered an important development: actual food consumption by 
German civilians was approximately 500 calories above the official rations. Black market 
activity and hoarding by farmers allowed many Bavarians to supplement their state-issued 
rations. Although military government officials would devote much of their time to eliminating 




 The relative security of farmers contributed to a new division of German society. As one 
historian observed, those Germans who received “normal consumer” rations comprised “the new 
proletariat of the occupation.” Meanwhile, industrial workers – factory workers, railroad 
workers, and, most significantly, miners – made the “gentry” due to their significantly larger 
rations. The “out-and-out aristocrats,” however, were the farmers who possessed all the food the 
needed and did not have to live off official rations.
20
 Rural Bavaria’s emergence from the war 
relatively unscathed furthered the division of society. Hans Speier, traveling towards 
Berchtesgaden in November 1945, described a nearly idyllic scene to his wife. “There was a 
deep snow on the meadows all around you…everything in perfect peace with glistening 
snowfields; a few houses with their protruding gables and brown wooden balconies…For a 
moment, there had never been any war.”
21
 These social divisions ultimately grew in importance 
as food shortages persisted, with urban Bavarians resenting the relative wealth of rural farmers 
and those farmers growing frustrated with the demands placed upon them during the occupation. 
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 Critical shortages in transportation also exacerbated the chaotic food situation during the 
first year of the occupation in Bavaria. After years of bombing and months of ground combat, 
Germany’s railroads and roadways largely existed in name only. Urban marshalling yards were 
wrecked and overburdened, bridges and the rest of the infrastructure were in horrible condition, 
and the denazification of transportation, especially the Reichsbahn, left few qualified personnel 
to rebuild Bavaria’s transportation network. The transportation problems affected the entire 
economy in American-occupied Bavaria, as will be discussed in the following chapter, but the 
posed a particularly acute problem in the food crisis of 1945. For example, in May and June 
nearly 3,900 tons of railroad shipping was requested each day to deliver food in the regions 
occupied by the Third Army, but only 1,150 tons per day were actually provided. Without 
adequate transportation, food harvested in the rural regions of Bavaria was not shipped to cities 
like Munich or Nürnberg, or exported to the industrialized regions of western Germany now 
dependent on Bavarian foodstuffs. Individual communities also experienced pronounced 
transportation difficulties. In rural Bavaria, a severe shortage of draught animals, particularly 
horses, hampered production and local transportation. Meanwhile, the sheer level of urban 
destruction posed problems for the delivery of food within cities. This contributed to the 
maldistribution of food throughout the Land, where rural regions had an abundance of food 
while cities slowly starved. Indeed, military government officials realized early on that 
“transportation deficiencies were among the basic difficulties in the reorganization of elementary 
economic life” in Germany, including food distribution.
22
 
 Faced with a starving and distraught civilian population, many military government 
officials were increasingly sympathetic to the plight of Bavarian civilians. MGOs saw many 
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Bavarians, particularly women and children, as victims of the war and in need of their protection. 
Historian Petra Goedde examined this phenomenon among American GIs in Germany. Wartime 
propaganda painted Germans as a monolithic people unified in their support of the war, Nazism, 
and militarism. What these GIs found, however, was “a defeated population devastated by the 
destruction of the war and rather desperate” to make peace. In particular, their ubiquitous 
interactions with German women, many of whom struggled to survive in the postwar chaos, 
produced a feminized vision of Germany in which GIs became providers and protectors, “first 




 A similar development occurred among military government officials in Bavaria. Tasked 
with not just living in defeated Germany but with overseeing its administration, MGOs possessed 
day-to-day experience with the crises gripping the Land. They also interacted with both Bavarian 
women and Bavarian men, as their official duties brought them in contact with large numbers of 
government officials, economic leaders, and former soldiers. Combined with the engrained 
pragmatism of Army postwar planning and concerns about American morality in the former 
heartland of Nazism, these developments formed the foundation for military government 
officials to mitigate the effects of American policy in Bavaria. 
Military government sympathy for German civilians emerged soon after the end of 
hostilities in May 1945. MGOs interacted with Bavarian civilians daily as part of their official 
responsibilities. Elderly German women and young, widowed wives were common sights at 
many detachment offices. Desperate for any help to survive in postwar Germany, destitute 
Germans begged American officials for help, whether that be getting a job for military 
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government, intervening in food disputes, or providing housing. In the Army’s quest to turn 
responsibility over to German authorities as rapidly as possible, there was often little that could 
be done for individual Bavarians. Nevertheless, such appeals and the image of women and 
children struggling for survival had an impact. Sergeant Walter Krause, an MGO at a hospital in 
Bavaria, expressed “deep sadness at the destruction of property and a terrible rending as I 
identified with the people who had experienced the war.” For Krause, the suffering of German 
civilians, particularly women and children, became a personal experience. “The present want and 
suffering of the women and children involved us now,” he wrote. “We saw it; it became a 
personal thing. The need and the suffering was now.”
24
 Even many Jewish-American occupation 
officials expressed sympathy towards the civilian population. One medical officer, a Colonel 
Cohen, explained: “I am a Jewish fellow. I should hate these people but I cannot. A little girl 
came yesterday for medical attention for her father. I gave it to her.”
25
 Intimately familiar with 
the depravations of postwar Bavaria and routinely interacting with suffering civilians, military 
government officials soon saw Bavarians as victims of the war. 
Women and children alone did not stir military government sympathy, however. MGOs 
also interacted with large numbers of Bavarians as part of their duties and these interactions 
influenced American attitudes towards Germans. With relatively few individuals in military 
government, American officials were, from the beginning, dependent on Bavarian authorities to 
administer the Land. While these Bavarian officials often frustrated MGOs, there was also an 
appreciation for the challenges of administering postwar Germany since the Americans also 
addressed the same problems. Daily interactions between American and German officials, 
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therefore, often produced collegial, if not friendly, sentiments. Walter Krause described a close 
relationship he developed with former Luftwaffe General Herbert Schroeder at the hospital he 
oversaw. The two routinely met at Krause’s quarters to discuss philosophy, religion, and the war. 
Krause observed, “It was all very friendly and we found great satisfaction in spending our time 
together.”
26
 In Munich, William J. Moran developed similar sentiments for his German 
counterparts. After being transferred from Munich, Moran wrote to Hans Mühlhauser, a civilian 
employee in the city’s police department who Moran worked with as the detachment’s Public 
Safety Office for almost two years. “Your abilities, experience and loyalties were given most 
generously to your tasks and your superiors,” Moran explained. “Your loyalty in remaining at 
your post, despite personal disadvantages, was typical of actions which gained the confidence of 
those with whom you were associated.”
27
 Similarly, Moran penned a fond letter to his secretary 
in Munich, Ruth Brinkmann. “You have not been spared the trials and difficulties of the German 
people in their war-devastated nation,” he wrote. “It shall be [ever] to your credit, however, that 
in these times of chaos…you have not lost the proper perspective and have adhered closely to the 
sound teachings which you learned in your home.” Her devotion, Moran insisted, “played no 
small part” in the success of military government.
28
 
The sentiments of American officials, however, did not go unreciprocated. Many 
Bavarian officials and civilian employees of military government fondly recalled their 
experiences with local military government officials. Peter Christen, a German military 
government employee in Bavaria, wrote with reverence of a MGO particularly well liked in the 
local community. The MGO helped the local population however he could, Christen explained, 
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and “shamed me and others by his sense of justice.”
29
 William Moran’s personal secretary, Ruth 
Brinkmann, expressed similar sentiments towards her superior in the Munich military 
government office. Writing to Moran for his birthday in July 1946, Brinkmann praised Moran’s 
“courage, zeal and good humor” and encouraged the American official to continue integrating 
“some humanity and kind helpfulness to [the] just and proper handling of office affairs.”
30
 The 
following Christmas Brinkmann again wrote Moran to thank him “for the lessons on business 
and general life-wisdom which I gained through you…”
31
 
Taken together, the plight of German civilians and the collegial, even fond, interactions 
with Bavarian officials and military government employees produced a notable strand of 
sympathy for the populace living under American rule in Bavaria. Many American MGOs, 
reflecting a trend among regular Army units, increasingly saw themselves as the protectors of 
victimized German women and children. Additionally, occupation officials interacted with 
German officials and employees daily. While these relationships may have started off cool, many 
saw the emergence of mutual respect and even friendship. Under such circumstances, MGOs 
were increasingly sympathetic to struggle for existence that the vast majority of Bavarians had to 
deal with on a daily basis. Therefore, many occupation officials, particularly at the local levels, 
found it difficult to implement American policy if Bavarian colleagues and seemingly victimized 
civilians faced the threat of starvation. 
Beyond growing sympathy for Germans of all stripes, the food crisis reinforced the 
Army’s tendency towards pragmatism and raised concerns about the preservation of American 
morality in Germany. As discussed in the first chapter, the Army’s planning for the postwar 
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occupations stressed the importance of pragmatism and efficiency in re-establishing the 
foundations of civic society. This emphasis reflected Army concern that military necessity serve 
as the determining factor in postwar occupation, as evidenced in SHAEF’s Handbook for 
Military Government. MGOs embraced this tendency towards pragmatism in response to the 
suffering of German civilians. Faced with the choice between the negative tone of American 
policy or feeding the civilian population, many military government officials chose the latter in 
the name of pragmatism. Captain Julian Bach explained, “…there are two solutions: Import or 
Starve.” “Hungry people rarely make good democrats,” he continued. “Following amputation, 
doctors rarely kill their patients, but off them instead a crutch.”
32
 Bach also insisted that the 
United States held a paternalistic responsibility towards the German people, who were “our 
subjects” and “our responsibility.” After twelve years of dictatorship and war, the German 
people were not in good moral or physical shape; the people were “withered and spent.”
33
 As 
ruler of these subjects, Bach argued that the United States was ultimately responsible for the fate 
of those Germans living in the American zone of occupation. 
Some Army officials also expressed concern about American morality in Germany. 
Letting Germans starve, they feared, would damage the health and morality of the occupation 
and military government forces. Fear of American moral decay was not uncommon in postwar 
Germany. The Billy Wilder film A Foreign Affair portrayed German women as corrupting 
influences on naïve American soldiers. Nightclub singer Erika von Schlütow corrupts Captain 
John Pringle until the captain is saved by a female congresswoman.
34
 Yet officials who would 
challenge the negative aspects of American policy also warned of American moral decay. “This 
is not for the sake of the Germans,” Julian Bach argued, “but for the sake of the Occupation 
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troops, whose lives, health and morality are also at stake.” The refusal to accept that the German 
population must be fed would reduce Americans “to the morale level of the Germans and their 
concentration camps.”
35
 To preserve American moral authority, therefore, military government 
would have to secure the lives of Bavarian civilians. 
Faced with a major food crisis in 1945, the general vindictiveness of American policy 
towards Germany, and growing sympathy for the plight of the Bavarian populace, military 
government officials sought ways around official policy. MGOs and OMGB officials wanted to 
mitigate the effects of US policy in Bavaria and address the crippling food crisis of the postwar 
era. However, limited measures were available to Bavarian military government. Located at the 
bottom of the military government hierarchy, MGOs could not radically expand the power of 
their offices by directly intervening in Bavarian affairs, nor could they single-handily change 
American policy. Additionally, Bavarian farmers had already planted their fields before the end 
of the war; little could be done to influence the harvest of 1945. Ultimately, the Americans 
adopted an indirect approach and stressed German responsibility for solving the food shortages. 
Captain Ralph Cole outlined the scope of military government efforts to combat the food crisis in 
July 1945. Writing to military government headquarters in Munich, Cole proposed a series of 
objectives and short-term actions to address the food crisis. The most important objective, in his 
mind, was to re-establish the Bavarian Food and Agriculture Office to coordinate the production, 
collection, and distribution of food throughout the Land. He also proposed surveys of 
agricultural supplies, farm labor, and the 1945 crop; the creation of a 1946 crop production plan; 
increasing the ration to 1,500 calories; making “every effort” to secure delivery of crops; and 
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acting “promptly and firmly” against violations of food regulations.
36
 Cole was not clear how 
exactly these often nebulous measures would solve the food crisis, yet this outline became the 
blueprint by which American military government officials addressed the food crisis and 
minimized the impact of negative US policy. By embracing the policy of returning responsibility 
to Bavarians as rapidly as possible, MGOs could work around the more constrictive aspects of 
American policy. If questioned by policymakers of American media, MGOs could defend efforts 
to protect civilians as the work of German authorities simply doing their jobs. 
 A survey of the 1945 crop represented one of the first actions taken by military 
government. MGOs knew the food situation was severe but did not understand the full 
parameters of the crisis. It would be difficult to mitigate the effects of American policy if 
military government officials did not know the extent of food shortages in Bavaria. On August 
20 USFET published the preliminary crop estimate for the entire American zone, including 
Bavaria. The report warned, “The disruption of agricultural organizations and services resulting 
from the war and subsequent military occupation has made the estimation of the 1945 crop 
especially difficult.” In Bavaria, the survey estimated a wheat crop of 583,800 metric tons – a 
small increase over the 1944 crop of 582,000 metric tons, but well below the 702,000 tons from 
1943. On the other hand, initial estimates of the potato crop indicated a smaller crop in 1945 – 
4,050,000 metric tons – compared to the 1944 crop of 4,163,000 tons.
37
 Military government 
officials conducted these surveys for the next several months, hoping to get a more accurate 
picture of the harvest within the American zone and inside Bavaria, specifically. Subsequent 
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reports appeared on 29 September, 10 November, and 27 February 1946. Each survey adjusted 
the estimated yield per hectare and the total production. By November production of potatoes in 
Bavaria had risen to 4,100,000 metric tons.
38
 However, the final survey in February 1946 revised 
wheat production downward to 525,000 tons, while wheat and rye production declined by fifteen 
percent in the American zone when compared to 1944.
39
  
These crop surveys served two main purposes for Americans within military government 
throughout the occupation of Bavaria. First and most obviously, they provided an estimate for 
that year’s harvest of wheat, rye, potatoes, and other important crops. Officials needed an 
accurate estimate to plan food imports, ration requirements, and exports to other regions of 
Germany. Second, the surveys served as a valuable comparative tool. Military government 
officials of all stripes in Bavaria compared each year’s crop production to the production of 
previous harvest, especially from the prewar years. When production lagged behind stated goals, 
the Americans then used the comparisons to previous years to encourage German officials and 
farmers to increase their production. If Bavaria produced so much wheat in 1938, Americans 
argued, then it could do so in 1946 or 1947. 
Americans within OMGB also combatted the food crisis through requisitions of food and 
public encouragement to farmers to meet their delivery quotas. For example, in the first two 
months of the occupation military government units attached to the Third Army requisitioned 
46,000 tons of imported foodstuffs for use during the rest of 1945. They also requisitioned two 
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million Red Cross food parcels to give to displaced persons located in Bavaria.
40
 On the other 
hand, Americans actively encouraged Bavarian farmers to fulfill their delivery quotas to secure 
“maximum deliveries of farm products.” Newspaper reports, radio exhortations, and the public 
threat of “stringent late penalties” in late 1945 drove home the importance of deliveries, or so 
military government officials thought.
41
 These encouragements, relatively rare in 1945, became a 
staple of OMGB efforts to combat the food shortages of the occupation. Hoping to limit the 
effects of American policy in Bavaria, MGOs saw the compliance of Bavarian farmers with crop 
delivery quotas as one of the most important steps to take. Ultimately, the exhortations also 
served another purpose: to convince Bavarians, especially farmers, to view the food crises 
through the same lens as their occupiers. As the occupation progressed, Americans and 
Bavarians increasingly clashed over who defined the scope and severity of the crisis. 
The most visible actions taken by Army and military government units, however, were 
attempts to shut down the near ubiquitous black markets. Desperate for food, ever larger 
numbers of Germans turned to the black market, which had been well-established in Germany 
before the end of the war. Additionally, a wide variety of American occupation soldiers, 
including individuals within military government, participated in the black market. The Bavarian 
black market, as with the black market throughout postwar Germany, was driven by the crippling 
shortages of food, the lack of any normal consumer goods, and the existence of large sums of 
money without anything to buy. Survivors of Allied bombings, for example, received significant 
relief payments from the state during the war. Yet the destruction of many goods during the war 
and the strict rationing of others made it difficult to spend that relief money at traditional stores. 
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As a result, bombing victims used their state-provided cash to purchase badly needed goods, 
such as shoes, clothing, or fresh vegetables. Even urban residents who emerged from the war 
unscathed turned to the black market to supplement their meager rations. On the black market a 
resident of Munich could acquire fresh eggs, milk, or coffee for Reichsmarks, cigarettes, or 
something as mundane as a pair of pants. Free from official price controls, inflation plagued the 
black market. Survivors of bombing raids, with their cash relief payments from the state, could 
afford to drive up prices far beyond the ability of other Germans to pay. As a result, cigarettes 
had already become a de facto currency in the black market before the end of the war, a 
development that only escalated with the proliferation of highly-covered American cigarettes. 
In some instances, the local black market operated out in the open and became a sort of 
market where Germans, displaced persons, and Americans haggled over goods. Often the cry of 
“Zigaretten” could be heard as you approached an open-air black market location, which became 
almost a cacophony by the time you reached the main market.
42
 At other times, enterprising 
civilians approached American barracks or clubs to engage in Americans in black market trading 
German civilians offered cameras, watches, Nazi memorabilia, and Occupation Marks – used to 
pay all Allied soldiers in Germany and illegal for Germans to possess – for cigarettes. Eager for a 
souvenir from their time in Bavaria, many American soldiers obliged, exchanging food and 
cigarettes for a Nazi Party badge or some other piece of memorabilia from the Third Reich. A 
good wrist watch, for example, could earn as much as three cartons of cigarettes or ten one-
pound cans of American meat rations. Bavarians then took their newfound riches, particularly 
cigarettes, to barter with nearby farmers. For urban residents, this often meant long days 
traveling to local farming communities in search of extra potatoes, fresh vegetables, or eggs. 
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Sometimes Bavarians bypassed the American middleman and took their luxury goods directly to 
farmers. That same wristwatch might yield up to four pounds of butter from a farmer.
43
 
For many Americans, including military government officials, the economic opportunity 
of the black market was too much to pass up. An American cigarette often sold for the equivalent 
of $10 each, candy bars for $5 apiece, and watches for upwards of $200. Americans of all stripes 
could buy ten packs of cigarettes at their PX each week for fifty cents apiece. They could then 
sell them on the black market for the equivalent of $100 each. Following this practice, Julian 
Bach calculated that an American could make a $5,200 a year selling just the cigarettes from his 
Army ration.
44
 Enterprising Americans even had relatives mail cartons of cigarettes to Germany 
where they were sold on the black market and the profits sent back across the Atlantic. 
Additionally, the early policy of not capping the amount of money a soldier could send home 
provided a major incentive to participate in the black market. One Army company, totaling 123 
men, sent home $200,000 worth of money orders in just one month.
45
 Other Americans, 
meanwhile, participated in the black market more indirectly. Sergeant Walter Krause, for 
example, stayed in a villa with a German family for some time. His host, Herr Koch, prepared 
meals and Krause provided extra American rations, cigarettes, and coffee for Koch to barter with 
at the black market. In exchange, Krause’s host received fresh eggs, meat, and vegetables.
46
 
The black market received the most attention, but Americans also facilitated other aspects 
of the informal Bavarian economy. Military government officials, occupation troops, and even 
visiting Americans often paid Germans, particularly women, for domestic services. Bavarian 
women might carry on a private laundering business for Americans, who would then pay in scare 
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items like cigarettes, coffee, and soap.
47
 One American visiting Munich, Richard Berlin, 
observed the informal economy at work in his hotel. When he asked to have his clothes 
laundered, the maid said she would rather be paid with cigarettes and soap instead of money. 
Berlin observed, “Anyone in Munich will work 12 hours a day for food.”
48
 Military government 
offices, in a more formalized system, also employed thousands of Bavarians who received 
daytime meals as part of their pay. These aspects of the informal economy existed alongside and 
in many ways facilitated the black market. Bavarians who accepted payment in cigarettes did so 
to barter those cigarettes for food with local farmers. 
By fall 1945 prices soared on the Bavarian black market. In Munich, the price of eggs 
and pork shot up one hundred percent, while bread rose sixty percent.
49
 To combat the black 
market, Americans tried a variety of measures. Most recognized early on that the black market 
would not truly be defeated until rare commodities were readily available again, but they still 
advocated negative means to hamper the growth of the illegal transactions. In August 1945, 
Major David Blossom on the Legal Section of OMGB encouraged one Munich military 
government detachment to post anti-black market notices near notorious black market locations. 
These notices, Blossom believed, would act as a deterrent and prevent Bavarian from feigning 
ignorance of military government regulations.
50
 Then a few days later on 9 August the Third 
Army, at the command of General George Patton, dictated a new anti-black market law to the 
Bavarian government. The new law prohibited five or more civilians from gathering at any place 
where goods were sold, unless it was a licensed business. It also authorized civilian police to 
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disperse or arrest all crowds at unauthorized business places. Violators could face a maximum 
sentence of five years in jail and/or a fine up to 10,000 RM.
51
 
In addition to combatting German black market activities, military government and Army 
officials worried about the activities of American servicemen stationed in occupied Germany. As 
a result, on 10 September General Eisenhower issued orders to limit American involvement in 
the black market.  “This theater is faced with a serious and difficult black market problem,” 
Eisenhower explained, “which constitutes a direct menace to the United States control of the 
German economy, is directly in conflict with the United States objective of maintaining law and 
order, promotes inflation and encourages theft and robbery.” Therefore, all American personnel 
were prohibited from selling any American goods to Germans, from buying any rationed German 
goods, and from paying above legal prices for any non-rationed German goods.
52
 Then three 
months later the personnel of the Third Army were again prohibited from participating in the 
black market, this time by Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott, due to “numerous flagrant 
violations” of German rationing laws.
53
 Military government even tried to channel the black 
market into legal channels by setting up official barter stations. If Germans wanted to barter their 
luxury goods for foods, Americans reasoned, it was better for them to do so through a formal 
system. 
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Despite American efforts, however, the black market continued to thrive and even 
expanded as the food crisis continued into 1946. In January an Inspector Franz of the Munich 
Criminal Police Black Market Section reported that the illegal economy was “rather difficult to 
control” and that “most of the black market dealers are DPs who sell rationed goods and 
American Army goods for exorbitant prices.”
54
 Indeed, during the month of January alone there 
were 1,698 price control violations reported to OMGB, with a total of 608,476.96 RM in fines 
and excess profits confiscated.
55
 By the first week of February black market prices in 
Niederbayern-Oberpfalz region of Bavaria reached 17.5 RM per kilogram of meat, 2.55 RM for 
one American cigarette, and 50.2 RM per pound of butter.
56
  
German authorities preferred to blame displaced persons for the black market activity, 
but Germans and Americans alike actively participated in the illicit market economy of Bavaria. 
One particularly enterprising American, Andrew Wormser, racked up a long list of black market 
dealings in the town of Eschenbach. According to the local police, Wormser’s dealings 
possessed a total value of 21,000 RM. Wormser supposedly sold thirty pounds of sugar for1500 
marks, 120 packs of German cigarettes for 2000 marks, 40 packs of American cigarettes for 
1000 marks, and 30 liters of brandy for 4500 marks.
57
 For hungry Germans and Americans 
looking to make extra money the black market offered a tantalizing opportunity, so it continued 
to thrive despite the early efforts of military government officials. In addition, participation in the 
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black market and the informal goods economy provided one opportunity for military government 
officials to act on their sympathy for the Bavarian population. While many military government 
elites saw the black market as a drain on the economy, many MGOs saw the direct impact it had 
on the residents of their communities. Throughout Bavarian military government, American 
officials at the local level reported on the black market activities of Bavarians and German 
attempts to combat the illegal economy. However, these Americans remained aloof from efforts 




By early 1946, despite the efforts of military government, food stocks in Bavaria were 
dangerously low. The ration for “normal consumers” remained at 1,550 calories, but major 
shortages loomed. Available stocks of most important food items decreased over the course of 
January and by late February a bread shortage spread throughout Bavaria. Germans with unused 
ration tickets “stripped many bakeries of all available stocks of bread and flour” and “for the first 
time in many [months], queues formed before bakeries, and many were soon sold out.”
59
 In 
Regensburg the food shortages grew so severe that the Bavarian Food and Agriculture 
Warehouse in the city started to distribute spoiled food, including dried eggs, milk, biscuits, and 
canned goods that arrived spoiled.
60
 When good news arrived, it was often good only in 
comparison to the larger crisis. For example, the Food and Agriculture Branch of OMGB 
announced at the end of February that it would now be possible to distribute up to two eggs per 
person per month if Bavaria was not required to export eggs to other regions of Germany. Two 
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eggs per month barely made a dent in the food shortages plaguing Bavaria, but at least military 
government could add to the diet of Bavarians instead of taking away.  
By April the crisis was so serious that the Third Military Government Regiment began its 
own food conservation program. American units rarely lacked food, but the shortages in Bavaria 
were so great that U.S. units now took part in conservation efforts. The detachments of the Third 
MGR were ordered to “insure adequate care and safeguards” against breakdown of ration 
regulations, including the proper storage of perishable food items like meat, vegetables, and 
fruits. Additionally, the conservation program, in a seemingly contradictory move, prohibited 
German workers from eating leftover food because such a practice produces “an ever increasing 
amount of leftovers.” Finally, each mess officer was to post signs in sight of all personnel. 




The impact of measures such as this was limited, however. In occupied Bavaria food 
shortages worsened during the winter months and relaxed during spring and summer. As the 
second year of the occupation approached the food situation again moderated and was, in 
comparison to the previous year, relatively stable. Additionally, many military government 
officials recognized early on that the food crisis was best solved by the Bavarians and turned 
over as much responsibility to Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible. Yet as the Americans 
abdicated direct control over the food crisis they came into conflict with the same Bavarians they 
sought to empower. Food shortages frustrated both Americans and Germans, and as the 
occupation progressed the two groups clashed over who got to define the scope of the crisis, 
even as the situation steadily improved. 
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Continued Shortages, 1946-1947 
 During late spring and early summer 1946 in Bavaria, the food shortages roiling the 
occupation appeared less desperate than they were during the winter months. Winter crops 
alleviated some of the grain shortages, while fresh vegetables arrived at market to supplement 
the often dour official ration. Meanwhile, a period of dry spring weather provided a favorable 
planting season to Bavarian farmers and kindled hopes for a good harvest as long as the region 
received enough rain during the summer.
62
 Major Albert Snow predicted that Dachau would be 
in a position to export at least as much food as they had in 1945 since preliminary crop yields 
showed good results.
63
 The more favorable situation allowed American and Bavarian officials to 
slowly raise rations for the average Bavarian. The bread ration in Munich for the period from 19 
August to 15 September increased from 4,200 grams to 5,000 grams per week, even though the 
overall caloric value remained the same. Then in September the population received the good 
news that the official ration would return to 1,550 calories per person per day. In Regensburg, 
reported Captain J.W. Bossert, this news “was received with enthusiasm by the population.” 
Despite the welcomed news, however, complaints persisted about the reduced fat ration.
64
  
Military government officials remained concerned about the lingering food crisis. The 
prospect of widespread starvation, particularly in Bavaria’s cities, was something MGOs wanted 
to avoid. In the spring and summer of 1946, however, American policy retained its vindictive 
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tone. American officials in Bavaria, therefore, continued their indirect methods to address the 
major food shortages. In particular, they doubled down on their efforts, first enunciated by 
Captain Cole’s July 1945 report, to transfer responsibility over to Bavarian officials. The 
Americans, for example, pressured officials at all levels of the Bavarian government to increase 
food collections and compliance with delivery quotas. Military government officials encouraged 
Bavarians in Ministry for Food and Agriculture to develop more effective incentives and 
enforcement measures. By encouraging Bavarian government action on the food crisis, MGOs 
could portray efforts to alleviate the shortages as the work of Bavarian authorities and not a 
subversion of American policy. Encouraging German responsibility also reflected the general 
Army culture that wanted to limit its involvement in traditionally unmilitary tasks and the early 
postwar planning that called for transferring administrative responsibility to native officials as 
rapidly as possible.  
However, local German officials – the Landrat in charge of each Kreis, the 
Bürgermeister of each town, and the local food officials – received the bulk of the pressure. For 
example, in late October 1946 the Food Ministry assigned Landkreis Dachau a quota of 2,000 
tons of potatoes for export. Local Bavarian officials, according to First Lieutenant Jerome 
Walker, claimed that Dachau could not possibly meet the quota. Flooding and hail had damaged 
crops throughout the Kreis, they argued, and some regions lost nearly ninety percent of the crop; 
at most, Dachau could collect and deliver 1,200 tons. By 26 November the Kreis exceeded the 
predictions of the local officials, but the 1,300 tons of deliveries remained well below the 
assigned quota. At that point, Walker called all Bürgermeisters and Food Office officials to a 
meeting where the problem of deliveries was “thoroughly thrashed out” and each Bürgermeister 
promised to do his best to “drive out every last pound of potatoes.” During the last four days of 
108 
 
November farmers delivered an additional 666 tons of potatoes to bring the total to 1,966 tons; 
Dachau would meet the 2,000 ton quota by early December. According to Walker, the “constant 
harassing” of food officials and Bürgermeisters had produced “excellent results.”
65
 
The American commitment to empowering Bavarian officials soon produced conflict 
between OMGB and the Bavarians. Local Bavarian officials repeatedly complained about the 
high quotas set by the Food Ministry in Munich. Additionally, the Americans and Germans 
competed over who got to define the severity of the crisis and what constituted success. In 
particular, officials from Munich and the surrounding area clashed with military government. 
During May 1946, as the final efforts to collect food from the 1945 crop wrapped up, officials 
from Landkreis Munich complained of high quotas and sought to redefine what constituted 
successful deliveries of food. Lackluster deliveries from the Kreis led the Food Ministry to 
dispatch inspectors to the farming communities surrounding Bavaria’s largest city, such as 
Kirchheim and Taufkirchen. These inspectors visited local farms, totaled the food remaining, 
subtracted the amount needed to feed the farmers, and confiscated the rest. Yet even these drastic 
measures, according to city officials, did not secure 100 percent delivery of the assigned quotas. 
Indeed, these state inspectors even said, or it was reported to military government they said, that 
the quotas “had been fixed up too high by the State’s Ministry for Food and Agriculture.” 
Additionally, persistent war damage, severe weather in the form of drought and hail, and a lack 
of farming supplies meant that the crop did not meet expectations. It was for these reasons that 
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Munich officials asked the State Ministry “over and over again” to lower delivery quotas.
66
 
These Munich food officials repeatedly complained about what they perceived as unrealistically 
high quotas for food delivery. At the same time, they tried to redefine what constituted success in 
food deliveries. Based on factors like weather and war damage, the farmers in the Kreis 
succeeded in delivering as much food as possible. Due to these outstanding problems, therefore, 
the current deliveries should be considered a success and confiscations of additional food 
stopped.  
Military government’s response to protestations such as these was often to double down 
on the pressure to meet the assigned quotas; yet they rarely used force to compel deliveries or 
intervened to lower quotas. In their eyes, Bavarians had to take responsibility for the crisis and 
solve it themselves. Even when a major crisis broke out, as it did in the final months of 1946 
when a potato shortage threatened, the Americans remained reluctant to intervene directly. 
Instead, they pushed for Germans to take full responsibility. In October, major transportation 
problems threatened to undermine the delivery of the potato harvest from rural communities to 
urban areas. In response, Brigadier General Walter Muller, head of OMGB, proclaimed that the 
crisis “requires immediate action on the part of the members of Military Government.” That 
action, however, remained relatively indirect. Regular Army headquarters authorized the use of 
twenty percent of its truck transportation to ship the potato crop, but most of the responsibility 
for “Operation Spud” still resided with the Bavarians. Bürgermeisters were to inform officials 
from the local Food Office A of the quantity of food to be collected, where it had to be delivered, 
and other pertinent information. The food officials then had to request the transportation through 
the closest military government office. In addition, the Germans were to provide all labor needed 
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to load and unload the Army trucks. Military government officials, on the other hand, merely 
relayed the requests for transportation to the pertinent regular Army commander, made sure the 
Bavarians ordered the requisite amount of transportation, gathered appropriate information, and 




By the time it ended in mid-November, Operation Spud produced notable success. From 
7 to 16 November, 347 Army trucks hauled 1,414 tons of potatoes from just the area surrounding 
Munich. Potato wholesalers in Munich were “very satisfied” and “do not want to fail to express 
our thanks for the American trucks.”
68
 Several months later, OMGB circulated a letter from 
General Clay to General Muller praising American involvement in the emergency food 
collection program. According to Clay, potato collections increased by 80,000 tons and saved 
American taxpayers “many millions of dollars” by reducing the need for imports of food. The 
participation of local military government officers, Clay wrote, was “a tremendous factor in the 
accomplishment of the emergency program.”
69
 Clay’s letter, however, revealed the exceptional 
nature of American involvement in Operation Spud. It was an emergency that drove this limited 
form of direct U.S. involvement in trying to solve the food crisis. The program, thrown together 
at the last minute, brought direct American intervention but it remained limited and Bavarians 
retained primary responsibility. Indeed, Operation Spud quickly receded into the background 
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once completed. Military government officials returned to using indirect methods, particularly 
pressure, on local Bavarian officials to ensure compliance with delivery quotas. At the end of 
November, Major Frank Tracy reminded military government detachments in the Oberbayern 
region that no force was to be used against Germans without first being approved by the Public 
Safety or Operations branches of OMGB.
70
 Americans cared deeply about solving the food crises 
plaguing Germany and wanted to circumvent US policy. However, they preferred indirect 
methods to secure their objectives, even when they produced rising conflict with Bavarian 
officials. 
Meanwhile, the food situation deteriorated as winter approached. Rising shortages 
threatened to bring a new crisis, although one less severe than the previous winter. Even with the 
success of Operation Spud, “considerable difficulties” remained with the potato supply in 
Munich. In 1946 Bavarian officials, at the behest of military government, planned a cellar 
storage program for potatoes during the upcoming winter. By mid-November, however, few 
residents in Munich received their potatoes for storage. The problem continued into December, 
with twenty-five percent of the potatoes allotted for winter storage in Munich failing to arrive 
from Unterfranken due to transportation problems. As a result, Munich’s food officials reduced 
the amount of potatoes allocated to each resident from two and half zentners (or 150 kilograms) 
to one zentner (50 kilograms). Yet even this reduced amount could not be met in full by the end 
of the year.
71
 Other shortages also plagued Bavaria and contributed to the renewed crisis. During 
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November, evaporated milk and pudding powder were in short supply in Munich. The following 
month small amounts of peanut butter finally went on sale in Landkreis Wolfstein after a two-
month delay, but good news was minimal as 1946 transitioned to 1947. By early January 1947 
bread grain deliveries fell far behind their stated goals. In the communities surrounding Munich, 
for example, farmers delivered less than forty percent of the yearly quota due to shortages of fuel 
and spare parts for farm machinery.
72
 
Due to these shortages, the Bavarian population grew increasingly restless. Munich 
residents frequently complained “that certain goods are to be had only theoretically, but cannot 
in reality be bought anywhere…”
73
 In addition, black market activity and petty thefts rose as 
Bavarians did all they could to survive in postwar Germany. All throughout 1946 the black 
market expanded throughout Bavaria, despite the efforts of military government and German 
police. The Dachau police were “particularly active” against the black market and arrested 
numerous offenders, especially displaced persons living outside of United Nations camps. 
Nevertheless, the activity continued and without any major organized activity it was nearly 
impossible to defeat.
74
 Germans of all stripes participated in the black market. In Wolfstein one 
Johann List, a former POW, was “notorious in the whole community on account of his black 
market trade.” List traded in Czechoslovakian cigarette paper, saccharin, and sugar, and people 
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from as far away as Munich and Stuttgart wrote to enquire about purchasing items he sold.
75
 
Other Bavarians participated in the illegal economy on a less regular basis. Karl Richard 
Grosshäuser traveled from Nürnberg to Wolfstein in August 1946 to trade tobacco for 
mushrooms and raspberries when the local police apprehended him and his wife.
76
  
The frenzy of small-time black market activity produced higher and higher prices. By the 
end of March 1947, a pack of American cigarettes, which sold for 80 RM at the end of 1946, 
now sold for at least 100 RM. Coffee sold for 125 RM per pound, while a single pound of butter 
cost 70 RM.
77
 Additionally, rising prices frustrated large segments of the population, particularly 
farmers who had to sell their products at fixed prices. Lieutenant Jerome Walker warned from 
Dachau in November 1946 that “the largest dis-satisfied group is the farmer.” Farmers could sell 
potatoes for just 3.40 RM per one hundred pounds, yet a single cigar in Dachau cost 3.50 RM 
and similar ratios existed for items like milk and beer. In light of these high prices, Walker 
understood why farmers held back as much of their production as possible. After all, “With 
marks the farmer can buy little or nothing. With his produce he can trade for nearly any items.”
78
 
As Bavarians grew more frustrated with high prices they also sought to blame their plight on 
perceived outside groups. Military government received its fair share of the blame, but displaced 
persons and Jews took most of the blame. German officials routinely held DPs responsible for 
most black market activity. Additionally, some Bavarians associated the Jewish population with 
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the illegal economy and high prices, even though plenty of Germans participated on their own 
volition. In May 1946, for example, Bavarians complained to Major Albert Snow in Dachau of 
black market activities at three Jewish farms set up to train young people going to Palestine.
79
 
The association of Jews with the black market remained relatively rare at this point, but when the 
food crisis returned with a vengeance in 1947 and 1948 it was ever more prevalent. 
Increasingly desperate for food and protection, the number of Bavarians, particularly 
women, who relied on American providers also rose. Many young German women turned to 
companionship with American GIs to secure badly needed food for their families. At times these 
relationships centered solely on the material benefits. Some women turned to prostitution to save 
their families from starvation or to supplement their meager rations. In other instances, food was 
not the decisive factor in the relationship but still played a major role. As Petra Goedde noted, 
“Food…replaced flowers and jewelry as the most common instrument of courtship” in postwar 
Germany.” Kaethe Schmidt recalled how her future husband, Don Sears, provided her family 
with soap, food, and other scarce goods. Similarly, Liese-Lore Spreen’s future husband brought a 
turkey to their first date.
80
 Other German women accepted American companionship in an 
attempt to return a sense of normalcy. One unidentified young women explained that she was 
“happy because my friends provide me with food and decent clothes to wear.” Before her 
relationships with Americans she had spent long days foraging for potatoes or retrieving wood 
from the forest. “Now, is that really living? A life to lead when you’re young?” she asked. “No, 
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the nights are over when I felt the fear rising up in me that my whole life could go on and finish 
in such misery. Now I finally want to live for a change.”
81
 
Therefore, as spring approached in 1947 tensions surrounding the food shortages in 
Bavaria grew more acute. German civilians frustrated with the continued shortages resorted to 
black market activity and blamed their problems on DPs and the Jewish population. American 
and Bavarian officials, meanwhile, clashed for the first time over who defined the scope of the 
food crisis and the best way to respond. These tensions, which grew slowly over the course of 
1946 and into 1947, did not appear threatening in early 1947. After all, the food situation 
improved significantly since the chaotic first year and the recent winter was relatively mild. 
Americans and Bavarians alike, however, were not prepared for the major crisis that hit Bavaria 
in 1947 and 1948, a crisis that caused these simmering tensions and frustrations to explode. 
Renewed Crisis, 1947-1948 
As the winter of 1946-1947 ended, concern about the food shortages remained prominent. 
Although food remained scarce in early spring 1947 and the food situation was not as chaotic 
during the first year and a half of the occupation, MGOs still expressed worry about the nagging 
problems. Shifting American policy, however, provided a reason a reason to be optimistic. 
Starting with Secretary of State James Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946 and 
continuing with the official merger of the American and British zones of occupation on 1 
January 1947, American policy openly embraced the reconstruction of postwar Germany, 
including Bavaria.
82
 American officials in Bavaria would not have to mitigate the effects of a 
negative policy as they had for the first eighteen to twenty-four months of the occupation. 
However, American frustration did not disappear. Instead, it was now turned towards the 
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Bavarians, particularly bureaucratic officials and farmers, as the most severe food crisis since the 
end of the war gripped the Land in late 1947 and early 1948. MGOs remained sympathetic to the 
plight of urban residents, but increasingly resented the resistance of bureaucrats and farmers who 
insisted that they could not meet quotas for food production or who challenged American policy. 
One of the main targets of their frustration was what they viewed as a chaotic and 
inefficient system for the production, collection, and distribution of food. During April, Major 
W.W. Perman, director of the military government office in Berchtesgaden, reported that only 
five of the twenty-one communities in the Landkreis received delivery quotas from the Food 
Office A in Traunstein.
83
 In Landkreis Wolfstein, the situation was just as chaotic. The Food 
Office in Passau established quotas for communities, or Gemeinde, but possessed no direct 
control over the deliveries of individual farmers; instead, local Bürgermeisters were responsible 
for breaking down the community quotas. However, most farmers “don’t even know the exact 
amount of their quotas” and deliveries, when they did occur, were not reported correctly. As a 
result, delivery statistics remained out of date, sometimes by up to six to seven months. To 
exacerbate the situation, local Bürgermeisters had yet to impose a severe penalty on delinquent 
farmers. In response, farmers who met their quotas, the local military government office reported 
in May, “are considered as silly” and laughed at by their neighbors.
84
 Two months later, Captain 
Robert MacWhorter further described the chaotic system. “There is no uniformity in the 
assignment of quotas among the various gemeinde,” he explained. In addition, the records of the 
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Similar complaints about the food system littered American reports throughout Bavaria. 
The chaotic and inefficient methods of collecting food simply exacerbated the fact that western 
Germany was now “one of the great food-deficit areas of the world.”
86
 Without greater 
efficiency in the Bavarian system, any attempts to mitigate the impact of American policy in 
Germany would face an uphill battle. This reality increasingly frustrated military government 
officials committed to ending the food crisis in Bavaria as rapidly as possible. It would remain a 
next to impossible task if the Bavarian system remained an unorganized and inefficient mess.  
Americans in military government also expressed rising frustration with Bavarians of all 
stripes. Bavarian officials from all levels of government received substantial amounts of 
criticism. From Berchtesgaden, Major Perman complained, “The food situation in this Landkreis 
is critical and that condition is contributed to by community official connivance to avoid 
compliance with delivery quotas…” The Bürgermeisters were “solely responsible” for the 
farmer’s “outright refusal to comply with the quotas.” In the small community of Piding, for 
example, the Bürgermeister, after the Food Ministry rejected his requests for reduced quotas, 
authorized local farmers to not comply based on the “mere contention that the full quota could 
not be met.”
87
 Military government officials also repeatedly highlighted the fact that the 
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Bürgermeisters were elected officials and therefore reluctant to take any actions that might anger 
their constituents, such as imposing fines for hoarding of foodstuffs.
88
 
American frustration, however, was not limited to local officials. Increasingly, they 
complained about the inaction of Land-level officials, especially within the government. The 
Minister of Food and Agriculture, Dr. Josef Baumgartner, attracted much of their focus, but all 
officials received some complaints. For example, on 12 August 1947 General Muller chastised 
Dr. Hans Ehard, the Bavarian Minister President, for his government’s failure to “effectively” 
deal with the problem of food hoarding. According to Muller, “It is evident that the Economics 
Ministry has not attacked this problem with the tenacity and sincerity necessary to obtain 
satisfactory results.” To address the issue, Muller “suggested” that Ehard “give this matter your 
personal attention.”
89
 Four months later the new Military Governor for Bavaria, Murray van 
Wagoner, also expressed his frustration with the Bavarian government. Even though military 
government had spent considerable time trying to increase the amount of land devoted to 
consumption crops such as wheat and potatoes, Bavarian farmers continued to plant 
approximately the same hectarage. Van Wagoner then pushed Ehard to expand the regulatory 




Meanwhile the conflict between American and Bavarian officials over who determined 
the severity of the food crisis continued. Competing crop yield estimates produced one source of 
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conflict. In early June OMGB commissioned two separate surveys, one for crops and one for 
livestock in Bavaria. Each military government detachment investigated at least five farms in 
their Landkreis to determine planting levels and compare the livestock population with the 
numbers reported for the 3 June livestock census.
91
 Then in September OMGB complained about 
German yield estimates for bread grains and potatoes. Military government surveys on grains 
established “that the German yield estimates were much too low.” Additionally, the Americans 
expected that German estimates of the potato crop would also be low. An underestimate of just 
twenty doppelzentner (100 kg) per hectare, General Muller warned, represented the possible 
illegal disappearance of 1.3 million tons of potatoes, valued at $20.6 million, in the combined 
US-UK zones. In addition, accurate crop estimates remained vital to set fair delivery quotas. 
Therefore, OMGB ordered military government detachments to conduct yet another crop yield 
survey.
92
 The Americans’ rising frustration with German officials carried over into the fight over 
crop yield estimates. Military government officials suspected that the Bavarians might be 
purposefully underestimating crop yields to keep more food in Bavaria instead of shipping it to 
other regions of western Germany. 
The conflict between the Americans and the Bavarians grew more pronounced as they 
struggled over who got to define the severity of the crisis. In particular, the Bavarian Minister of 
Food and Agriculture, Dr. Baumgartner, pushed back against the American view of the food 
shortages. In an 11 September memo to Ehard, and that was subsequently forwarded to OMGB, 
Baumgartner described a near apocalyptic situation. The drought plaguing Bavaria had 
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“influenced the supply of the Bavarian population with food to an alarming degree.” According 
to the Food Minister, the bread grain crop – wheat and rye – was twenty-eight percent smaller 
than the 1946 crop, which meant that Bavaria could not meet its quota of 410,000 tons for the 
year. In addition, potatoes posed “the most serious problem of the supply to come.” German 
estimates placed the 1947 crop at fifty percent of the 1946 harvest and Baumgartner warned that 
Bavaria might run out of potatoes in January or February 1948. The meat supply also presented a 
major challenge. A livestock reduction program, designed to reduce the hectarage needed to 
grow fodder crops, meant that tens of thousands of cattle, pigs, and sheep would flood the market 
in the coming months. Bavaria, however, lacked the supplies necessary to lay “ample stores” of 
meat for the winter months. Baumgartner estimated the Land needed 70 million steel cans for 
storage, but only possessed some two million and lacked the sheet metal required to make more. 
“If it were not for the grain imports the American Military Government is placing at our disposal 
in a high-hearted manner,” the Food Minister wrote, “the situation would be truly desperate.” 
Indeed, he urged the Minister President to intervene with the Americans to secure greater 




A few days later George Quarles, head of OMGB’s Food and Agriculture Branch, wrote 
a detailed response to Baumgartner’s apocalyptic description. Quarles recognized the situation 
remained perilous, but he insisted that the Bavarian overstated the seriousness of the situation. 
Citing surveys conducted by military government offices, the American argued that the bread 
grain crop should total 500,000 tons, not the 410,000 reported by Baumgartner. Yet again 
diverging yield estimates shaped the conflict between American and Bavarian officials. In terms 
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of potatoes, Quarles admitted that the drought affected the harvest, but he insisted it was not the 
full story. Bavarian farmers did not “come anywhere near” the planting quota of 394,000 
hectares, instead planting just 224,000 hectares. If the farmers had planted according to plan, 
Quarles argued, “there would be sufficient potatoes in spite of the drought.” As for the storage of 
meat during the winter months, the military government official insisted that Bavaria was 
allocated six million steel cans and 2,000 tons of sheet metal, enough for some 25 million cans.
94
 
Quarles clearly did not accept Baumgartner’s description of the situation. The situation remained 
precarious, but Quarles and the Americans believed that the Bavarians exaggerated the 
seriousness of the situation as an attempt to skirt responsibility for fulfilling their assigned 
quotas. 
As winter approached, Baumgartner continued to push back against the American vision 
of the food crisis. In early November military government ordered the Food Minister to ship 
126,000 tons of potatoes to Württemberg-Baden and another 8,000 tons to Hesse. Baumgartner 
complied, but complained to the Süddeutsche Zeitung that “the Bavarian potato supply will break 
down right away by compliance with the Frankfurt directive.”
95
 The following month he 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the order that provided displaced persons with three times the 
amount of potatoes as the rest of the Bavarian populace. Bavaria remained 100,000 tons short of 
its requirements for the winter, particularly in northern Bavaria where Erlangen received just 
thirty percent of its allotted potatoes and Bamberg forty percent. Instead of giving the DPs 
preferential treatment, Baumgartner proposed that DPs and civilians receive the same potato 
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 The Americans, however, refused to implement Baumgartner’s proposals; displaced 
persons continued to receive preferential treatment. Throughout 1947, then, the Food Minister 
pushed back against the constraints imposed by military government and challenged the 
American view of the food crisis. He insisted it was more severe than the American recognized 
and called for new policies that let the Bavarians keep more of their food.  
Military government, however, resisted and reasserted their definition of the situation: 
they acknowledged major problems, but insisted that Bavarians were partly to blame for their 
own predicament. The building frustration with obstinate farmers and Bürgermeisters 
undoubtedly influenced this point of view. After months of dealing with farmers who hoarded 
food and Bavarian officials who refused to punish them, Americans like George Quarles refused 
to let the Bavarians redefine the scope of the crisis. Indeed, the Americans also pushed back 
against the attempts of Baumgartner, the Bürgermeisters, and farmers. For example, military 
government enacted a new policy that reduced the imports of any Land that did not meet its 
quotas. If Bavaria was ten percent behind on its quotas, Bavaria would receive ten percent fewer 
imports. Then on 14 November a frustrated General Clay, in a telephone conversation with 
General Muller, expressed his frustration with the Bavarians, who were slow in following the 
order to ship potatoes to Württemberg-Baden and Hesse. He proclaimed he would not “ship one 
pound of American food into Bavaria if the Germans do not do their part.” Baumgartner, Clay 
fumed, was denying a direct order and that the Bavarians “playing a very destructive game if 
they do want their share of food.”
97
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While the higher-ups responded to Baumgartner, the military government detachments 
upped the pressure on the Bürgermeisters. In a speech to local officials, the MGO of Landkreis 
Schwabach, Major Lund, insisted that “you and you alone will be held responsible in case 
disaster should overtake you, your families, and your country.” Military government, the major 
explained, had done its part; 454,000 tons of food arrived in western Germany from the U.S. 
during September 1947 alone. Now it was time for the Bürgermeisters to cooperate with the food 
program. “You and only you can stave off disaster,” the American proclaimed.
98
 This language 
reflected the American preference to turn responsibility over to the Bavarians. Yet its insistent 
tone was symptomatic of the rising frustration of many American military government officials. 
MGOs wanted to address the food crisis, yet Bavarian authorities and farmers, in American eyes, 
refused to cooperate. 
The conflict between the Americans and the Bavarians grew in significance as the food 
situation worsened over the course of 1947 and early 1948. One of the most pressing issues was 
a major drought throughout Bavaria during the summer months. The drought, one of the worst in 
recent memory, negatively affected crops throughout Bavaria. In August, the head of Nürnberg’s 
Food Office reported that the hot, dry weather caused “heavy damage” to crops, especially wheat 
and rye, in the areas surrounding the city. Johann Kurz, a farmer from the town of Altdorf, 
similarly warned that the potato crop “can only be saved by sufficient rain during the next two 
weeks.”
99
 City officials in Munich also described weather characterized by “excessive heat and 
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 Responding to the warning of Bavarian officials, George Quarles, head of 
OMGB’s Food and Agriculture Branch, warned General Muller that the drought would reduce 
Bavaria’s harvest by thirty to forty percent from the 1946 harvest. If that happened, Quarles 
explained, not only would Bavaria be unable to export food, the Land would also require 
extensive imports to ward off starvation.
101
 
Expecting shortages due to drought and hoarding by farmers, military government 
officials imposed new controls on deliveries made by farmers. Assigned a potato quota of 
1,162,600 metric tons for 1947-1948, OMGB urged military government officers to increase 
their pressure on local Bavarians. MGOs were to hold meetings with all involved local officials 
to ensure that farmers received their individual quotas and that the farmers then delivered their 
full quota. In addition, OMGB established aggressive deadlines for food deliveries. By 31 
October Bavarian farmers needed to deliver forty percent of the grain crop and sixty percent of 
the potato crop. The full potato crop was then due by 30 November, while seventy-five percent 
of the grain harvest was due on 31 December and the full quota on 28 February 1948.
102
 
Despite these ambitious goals, food collections and deliveries once again lagged behind 
schedule during the fall and winter months. Some Bavarian communities did meet their quotas 
on time, but many others fell behind early on and struggled to keep up. For example, on 1 
December the Landkreis Regensburg met just 52.7 percent of its bread grain quota (7,371 tons 
out of 13,966 tons). More significantly, the Kreis’ potato deliveries amounted to a mere 51.7 
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percent (15,748 tons out of 30,450 tons), even though the full quota was due on 30 November.
103
 
By the New Year, Regensburg did manage to deliver seventy-five percent of its assigned bread 
grain quota as OMGB wished. However, potato collections remained far behind schedule with 
only 60.8 percent delivered.
104
 As the end of winter approached and weather improved, 
Regensburg’s food collections remained deficient. The Kreis delivered 18,663 tons of the 
required 20,240 tons of wheat, good for 92.2 percent of the quota, but had managed just 64.1 
percent of the potato quota.
105
 The reluctance of many Bavarian farmers to meet their full quotas, 
as we shall see, played a key role in lagging deliveries, but several other factors also contributed 
to the problem. Electrical shortages during the late summer and early fall limited the amount of 
threshing hat could occur on farms, which held back large portions of the bread grain crop.
106
 In 
addition, the winter of 1947 and 1948 was particularly severe, which limited the transportation of 
food and also encouraged additional hoarding by farmers. 
Because of lagging deliveries, major food shortages threatened the whole of Bavaria. In 
particular, the urban areas of the Land faced a potentially crippling potato shortage. By early 
November the city of Nürnberg received a mere twenty-five percent of the potatoes required for 
winter storage. The Social Democrat and Communist factions of the city council “violently 
criticized” the perceived inactivity of the Bavarian government and even mulled over requesting 
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military government to take the collection of foodstuffs into its own hands.
107
 Meanwhile, Dr. 
Baumgartner and the Bavarian Farmers Association issued a direct plea to farmers. Baumgartner 
recognized that the summer drought had had a “fatal effect” but the Food Minister requested that 
farmers do “something” to keep city residents from starving, such as delivering a quarter of the 
potato ration entitled to farmers (50 kg or one zentner). “Think of the old and sick people in the 
cities,” Baumgartner pleaded, “think of the children, think of the working population in the cities 
which every day need their daily bread!”
108
 
The renewed food crisis posed significant health problems throughout the American 
zone, including Bavaria. By the middle of 1947 the average German weight reached its lowest 
point, according to military government street surveys. Women weighed an average of 118.7 
pounds and the average weight for men was 134.5 pounds. In addition, the postwar mortality rate 
peaked in 1947 due, in part, to the severity of the food crisis. According to Lieutenant Colonel 
Walter DeForest, the mortality rate reached 15.4 per 1,000 in late 1947 before it began a slow 
decline.
109
 Figures from the German Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung, however, place 
the crude death rate as high as 20 deaths per 1,000 in 1946 and 1947.
110
 Additionally, the infant 
mortality rate remained much higher than during prewar years. Before the war, the national 
infant mortality rate was approximately 60 deaths per 1,000 births. By 1947 that figure spiked to 
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Coupled with these persistent health problems, the potato crisis and other food shortages 
contributed to rising tensions between Americans and Bavarians during the fall and winter 
months. Military government officials recognized the severity of the crisis, but remained 
frustrated with German officials and farmers. Indeed, Americans often stressed that the 
Bavarians had only themselves to blame for the severity of the situation facing them. On 16 
January, Murray Van Wagoner, the new military governor of Bavaria, took that position in a 
letter to the Bayrischer Städteverband. According to Van Wagoner, OMGB was “profoundly 
concerned with the problems of providing adequate food to the cities of Bavaria,” so much so 
that it imported 469,467 tons of food into Bavaria during 1947. The Bavarian government 
deserved its fair share of blame for the current potato shortage, but the military governor also 
placed the blame on the Bavarians themselves. Farmers failed to meet the planting quota for 
1947, for example, and planted seventy-one percent of the hectares allotted for potatoes. They 
also did not collect the entire crop as deliveries of grain and potatoes were some forty-five 
percent behind military government crop yield estimates. Van Wagoner, expressing American 
frustration with Bavarians of all stripes, concluded, “Apparent disregard for both planting and 
collection quotas for potatoes and a decrease in total land under cultivation in times like this 
must be accepted not only as a failure in the responsibility of the Bavarian Government, but of 
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large numbers of farmers, workers, and other segments of the Bavarian people.”
112
 The shortages 
of late 1947 and 1948, along with the severe winter, exacerbated the tensions between military 
government officials and the Bavarians they dealt with on a daily basis. 
American frustration with Bavarian farmers and officials was heightened by the 
continued sympathy for the plight of Bavaria’s urban residents. On top of major food shortages, 
city dwellers still faced lackluster housing, inconsistent work, and devastated communities. 
Walter Krause, now assigned to a military government position in Munich, expressed admiration 
for the resiliency of the city’s population. “They work for little money, they connive, they have 
become shrewd,” he wrote, “because their existence depends upon these things, their skill. Their 
guile…One cannot quite forget that these people are human and that they have life and feelings, 
after all.”
113
 For Americans like Krause, the continued suffering of Bavaria’s cities provided 
stark evidence of the crippling food crisis. Meanwhile, Bavarian farmers possessed what seemed 
like an abundance of food. Hans Speier, describing a visit to a small town outside of Munich in 
early 1948, wrote, “Indeed, there was excellent food in abundance…I was almost shocked by the 
heaps of food on the table.”
114
 For MGOs, therefore, the obstinacy of officials and farmers, 
particularly in light of farmers’ relative food security, exacerbated American sympathy for urban 
Bavarians and exacerbated tensions between the occupiers and the occupied.  
Meanwhile, the pervasive black market took on new life due to the severity of the 
renewed food crisis. For those Bavarians with the available cash, the black market provided 
access to much needed food and other supplies. Prices, however, skyrocketed as the crisis 
deepened, inflation expanded, and confidence in the Reichsmark plummeted. By the end of 
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September, Major John Rey reported that the monthly value of black market dealings in 
Regensburg approached one to two million Reichsmarks. Coffee cost 300 RM per pound, sugar 
sold for 80 RM a pound, and the cost of a pound of butter jumped to 200 RM.
115
 In Dachau the 
new military government officer, Captain George Jacobson, noted in January 1948 that the black 
market was almost “completely impossible to suppress.” Additionally, he mused that “the only 
persons in the [Landkreise] who do not engage in some black market activities are those persons 
in jail.” As a result, prices in Dachau remained sky high; a kilogram of coffee ran anywhere from 
500 to 600 RM, while butter cost 400 RM per kilo.
116
 The problems with the black market grew 
so pervasive that General Clay issued yet another injunctive against American participation in 
the illegal economy. “Utilization of the black market,” Clay wrote, “indicates a lack of respect 
for our own regulations and sets a bad example for the German people.” It also undermined 
attempts to reconstruct the German economy. For these reasons, Clay urged his subordinate 
commanders to utilize “all available means” to combat the black market. Military personnel 
participating in the black market would be shipped to the United States, while American civilians 
engaged in similar activities could be forcibly removed from the American occupation zone.
117
 
The stubborn persistence and rising prices of the black market demonstrated the continued 
severity of the food crisis facing American military government officials in Bavaria. As long as 
shortages remained, however, Bavarians and enterprising Americans would violate official 
regulations to secure much needed foodstuffs and other supplies. 
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Going into the 1948 planting season it appeared that little had been accomplished in 
Bavaria in the nearly three years since the end of the war. Indeed, a new shortage of meat added 
to the problems already posed by the lack of bread grains and potatoes. This deficit of meat, in 
many ways, was symptomatic of the problems still defining the food situation in occupied 
Bavaria. It also demonstrated the rut that the Americans fell into when it came to solving the 
food crisis. Once again, military government launched a collections drive and used indirect 
pressure on Bavarian officials to encourage compliance. To solve the “critical” meat shortage, in 
late February 1948 the Bizonal agencies in Frankfurt assigned Bavaria a quota of 156,447 tons, 
including 67,184 tons for export to other regions of Germany. Under the plan established by 
OMGB and scheduled to begin at the start of March, German officials retained primary 
responsibility, while American MGOs were tasked with organizing meetings between the 
appropriate local officials, overseeing the establishment of a meat collection committee, 
conducting spot checks of farms, and applying indirect pressure on Bavarians to comply with the 
program. One new measure demonstrated the seriousness with which OMGB viewed the 
situation: under some circumstances troops from the U.S. Constabulary, the law enforcement 
branch of the American Zone, were authorized to protect American or Bavarian personnel. 
However, American troops could not actually confiscate livestock. Kenneth Ingwalson, the new 
head of OMGB’s Food and Agriculture Branch, recognized that “this is not a popular program” 
but insisted “feeding people cannot wait: action must be taken now.”
118
 
Kenneth Ingwalson was symptomatic of the type of civilian that OMGB liked to hire for 
work on issues such as agriculture. Born in Little Falls, Minnesota, Ingwalson earned a 
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bachelor’s degree in agricultural science from the University of Minnesota in 1931.
119
 He 
worked with for the University Department of Agriculture after graduation as an educational 
agent for a variety of programs, including efforts to eradicate the barberry. He then served on the 
state’s 4-H staff, coordinating activities for clubs throughout southern Minnesota.
120
 After 
several years of working in Minnesota, Ingwalson became the state director of New Jersey’s 4-H 
program.
121
 During World War II he wrote several pamphlets for the Extension Service of the 
Department of Agriculture on youth leadership and agricultural education.
122
 Based on his 
extensive experience in rural agricultural issues, OMGB hired him to work in their Food and 
Agriculture Branch (ultimately renamed the Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division). As the 
occupation progressed, OMGB hired larger numbers of civilian experts to staff their branches or 
divisions, believing their knowledge and experience valuable in devastated Bavaria. These 
civilian experts, while important, often differed from the MGOs that ran individual detachments. 
Both groups embraced the pragmatism of the Army, but MGOs were often undertrained, did not 
possess the expertise of their civilian counterparts, and lacked significant familiarity with 
German society, including the ability to speak German. Some military government officers 
gained that experience if they stayed in the country long enough, but high levels of personnel 
turnover made such a task difficult. Therefore, experts like Ingwalson were needed to provide 
guidance to the over-burdened MGOs. 
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The new collection program promoted by Ingwalson initially succeeded at raising the 
collection cattle, sheep, and pigs throughout Bavaria. During the first week of March Bavaria 
collected an estimated 8,000 head of livestock, compared to the 7,693 collected during the first 
week of February. Then another 16,000 head of livestock arrived during the third week of 
March, some 7,000 more than during the third week of the previous month.
123
 Despite this 
significant increase, many communities throughout Bavaria quickly fell behind, just as they did 
with grain and potato deliveries. In Landkreis Wolfstein, for example, the local farmers fell 
behind before the month of March even ended. For the month, the Kreis received quotas 109.9 
tons for cattle and 15.84 tons for pigs. Yet by 22 March local farmers provided just eighty-nine 
head of cattle weighing 32.141 tons and a single pig that came in at 0.07 tons.
124
 Similarly, Kreis 
Nürnberg quickly ran up significant deficits. During March a mere twenty-one head of cattle, 
with a total weight of 5.289 tons, were collected against a quota of ninety head, while farmers 
delivered a grand total of two head of swine against a quota of 268.
125
 
Growing dissatisfaction among the Bavarian population exacerbated the difficulties 
posed by the shortages of potatoes, grain, and meat. Farmers and rural officials resented the 
planting and delivery quotas, especially when they saw the quotas as patently unrealistic. Herr 
Höldermann, head of the Food Office A that oversaw Nürnberg and the surrounding farming 
communities, called the new meat quotas established in March 1948 “quite unreasonable” and 
predicted that they would be “impossible to fill.” He argued that fulfilling the quota would 
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essentially mean exterminating the pig population in his region and therefore appealed to 
military government for relief from the quotas. Local MGOs simply advised him to meet the first 
month’s quota and then to appeal to the Bavarian Food Ministry for relief. Höldermann 
acquiesced but warned that “our new democracy would…lose face” when it became apparent the 
quotas were unenforceable.
126
 Captain George Jacobson reported similar resistance from the 
Bürgermeisters in Dachau. Due to upcoming local elections, the Bavarian officials were reluctant 
to support any program so unpopular with their constituents.
127
 Hans Schlange-Schöningen, a 
lobbyist for German farmers, defended the plight of farmers in early February 1948. “It is well 
known in what a desolate condition the farms are, all, without exception,” he explained. The 
“most basic things” – spades, ploughs, work clothes, shoes – were missing. Modern farming 
equipment, such as threshing machines, were even rarer. Schange-Schöningen continued, “How 
should the farmer deliver his grain in time, if he is forced to wait perhaps for weeks for some 
threshing machine which may still be around somewhere?” Despite the difficulties, he lamented, 
“the public will blame it on the farmers again.”
128
 
Meanwhile, urban residents grew increasingly resentful of the ever-present food 
shortages plaguing their cities. Industrial workers began a series of strikes or work slowdowns to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction. In Nürnberg the employees of MAN Machine Factories and a 
few other smaller businesses, for example, refused to work a full 45-hour week for more than a 
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month to protest declining rations.
129
 Even students voiced their frustration to military 
government officials. In an unsigned resolution that circulated at OMGB during the spring of 
1948, Bavarian students proclaimed, “We demonstrate against hunger and against those who 
administer hunger.” Raising the specter of communist radicalization, the students requested 
“immediate help so that we do not rot away in misery and apathy or are driven into the arms of 
fanatically radical forces.” Finally, they criticized the “easy-going indifference” of German 
officials who did little to solve the food shortages facing Bavaria.
130
  
The resistance of students, workers, farmers, and local officials highlighted a key issue 
raised by the food crises that roiled Bavaria: the food problems threatened to undermine the 
larger goals of the occupation, namely creating a democratic Germany. The constant focus on 
food issues, although desperately important, distracted from other critical issues, including the 
American efforts at denazification and democratization. Additionally, the conflict between 
Americans and Bavarians over the scope of the crisis and how best to solve it soured the 
relationship between the two groups, at least temporarily, and limited their ability to cooperate 
on other issues. It is no coincidence that OMGB’s campaign of reorientation (covered in Chapter 
Four) did not begin in force until the food situation in Bavaria was stabilized. The renewed crisis 
of 1947 and early 1948, the worst since 1945, posed a major challenge. Even as American policy 
shifted in the aftermath of Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech, the crisis brought American and Bavarian 
frustrations to the fore. MGOs no longer had to circumvent US policy directives, yet they now 
faced an increasingly frustrated Bavarian populace that resented the continued crisis. As the 
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spring planting season of 1948 approached there appeared no end in sight to the crisis, but within 
a year both Americans and Bavarians could put the years of crisis behind them. 
Away from Crisis, 1948-1949 
Early spring 1948 did not look promising for the food supply of Bavaria. The Land had 
experienced one of the coldest winters on record after a summer drought had wreaked havoc on 
the crops of farmers. Additionally, tensions between Americans and Bavarians reached a high 
point as both sides competed over who defined the severity of the food crisis. Despite the 
negative outlook, the food situation improved rapidly in 1948. Food shortages remained 
throughout the next twelve months, but an excellent harvest and improving relations between 
military government and their Bavarian counterparts signaled an improving situation. 
Additionally, the much-needed introduction of the Deutschmark in June 1948 provided some 
semblance of economic stability, while the announcement of the Marshall Plan provided 
unmistakable evidence of the shift in American policy. As a result, MGO efforts abandoned 
attempts to mitigate US policy. No longer challenging the will of Washington, Americans in 
Bavaria spent most of their time prodding Bavarians to comply with military government 
measures to address the food crisis. In American eyes, the Bavarians no longer took the 
shortages seriously. Nevertheless, an improved food situation characterized the last twelve 
months of the occupation and provided reasons for optimism. 
By summer 1948 the food situation improved significantly. Early in the year such 
improvement appeared far away. Yet there were a several changes that laid the foundation for a 
quick turnaround. Dr. Alois Schlögl took over as Food Minister, replacing the rebellious Dr. 
Baumgartner, who had served as an irritant for most of the past year. Military government 
officials believed that Schlögl would at the least be less hostile than Baumgartner and welcomed 
136 
 
the change. In addition, the Americans and Bavarians agreed to conduct a combined crop yield 
estimate during July. This would, hopefully, remove one of the sources of irritation between the 
occupiers and occupied: differing expectations from each year’s harvest.
131
 Some of the sources 
of disagreement between the two camps were now gone and the foundation laid for a solution to 
the food crisis. 
 By the late spring and early summer, it appeared that a solution was at hand. Food 
planting and collections were more organized than at any previous time in the occupation. MGOs 
continued their indirect approach to encouraging deliveries, but the Bavarian government, 
especially under the new food minister, took a more active role in solving the crisis. In early 
April, for example, the Ministry of Food released a detailed “Kartoffel Anbauplan” to raise the 
planting and production of potatoes for the upcoming year. To meet the planning goal of 395,000 
hectares, Schlögl proposed a “sign-up campaign,” educational programs, and a new incentive 
program where farmers received an allotment of sugar for each hectare of potatoes planted and 
then bonuses for meeting or exceeding their individual quota. Murray Van Wagoner called on all 
military government officials to “support this program and give the best kind of enthusiastic 
leadership to it.” To do so, Americans drew upon the familiar playbook of organizing meetings 
with local officials, conducting spot checks, exerting indirect pressure on Bavarians, and 
generally demonstrating their support of the program.
132
 While the potato program fit into the 
established pattern, military government also created a “good will garden” program to 
supplement the official rations received by Bavarians. Since many Germans received few 
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vegetables, OMGB encouraged Americans throughout Bavaria to let civilians plant and cultivate 
small vegetable gardens in any unused land surrounding requisitioned homes or billets. It was 
important, Van Wagoner noted, “to encourage greater production wherever possible.”
133
 This 
program did just that, as the Americans wringed out calories wherever possible in occupied 
Bavaria. 
 These efforts seemingly payed off as reports of a fantastic crop flooded into military 
government offices throughout Bavaria. Gone was the crippling drought and heat of the previous 
summer. Instead, temperatures were cooler than average and rainfall was seventy-five percent 
above normal levels.
134
 By late August, Kenneth Ingwalson estimated a bread grain crop of 
nearly one million metric tons, a 125 percent of all 1947 production. Similarly, estimates for 
potato production skyrocketed to 4,620,000 tons, an increase of nearly 1,400,000 tons over the 
previous year’s crop. Without any evidence to back up his speculation, Ingwalson warned that 
these estimates could be ten percent below actual production.
135
 Most likely, the American 
remained suspicious of any numbers reported by Bavarians after the previous year’s conflict over 
crop estimates and due to continue frustration with hoarding by individual farmers. 
 In addition, the problems posed by the black market finally lessened. During mid-April 
prices remained high throughout Bavaria. In Regensburg, the acting MGO, Edward Garrison, 
reported that the price of coffee reached 600 RM per kilogram, while a kilogram of butter went 
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for 360 RM on the black market.
136
 Similarly high prices existed in Dachau. In that Landkreis a 
single kilogram of coffee cost 500 to 700 RM, butter ran 400 RM per kilo, and one liter of 
schnapps sold for up to 450 RM.
137
 However, after the combined British and American zones 
introduced a new currency, the Deutschmark (DM), on 20 June (discussed in the following 
chapter) black market activity and prices dropped significantly. From Dachau, Captain George 
Jacobson reported significantly lower prices throughout the Kreis. Coffee remained the most 
expensive product at 20 DM per kilogram, but butter now cost 9 DM per kilo and the price of a 
kilogram of flour dipped to 3 DM. The Dachau police also estimated, according to Jacobson, that 
black market activity had declined by fifty percent in the month following currency reform.
138
 In 
the small farming community of Mallersdorf outside of Regensburg, MGO William Neil 
reported similar developments. Some illegal buying and selling continued, but prices were far 
below legal prices. In essence, he explained, “black-market activity has practically ceased after 
the currency reform.”
139
 The same trend held true for the city of Regensburg itself. On 20 June, 
the cost of coffee on the black market was 700 RM per kilogram and butter sold at 500 RM per 
kilogram. Just eight days later those prices plummeted to 25 DM and 10 DM, respectively.
140
 
Currency reform did not eliminate the black market; as many Americans had noted since 1945, 
only the return of a normal and healthy economy could do that. However, a new, stable currency 
restored German confidence and channeled black market activity back into the formal economy. 
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Bavarian farmers now had a significant economic incentive to comply with their production 
quotas and to stop hoarding. A weakened black market, therefore, stabilized the food situation 
and made it appear as if the years of crisis had passed. 
 Indeed, official rations and the quantity of food available through legal channels 
increased throughout the summer. In mid-July Ingwalson predicted that world food production, 
the Marshall Plan, and Bavarian production would make a standard ration of 1,800 to 2,000 
calories possible in the near future.
141
 Expanding production and delivery numbers seemingly 
backed up Ingwalson’s optimistic attitude. During July cattle deliveries jumped an astounding 
183 percent over the previous month, in part due to currency reform. Butter and cheese 
production also rose by 91 and 71.6 percent, respectively. Even vegetables, which had been in 
rare supply for months, existed in “abundance…all over.”
142
 Higher official rations quickly 
resulted from this significant uptick in food production. During July, the average Bavarian 
received over 1,900 calories per day from their official ration, which was some 600 calories 
more than the June ration and 725 calories higher than in May. Additionally, many Bavarians 
could supplement their ration with 250 to 350 calories from unrationed fruits, vegetables, and 
other goods.
143
 By late August the glut of available food decreased somewhat and official rations 
declined, but the authorized ration for September remained far higher than during the winter at 
1,845 calories. Taken together, July, August, and September represented the highest rations since 
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 To many Bavarians, and some Americans, the food crisis appeared, 
miraculously, over. Due to better weather and currency reform the production and delivery of 
food skyrocketed during the summer. Rations remained below the 2,500 to 2,800 calories that 
military government hoped to ultimately achieve, but after the major food shortages of the 
previous three years the crisis appeared gone. 
 Despite the improvement in the food situation, or because of it, a variety of problems 
remained. Farmers, for example, struggled with falling prices for agricultural goods while the 
prices for consumer goods steadily increased. Official prices for potatoes dropped from 16 DM 
per zentner (50 kg) to 14.5 DM, so if Bavarian producers wished to sell for higher prices they 
had to participate in the black market.
145
 A German clerk in the farming community of 
Mallersdorf, E. Hans Krista, sounded the warning about falling agricultural prices and the rising 
prices of consumer goods during September 1948. Prices for machines, clothing, and fertilizer, 
Krista explained, were “substantially raised” in the aftermath of currency reform. The price of 
nitrogen fertilizer in Mallersdorf shot up nearly 200 percent. Meanwhile, the prices farmers 
received for their goods declined steadily. In mid-September, no farmers in the Kreis received 
more than 3.5 DM per zentner of potatoes, which was well below the official price. The low 
price of wheat, 9 DM per zentner, exacerbated the problem.
146
 The result was a rising cost of 
living and increasingly frustrated farmers. In Freising the Landrat reported that the rural 
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population resented continued price control on agricultural products limited their income while 
de-rationed industrial products for farming, like fertilizer, skyrocketed in price.
147
 The Bizonal 
agencies in Frankfurt raised official prices in mid-October as a response to the complaints of 
farmers; the price of wheat and rye rose by nearly 26 percent, while the price for cattle also rose 
by 33 percent.
148
 These measures provided much-needed relief for Bavaria farmers, yet their 
frustration remained as occupation authorities de-rationed larger numbers of industrial goods but 
kept agricultural products under strict controls. 
 While farmers dealt with declining prices for their goods, urban residents faced rising 
food prices as food wholesalers sought to maximize their profit from the expanding supply of 
foodstuffs. Just as the prices paid for agricultural products could not keep up with rising prices, 
urban wages stagnated as the price of food in cities rose. The hardest hit, the working class, 
offered the most vocal protests. On 21 August, a public meeting of the Bavarian Trade Union in 
Kelheim railed against the black market and high prices. One Herr Wolf, a Landtag deputy and a 
secretary of the Bayerischer Gewerkschaftbund of Niederbayern-Oberpfalz, criticized the “price 
dictatorship” of food dealers and producers. Wolf called for strict price caps and severe 
punishments against any business that violated them.
149
 Then in October all butchers in the 
Landkreise of Berchtesgaden, Traunstein, and Laufen announced they would close from 18 
October to 1 November to protest high meat prices, which often sold for twice the legal price.
150
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The result, like the situation with the farmers, was a rising dissatisfaction among urban residents. 
Many blamed black marketers, the Bavarian government, and OMGB for their plight, but 
increasingly the non-agricultural population blamed the farmers for the food situation. The 
improving food situation probably exacerbated this frustration. Bavarians of all stripes simply 
wanted a return to normal and the relatively prosperous summer months made it appear that a 
sense of normalcy would soon return. Continued rationing and price fluctuations, however, 
dampened their collective mood. 
 Continued tension between American and Bavarian officials also remained. In the eyes of 
most military government officials, the Bavarians got complacent at the first sign of prosperity. 
According to this line of thought, the rapid improvement in the food situation during the summer 
convinced the Bavarians that the worst of the food situation was over and now American 
authorities had to remind the German population that food problems remained. American 
complaints about Bavarian complacency began as early as the end of the September. On 29 
September Ingwalson warned that the food situation remained “critical” because military 
government still imported sixty percent of the grain required in western Germany. Potato 
shortages the following spring also threatened if the excellent potato harvest was not properly 
stored for the winter.
151
 A month later the American again sounded alarm. “Deep roads are being 
made into Bavaria’s food supply,” Ingwalson explained, and rations could drop to 1,300 or 1,400 
calories. Yet key Bavarian figures appeared not to take the situation serious. Food Minister 
Schlögl, for example, proclaimed, “The former manner of compulsory…controls can no longer 
be maintained.” Additionally, the president of the Bavarian Farmer’s Association wrote to 
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Schlögl: “Don’t run after controls – you can’t catch them any longer.”
152
 Comments such as 
these demonstrated to Ingwalson that Bavarian officials were complacent and unprepared for the 
approaching winter. 
 Unlike Baumgartner, however, Schlögl did not aggressively push back against this 
American conceptualization of the food problem. In late October, the Food Minister addressed a 
crowd at a meeting in Nürnberg. He recognized the growing concerns with the new 
Deutschmark, particularly the uneven circulation of the new currency, and criticized the Bizonal 
agencies in Frankfurt for not consulting the ministers in each Land before issuing their 
directives. Schlögl even explained his distaste for government controls, but acknowledged their 
necessity at the present. Since the “welfare of the State” was at stake, the situation required the 
“severest rationing.”
153
 The new Food Minister clearly possessed his own reservations about the 
food shortages, but he did not embrace the rebelliousness associated with his predecessor and 
limited the scope of the renewed tension between the Americans and the Bavarians. 
 Nevertheless, American frustration with the Bavarian population grew yet again. An 
Ingwalson speech circulated to MGOs in early November gave voice to this tension. In the 
speech, given at a series of reorientation meetings addressing the food situation, Ingwalson was 
blunt. Addressing his German audience, he said: “Many Bavarians have come to believe that the 
really serious food shortage ended with currency reform. Right now I want to say in very plain 
language to all Bavarians that the food shortage is not over.” Expressing his frustration, he 
emphasized that while the United State continued to import food to Bavaria many Germans 
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participated in the black market, thereby exacerbating food shortages.
154
 As the Food, 
Agriculture, and Forestry Branch explained to MGOs in December, “M[ilitary] G[overnment] 
has done its part; it is now up to the Bavarians.”
155
 
 Several other factors drove American frustration and posed problems to the food situation 
in Bavaria. German resentment of and resistance to American-sponsored food collection 
programs continued. Farmers and Bürgermeisters still criticized the delivery quotas for grain, 
potatoes, and meat as unrealistic and unfair. One meeting in Nürnberg lambasted the tendency of 
American officials to make promises about improving the food situation but then shift the blame 
to the Bavarian government when their promises fell through. “If the Bavarian government is 
unable to meet the promises made by Military Government,” the meeting’s attendees concluded, 
“it should feel compelled to resign and leave the administration of Germany to American 
Military Government.”
156
 Farmers also complained about their position vis-à-vis other trades and 
industries. Rural Bavarians felt it unfair that Bizonal agencies required them to export food to 
northern Germany, but did not require German industries in cities like Hamburg to send farming 
equipment to Bavaria.
157
 In a similar vein, E. Hans Krista reported from Mallersdorf in late 
November that the local farmers resented that their work remained under strict controls while 
other industries were granted “certain liberties.”
158
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 Lagging food deliveries, despite an excellent crop, undermined the progress made during 
the summer months and contributed to the American frustration with the Bavarian population. 
Food deliveries and collections skyrocketed in the immediate aftermath of currency reform, but 
as the end of 1948 approached collections plummeted. In some cases, they even lagged behind 
the rates for 1947. Delivery problems first appeared in the meat supply during September. 
During the month, voluntary deliveries of meat declined to just 4,000 tons, as compared to the 
8,700 tons delivered during July.
159
 The problem hit all regions of Bavaria and contributed to the 
rising meat prices that led to a strike of butchers in Berchtesgaden. Yet the problem even 
impacted agricultural communities. In Mallersdorf the supply of meat “almost collapsed” by the 
middle of October and few butchers could get meat at “halfway normal prices.” Military 
government attributed the shortages to renewed black market activity, which swallowed up 
enormous quantities of meat and diverted the supply away from legal channels. 
  Bread grain and potato deliveries also proved particularly problematic. On 15 November 
collections stood at an estimated 490,000 tons of potatoes and 135,905 tons of grain. These 
numbers appeared promising but were, in fact, already behind schedule. Bavarian farmers had 
delivered just 18 percent of the yearly grain quota of 763,295 tons, compared to the expected 
total of 30 percent.
160
 To remedy the situation, Food Minister Schlögl implemented new 
measures to secure deliveries of food. Bavarian inspectors, controlled by Munich, would identify 
the farmers with the worst delivery records in each Kreis. The inspectors would then make 
“examples” of the farmers by confiscating their quota, imposing a fine, and then publicizing their 
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 Within the first two weeks of December the Food Ministry confiscated 1,000 
zentners of grain and imposed 30,500 DM worth of fines. Deliveries improved somewhat but 
still lagged far behind stated goals. By 26 December an estimated 324,328 tons of grain and 
36,005 tons of livestock arrived at Bavarian collections points. These totals represented 42 
percent of the quota for both grain and meat, but Bavarian plans called for delivery of 70 percent 
of the grain quota and 58 percent of the meat quota by 31 December.
162
 As deliveries lagged, 
many Americans feared a repeat of the crisis from the previous winter and increased the indirect 
pressure on Bavarian officials and farmers. 
 In January 1949, the Bavarian Food Ministry, prodded by military government, 
introduced yet another new program to spur deliveries of much-need foodstuffs. Ministry 
investigators held meetings with Bürgermeisters to review the delivery records of local farmers. 
Each Bürgermeister was then given three to four days to raise the deliveries for those farmers 
delinquent on their quotas. If the farmers still lagged after that, a new round of confiscations 
would begin. Additionally, the Ministry began a new incentive program. Farmers meeting 80 
percent of their quota could purchase corn as fodder for their animals at a ratio of one ton of corn 
for every two tons delivered. Those farmers who delivered their entire quota received a far more 
favorable ratio: they could buy 1.25 tons of corn fodder for each ton of wheat delivered.
163
 
 Despite the efforts of the Bavarians and the Americans, food deliveries never reached 
their stated goals. In Landkreis Wolfstein Lieutenant Robert Rivet, warned that a mere 60 
                                                 
161
 “The Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Situation,” Issue No. 11, 22 Nov 48, Food, Agriculture, and Forestry 
Situation 1949 Folder, Box 180, 630 (A1): Pub., Dir., & Rel. Rec., 45-49, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA. 
162
 “Collections Progress,” 27 Dec 48, to Land Director, OMGB, from Vernon W. Darter, Food & Agriculture 1 
Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA. 
163
 “The Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Situation,” Issue No. 15, 11 Jan 49, OMGB, Food, Agriculture, and 
Forestry Situation 1949 Folder, Box 180, 630 (A1): Pub., Dir., & Rel. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, 
NARA; “The Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Situation,” Issue No. 16, 20 Jan 49, OMGB, Food, Agriculture, and 




percent of the grain quota would be met that year.
164
 In Mallersdorf the 31 December goal of 70 
percent delivery of the grain quota was not met until the end of February, which was the original 
deadline for full delivery of the bread grain quota in Bavaria.
165
 By the end of March, bread grain 
deliveries in Bavaria totaled 648,600 tons. This number represented 74 percent of expected 
deliveries from July 1948 through March 1949 and 68 percent of the assigned yearly quota. The 
results of the food collection drives of 1948 and 1949 appeared disappointing yet again. Yet 
compared to past crises, the situation had improved. The new deliveries represented 130 percent 
of the total grain delivered during the crisis months of 1947-1948.
166
 Compared to the worst of 
the postwar food shortages, the problems of 1948 and 1949 appeared relatively mild. Americans, 
however, still predicted dire shortages if Bavarians did not fully comply with their delivery 
quotas. Kenneth Ingwalson, for example, warned that the fat ration could drop from 625 grams a 
week to 400 if Bavarian farmers did not fulfill their responsibilities.
167
 Yet the threatened 
shortages never materialized and the lagging collections did not hamper the food situation. 
Instead, the threat of new shortages was used as a tool by some Americans, especially Kenneth 
Ingwalson, to pressure Bavarians into greater compliance with the food delivery programs. 
Ingwalson, after all, had been one of the loudest voices in OMGB criticizing what he perceived 
as Bavarian complacency after currency reform in June 1948. Therefore, the warnings of 
pending food shortages served more as a motivational tool to encourage officials and the 
population to take the food situation serious even as conditions improved significantly. 
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 By the spring of 1949 the overall food situation was far more stable than it had been 
eighteen months before. Collections still lagged, but rations never made a significant drop again 
and actual consumption steadily increased as more food appeared on the market. During April, 
for example, the meat ration increased to 600 grams per week. Meanwhile, “abundant” supplies 
of potatoes meant that urban residents could buy fifty kilograms for as little as 4 DM.
168
 April 
also represented the ninth consecutive month that the official ration met or exceeded 1,800 
calories. During the month, all rationed items were supplied “without difficulty” and the average 
Bavarian could purchase an additional 300 to 500 calories from non-ration fruits, vegetable, 
poultry, or eggs, driving actual consumption to approximately 2,100 calories.
169
 By the time the 
West German Länder approved the Basic Law in May 1949 and the Federal Republic of 
Germany came into existence the food situation in Bavaria reached a new normal. In June, the 
official ration remained above 1,800 calories for the twelfth consecutive month. Potatoes existed 
in “unlimited” quantities and the fat ration stood at 800 grams per week, compared to the meager 
100 grams in May 1948.
170
 Bavarian farmers embraced the return of some sort of normalcy, but 
also pushed for a complete return to normal. Throughout Bavaria they continued to criticize 
ration controls and official prices. While rationing remained and shortages would continue for 
several years, the occupation of shortages was no longer as desperate is it once had been.  
Conclusion 
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 In 1949, the food crises of 1945 through early 1948 appeared far away. Bavaria, and 
occupied Germany as a whole, still faced problems, but no longer did the desperate shortages of 
the early years of the occupation impact day-to-day life in Bavaria. Yet it had been a difficult 
four years for all involved. Urban residents, obviously, faced crippling food shortages that 
largely remained beyond their control. Bavarian farmers struggled to make ends meet in a 
country where low official prices limited their ability to buy desirable and expensive consumer 
goods. They also faced near unrelenting pressure to increase their production since Bavaria was 
now the key to feeding all western Germany. German officials, too, faced a challenging situation. 
Stuck between two separate groups – the Americans and the Bavarian population – they were 
forced to walk a fine line between the two, sometimes pushing back against American demands 
and other times pressuring the population to meet the latest delivery quotas.   
Finally, the food crisis presented the American occupiers with a problem they were little 
prepared to deal with. The depth of the initial crisis, coupled with the punitive aspects of 
American policy towards Germany, nearly overwhelmed military government during 1945 and 
1946, but American authorities ultimately worked out a consistent response to the crisis. Faced 
with a decidedly unmilitary task but sympathetic to the plight of the Bavarian population, 
military government officials placed most of the responsibility for solving the food shortages 
directly in the hands of the Bavarians themselves. Embracing the American policy of returning 
authority to German officials as rapidly as possible allowed MGOs to work around the more 
constricting aspects of US policy. In the name of promoting Bavarian responsibility American 
officials in Bavaria could encourage a minor form of agricultural reconstruction, even before US 
policy shifted. This approach often led to tension between the empowered Germans and their 
occupiers, yet combined with the efforts of policy elites in Frankfurt, Berlin, and Washington, 
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D.C., it successfully stabilized the situation by 1949. The stubborn persistence of American 
military government officers in Bavaria did not solve the problem of food shortages; those would 
exist for several more years. But their efforts did help create a sense of stability that allowed the 




Chapter 3: Rebuilding Bavaria: The Limits of Military Government 
 
“While no extensive economic survey has been possible it is known that extraordinary hardships 
and suffering on the part of the civil population will undoubtedly occur with resultant widespread 
epidemics and political upheavals…” 
- Lt. Col. Eugene Keller, 22 June 19451 
 
“The efficiency and industriousness of the Germans had already produced great changes in the 
past months…Hard work, initiative, and the desire to emerge from the ruins of war were in 
evidence wherever one looked. The Germans were bringing their country out of chaos.” 
- Sgt. Walter Krause2 
 
 
 While American occupation officials coped with the task of feeding the beleaguered 
Bavarian population, they simultaneously faced the arduous task of promoting the economic 
reconstruction of Bavaria. As outlined in the first chapter, the war left the German economy in 
shambles. Years of aerial bombardment and then some six months of intense ground combat 
devastated the foundation of economic life in occupied Germany. Industrial factories throughout 
the country were in ruins. Ravaged transportation networks meant that what little production 
existed could not be transported and that the mutually-dependent regions of the German 
economy did not remain in contact with each other. Without food from the east or Bavaria, the 
industrialized Ruhr faced starvation. And without the coal and basic industrial production from 
the Ruhr, Bavaria confronted economic crisis. Non-existent foreign trade meant that few funds 
existed to pay for the imports of food and raw materials desperately needed to simply ward of 
disaster, let alone rebuild a functioning economy. Coupled with the widespread destruction of 
urban housing and the significant increase in population due to refugees and ethnic German 
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expellees from Eastern Europe, these issues posed a major problem to the Americans tasked with 
overseeing the occupation in Bavaria. 
 From the beginning, however, the avenues of action available to occupation officials 
were circumscribed and what actions they could take often produced limited, or even 
contradictory, results. Early in the occupation, American policy, as outlined in JCS 1076, 
constrained American actions. American policymakers had not yet embraced reconstruction and 
accepted the resuscitation of economic life only to avoid “disease and unrest.” Military 
government officials in Bavaria, however, again circumvented official policy to ward off 
imminent crisis. Convinced that some form of economic reconstruction was necessary to rebuild 
Bavarian society, American officials promoted the revival of basic economic activity and pushed 
production by those industries that could provide needed supplies for the occupying army. These 
activities, nonetheless, were curbed by the American desire to turn over responsibility to the 
Bavarians as quickly as possible. The early efforts at restarting the Bavarian economy, therefore, 
proceeded at fits and starts. While most occupation officials recognized the importance of 
providing basic economic services and consumer goods, the demands of the regular Army often 
undermined the supply of such goods. Additionally, the Americans grew increasingly frustrated 
with the actions of Bavarian officials during this initial period of the occupation, even though 
they wanted Germans to take responsibility for solving their own economic problems. Along 
with the growing problem of refugees and expellees, continued labor shortages, and constant 
rumors that undermined Bavarian morale, economic recovery was minimal during the first 
eighteen months of the occupation, despite the efforts of Bavarian military government officials. 
 Beginning in 1947, with the change in Anglo-American policy, new, more vigorous 
efforts at economic reconstruction appeared. Secretary of State James Byrnes’ “Speech of Hope” 
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in Stuttgart in September 1946 embraced reconstruction and policy, while the economic merger 
of the British and American zones on January 1, 1947, and the announcement of the Marshall 
Plan in April 1948 provided more effective means at rebuilding the German economy. In 
Bavaria, this provided occupation officials with more avenues for reconstruction, but their 
options still remained fairly limited, particularly since the goal of turning over responsibility to 
German officials remained. American frustration with their Bavarian counterparts, therefore, 
remained and even mounted with minimal economic improvement. Additionally, occupation 
officers still faced the sometimes-contradictory effects of reconstruction efforts. The introduction 
of a new currency in June 1948 provided immediate short-term benefit, but its effects quickly 
began to wear off. Throughout late 1948 and early 1949 a growing money shortage and declining 
confidence among Bavarians threatened to undermine recent success. The continued issues 
surrounding labor, expellees, and housing also demonstrated the limited impact of American 
efforts to rebuild the economy of Bavaria. 
 Ultimately, the Germans themselves were responsible for the Wirtschaftswunder 
(“economic miracle”) of West Germany. They pursued reconstruction throughout the 1950s and 
into the 1960s, well after the American military occupation ended. For the Americans, however, 
efforts at economic reconstruction proved particularly frustrating. American policy, for nearly 
two years, limited the options available to MGOs inclined to challenge official policy. Even after 
1947 economic growth advanced in fits and starts, while new and old issues seemingly 
undermined whatever success was achieved. Military government officials consistently grappled 
with the economic issues plaguing postwar Bavaria and they struggled to see the positive 
outcomes of their actions. American efforts at economic reconstruction in Bavaria clearly 
demonstrated the limits of military government in occupied Germany. 
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Crisis and Limited Reconstruction, 1945-1947 
 The Bavarian economy encountered by Americans in May 1945 had virtually ceased 
functioning. Years of aerial bombardment and then months of ground combat pummeled 
economic life into pieces. The horrific economic conditions throughout 1945 presented 
American military government officers with a massive, and sometimes overwhelming, challenge. 
In order to fully understand the challenges facing American officials, therefore, one must 
examine the economic conditions plaguing Bavaria throughout the first six months of the 
occupation. Doing so will provide some glimpse into the enormity of the obstacles facing 
Americans and Bavarians alike. 
 The greatest economic difficulty facing Bavaria throughout 1945 – which would continue 
to haunt the occupation for several years – was the critical shortage of coal. Almost immediately, 
military government officials warned of pending calamity due to the shortage of the fuel that was 
the lifeblood of the Bavarian economy. In June, the G-5 Section of the Third U.S. Army warned 
that “the most critical item of civilian supply” was coal. During the month, approximately 20,000 
tons of coal was available for civilian use in Bavaria, well below the minimum requirements of 
120,000 tons.
3
 Without sufficient quantities of coal, nearly all aspects of the Bavarian economy 
struggled to recuperate. In Munich, for example, the municipal gas plant could not function 
without a steady supply of coal. Without the gas plant, Lt. Col. Eugene Keller reported, “many of 
the basic [essentials] of healthful life” in Munich would not exist. The plant fueled some seventy 
percent of the city’s bakeries, provided heating to nearly 8,000 hospital beds, and served as the 
primary cooking fuel for much of the city under normal conditions. Additionally, the city 
received just fifty-eight percent of the coal required to maintain “minimum civilian necessities.” 
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Bakeries received 1635 tons compared to requirements of 2360 tons and the city’s restaurants 
received approximately one-quarter of needed coal. Meanwhile, hospitals in Munich required 
some 1790 tons of coal to operate at a minimal level, yet they received just 1372 tons during the 
months of June. Keller warned that “extraordinary hardship and suffering on the part of the civil 
population will undoubtedly occur” without a steady supply of both coal and gas.
4
 
 By early July, however, Bavarian officials added their voices to the warnings of a dire 
fuel shortage. The Oberbürgermeister of Munich, Dr. Karl Scharnagl, warned that the supply of 
coal to the city was the cause of “much anxiety” and that “the sorrows with respect to the fuel 
supply are increasing daily.” The allotment of twenty pounds of coal for each member of a 
household was “absolutely insufficient,” while the domestic supply of coke threatened to run out 
by the end of July. Scharnagl “begged” that the Americans restart production at the city’s gas 
plant and that they release parts of the large coal reserve held by the Third Army to increase the 
fuel supply as rapidly as possible.
5
 The Munich Wirtschaftsamt (Economic Office) also painted a 
grim picture of the fuel situation. Prewar deliveries of coal and coke amounted to approximately 
1.1 million tons per year. The Wirtschaftsamt estimated that some 653,000 tons of coal and coke 
were required to provide “nearly normal heating” in postwar Munich. Deliveries, however, 
dropped steadily during the war, from 857,111 tons in 1942/43 to 456,018 tons in 1944/45.
6
 By 
the middle of August those deliveries had “ceased almost entirely.” Coal mines in Upper Bavaria 
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produced 50,000 tons each month, less than half of their prewar output of 110,000 tons per 
month. The Third Army seized some 30,000 tons of that production, leaving a mere 20,000 tons 
for civilian needs each month. Production in the Ruhr mines, which provided most of Bavaria’s 
coal, was in even worse shape. Monthly production plummeted from ten million tons per month 
to just 1.5 million tons in July 1945. Additionally, the number of employed miners dropped from 
510,000 to 145,000, while thirty to fifty percent of work shifts were often missing.
7
 
 Together with widespread war destruction and ravaged transportation networks, the fuel 
shortage in 1945 crippled the Bavarian economy. Industries throughout the Land operated at a 
minimal level, if they even operated at all. In Kreis Eschenbach, for example, the activity of 
many major companies and factories slowed to a crawl. The Maximilianshütte, which produced 
brown iron ore in Auerbach, normally employed 400 to 500 individuals. Even though the plant 
was in order, however, it only employed some twenty to thirty people due to a lack of 
transportation and machine oil. Similarly, a men’s clothing factory in Auerbach employed a mere 
fifty workers when their normal workforce numbered 600 and the lack of raw materials 
threatened to shut down what minimal production existed. Finally, the Broncefarbenwerke A.G. 
in Rothenbruck employed just one-quarter of its usual workforce of 120.
8
 Nürnberg industry, 
meanwhile, possessed a mere ten percent of normal peacetime capacity at the end of the war and 
operated at a miniscule eight percent of regular capacity.
9
 
Kreis Eschenbach and the city of Nürnberg reflected the reality of economic stagnation 
throughout Bavaria, and Germany at large. Shortages of fuel, rolling stock, and personnel 
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hampered transportation. Dwindling coal stocks crippled economic activity. American observers 
quickly noted the now nonexistent integration of the German economy. Julian Bach wrote, “This 
flow and integration no longer exist…Communications and transportation are either bombed out, 
lacking or short of fuel, and neither raw material nor finished goods as yet flow freely or even 
perceptibly between the Zones.”
10
 On October 31 the city of Regensburg possessed a mere two 
days’ supply of coal. November coal allocations for Bavarian industry amounted to 69,300 tons, 
approximately twenty percent of prewar use, and total allocations were just sixteen percent of 
“normal” consumption. The result was a nearly non-existent economy. Bavarian steel factories 
produced just 125 tons a day during the month of October. In September 1945 shoe production – 
an industry vital for equipping workers with the necessary supplies to work – reached a mere 
thirty percent of normal. 225,000 pairs of shoes were produced in the Land, a total that reached 
thirty percent of normal production.
11
 The Bavarian economy was at a standstill and posed a 
major challenge to the Americans tasked with overseeing the occupation of the Land. 
To address these challenges, however, military government officials possessed few 
options during the early years of the occupation. Official policy, the requirements of the Army, 
and attempts to turn responsibility over to the Bavarians as quickly as possible constrained their 
actions. The result was some economic recovery, but American actions possessed limited effects 
as persistent problems plagued the Bavarian economy. American policy represented the clearest 
constraint on action in Bavaria. As discussed in Chapter 1, U.S. policy possessed a significant 
punitive tone, despite some of the loopholes crafted within JCS 1067. American commanders in 
Germany, particularly General Lucius Clay, stretched the confines of this directive to the 
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maximum to ward off catastrophe, but its negative tone seemingly limited the prospects of 
economic reconstruction in Germany.  
American military government officers, however, increasingly favored some form of 
economic recovery throughout Germany, including Bavaria. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the 
Army’s long-term planning for another postwar occupation, which occurred throughout the 
interwar period, and the service’s institutional culture emphasized short-term military objectives, 
particularly “military necessity” and the quick restoration of civil government.
12
 This culture 
engrained a noticeable strain of pragmatism in regard to economic reconstruction in any potential 
military occupation. For many MGOs, therefore, the most important task was avoiding 
catastrophe and the revitalization “normal” civic life. Faced with the monumental challenges of 
feeding a defeated populace, providing shelter, caring for displaced persons, reestablishing basic 
transportation services, and many other issues, American officials saw recovery as more 
important than the punitive aspects of U.S. policy.
13
 
At the same time, the growing sympathy for the German populace that led military 
government officials to mitigate the effects of American policy in regard to the food crises also 
influenced attitudes towards economic reconstruction. As historian Petra Goedde demonstrated, 
GIs increasingly identified the German populace as a weakened, feminized population in need of 
protection.
14
 This feminization of Germany led to individual acts that circumvented US policy 
towards their former enemy. American GIs provided badly needed food, clothing, and other 
goods to both German girlfriends and children. In addition, participating in the black market, 
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while it often undermined the official economy, helped circulate otherwise rare goods in Bavaria. 
Some Americans also admired the ability of Germans to survive and slowly rebuild in the chaos 
that characterized postwar Bavaria. “The efficiency and industriousness of the Germans had 
already produced great changes in the past months…” Sergeant Walter Krause wrote. “Hard 
work, initiative, and the desire to emerge from the ruins of war were in evidence wherever one 
looked. The Germans were bringing their country out of chaos.”
15
 This sympathy, much like it 
had it dealing with the food shortages, led many military government officials to question the 
vindictive tone of American policy in Germany. Julian Bach explained, “…there is a growing 




In Munich, Lt. Col. Eugene Keller reflected this early sympathy towards segments of the 
Bavarian populace and a tendency towards reconstruction. An engineer in civilian life, Keller 
traced his descent from Alsatian immigrants to the United States and, unlike many MGOs, spoke 
fluent German. Additionally, he was a practicing Roman Catholic, which helped him fit in to 
predominantly Catholic Bavaria.
17
 From the beginning of the occupation Keller adopted the 
pragmatic approach to military government that the Army had cultivated during the interwar era. 
He appointed pre-Nazi Oberbürgermeister Karl Scharnagl as Munich’s first postwar 
Oberbürgermeister, hoping that an experienced official would facilitate the recovery of the city. 
The MGO also emphasized the practical experience of his fellow detachment officers. According 
to Keller, each had been “chosen from civilian volunteers with experience in the problems of 
civil government and administration…”
18
 Ever concerned with pragmatism, the Army had 
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assigned some of its most qualified military government officials to Munich to address the many 
problems that plagued the city in the aftermath of the war. Combined with the growing sympathy 
for the civilian population, this pragmatism pointed towards a willingness to challenge official 
policy in postwar Bavaria. 
Despite the growing support for some form of reconstruction, American officials in 
Bavaria possessed few options when it came to rebuilding Bavaria throughout 1945 and 1946. 
One such option focused largely on providing basic services and supplies to the occupation 
forces.  The occupying Army required large supplies of replacement parts for vehicles, materials 
to repair potential barracks, and even beer. To meet the Army’s demand, the Production Control 
Agency supervised the resumption of production in Bavaria for the Army’s needs. The PCA 
tracked down “every local industry capable of producing anything needed for Army supply.” If 
the industry could produce anything useful, the PCA set them to work by providing priority 
access to raw materials and labor. During May 1945, for example, eight industrial firms received 
approval to produce materials for the Army and “essential civilian needs” and they were joined 
by eleven additional firms by the end of June. Similarly, much of the operating industry in 
Nürnberg was tied up in work for the Army. During the summer of 1945 Machinenfabrik-
Augsburg-Nürnberg (MAN) was reconditioning over 2,000 truck engines for the Third Army 
and then had to refurbish an additional 200 Ford engines. Similarly, Süddeutsche Apparatan 
Fabrik (SAF), which manufactured telephones, received instructions to give priority to Army 
needs or German requirements.
19
 The PCA was not concerned about the rehabilitation of the 
German economy and remained focused on providing goods for the Army in Bavaria. 
Nevertheless, the organization was “in fact responsible for the rehabilitation of German 
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industry.” The G-5 Section also encouraged reconstruction for Army usage, but more openly 
operated on the assumption that “the more economic rehabilitation there was, the better.”
20
 
The primacy of American demands extended to the trickle of coal coming out of 
Bavarian mines during the summer of 1945. Occupation forces required substantial amounts of 
coal to fuel Army power stations, fire American bakeries, heat barracks, or provide fuel to 
Bavarian businesses producing for Army requirements. To provide the necessary fuel, the Upper 
Bavarian coal mines operated under the control of the quartermaster of the Third Army. Army 
needs encouraged the resumption of mining and limited economic recovery, but simultaneously 
exacerbated the coal shortage. Under occupation regulations, the Army received as much as 
eighty percent of the production from Bavarian coal mines, which left limited amounts for 
civilian use.
21
 During July 1945, for example, some seventy-six percent of coal production from 
Upper Bavarian mines – 41,100.3 tons – went to occupation forces, while the Bavarian 
Economic Office (Landeswirtschaftsamt) received 12,350.85 tons, approximately twenty-three 
percent of production.
22
 With the Army taking the vast majority of Bavarian coal and 
transportation difficulties limiting the arrival of coal from the Ruhr, the existing shortages 
became even worse. The Munich Wirtschaftsamt warned that the city faced a deficit of 201,509.5 
tons for just the five main consumer groups: hospitals, bakeries, small local industry, households, 
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 While Army requirements sometimes rehabilitated some local industries and 
military government entities like the PCA saw their tasks, at least somewhat, as a means to 
restart the German economy, these limited American actions also inhibited recovery. The ever-
present demands of the occupying Army funneled desperately needed materials and production 
away from the Bavarian economy. 
 As American demands both supported and limited economic reconstruction, military 
government officials pursued the other limited means available to them to circumvent U.S. 
policy and restart Bavarian economic life. Reflecting the institutional culture that emphasized 
pragmatism and restoration of normal civic society, MGOs turned responsibility over to local 
Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible. In June 1945, for example, Bavarian officials were 
ordered to take over responsibility for key repairs to road transportation in the Land. They were 
to secure all stocks of spare parts for vehicles, to reopen civilian garages and repair shops, and to 
begin the repair of vehicles as rapidly as possible.
24
  The following year American officials 
similarly pressured their Bavarian counterparts to collect sufficient firewood to cover the 
expected coal shortages during the upcoming winter. On July 20, 1946, high-ranking military 
government officers met with the Bürgermeisters of Nürnberg and Fürth to discuss the supply of 
wood to the Nürnberg-Fürth Enclave. The enclave commander, one Colonel Williams, 
emphasized that the collection of wood had to begin immediately and then outlined the 
procedure for supplying the alternative fuel. Bavarian officials retained responsibility for the 
program. The local Bürgermeister would make a request to the appropriate Forest Master, who 
would then cut the necessary wood with labor on hand. The wood would then, under German 
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supervision, be shipped to the city and distributed. Williams proclaimed that the Army would try 
to acquire equipment to aid the civilian program, but emphasized that Bavarian officials should 
plan to work with the equipment on hand.
25
  
The MGO of Nürnberg, Lt. Col. A.T. Callicott, diligently followed Williams’ 
instructions. He reminded local officials that they, not military government, were ultimately 
responsible for the supply of fuel wood to the city, all while he repeatedly informed military 
government headquarters in Munich that the Bavarians lacked basic tools to carry out the 
program, including 1100 axes and thirty-eight power saws. Callicott was optimistic that prompt 
action on the part of the Bavarians, coupled with the supply of tools, would collect enough 
firewood for the winter.
26
 The MGO’s optimism, however, was misplaced. By late September, 
Callicott requested significant American assistance with the program. German labor cut 
significant amounts of wood, but problems with rail and road transportation left much of it sitting 
in the forests and just fourteen percent of the 325,000 cubic meters needed for the winter had 
arrived in the city. Although Callicott had previously followed the American policy of handing 
responsibility over to German authorities, he now argued that it was better for the Army to give 
assistance now instead of when the situation became an emergency. Therefore, he encouraged 
OMGB to provide Army trucks to haul wood into Nürnberg during October and November while 
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the days were longer and the weather remained tolerable.
27
 American officials ultimately agreed 
and by mid-October, authorized Army trucks to meet the needs of Nürnberg.
28
  
Much like the response to the food crises of the postwar years, military government 
officers sought economic recovery by forcing Bavarian officials to administer most attempts at 
economic reconstruction. By placing responsibility in the hands of local officials, efforts at 
economic reconstruction would, in part, look like the efforts of Germans themselves, not their 
American counterparts. This provided an indirect means to mitigate the effects of US policy 
towards Germany. Additionally, the practice reflected the Army’s broader institutional 
preference, developed during the interwar years, to return responsibility to local civic officials as 
rapidly as possible. Military government officials would not directly intervene in their decisions, 
except for emergencies. When disaster threatened, however, that intervention was limited, such 
as providing transportation for the shipment of badly-needed fuel. 
Beyond working through local officials, military government officials used other 
methods to circumvent American policy and rebuild Bavaria. They often conducted surveys to 
determine the problems facing the Bavarian economy or served as mediators between German 
businesses and the government. During August 1945, Bavarian military government 
headquarters established an Economics and Supply Branch to oversee such activities.
29
 Their 
activities were limited during 1945 as the immediate crises of food and fuel or needs of the 
occupation army took precedence. Yet beginning in early 1946 military government officials 
used the limited options available to them to promote greater levels of economic reconstruction. 
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Specifically, the Americans focused their efforts on reviving exports, which they saw as the most 
effective way to pay for the imports required to keep Bavaria from starving, while also lessening 
the financial burden for the United States. During January military government officers met with 
Bavarian officials and representatives of different trades and industries to promote production 
and exports. Businessmen were hesitant due to “uncertainty of the future…and the problem of 
supply.” To assuage their concerns, the Americans promised to organize a program whereby 
companies that produced for export would receive preferential treatment for resupply and raw 
materials. Additionally, military government offices surveyed major Bavarian industries to 
determine possibilities for exports. The porcelain industry, for example, was viewed as 
particularly attractive. An American survey estimated that the industry, for approximately 2.5 
million Reichmarks (RM) needed to purchase raw materials and fuel, could produce some 52 
million RM worth of exports.
30
 This American emphasis on reviving exports in early 1946 
culminated with the opening of an export exhibition for Bavarian arts and crafts in Munich. 
Located at the Haus der deutschen Kunst (House of German Art) in Munich, the Americans 
promoted the exhibition and Bavarian arts and crafts as “the first bridge to the world.” The 
“renowned standards of precision” and “famed Bavarian supremacy in nice things” would “win 
back satisfaction and confidence for Bavarian art-goods all over the world” while bringing in 
much needed dollars to pay for the imports that kept Bavaria, and Germany, from collapse.
31
 
 However, the options for American officials inclined to challenge U.S. policy remained 
limited. Unless they were willing to blatantly flaunt Washington directives or incur the wrath of 
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the American populace, MGOs did not possess many significant avenues to promote economic 
recovery. Exacerbating the limits on American options for Bavaria’s postwar economic recovery 
were a series of serious issues that plagued the German economy throughout 1945, 1946, and 
into 1947. Labor shortages, a severe housing crisis, and the influx of ethnic German expellees 
from Eastern Europe all piled on to an already stressed Bavarian economy. These persistent 
issues constrained American actions and limited the impact of the efforts at reconstruction that 
did occur. 
As early as May 1945, some Americans in Bavaria complained about the lack of labor 
and the perceived unwillingness of Germans to carry out needed work. Captain August Hill, the 
labor office for Detachment E1B3 in Nürnberg, chastised that city’s Arbeitsamt (Labor Office) 
about the labor situation just five days after the end of the war. According to Hill there had been 
“a failure of the German people of this city to provide the labor required” for Army needs and 
the task of reconstruction.
32
 In Munich a few weeks later Army engineers requested 1,000 men 
from city officials to assist in their reconstruction efforts, but only 300 showed up for the 
assigned labor. By August 1945 the labor shortage had grown so severe that the military 
government office in the city authorized the arrest and imprisonment of any worker who did not 
to report to their jobs.  
Despite these initial complaints, the Army’s large appetite for German labor often 
exacerbated these labor shortages and undermined the civilian economy. Sometimes Army 
demands facilitated recovery, notably when engineering units requisitioned labor to help repair 
bridges or railroads. Other times, however, Army labor requirements took badly needed workers 
out of the civilian economy. From November 15 to 22, for example, the Army demanded 2,300 
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skilled workers for its requirements in the Munich area, including construction, auto repair, and 
other critical occupations. Some 800 of those workers were provided “by stripping and closing 
down civilian repair shops” which created a “critical situation” in the city’s economy. The 
problem was that the Army’s incessant demands for labor overburdened the civilian economy as 
local businesses were often “stripped…below the point necessary for [them] to function.” Before 
November 15 Munich’s 220 civilian auto garages employed 623 mechanics, but by the end of the 
week approximately 400 of those skilled laborers were transferred to military projects.
33
 The 
demands of the U.S. Army threatened a Bavarian economy already overburdened by the scars of 
world war. As with early attempts to restart some level of production, the Army became military 
government’s own worst enemy; labor desperately needed in the civilian sphere was often tied 
up with the Army which only exacerbated the labor shortages.  
Throughout 1946 the labor problems remained a thorn in the side of military government 
and its attempts to resuscitate a basic level of economic activity in Bavaria. In January OMGB 
reported an “acute shortage” of skilled workers and agricultural labor. To mitigate the shortages, 
the Bavarian ministries of Labor and the Interior organized labor offices in the five camps 
receiving refugees in the Land. To make “maximum use” of the refugees’ skills, the camp offices 
would register, interview, and classify the incoming refugees according to their occupation. The 
offices would then assign them to areas where their skills were most needed.
34
 Nevertheless, the 
cries of labor shortages continue throughout Bavaria. In Landkries Rothenburg a large demand 
for farm labor continued because “almost all these refugees are not fit for any kind of work.”
35
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The arriving civilians were largely old men, women, and children unsuited for heavy labor. Even 
those adult men who did arrive were often in poor shape due to malnutrition or injuries sustained 
in the war. Additionally, refugees and expellees usually lacked the necessary clothing, such as 
boots, required for physical work.
36
 
At the same time of significant labor shortages, Bavaria faced another problem: high 
unemployment. By October 1946 total employment in the Land had increased by 651,000 over 
the previous twelve months. That increase, however, was largely confined in a few sectors of the 
economy. By September 1946 agricultural work employed some 368,000 people, compared to 
220,000 in 1938. Similarly, public service employment increased by 100,000 from 1938 and 
nearly 118,000 Bavarians found jobs with the occupation forces. On the other hand, construction 
employed 79,000 fewer people in September 1946 (219,000 versus 298,000) and the number of 
people working in textiles dropped from 76,000 to 44,000. As a result, unemployment numbers 
spiked. From June to September 1946 the number of unemployed workers rose by 61,000 to a 
total of 316,000, the result of languishing economic conditions and the influx of expellees from 
Eastern Europe.
37
 From January through October approximately 754,000 ethnic Germans entered 
Bavaria and these expellees comprised nearly forty percent of the unemployed in the Land.
38
 
At the same time, however, there were 131,000 job openings in August and 127,000 in 
September, including 40,000 in construction, 18,400 in metal industries, and 13,000 in 
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agriculture. By the end of October there were still 123,000 open jobs in Bavaria.
39
 The problem, 
identified by the Bavarian Ministry of Labor, was largely due to the maldistribution of available 
jobs and the labor pool. More than half of all job openings existed in Munich and Nürnberg, the 
Bavarians noted, and two-thirds were in the five cities of Munich, Nürnberg, Augsburg, 
Würzburg, and Regensburg. However, most expellees settled in rural areas because that was the 
only place where accommodations were possible. Yet these rural communities possessed few 
employment possibilities and inadequate transportation facilities to move would-be workers to 
available jobs. American and Bavarian officials also faced an increasingly depressed labor force. 
On December 23, 1946, the Landrat of Wolfstein warned of “a critical depression leading to a 
certain degree of anxiousness” among workers.
40
 A month later, Lt. Col. James Kelly of Munich 
recorded a similar complaint. He explained, “The willingness of the population to work is very 
low. General complaints are heard, that those persons willing to work are burdened beyond 
measure…”
41
 Together, the reports of the Bavarians and Americans identified a crucial 
component of the labor problem in postwar Bavaria: it was interconnected with other issues 
plaguing the occupation. The supply of food, housing shortages, the influx of expellees, and 
several other problems all influenced the twin issues of labor shortages and high unemployment. 
With the options available to military government officials in Bavaria limited, there was little, at 
this point, that they could do to address the problems. 
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Beyond labor problems, Americans also faced the persistent housing shortage that 
plagued postwar Bavaria. From the very beginning of the occupation, housing posed on the most 
significant problems faced by American military government officers. The most immediate issue 
was wartime destruction. In June 1945, for example, the military government detachment 
stationed in Munich reported that twenty-four percent of all dwellings in the city were a “total 
loss” and an additional 8,000 dwellings – including over 62,000 apartment flats – were “heavily 
destroyed.” Although some 300,000 residents fled the city during the war and, for the time being, 
made the housing situation tolerable, the Americans warned that the return of both residents and 
former soldiers would strain the housing situation in the Bavarian capital.
42
 By February 1946 
the Housing Department of the Ministry of Labor reported that an average of two people lived in 




Exacerbating the shortage of housing brought on by the war was the arrival in Bavaria of 
large numbers of refugees and ethnic German expellees. Already in December 1945 
approximately 905,000 German refugees resided in Bavaria, most of whom had fled either Allied 
bombing or the advancing Red Army.
44
 The arrival of the Volksdeutsch from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – which the western Allies had quietly supported at the Potsdam 
Conference – was scheduled to begin in 1946 and would further burden the already critical 
                                                 
42
 “Annual Historical Report for Military Government SK-LK Munich,” 3 July 46, to Director, OMGB, from Lt. 
Col. Eugene Keller, Pg. 146, Historical Reports 45-48 Folder, Box 406, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, 
RG 260, NARA. 
43
 Weekly Summary No. 40, OMGB, 7-14 February 46, in “Historical Report, Military Government for Land 
Bavaria, 1 February to 28 February 46,” MG for Bavaria Historical Report February 1946 Folder, Box 1, 42823 
(A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA. 
44
 “Operation Report, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, December 1945,” Pg. 7, OMG Bavaria Rpts of 





 By February 1946 these expellees, who were just “beginning to trickle into 
Bavaria,” already posed problems to American and Bavarian officials alike. In Landkreis 
Hammelburg, located to the north of Würzburg and to the northwest of Nürnberg, the arrival of 
expellees caused “a great deal of anxiety.” Some 1,260 expellees arrived in the Kreis by the end 
of February – out of a scheduled 9,000 – and the local population avoided housing these 
Volksdeutsch whenever possible. The locals justified their aversion on the grounds that their 
houses were too small and space was limited. Native resistance in Hammelburg was so 
pronounced that local police, at times, employed “forceful methods” to ensure that the local 
population took in expellees.
46
  
The influx of ethnic Germans continued throughout 1946. As ethnic Germans “continued 
to pour into…Bavaria” during the summer, housing shortages became one of “the most acute” 
worries facing American occupation officials. Arriving Volksdeutsch lived in “crowded, 
unsanitary conditions” that could not be used during the upcoming winter “without great 
suffering.” Even communities that avoided significant war damage could not accommodate the 
rising tide of expellees. Landkreis Wertingen, with a population of 22,000, faced the prospect of 
housing as many as 18,000 expellees. In such a case, it would “not be possible” to house so 
many additional people “without living conditions being subnormal.”
47
 
In addition, Army practices in the Land routinely exacerbated the already major housing 
crisis. To quarter occupying forces and the large numbers of dependents arriving from the United 
States, Army units requisitioned substantial amounts of German housing. Military government 
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detachments participated in the practice, but regular Army units took the most German 
residences. The mere practice of requisitioning worsened the housing situation, but Army units 
often took the nicest housing left standing, leaving the homes and apartments in the worst 
condition for German civilians. Julian Bach, a former occupation soldier, explained, “Most men 
agree that they have never lived so well while in the army…With few exception, what is most 
comfortable and still standing…is being lived in or used by us.”
48
 Similarly, Richard Berlin 
described “liberated” Bavarian houses in which occupation forces lived. They possessed “lovely 
decorative paintings” and included gables that were “quaint, artistic sights.”
49
 By late October 
1946 the Munich Military Community, which oversaw all the military units stationed in and 
around the Bavarian capital, had already requisitioned approximately 1,000 houses. Now the 
military community submitted requisitions from an additional 300 houses and apartments within 
the city. In Forchheim requisitions by the Erlangen Military Community displaced 988 civilians 
and raised housing density from 2.59 persons per room to 2.9 per room.
50
 
While MGOs recognized the necessity of requisitioning some Bavarian housing, the 
scope of the practice produced growing frustration. Peter Christen, a German military 
government employee, described the rising anger of the unnamed captain in charge of the 
detachment where he worked. One morning, Christen recalled, the captain “cursed in a most 
horrid, highly objectionable fashion.” The captain had just received another request for fifteen 
more houses to requisition and had cursed “to stiffen his soul against his consternation and 
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 MGOs in Munich and the surrounding area similarly struggled with the reality of 
the housing crisis and the impact of American requisitions. Responding to the requests for more 
dependent housing at Neubiberg, one American voiced his dislike for a new round of requisitions 
and insisted that “to approve these requisitions would mean a terrific impact in the communities 
involved.”
52
 Similarly, Eugene Keller warned from Munich that there was “an increasing amount 




As requisitioning continued and took up valuable housing space, German opposition to 
the practice emerged and took on a variety of forms. Beginning in December Bavarian officials 
at both the local and Land level pushed back against requisitions in the town of Grünwald, which 
was located just outside Munich. On December 10, the Bavarian Minister of the Interior, Josef 
Seifried, asked the military government detachment in Munich to stop a new wave of 
confiscations. The town’s population, Seifried explained, expanded from 1,800 in 1939 to 4,800 
by the end of 1946. Grünwald already faced a significant housing shortage and these new 
requisitions would impact up to 2,000 people. According to the Bavarian minister, the 
confiscations produced an “increasing lack of comprehension” among the populace and 
contributed to “the feeling of…bitterness.”
54
 In early January 1947 the town’s Bürgermeister 
warned that town’s inhabitants were “overwhelmed by an extraordinary excitement.” Some made 
threats to German officials cooperating in the requisitions and other planned a protest in front of 
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Brigadier General Walter Muller’s house, the Director of OMGB.
55
 Even the newly appointed 
Bavarian Minister-President, Hans Ehard, wrote General Muller to ask that the requisitions in 
Grünwald stop. Additionally, Ehard asked Muller to investigate the housing situation in Bavaria 
more broadly, particularly reports that requisitioned houses sat empty for weeks or months while 
their former residents struggled to find housing. The Minister-President also warned of an 
increasingly frustrated Bavarian populace. According to Ehard, “the situation and the state of 
mind within the population [has] become very serious and the Government can no longer assure 
that utterances and manifestations of resentment may not arise amongst the population.”
56
 
Requisitioning, then, both exacerbated the housing crisis and caused resentment among 
Bavarians. 
In response to German resistance and their own frustration, military government officials 
tried to limit the scope of housing requisitions. Ultimately, this path of action represented the 
most viable option for most MGOs to tackle the housing crisis. On September 21, General 
Muller issued an order that housing density would not exceeded 2.4 persons per room and MGOs 
used this number to push back against regular Army requests for additional German housing. 
During late October and early November, for example, military government officials and regular 
Army officers clashed over additional requisitions in the towns of Ansbach and Forchheim, both 
communities surrounding Nürnberg. On October 17 Lt. Col. W.R. Whitaker, head of Detachment 
B-228 in Ansbach, cited the military government order to cap housing density at 2.4 persons per 
room as justification for rejection of twenty-five requisitions made by the Ansbach Military 
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 Similarly, Major Harold Zurn of the Forchheim detachment returned sixty-one 
requisitions to the Erlangen Military Community. Housing density in Forchheim, Zurn argued, 
already exceeded the maximum allowed by Muller’s directive at an average of 2.58 persons per 
room. He insisted that the requisitions made by the military community in Erlangen would have 
raised the housing density to 2.81. For that reason, Zurn explained, “this office cannot approve of 
or concur in any further requisitions of property in this city.”
58
 
The resistance of military government officials to further requisitions frustrated their 
regular Army counterparts, who thought that German officials had duped the MGOs. In response 
to Lt. Colonel Whitaker’s rejection of the requisitions in Ansbach, Colonel J.P. Kirkendall, the 
commanding officer of the Ansbach Air Force Station, argued that more rooms were available 
than German officials reported. Additionally, he insisted that the maximum density of 2.4 
persons per room did not reflect the standards outlined by Army engineers; instead it should be 
three persons per room. Kirkendall also dismissed the notion that the military community look 
for dependent housing in other, less crowded communities. Most were over twenty miles away, 
which was, supposedly, too far and would require a “tremendous increase” in drivers, guards, 
cooks, and other personnel.
59
 Army officers also objected to Major Zurn’s rejection of additional 
requisitions in Forchheim. Citing many of the same reasons as Colonel Kirkendall in Ansbach, 
Colonel Wendell McCoy, the commanding officers of the Erlangen Air Force Station, insisted 
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that the German figure of 2.58 persons per room was vastly inflated. Based on an independent 
housing survey, McCoy argued that the true housing density in Forchheim was just 1.366 and 
only slightly higher – 1.6 persons per room – in the villages surrounding the city.
60
 Similarly, Lt. 
Colonel R.H. Thorn from Erlangen pushed back against the housing density figure provided by 
Major Zurn and the German officials. The true housing density, he argued, was at most 1.56 
persons per room and, most likely, even lower. With the additional sixty-one dwellings requested 
by the Erlangen Military Community removed from civilian use, Thorn explained that housing 
density in Forchheim would climb to 1.73, well below the maximum of 2.4.
61
 
Ultimately, military government and regular Army officers reached a sort of compromise 
solution for the housing problems in Ansbach and Forchheim. The requisitions for Forchheim 
received approval, while the Ansbach requests were held in a sort of limbo. The Ansbach 
requisitions did not receive immediate approval, but it was agreed to move displaced persons and 
refugees living in the city to make room for Army requirements.
62
 The entire dispute, however, 
highlighted many of the problems facing the Americans, particularly occupation officials, in 
dealing with the housing crisis. First was the fact that the Army acted as its own worst enemy at 
times. As was the case with the Army snatching up skilled workers throughout 1945 and 1946, 
Army requisitions of German housing only exacerbated the shortage of housing. The influx of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees and expellees into Bavaria meant that even communities that 
suffered minimal wartime damage faced significant shortages which the Army made worse by 
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requisitioning sorely needed dwellings. On top of that, the requisitions often took some of the 
nicest homes available – the homes of former Nazis were particularly popular – which 
contributed to the “crowded, unsanitary conditions” that characterized large swaths of postwar 
housing.
63
 Second, the dispute highlighted the limited options available to military government 
in their attempts to mitigate the effects of American policy towards Germany. In this case, 
MGOs engaged in open opposition to an aspect of U.S. policy in Bavaria. Yet even such open 
opposition could not completely stop the Army from taking more German housing.  
By early 1947 the actions of military government produced some economic recovery, but 
it remained limited and proceeded in fits and starts throughout the first few years of the 
occupation. For MGOs, increased exports provided some evidence of an improved economy. 
The sale of 1,032 tons of hops to the United States during the last week of February 1946 (a sale 
valued at 2,858,000 RM), supposedly painted an “optimistic picture” of the export program. Yet 
during the same month just nineteen percent of the total requirements for the woodworking 
industry were met. Shortages of wood and skilled labor, the demands of the Army, and the needs 
of German refugees all stretched the industry to the breaking point, which threatened to 
undermine American plans to employ artistic woodworking as one of Bavaria’s main exports. 
Persistent fuel shortages also limited economic recovery. On February 19, the Land had received 
just thirty-seven percent of the 183,100 tons of coal and coke allocated from the Ruhr, Saar, and 
Cologne areas. Additionally, a meager 756 tons of gasoline (out of an allocated 4,422 tons) and 
2,791 tons of diesel (out of an allocated 8,950 tons) had arrived in Bavaria.
64
 In Regensburg, the 
coal supply for the city’s Gas Department rapidly declined. The emergency stock of coal 
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declined from 2,376 tons in January to 860 tons on April 20, 1946. Without an adequate supply 
of coal, American MGO Hyman Gilberg warned, the city would have to reduce the consumption 
of gas below its already low levels.
65
 
The economic problems continued into the summer and fall months. Bavarian steel 
production increased significantly during May, from 2,300 tons in April to 12,754 tons. 
Additionally, American economic officials found roughly twenty-five manufacturers capable of 
producing toys for export. Such a program, they hoped, would produce 400,000 to 500,000 RM 
worth of exports.
66
 But such progress was quickly undermined by the persistent fuel shortages 
plaguing Bavaria. On August 7, 1946, Maj. Albert Snow warned from Dachau that there was “no 
coal available” for household heating during the approaching winter and that industrial activity 
remained “subnormal” due to a lack of raw materials and coal.
67
 A month later the head of the 
Munich Wirtschaftsamt reported that the city faced “a serious deterioration in the fuel situation” 
during the next few months. Deliveries of coal briquettes from Cologne and the Russian Zone 
had dropped by sixty percent, while coal arriving from Upper Bavaria fell ten percent. And the 
situation only promised to get worse as collecting and distributing the fall harvest ate up massive 
quantities of transportation.
68
 Two months later, the Wirtschaftsamt repeated its dire warnings. 
Coal and coke stocks in Munich were “entirely eaten up” and if deliveries did not increase the 
city’s coal supply could run out by the beginning of December. The situation was so severe that 
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German officials called for temporarily halting coal deliveries to industrial firms and rerouting 
that coal to households.
69
  
Meanwhile, the Bavarian population possessed little confidence in the postwar economy. 
This lack of confidence manifested in the proliferation of rumors throughout Bavaria. The most 
persistent rumor was that the Reichsmark would soon be devalued to stabilize the economy. As a 
result, Germans throughout the Land tended to hoard small bills and coins due to the belief that 
such denominations would be kept in circulation after any readjustment to the currency. They 
also, American officials observed, deposited funds in banks on the hope that funds in banks 
would be preserved during any currency manipulation. During 1946, these normal rumors took 
on added detail. In January 1946, for example, rumors of currency devaluation hit Landkreis 
Landsberg with two additional details. According to the rumors all cash money would be 
stamped by a bank and after readjustment would be worth just one-tenth of its former value. 
Bank accounts, on the other hand, would retain forty percent of their former value. Acting on 
these new rumors, the residents of Landsberg deposited their money in local banks as quickly as 
possible.
70
 The presence of such rumors hampered economic recovery in postwar Bavaria. Most 
obviously, it painted a picture of economic chaos and damaged the population’s confidence in 
the Bavarian economy. Rumors also had immediate practical affects. They encouraged hoarding 
of money which meant that Germans did not spend their Reichmarks at Bavarian businesses 
desperately in need of income. 
By early 1947, over eighteen months into the occupation, economic recovery remained 
fleeting. Munich reported 159,248.95 RM worth of “exports” during December 1946, but such 
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exports did not include any shipments outside Germany. Only by expanding “exports” to include 
trade to the other zones of occupation could the city report such figures.
71
 In Dachau, meanwhile, 
small businesses shut down for lack of coal. According to Lieutenant Jerome Walker, bakeries 
and hospitals “are the only spaces having any hope of obtaining any coal in the near future.” 
Even city officers faced closures, which were open for just two hours in the morning and two 
hours in the afternoon. Instead, most city workers conducted their business at home.
72
 The 
effects of the fuel shortages plagued the city of Regensburg, as well. Major George Ganer 
warned that an “extreme shortage of coal” existed in the city, one that severely hampered the 
generation of electricity. Each Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday saw significant electricity 




Throughout 1945, 1946, and early 1947, therefore, military government efforts to 
circumvent American policy in Bavaria had a limited effect. There were some positive effects, 
but a considerable number of problems remained. Nürnberg, like most urban areas in Bavaria, 
faced considerable labor shortages during the early spring of 1947. Lack of transportation, as it 
had for months, prevented large numbers of rural unemployed from filling the available jobs. 
Additionally, the city lost skilled labor to administrative jobs and other work with a regular 
monthly salary. As a clerk with a monthly salary, a Bavarian worker could earn at least 265 RM 
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per month instead of the 180 RM per month as a skilled laborer.
74
 Nevertheless, the city’s 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce reported some notable economic success. The regional toy 
industry, centered in Nürnberg, made “considerable headway in the reconstruction of their 
plants” by early 1947. Shortages of fuel, raw materials, and labor remained, but the industry now 
possessed export orders worth approximately two million dollars.
75
 Smaller communities also 
experienced some economic recovery. From Landkreis Wolfstein, located southeast of Nürnberg, 
Captain Robert MacWhorter optimistically reported that the town’s small industrial firms 
maintained production “fairly well” during the winter despite the persistent shortages gripping 
the Bavarian economy. The Kreis’ largest industry, a carbide factory, maintained “high level” 
production throughout 1946 and into 1947, with its output of carbide and synthetic stones 
shipped to the French zone of occupation.
76
 
 This progress, however, remained minor. Major shortages of coal, labor, and housing 
stock severely limited the scope of economic recovery in the US-occupied Land. Additionally, 
American actions remained limited as long as U.S. policy refrained from actively rebuilding 
postwar Germany. Military government officials were often limited to reporting on the severity 
of the crisis or encouraging local Germans to take responsibility for restarting basic economic 
life. When the Americans could take action directly related to the Bavarian economy, they often 
made the situation worse. Requisitions of buildings for Army use exacerbated the housing crisis. 
The Army’s high demand for labor pulled desperately needed workers away from Bavarian 
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industries as they tried to rebuild. And the Americans’ requirements for coal and basic industrial 
production diverted precious resources away from the Bavarian economy. At this point in the 
occupation the limits on military government had become clear. Even when MGOs actively 
resisted U.S. policy, as in the controversy over requisitions in Grünwald, their actions had only 
minor effects. Sympathetic military government officials wanted to mitigate the impact of 
American policy in Bavaria, but possessed few tools to do so during the first years of the 
occupation. 
Efforts at Reconstruction, 1947-1949  
While economic activity in western Germany languished throughout the second year of 
the occupation, policymakers in the United States reconsidered the policies put in place by JCS 
1076 and the Morgenthau Plan. Increasingly a policy of economic reconstruction replaced the 
old policy of deindustrialization, even if that policy, as carried out in Bavaria, did not truly limit 
German industry. On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes signaled the growing 
shift in American policy. Speaking in Stuttgart, Byrnes criticized the practice of treating each 
zone of occupation as “self-contained economic…units” and called for the economic unification 
of Germany. Additionally, the Secretary of State emphasized that European recovery would be 
hampered “if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse.”
77
 
Byrnes’ speech demonstrated a growing shift in American policy towards Germany, but it was 
also primarily concerned with criticizing the obstructionism of the Soviet Union and France in 
implementing the Potsdam Agreement. As such, the official economic unification of the 
American and British zones of occupation on January 1, 1947, was both an attempt to carry out 
the principles of the Potsdam Agreement and a move to support economic reconstruction in 
Germany. The merger, announced on December 2, 1946, set up bizonal economic agencies and 
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promised to support “the expansion of German exports…as rapidly as world conditions 
permit.”
78
 For American policymakers, one way to revise current economic policy in Germany 
was to promote the full implementation of the Potsdam Agreement between the victorious Allies, 
but they were also willing to chart their own course in western Germany. 
Further revision of overall American policy occurred in March 1947 when former 
president Herbert Hoover released his report on economic conditions in Germany and Europe. 
His report reinforced the growing belief that the economic reconstruction of Germany was vital 
to the well-being of Europe as a whole. According to Hoover, “The productivity of Europe 
cannot be restored without the restoration of Germany as a contributor to that productivity.” War 
damage, border changes, plant removals for reparations, and policy caps on the level of industry, 
however, had severely limited the capacity of the German economy. For example, the most 
recent level of industry plan – announced in March 1946 – limited the production of heavy 
machinery to thirty-one percent and automobiles to ten percent of 1938 production levels. 
Hoover also criticized the “illusion” that Germany, after its loss of territory to Poland and the 
Soviet Union, could be left as a pastoral state without killing or removing some twenty-five 
million people and that Europe could recover without Germany. To do so, the Americans and 
British should free German industry from current controls, end the removal of industrial plants 
for reparations, and ensure that the Ruhr remain a part of Germany. If the United States and 
Britain could not get such an agreement from France and the Soviet Union, Hoover argued, the 
two allies should act unilaterally to make the necessary changes.
79
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On August 29, 1947, British and American policymakers did just that when they 
announced a new level of industry plan for the bizonal economic area. The new plan allowed 
combined economic production up to 1936 levels, whereas the previous plan called for industrial 
production at seventy to seventy-five percent of levels in 1936. Without raising the levels of 
heavy industries like metals, machinery, and chemicals, military government argued, it was 
impossible to create a self-sufficient bizonal area. The new plan retained eighty percent of the 
1936 heavy machinery industry in the combined US and UK zone. Additionally, enough 
production capacity would remain to produce approximately 160,000 passenger cars and 61,500 
commercial vehicles each year, compared to the existing caps of 40,000 and 38,000, 
respectively.
80
 By raising the level of industrial production, the financial burden on the American 
and British taxpayers would, hopefully, be lowered. Increased German production could be used 
to both rebuild Europe and to pay for the imports necessary to sustain the combined British and 
American zones, particularly food. Even before the announcement of the Marshall Plan, then, 
American policy in Germany shifted toward the active reconstruction of the German economy.
81
 
Within Bavaria this policy shift meant that MGOs no longer had to indirectly mitigate the 
effects of American policy towards Germany. Instead, they could openly push for economic 
reconstruction. Military government officials expressed a growing interest in the reconstruction 
of the Bavarian economy. More of their correspondence addressed reconstruction and they now 
worked in conjunction with American policy to encourage economic activity throughout the 
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Land. Yet the impact of military government activities remained limited. Even when American 
officials took a more active role, it was difficult to see any immediate results. Nagging economic 
problems and a continued policy of transferring responsibility to Bavarian officials and refusing 
direct intervention limited American influence. Instead, their options for promoting economic 
recovery were much the same as they had been for the first two years of the occupation: 
conducting economic surveys, reporting on local conditions, and meeting with German officials 
and businessmen.  
One example of these indirect American methods were military government efforts to 
promote new economic organization like the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA) and painting an 
optimistic picture of the economic situation in Bavaria, as if emphasizing positives could 
outweigh the continued problems. The Economics Division of OMGB, for example, circulated a 
report on foreign trade in Bavaria in early 1948. The report optimistically predicted a balance of 
trade by 1949. During 1947, the Land imported over one billion dollars’ worth of goods while 
exporting products worth $350 million. This deficit of nearly $700 million would, supposedly, 
achieve a balance of $935 million worth of both exports and imports within two years.
82
 In May 
1948, Paul Nevin, the director of foreign trade for the JEIA in Bavaria, acknowledged that “a 
gigantic task faces German industry, labor, and government” to revive foreign trade. 
Nevertheless, Nevin painted a positive picture of the export program in Bavaria. By the end of 
April, export sales for Bavarian businesses in 1948 totaled $16,169,736.05, including $4.5 
million in sales during April alone. The year 1947, on the other hand, saw total export sales just 
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exceed $53 million, while sales during 1946 failed to reach $20 million.
83
 These numbers, Nevin 
insisted, were a significant increase over the previous years of the occupation and demonstrated 
that progress had been made on reconstruction, even if much work remained. A positive 
American attitude could only reach so far. What recovery truly needed was German participation 
in the restructured postwar economy. 
Another method of indirect reconstruction was facilitating German participation in the 
postwar economy. Even before the shift in American policy towards Germany, U.S. officials in 
Bavaria had encouraged German businessmen to take an active role in resuscitating Bavarian 
economic life. This usually took the form of meetings, letters, and public exhortation. After the 
United States embraced a great degree of reconstruction, however, another tool of indirect 
recovery emerged: using new military government economic institutions to promote economic 
activity. The JEIA, most prominently, provided financial aid to help businessmen travel abroad. 
Additionally, the agency decentralized the process for exporting Bavarian-made goods 
throughout 1947. Local offices issued export licenses as the final measure of control over the 
process, but businesses negotiated their own deals.
84
 The following year American officials 
added further incentives for Bavarian businesses to export their goods. Exporters were given 
priority access to international telephone and telegraph lines along with airmail. Additionally, 
they obtained licenses to import sorely needed raw materials to support production for export and 
received priority allocations of domestic materials such as coal.
85
 By incentivizing foreign trade, 
American officials worked indirectly to revitalize the Bavarian economy. 
                                                 
83
 “Monthly Foreign Trade Letter to L&S Detachments,” 14 May 48, from Paul S. Nevin, Pg. 2, Correspondence 
1946-1949 Folder, Box 432, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA. 
84
 “Trade and Commerce Review of 1947: Development of Bavarian Exports,” Joint Export-Import Agency, Branch 
Office Bavaria, Trade & Commerce Branch, Economics Division, OMGB, Pg. 10, Border Control Folder, Box 378, 
666 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, LSO Miesbach, RG 260, NARA. 
85
 “Monthly Foreign Trade Letter to L&S Detachments,” 14 May 48, from Paul S. Nevin, Pg. 1, Correspondence 
1946-1949 Folder, Box 432, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA. 
187 
 
With these familiar and new options for promoting economic recovery, the Bavarian 
economy show some signs of life. Economic conditions remained precarious throughout 1947 
and into 1948, but the situation was not as critical as during the first two years of the occupation. 
The steadily expanding volume of exports from Bavaria demonstrated the return of some 
semblance of normalcy. In 1946, Bavarian businesses signed export contracts worth 
approximately $19.9 million. However, the following year saw significant improvement, 
particularly during the last half of 1947 as American policy shifts became reality. That year saw 
total export sales of over $53 million, including $43 million worth in the last six months of the 
year. This significant jump represented an increase of 410 percent during the final half of 1947. 
The increased sales throughout 1947 included $7.9 million for the Bavarian china industry, $7.5 
million worth of Bavarian hops, and $6.9 million in textiles. Additionally, actual shipments of 
exports increased significantly throughout 1947. During 1946 export shipments totaled just under 
$5.4 million. That figure, however, rose to $21 million by the end of the next year, including 
nearly $2.9 million alone in December. American economic officials congratulated themselves 
for the improvement in the Bavarian economy. The Bavarian office of the JEIA argued that 
American promotion activities, which stressed “the vital role Bavarian export manufacturers 




Despite these improvements, significant difficulties remained. Shortages of raw 
materials, electricity, coal, and other basic supplies hampered reconstruction. On August 29, 
1947, Dr. Karl Scharnagl, Oberbürgermeister of Munich, complained to the military government 
detachment about electricity rationing. The rationing, Scharnagl warned Lieutenant Colonel 
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James Kelly, would have “serious consequences to the households, the economy, and to theaters, 
cinemas, and similar institutions.”
87
 Kelly forwarded Scharnagl’s complaint to H.A. Taylor in the 
Economics Division of OMGB. While sympathetic to the problem of electricity rationing, Taylor 
insisted the issue could not be avoided. Interruptions were a necessary evil since the supply of 
electric power was “so critical that service cannot be guaranteed even to top priority 
customers.”
88
 Electricity rationing was, in part, a product of continued fuel shortages throughout 
Bavaria. Transportation difficulties from the Ruhr and Army requirements still limited the supply 
of coal available for Bavarian businesses. Additionally, coal briquettes, used to fire bakeries and 
warm homes, remained dangerously low. In Landkreis Lohr am Main the delivery of briquettes 
was “barely sufficient” to meet the needs of bakeries due to looting during transport.
89
 
 Additionally, the German populace remained wary. Hoarding of resources and money by 
Bavarians limited the already minor effects of reconstruction. Even as Bavarian exports surged 
during 1947 and early 1948, many businessmen in the Land demonstrated notable recalcitrance. 
Despite incentives from the JEIA and the threat of laws requiring them to sell their goods, the 
Americans faced considerable resistance from Bavarian businessmen. Indeed, the resistance 
appeared “to be increasing daily,” particularly as rumors of currency reform circulated and the 
inefficacy of German economic agencies grew.
90
 In January 1948, for example, Captain Wayne 
Farrington wrote to Munich that the economic situation in Landkreis Lohr am Main had 
deteriorated despite the relative stability of labor and production for several months. The only 
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explanation, Farrington insisted, was that “manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers are hoarding 
on an increasingly large scale.”
91
 Then in early April Farrington repeated his warnings about 
hoarding of resources. Hoarding, he explained, kept raw materials from industry and meant that 
little prospect for economic recovery existed until a currency adjustment took place. The Landrat 
in Lohr occurred. He blamed newspaper reports that currency reform would happen soon, which 
produced hoarding on an ever-larger scale. The local economic office possessed few options and 
was mostly limited to “appeasing and consoling the public.” Yet even those efforts failed as the 
local populace grew “more irritated every day.”
92
 
The result was a significant shortage of badly-need goods and materials, even as 
production slowly recovered. Throughout the Land Bavarians received a trickle of consumer 
goods, particularly when compared to prewar levels. In 1947, for example, Bavarians got just 
one-tenth of the tobacco, shoes, and textiles they had before the war, while a mere one-twentieth 
of the prewar supply of soap existed. These tiny amounts only partially covered the needs of 
“high priority individuals” like displaced persons, former victims of Nazi persecution, and ethnic 
German expellees from Eastern Europe. The average Bavarian, however, “received practically 
nothing.”
93
 Germans, both officials and normal civilians, grew increasingly frustrated with the 
situation. The Landrat of Lohr am Main complained, “What is the use of all the planning, what is 
the use of all directives covering the life of the economy when there is practically nothing to 
                                                 
91
 “Weekly Intelligence Report for week ending 2400 hours, 8 January 1948,” 8 Jan 48, to OMG for Bavaria (Attn: 
Intelligence Branch), from Capt. Wayne Farrington, Pg. 1-2, Karlstadt 1945-48 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): 
Correspondence & Records with Related Units, 1946-1950, Records of Dist. IV (Branch A), RG 260, NARA. 
92
 “Weekly Intelligence Report for week ending 2400 hours, 1 April 1948,” 1 April 48, to OMG for Bavaria (Attn: 
Intelligence Branch), from Capt. Wayne Farrington, Pg. 1-2, Karlstadt 45-48 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): Corres. & 
Rec. w/ Rel. Units, 46-50, Rec. of Dist. IV (Branch A), RG 260, NARA. 
93
 “Trade and Commerce Review of 1947: Development of Bavarian Exports,” Joint Export-Import Agency, Branch 
Office Bavaria, Trade & Commerce Branch, Economics Division, OMGB, Pg. 6, Border Control Folder, Box 378, 





 These major shortages were, in part, a product of the wartime destruct wrought by 
American and British bombers. Transportation networks remained precarious and the intricate 
links that had connected the different regions of the prewar German economy were still 
incomplete. More significantly, however, civilian confidence in the Reichsmark evaporated 
during the occupation. Without a stable currency, Bavarians of all stripes either hoarded goods or 
participated in the informal, often illegal, economy. Bavarian economic life showed some signs 
of improvement, but still felt the effects of wartime destruction and postwar partition by spring 
1948.  
In response, the western Allies, without consulting the Soviets, decided to introduce a 
new currency into their zones of occupation. Negotiations between the four occupying powers 
previously tried to reach an agreement on the introduction of a new currency, but hit a snag on 
where the money would be printed. Throughout the spring American, British, French, and 
German officials hammered out the details of the conversion from Reichsmarks to Deutschmarks 
(DM). Although occupation officials did not announce currency reform until the day of its 
implementation – June 20, 1948 – rumors circulated throughout Bavaria. Newspapers and local 
officials all expected an adjustment to the currency and publicly speculated about what form it 
could take. The proliferation of rumors and newspaper speculation exacerbated the hoarding of 
goods that occurred throughout the spring. During May and June economic activity in Bavaria 
effectively ceased. In Mallersdorf, located outside of Regensburg, the rumors of currency reform 
“created a nervousness within the Landkreis.” Businessmen refused to sell many items and even 
local government officials encouraged the hoarding of goods on the belief that they could then be 
thrown onto the market after currency reform to stimulate the circulation of a new currency. 
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Additionally, many Bavarians were reluctant to work. They did not want to work for money that 
would soon lose most, if not all, of its value.
95
 By June 17 it was “absolutely impossible to buy 
anything except essential food items” in Mallersdorf. Many retail shops closed as owners either 
took “vacations” or claimed they had nothing to sell.
96
 
When currency reform and the introduction of the Deutschmark was finally announced 
by the western Allies, Bavarians “felt a great relief.” The payment of the first 40 DM to 
individual Germans occurred on June 20 and introduced some stability to the Bavarian economy. 
Although some complained that 40 DM was not enough money, the “uncertainty and excitement 
which took possession [of] the people” had now ceased.
97
 Within days, currency reform 
seemingly solved many of the economic problems plaguing communities throughout Bavaria. In 
Mallersdorf the Landrat reported that currency reform “had a revolutionary effect on the 
economy.”
98
 Similarly, German officials in Freising reported that the new currency eliminated 
black market activity “immediately.”
99
 
With a new currency, military government officials now worked within American policy, 
instead of circumventing it, to actively promote reconstruction. In particular, Americans 
emphasized the economic developments unleashed by currency reform. Throughout the rest of 
1948 military government officers, particularly those working within economic agencies, 
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highlighted the success of American programs and the positive effects of the new Deutschmark. 
Just a few weeks after currency reform, Paul Nevin, the director of JEIA Foreign Trade Division 
in Bavaria, reported that the Deutschmark now provided a “legitimate medium of exchange” for 
international trade. While the instability of the Reichsmark had provided no incentive to German 
manufacturers to export, Nevin argued that the new currency ensured greater economic incentive 
for German exporters.
100
 For American officials, growing export sales demonstrated the positive 
developments described by Nevin. Bavarian exports, for example, rose significantly after the 
introduction of the Deutschmark in June. Export contracts in the Land totaled $4.6 million during 
April 1948. By mid-October the JEIA reported that the value of export contracts surged to $8.3 
million in August and $9.5 million in September.
101
 Rising export shipments also demonstrated 
the growing success of economic reconstruction in the eyes of many occupation officials. Export 
shipments out of Bavaria reached $9.7 million in both September and October 1948, an increase 
of twenty-five percent over August.
102
 Finally, Americans also eagerly reported major trade 
agreements reached between Bavaria and various countries around the world. JEIA announced 
new trades deals with Czechoslovakia, Egypt, and Italy in November and a tentative trade deal 
with France, valued at $300 million, in December.
103
 Such trade deals not only served as proof of 
Bavaria’s economic recovery, but they would also provide badly needed raw materials, coal, and 
foodstuff to facilitate further recovery. 
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By December 1948 American occupation officials throughout Bavaria proved decidedly 
optimistic about the economic situation in the Land. This positive attitude was best captured by a 
sprawling report written by Harold Taylor, the economic advisor to OMGB headquarters in 
Munich. While Taylor recognized that significant room for improvement remained, he argued 
that the record of improvement since the start of the occupation “holds forth much 
encouragement for the future.” Specifically, June’s currency reform was “the greatest economic 
event in Western Europe in recent years.” It provided greater economic incentives to both 
industrialists and labor and facilitated the steady recovery of production throughout Bavaria. The 
average monthly value of industrial production, for example, rose from 209 million RM in 1946 
to 510 million DM in October 1948. Steel production in Bavaria increased from an average of 
12,326 tons per month in 1946 to a monthly average of 24,772 tons through the first three-
quarters of 1948, which nearly equaled the 1936 average of 25,260 tons. Additionally, greater 
production of consumer goods, Taylor argued, demonstrated the improvement of the Bavaria 
economy. October 1948 production of radios and bicycles both exceeded their prewar monthly 
averages. Finally, Taylor repeated the usual American emphasis on rising exports as evidence of 
economic recovery. The total value of Bavarian export sales rose from $20 million in 1946 to 
$60 million through ten months of 1948. Similarly, the value of actual export shipments rose 
from $5 million to $27 million over the same period.
104
 For many American officials and 
military government officers, then, the Bavarian economy was well on its way to recovery. 
Indeed, the introduction of a new, stable currency was ultimately a key factor in the 
reconstruction of the West German, and Bavarian, economy. 
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Despite these notable improvements, currency reform brought its own challenges to 
American efforts at reconstruction in Bavaria. Even as the supply of consumer goods and much-
need materials grew, soaring prices and a shortage of the new Deutschmarks posed another threat 
to economic recovery. After weeks of speculation and hoarding, currency reform released large 
numbers of previously unavailable consumer goods. In addition, Bizonal agencies lifted 
rationing regulations on many consumer goods shortly after currency reform. Shop owners, 
previously reluctant to sell goods for essentially worthless Reichsmarks, now sold goods to 
acquire as many Deutschmarks as possible. Germans throughout Bavaria embraced this influx of 
consumer goods, even if many, particularly farmers, resented store owners for the practice of 
hoarding. After years of shortages, civilians snatched up badly needed consumer goods, such as 
shoes, clothing, and basic household products. While the supply of these goods was large enough 
for the first several weeks after currency reform, the pent-up demand of the Bavarian populace 
produced a run on consumer goods that led to another shortage. Perhaps most significantly, high 
demand quickly drove up prices, often far beyond the ability of an average Bavarian to pay. 
As a result, many Bavarian officials and civilians soon grew frustrated with currency 
reform. In Freising, MGO Robert Annis reported, the population was in a “distressed condition” 
and “very discontented” due to rising prices by the end of July.
105
 German officials in 
Mallersdorf, meanwhile, were “gravely worried” about the tendency of businessmen in the 
community to raise prices beyond what the average worker could afford. They argued that the 
practice undermined public confidence in the Deutschmark and produced rumors that the new 
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currency was on the same trajectory as the failed Reichsmark.
106
 The Landrat in Freising 
expressed similar concerns at the end of August. “The increase of prices after the currency 
reform,” Dr. Phil Held explained to the local military government office, “is considered 
unbearable by the population.” Rising costs of living questioned the supposed benefits of 
currency reform and undermined public confidence in the new currency.
107
 
The problems associated with currency reform continued throughout the fall and early 
winter of 1948. While many businessmen and industrialists appreciated the gradual abolition of 
most rationing restrictions, many workers were “terrified” by rising prices. Textiles, shoes, and 
other household goods, sorely needed by many Bavarians after years of rationing and inflation, 
were “now as unattainable…as before…currency reform.”
108
 Throughout the fall, rapidly rising 
prices priced many Bavarians out of the market for basic consumer goods. Farmers suffered 
since price controls still existed on most agricultural products and those official prices remained 
low. As explained in the previous chapter, farmers throughout Bavaria grew increasingly 
frustrated by the imposition of economic controls while other areas of the Bavarian economy saw 
their controls lifted. The inability to purchase basic consumer goods exacerbated the perceived 
inequity of continued economic controls on farmers. Therefore, rural Bavarians were particularly 
frustrated by the rapid rise in prices initiated by currency reform. By late December the military 
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government officer in Berchtesgaden even reported rumors of yet another currency conversion 
brought on by complaints about soaring prices and low wages.
109
 
American officials recognized that some problems remained after currency reform. 
Rising prices for consumer goods was one such challenge, as was the growing difficulty of 
obtaining credit for Bavarian businesses. In November, F.F. Egger explained that “the paramount 
difficulty” for industry in Landkreis Bad Tölz was securing credit from local banks, particularly 
long term loans. Businesses often carried out their activity “on a hand to hand cash basis” and 
when they could secure credit it was usually accompanied by an interest rate of eight to ten 
percent. Local businessmen and government officials, Egger reported, blamed “everything…on 
currency reform and Bizonia.”
110
 The complaints of Bavarian businessmen, officials, and 
workers, however, frustrated many American officials in Bavaria. In response, some military 
government officers reminded local officials and inhabitants that the United States paid for a 
significant percentage of Bavaria’s recovery. At the opening of a trade exhibition in Bad 
Reichenhall on December 4, for example, the local MGO gave a speech that summarized all the 
policies designed to improve economic life in Bavaria, while also reminding the audience that 




American officials also shifted blame for the economic problems still plaguing Bavaria. 
Harold Taylor, in his long report December 1948 report, blamed the Nazis for the “most 
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controversial matter” of rising prices for consumer goods. The strict price controls and subsidies 
instituted by the Nazi government and then kept in place by the Army after the war, Taylor 
argued, meant that few items sold before currency reform bore little relationship to their actual 
cost. Additionally, Taylor laid the phenomenon of increasing prices at the feet of “natural 
economic laws.” Pent-up demand after six years of war and a population increase of fifty percent 
in Bavaria produced a “tremendous market” and until that demand was satisfied prices would not 
decline. For Taylor and many American officials, military government accomplished all it could 
to rebuild the Bavarian economy. The Bavarian people should not “despair of the future” 
because of the notable improvement in the economy of the Land. Instead, ultimate success at 
reconstruction, Taylor insisted, depended “upon the German people and the support that they and 
their leaders render the program.”
112
  
For military government officials, currency reform had accomplished its goals, mainly 
stabilizing an unstable German economy. The result was significant economic improvement and 
the promise of full recovery. Rising prices posed a challenge, but the Americans had done their 
part and now they wanted the Bavarians to pull their own weight. However, the experience also 
demonstrated the limits of American military government in Bavaria. For one, even though the 
decision to introduce a new currency was American and Allied-driven, occupation officials still 
limited their participation. Instead, primary responsibility belonged to German officials and 
American MGOs would assist when needed. In June 1948, for example, Captain Albert 
Rutledge, the executive officer for the Regensburg military government area, forwarded a memo 
to all regional military government offices. The memo, originally distributed by the headquarters 
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of OMGB’s Branch D, explained that currency reform was “basically a German action.”
113
 
Additionally, the problems unleashed by currency reform, particularly rapidly rising prices, 
highlighted the limits to military government. While the introduction of the Deutschmark 
ultimately stabilized the West German economy, the decision produced significant challenges for 
American officials in Bavaria, problems that they expected the Germans to address. Even the 
most important economic reform of the occupation created significant challenges for military 
government. Nevertheless, occupation officials remained positive about the economic situation 
and insisted that major recovery lay just around the corner. 
Despite American optimism about the economic situation in the aftermath of currency 
reform, major problems still plagued the Bavarian economy. Many of these issues were the same 
as those that had constrained military government efforts to circumvent U.S. policy from 1945 to 
1947. Specifically, notable labor problems limited recovery, while the housing crisis, coupled 
with the influx of additional ethnic German expellees, provided another major challenge. Much 
like the obstacles of the first two years of the occupation, these challenges limited the ability of 
military government officials to promote economic reconstruction. As long as MGOs still 
transferred primary responsibility for the Land’s economic problems to German officials and 
refused to take direct action, the impact of military government on economic recovery was 
minimized. These Americans sought Bavarian reconstruction, but the nagging issues of postwar 
Germany and the scope of military government limited their ability to control economic 
recovery. 
When it came to labor shortages, the rural areas of Bavaria represented a persistent 
problem for military government officials. These largely agricultural Kreise often lacked 
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sufficient labor to meet the demands of local farmers, particularly during planting and harvest 
seasons. The problem lay not with insufficient populations in these agricultural regions; in fact, 
population numbers skyrocketed as ever larger numbers of ethnic German expellees arrived in 
Bavaria. These expellees, however, were often former industrial workers and refused to take up 
agricultural work, instead hoping for an industrial job in a nearby city. For example, Landkreis 
Dachau was approximately sixty-five percent agricultural. However, the expellees assigned to 
the region by the Bavarian government were almost sixty-five percent industrial workers. The 
military government officer in Dachau, Captain George Jacobson, complained to OMGB that 
expellees were assigned to the Kreis without any consideration of their economic skills or local 
requirements.
114
 Similarly, Major Leonard Day reported from Wasserburg that “There are still 
many persons who are unwilling to take up employment…because the work offered is 
undesirable.”
115
 These displaced industrial laborers refused agricultural work, but they also could 
not get the factory work they desperately wanted. As was the case for the first two years of the 
occupation, transportation difficulties limited that ability for unemployed industrial workers to 
reach the available industrial jobs. As a result, labor shortages continued throughout the Bavarian 
economy despite a surplus of available labor. 
In addition to the familiar problem of the maldistribution of labor, the introduction of the 
Deutschmark in June 1948 also produced its own challenges. During the weeks after currency 
reform, many American officials closely watched the labor market for any significant 
developments. Writing from Munich, Frantz Loriaux, the head of OMGB’s Manpower Division, 
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observed on June 30 that unemployment due to currency reform “has not been significant to 
date.”
116
 Officials in military government offices throughout Bavaria, however, were not quite as 
optimistic as Loriaux. Instead, they warned of rising unemployment and a declining demand for 
labor. In Mallersdorf, the director of the local Labor Office reported just three days after the 
introduction of the Deutschmark that industrial enterprises started dismissing workers due to a 
“dire shortage of money.” The Labor Office encouraged employers to defer such decisions by 
lowering the hours worked per week, but the local office warned that increased unemployment 
was unavoidable.
117
 Indeed, by early August approximately one-quarter of the 1,322 unemployed 
workers in Mallersdorf had lost their jobs in the weeks since currency reform.
118
 From 
Berchtesgaden Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Place reported similar developments. Unemployment 
in the Kreis rose from 650 on June 20 to 1,450 on July 30. Additionally, employers cut back 
significantly on their hiring. According to Place, approximately 1,100 job openings available 
before currency reform had been cancelled in the intervening weeks. Coupled with a “very 
considerable” increase in applications for employment, the supply of labor in Berchtesgaden was 
far greater than demand.
119
  
Although military government officials refrained from categorizing the rise in 
unemployment as a renewed crisis, the drop off in demand for labor after currency reform did 
frustrate portions of the Bavarian populace. German workers were particularly frustrated. Many 
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had expected “a period of unemployment” after currency reform, but never believed that the 
introduction of a new currency would produce “such distressing conditions.” As a result, 
according to one local Bavarian official, the “simple man” now held the Americans responsible 
for his hardships and believed that the U.S. “intended to destroy the German economy.”
120
 Of 
course, the Americans were committed to the reconstruction of economic life in Bavaria by late 
1948. Yet their insistence on a relatively hands off approach meant that they could not respond to 
every problem in the Land. Therefore, as economic problems continued, particularly labor 
displacement, apparent American inaction became an easy target for German complaints. 
While the labor market remained volatile, American officials also faced continued 
housing problems, particularly due to the influx of ethnic German expellees. Throughout Bavaria 
the housing situation, especially for expellees and refugees, remained critical. The average 
number of people per room in Nürnberg, for example, remained as high as 2.21, even though 
nearly 11,000 rooms had been reconditioned since the end of the war.
121
 The same situation 
existed throughout Bavaria. Cities that had experienced major bombing raids still possessed 
housing stock that was either destroyed or damaged during the war, even as their populations 
increased. The persistent economic shortages of the postwar years, coupled with damaged 
transportation networks, meant that cities could not acquire the necessary materials to repair all 
their prewar housing or build new housing to accommodate new arrivals. The problem, however, 
was not confined to the cities. Communities that had escaped widespread destruction, even in the 
remote corners of Bavaria, faced major housing shortages due to the influx of ethnic German 
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expellees from Eastern Europe. German officials, cognizant of the urban shortages, funneled the 
new arrivals into the only regions that possessed undamaged housing stock. Yet what undamaged 
housing that existed in Bavaria’s rural regions was soon overwhelmed as hundreds of thousands 
of new people arrived in the Land. 
Germans civilians and expellees both suffered due to the crisis. The full extent of that 
suffering could easily hide behind statistics until military government officials inspected the 
housing situation in their local communities. Peter Christen, a German employed by military 
government, observed, “The unspeakable misery of a completely overcrowded town with 
innumerable small and gross tragedies was brought out into the open” during inspections. 
“Unbelievable” rumors became “reliable facts.” Christen recalled one housing inspection of an 
old, ramshackle building that housed six families. On the first floor lived a single mother with 
four children and a prostitute residing in Bavaria illegally. The second floor included a war-
disabled veteran with tuberculosis and his wife and a divorced couple forced to live together for 
lack of space. Finally, the third floor held an elderly woman caring for babies that were the result 
of American-German relationships and a room crammed with eight people. The MGO, Christen 




 As bad as German civilians often suffered, expellees bore the brunt of the crisis. Lacking 
sufficient housing in communities, German and American officials often housed new arrivals in 
camps, many of them former concentration camps. At a camp outside Freising, refugee and 
expellee families crowded into small, poorly-constructed rooms. One 120 square meter room in 
the camp housed forty-three people from seventeen families, yet its only heating source was a 
small homemade stove. Thirteen women, eight men, six children, and a two-week-old baby 
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occupied a similar 105 square meter room, where they had lived for more than a year.
123
 
Additionally, the effects of currency reform hit expellees particularly hard. Many of the recently 
arrived ethnic Germans could not find work in their previous occupations and they faced 
significant challenges in establishing their own businesses, such as acquiring credit from local 
banks. Meanwhile, farmers and other individuals housing expellees effectively price gouged 
them, collecting the “maximum possible” rent whenever possible.
124
 
As the housing crisis persisted, ethnic Germans struggled to integrate into German 
society. The expellees faced this problem throughout western Germany, but it was particularly 
pronounced in Bavaria, a traditionally conservative, inward-looking Land. During the war, many 
Bavarians resented the evacuation of urban residents from Berlin or the Rhineland to escape 
Allied bombs. Such resentment only grew, and took on aspects of xenophobia, with the arrival of 
millions of ethnic Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Sergeant Walter Krause 
experienced this disdain for non-Bavarians during his time in Bavaria. According to Krause, he 
met a woman named Ilse, a refugee from the Soviet Zone, at an enlisted man’s club in Munich. 
When he tried to find her in a nearby village, however, he found the civilians “largely 
uncooperative” due to their visceral dislike for refugees. When confronted by Krause, many 
residents explained, “These people come to take our jobs; they work for less pay than we do; 
they get government jobs and the government looks after them. Our homes and rooms in our 
homes are requisitioned and they live with us. We have to feed them, and they are a drain on our 
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 Ethnic Germans, already suffering from deplorable housing conditions, also faced 
significant opposition from the very society in which they were trying to live. 
American officials recognized the severity of the problem facing them and used their 
limited options to address the situation. Shortly after currency reform, Murray van Wagoner, 
Director of OMGB, wrote General Lucius Clay about the shortage of housing throughout 
Bavaria. Housing, he explained, “still evokes many complaints from German civilians.” Van 
Wagoner believed that the best solution to the problem was for Americans to “interfere as little 
as possible.” In part, this meant encouraging German solutions to the housing shortage, but it 
also meant limiting American requisitions of housing to help create “normal economic 
conditions.” To make his point, the Bavarian military governor highlighted large buildings 
throughout the Land that sat empty under American requisition. In Deggendorf, for example, 
three hotels with a total capacity of 700 sat vacant for nearly a year. Similarly, the Prinz Leopold 
Kaserne, which comprised four buildings in Regensburg, was also empty since July 1947.
126
 
Clay agreed that “we must not have idle property under present conditions in Germany.” 
However, he insisted that it was the responsibility of military government officers to identify 
empty buildings and to secure their release through the local Army commander.
127
 MGOs also 
compiled a “housing index” to record the average number of people living per room throughout 
Bavaria. These actions reflected many of the “unimaginative” methods used by military 
government to address the housing crisis.
128
 As long as the Americans remained committed to 
turning responsibility over to Bavarian authorities, MGOs possessed few direct options for 
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addressing the severe housing crisis, no matter how sympathetic they were towards the plight of 
expellees. They could address misuse of requisitioned property, but that was the extent of direct 
American involvement. 
As MGOs grappled with these persistent issues and economic recovery remained fleeting, 
American officials throughout Bavaria grew increasingly frustrated with both German officials 
and the local population. Some military government officials now looked upon the Bavarians 
with suspicion, questioning their reports and hostility towards the expellees that now comprised 
nearly a quarter of the Bavarian population. Meanwhile, the Germans also started to push back 
against the Americans, criticizing their understanding of the housing situation and their approach 
to economic reconstruction in Bavaria. The result was a process quite similar to the 
confrontations surrounding the food crises of the postwar era. Reluctant to take direct action, 
American officials instead prodded their Bavarian counterparts to address the housing shortage. 
These Bavarians, however, saw the housing problems, in part, as a byproduct of American 
actions and pushed back against military government efforts. As with the confrontations over 
food, this clash highlighted the limits on military government. Even though the negative policies 
were gone, MGOs possessed few options and faced an increasingly frustrated Bavarian populace. 
For American MGOs, the Bavarians were too lax in their efforts to address the shortage 
of housing, failing to adequately distribute available rooms, favoring rich members of the 
community, or ignoring the plight of expellees. From Munich, Lieutenant Colonel James Kelly 
rebuked the Bürgermeister of Pullach for the actions of local housing officials. Kelly cited a few 
supposedly unused rooms to support his argument that the Bavarians were not adequately 
addressing the housing problem. For example, he referenced a house on Baumstrasse that 
included seven rooms, but housed just four people. Similarly, Kelly also mentioned another 
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house on Sollnerstrasse, where two people supposedly lived in four large rooms. For the 
American MGO, this represented an unnecessary waste of space. “In view of the very critical 
housing shortage,” he wrote, “and so many poor people seeking shelter, it is indeed very tragic 
that Germans, particularly German officials, should favor one section of the community, when 
others suffer for lack of shelter.”
129
 
The officials of Pullach, however, did not accept Kelly’s rebuke and pushed back against 
the American’s effort to define the scope and severity of the housing crisis. Addressing each case 
of wasted housing referenced by Kelly, the city’s Bürgermeister refuted the argument that city 
officials were not adequately addressing the issue. The house on Baumstrasse, for example, 
actually housed seven adults, not four as Kelly insisted. An additional family had also lived in 
the house until recently, but housing officials recently moved them to better dwellings. In 
addition, the house on Sollnerstrasse also contained a women’s tailor that employed five people. 
Therefore, the rooms were not wasted, but used for the benefit of the local economy. Americans, 
the Bürgermeister insisted, did not fully understand the complexity of the housing situation in 
Bavaria. “Short, superficial inspections” of houses, the kind favored by MGOs, revealed “no 
clear picture” of the situation. Additionally, it was often “absolutely necessary” to let Germans 
work out of their homes, lest they have to close their business. Local housing officials, the 
Bürgermeister insisted, “deserve thanks and protection” for their work in a “nerve-shattering” 
field. Such individuals “stand continually in the midst of uncontent persons…one whom they 
must impose dwelling restrictions.”
130
 Military government officials, the German mayor argued 
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to Kelly, did not fully understand the complexity of the situation, including the economic and 
political considerations behind housing.  
The rising tension over housing also emerged around the issue of American requisitions 
of Bavarian property. Bavarian officials often complained about excessive requisitions, 
particularly for use by American families. In response, military government officials investigated 
the reports of unnecessary requisitions. Although many were sympathetic and frustrated with the 
pace of Army requisitions, several also grew frustrated with the German complaints. During late 
September 1948, for example, Jesse Ott of Mindelheim investigated a complaint from the Land 
government that American requisitions in the resort town of Bad Wörishofen took up too many 
of the 5,000 beds available in the town’s hotels. Ott rejected that argument, however. He insisted 
that the Army requisitioned only thirteen percent of those beds – a total of 672. Of those, 
dependent families occupied just half. Ott did not doubt that requisitions dislocated many 
Germans and that they had to live in more “primitive” conditions as a result. Yet he insisted that 
those complaining about their housing deserved their plight, especially for the treatment of 
expellees and refugees. Ott explained: 
It should be born in mind, however, that some of these people are the ones who have 
forced the refugees to live in primitive, unsanitary, vermin-infested camps and barracks 
for the past three years by their refusal to give sanctuary to the refugees in their fine 
homes. There is little sympathy due this category. They are but now [experiencing] some 
of the hardships which they have smugly watched the refugees endure from the aloofness 




Most MGOs did not express such a vengeful attitude, although many grew annoyed with their 
Bavarian counterparts during the last year of the occupation. American officials, particularly 
those sympathetic to the plight of DPs and expellees, saw Bavarian complaints as hypocritical. 
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Overall, the growing confrontations reflected the antagonism over the food crises. MGOs wanted 
Germans to take specific actions, but these German officials vehemently disagreed with the 
American perspective and resisted military government efforts to define the severity of the crisis. 
 Somewhat related to continued housing problems, American and Bavarian officials also 
clashed over other economic matters, particularly in relation to refugee and expellee businesses. 
After the introduction of the Deutschmark, the shortages of money and credit that threatened 
German enterprises also reached those operated by ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern 
Europe. In September 1948, the MGO of Wolfratshausen, M.A. Weightman, met with eighteen 
local businessmen of the Industriegemeinschaft, an organization of expellee small businesses. 
The most severe problem facing them was the lack of credit. Banks in both Munich and the 
community had “consistently refused loans.” Without half a million Deutschmarks, these 
businesses faced closure. It was clear that Bavarian banking officials did not consider the refugee 
firms good credit risks. However, Weightman was sympathetic to the plight of the expellee 
businessmen. He argued, “It is my opinion that some consideration should be given to the fact 
that these businesses were built up from literally nothing.” This fact, he insisted, should 
positively impact the credit rating of the expellee firms. Additionally, Weightman criticized 
government officials for their inactivity. The Bavarian Landtag allocated ten million 
Deutschmarks for bank loans to businessmen like those of the Industriegemeinschaft in 
Wolfratshausen. However, “administrative red tape has prevented a single Pfennig of this fund 
from being so used.”
132
 To Weightman, Bavarian officials dragged their feet because of hostility 
towards expellees and refugees. The German insistence that not enough credit existed in the 
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Landkreis to meet the “excessive” demands of the expellees was hollow when some ten million 
Deutschmarks existed, somewhere in the Bavarian government, for such a purpose.  
 Bavarian treatment of prospective refugee and expellee business owners also annoyed 
American officials. According to the Americans, Bavarian officials issued business licenses if a 
prospective business was “needed by the community.” To MGOs, who grew up in the American 
economic model, this practice was out of sync with proper economic practices. Perhaps most 
importantly, however, American officials saw the practice as a means to further discriminate 
against refugees and expellees. Gerald McMahon, the MGO of Berchtesgaden, dismissed official 
assurances that all business applications received fair consideration. Such assurances, McMahon 
wrote, “cannot be accepted lock, stock, and barrel” since complaints of discrimination against 
expellees and the actions of the Landrat “has taught this office to be highly [skeptical] of such 
one-sided reports.” McMahon cited the experience of one “Herr D,” a refugee from Silesia who 
wanted to o pen a textile business in Berchtesgaden. The licensing committee rejected Herr D’s 
first application because he did not yet possess a “suitable shop” to house his business. The 
Silesian sought out a place for his business, but was told that he first must possess a business 
license. Herr D ultimately found a building, but was then told by the licensing committee that 
“sufficient stores of that kind [textile] have been opened.” The American observed, “This is a 
case of a dog chasing his own tail and getting nowhere.”
133
  
Military government officials experienced significant frustration with their German 
counterparts over Bavaria’s economic problems. As with the rising tensions over feeding the 
Land, Americans and Germans clashed over who got to define the scope and severity of the 
issues facing the occupation. MGOs also expressed their sympathy for refugees and expellees 
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living in Bavaria and attacked what they saw as discriminatory practices by their Bavarian 
counterparts. Coupled with continued labor and housing shortages, the tensions between 
American and Bavarian officials further demonstrated the limits of American military 
government. The Americans could promote their vision of postwar Bavaria and policies of 
economic reconstruction, but they could not solve the nagging problems of the Bavarian 
economy. This was especially true so long as military government avoided direct interference in 
the economic life of Bavaria. More significantly, Bavarian officials, by pushing back against 
American actions, limited the impact of military government. They forced consideration of their 
views by American officials throughout Bavaria. This often frustrated MGOs, but it meant that 
they had to carefully consider the Bavarian perspective and could not simply impose an 
American vision. 
Despite continued economic challenges and American-German tension, the Bavarian 
economy made noteworthy progress in the months before the creation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in May 1949. Undoubtedly, significant problems remained. Money and credit 
shortages, which had cropped up in the months after the introduction of the Deutschmark, 
remained. Gerald McMahon warned that Berchtesgaden faced a “serious economic crisis” due to 
credit shortages.
134
 Similarly, the communities of Kelheim and Mallersdorf described growing 
economic issues brought about by the money and credit shortages. In Kelheim several furniture 
factories faced the prospect of closing, not because they lacked orders, but because their 
customers could not pay for their orders due to a lack of cash.
135
 Mallersdorf, meanwhile, 
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experienced a “dire shortage of money” and increased complaints about the “impossibility” of 
obtaining credit. Without credit, a local food factory temporarily closed its doors because it could 
not employ its workers.
136
 Military government also faced confusion over changing American 
economic policies, such as the decision to introduce “free trade” and lift strict licensing 
requirements in most trades, occupations, and businesses. OMGB dispatched several memos to 
clarify the policy to confused MGOs while many Bavarian officials insisted that they should be 
able to consider “public need” while making licensing decisions.
137
 
Despite these continued challenges, the Bavarian, and German, economy showed 
significant signs of recovery in the early months of 1949. By early January prices for consumer 
goods showed some signs of stabilization for the first time since currency reform the previous 
June. The reintroduction of some price controls, in part, steadied the price of goods in the 
Bavarian economy, but most importantly the population also gained some confidence in the 
Deutschmark. In particular, the population overcame “its original desire to effect often irrational 
purchases thus expending all of its money.”
138
 The rush to buy up sorely-missed textiles, radios, 
and other household goods had driven up prices. After this months-long rush ended, however, 
prices finally showed signs of levelling out. Such confidence in the new currency produced a 
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sense of normalcy in the economy. No longer did chaos characterize economic activities in 
Bavaria. Instead, a stable currency led to renewed confidence in official economic channels. 
Civilians, no longer fearful of runaway inflation, increasingly purchased through regular 
channels. With more disposable capital, Bavarian businesses could increase production to meet 
rising demand. This ultimately produced more jobs and stable sources of income that allowed 
civilians to purchase more consumer goods. 
Growing confidence in the formal economy finally achieved what American and 
Bavarian officials had sought for years: the mortal wounding of the black market. Since it was 
easier to buy food, textiles, and other goods in stores, and without ration coupons, the impetus 
for most black market activity disappeared. With a stable currency, cigarettes no longer served as 
the de facto currency of postwar Bavaria. The black market served an important purpose during 
the years of food and economic crisis immediately after the war; it allowed many civilians to 
ward off catastrophe by either bartering their own goods for food or by participating in the 
informal economy surrounding the occupying American army. For this reason, along with the 
lucrative profits to be made in the illegal economy, military government failed to eliminate the 
black market in postwar Bavaria. The incentives for participation were simply too great, no 
matter the punitive measures for participation. As economic conditions improved, however, the 
vital need for this function disappeared when civilians could purchase food and consumer goods 
in normal channels. Ultimately, the best counter to the black market was economic recovery, 
which finally emerged during the last nine months of the occupation. 
Another sign of the improving Bavarian economy was increasing export and import 
activity. In late March, the MGO in Cham, Riley Gilley, reported that a local program from 
imports from Switzerland made considerable progress. Two businessmen from the town of 
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Roding submitted a check to the JEIA for DM 180,000 to cover textiles and rice imported from 
Zurich.
139
 The JEIA also reported significant improvement in Bavarian export activity. March 
export shipments total $6,437,000, an increase of over $1.1 million from February. All told, 
Bavarian exports during the first quarter of 1949 reached $19,213,000. That total, for just three 
months, nearly equaled the total volume of exports for 1947 ($21 million) and was over half of 
the 1948 total ($37 million). American export officials contributed the rise in exports to the 
growing stability of the economy since Christmas 1948, even though some Bavarian industries 
had trouble selling on domestic markets due to persistent shortages of Deutschmarks. Such 
shortages forced camera, china, and chemical producers to seek “a substantial expansion of 
exports” to counterbalance lost domestic revenue.
140
 Essentially, the problems of small, local 
economies became a positive for the overall Land economy, at least to American officials at 
JEIA. 
 By the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949, the Bavarian economy 
showed significant signs of life. The shortage of money constrained recovery, but the market for 
consumer goods stabilized after months of rising prices. In addition, rising exports provided 
another sign of some sort of economic normalcy. Nevertheless, these developments 
demonstrated the limits of American military government in Bavaria. American policy had 
changed and MGOs no longer sought ways to mitigate its effects in the Land. However, 
American officials faced many of the same limits on their sphere of action as they had earlier in 
the occupation when they challenged official policy. Even though Washington promoted 
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reconstruction, MGOs exerted little direct control over this economic recovery. Still focused on 
promoting German responsibility, military government actions were largely limited to explaining 
American policy, reporting on economic conditions throughout Bavaria, and pushing back 
against German resistance. The creation of the Federal Republic further curtailed their options. 
American policy set the stage for recovery by early 1949, but military government officials in 
Bavaria possessed few direct options for promoting recovery. The economic situation 
undoubtedly improved over four years, but the Americans in military government faced many of 
the same constraints on their actions in 1949 as they did in 1945. 
Conclusion 
 By 1960 the Wirtschaftswunder was essentially complete. West Germany, along with the 
rest of Western Europe, recovered from the overwhelming devastation of the Second World War. 
That recovery represented one of the greatest economic turnarounds in modern history. Yet when 
the American occupation of Bavaria began in 1945, the severity of the economic situation 
seemingly made the Economic Miracle unlikely, if not impossible. Due to the war, Bavarian 
economic life was, essentially, nonexistent. Bombed out cities, ravaged transportation networks, 
and crippling shortages of nearly all basic materials limited the prospects for recovery. The 
Americans and their military government institutions in Bavaria faced the reality of economic 
collapse. They addressed the difficulties of high unemployment, limited resources, sagging 
civilian confidence, and shifting American policy. The Bavarian economy represented a crisis of 
the highest order. 
 To address this crisis, however, American military government officials in Bavaria 
possessed limited options. At the start of the occupation, American policy, still influenced by 
Henry Morgenthau’s calls for deindustrialization, circumscribed their options. Military 
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government officers – living amidst the chaos of a devastated economy and increasingly 
sympathetic to the Bavarian populace – sought ways to circumvent official policy in the name of 
pragmatism. The most direct means of reconstruction available to Americans early in the 
occupation was rehabilitating Bavarian industries to produce goods – plates, beer, coal, etc. – for 
the occupying U.S. Army. Such action helped to an extent, but they also undermined overall 
recovery by pulling badly-needed consumer goods out of the market and funneling scarce labor 
out of the normal market. Beyond that relatively direct method, American officials possessed 
largely indirect options for reconstruction. They reported on economic problems, surveyed the 
major economic activities in their regions, and offered moral encouragement to both Bavarian 
officials and civilians. In particular, the Americans’ desire to transfer responsibility German 
authorities as rapidly as possible constrained their potential avenues of action. Additionally, the 
persistent problems of postwar Bavarian acted as another check on military government. Labor 
issues, a major housing crisis, and the influx of ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe all 
exacerbated the already significant challenges facing the Bavarian economy and limited in the 
impact of American officials. The result was an economic recovery that proceeded by fits and 
starts during the first eighteen to twenty-four months of the occupation. 
 Prospects for recovery improved as American policy shifted in late 1946 and early 1947. 
Secretary of State James Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart signaled a changing American approach to 
economic reconstruction, which the merger of the U.S. and British zones in January 1947, the 
repeal of JCS 1076, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan cemented. By the summer of 
1947 American policy firmly embraced reconstruction of western Germany’s economy, yet the 
options for military government officials remained few. Most notably, the American 
commitment to transferring responsibility to German officials continued. MGOs in Bavaria 
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wanted their German counterparts, not the Americans, to promote economic recovery, a practice 
deeply engrained in the Army’s approach to postwar occupations. Instead, Americans in Bavaria 
persisted with their indirect methods. They encouraged German businessmen to expand their 
economic activities, offered incentives for exporting goods abroad, and generally sounded a 
positive message about Bavarian recovery. The most direct American intervention in the 
economy, at this point, was the introduction of the Deutschmark in June 1948. Even then, 
however, military government officials in Bavaria insisted it was fundamentally a German 
operation. After currency reform the Bavarian economy showed signs of improvement, but 
familiar problems remained and the new currency brought its own troubles. The supply of both 
labor and housing proved problematic, particularly as more ethnic Germans flooded into Bavaria. 
The Land government settled them in rural regions since the major cities could not house many 
more residents. Yet this left expellees far away from the available jobs, which were largely in 
cities. Currency reform also produced rapidly rising prices and a shortage of credit that could 
undermine the prospects of recovery. Additionally, Americans grew increasingly frustrated with 
their Bavarian counterparts. American and German officials, then, clashed over who got to 
define the severity of the economic crisis, much as they did over the food supply. 
 Nevertheless, the Bavarian economy showed significant signs of life by early 1949. 
Prices for consumer goods declined and export activity recorded a significant increase. The 
prospect of an economic collapse was the smallest since the start of the occupation. American 
officials in Bavaria, however, possessed limited influence on this recovery. They certainly hoped 
for and promoted economic reconstruction, but they deployed few direct options. Instead, the 
quest to rebuild Bavaria demonstrated the limits of American military government, at least as 
practiced in postwar Bavaria. Early American policy acted as one check on military government. 
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MGOs mitigated the effects of that policy as much as possible, but they possessed few tools to 
do so. In addition, the American preference for German officials to take responsibility further 
constrained the avenues open to MGOs, even as it produced tension between Americans and 
Bavarians. The Americans played an important part in the rebuilding Bavaria. Yet their influence 
was limited and, ultimately, the Germans were the most influential figures in the Economic 
Miracle of West Germany. 
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Chapter 4: Importing America: Democratization and Reorientation in Bavaria 
 
“The German people have no understanding of what democracy means in practice, either as to 
rights or obligations…” 
- Office of Military Government for Bavaria, 19 May 19471 
 
“These two evenings of discussion should result in a complete understanding that if the 
Bavarians expect to have their civil rights, they must constantly defend them as we do in the 
United States.” 
- C.S. Wright, 12 May 19492 
 
Although the crises of the first years of the occupation and the challenges associated with 
reviving the Bavarian economy posed major challenges to American officials in Bavaria, one of 
their most important tasks remained the creation of a democratic Germany. A democratic 
Germany – a unified, democratic Germany for those who still held such hope – would rejoin the 
community of nations and serve as the foundation for peace and stability in the heart of Europe. 
Democratized, Germany would no longer start deadly world wars, and with a reconstructed 
economy, the country could lighten the financial burden of the American taxpayers who funded 
the occupation. The rising threat of the Soviet Union and the emerging Cold War provided a 
greater sense of urgency to the task. As the Cold War took shape, only democratization and 
reorientation of the Bavarian, and German, populace could truly halt the spread of communism. 
Just as the Soviet Union imposed its political system in the East, so too would the United States 
import its democratic practices to Bavaria, although without the blatant use of coercive state 
power. 
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Like other aspects of the occupation, however, early American policy limited the 
democratization efforts of military government officials. Of course, the food and economic 
problems of postwar Bavaria presented a major obstacle. The first few years of the occupation, 
characterized by persistent shortages and repeated crises, were not conducive to the spread of 
democracy. Yet policy presented another stumbling block. The policy of nonfraternization, 
which lasted until the fall of 1945, limited interactions between Americans and Germans, while 
undergirding the concept of collective German guilt and the need for a harsh peace. Additionally, 
one of the earlies forms of democratization, albeit a negative form, remained contentions. 
Americans and Bavarians both struggled to define the scope and intent of denazification. The 
inherently negative aspect of denazification, destroying Nazism through the removal of Nazis 
and Nazis symbols, also produced tension with the more positive aspects of democratization, 
which theoretically sought to build democracy from the ground up. The contrast between 
promoting democratic practices while some Bavarians were systematically removed from their 
positions due to membership in the Nazi Party highlighted a tension between goals and means 
that American officials strove to reconcile in the face of mounting German criticism over 
denazification. 
Beyond the struggle over denazification, Americans in Bavaria experimented with 
exactly what reorientation would entail. The most prominent forum for experimentation was the 
German youth program. From the earliest months of the occupation, American officials targeted 
Bavarian youth, who had spent much of their formative years in Nazi Germany, as key figures in 
democratization efforts. Through youth groups, organized sports, discussion groups, seminars, 
and education reforms, Americans worked to impart the ideals of modern democracy and mature 
democratic citizenship to Bavaria’s youth. Ultimately, the youth programs served as a testing 
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ground for the larger reorientation mission. It was in the youth program that Americans 
developed the methods, language of modernity and backwardness, and the definitions of success 
– namely looking like US democracy – that characterized the larger democratization campaign of 
1948 and 1949.  
Even with the practice afforded by the youth programs, however, once military 
government officials turned their attention fully to the reorientation program a wide array of 
different programs all aimed for the reorientation of Germans living under American occupation. 
The Amerika Haus program, the reorientation film program, programs promoting cultural 
exchange, and the organization of discussion groups and town hall meetings reflected the 
different bureaucracies of Bavarian military government and produced a diverse approach to 
reorientation. Despite the diversity, American efforts at reorientation reflected a rather consistent 
goal: the democratization of Bavarians, and Germans in general, through a campaign of political 
modernization. Military government officials like William Moran, the Deputy Director of 
OMGB’s Field Operations Division, circulated ideas about the political backwardness of 
Bavarians and maturity of the American occupiers. These immature Germans would therefore 
receive an education in modern and mature democratic ideas from their American teachers. 
Military government officials sometimes went out of their way to proclaim that they were not 
imposing American standards on the Bavarians. However, the Americans who implemented the 
program naturally drew from the democracy with which they had the most experience: the 
United States. As a result, American democratic thought and ideals served as the backdrop 
against which German democratization was assessed. When their German pupils behaved in 
ways familiar to their American mentors, reorientation was viewed as a success. 
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While Americans judged success by the emulation of American practices, the Germans 
used reorientation for their own purposes. Some Germans embraced the language of political 
modernization to advance their political prospects. Others used the language to appeal to military 
government and challenge the authority of local, regional, and Bavarian officials. Most 
significantly, however, Bavarians also adapted the language of democratization to challenge their 
supposed teachers. Early on Germans pointed out the tension between denazification and 
democratization, but criticism intensified as Americans spread the language of political 
modernization. Bavarian officials, newspapers, and individuals used the language of 
democratization to critique what they viewed as military government’s undemocratic actions. 
Unpopular education reforms, in particular, were criticized as undemocratic as OMGB tried to 
force the Bavarian government to go along with its reforms. Bavarians of all stripes, then, co-
opted the language of reorientation to suit their own needs and goals. 
Democratization and reorientation were among the most important missions for 
American military government officers. Without their success, the goal of a democratic Bavaria, 
and Germany, would be difficult to reach. Although it received less attention during the first 
years of the occupation, Americans viewed democratization as just as important as feeding and 
rebuilding Bavaria. Unlike the food and economic crises, however, MGOs in Bavaria did not 
specifically challenge American policy regarding reorientation. Many viewed the early 
nonfraternization directive as impractical, but high-level American officials also recognized its 
failure early on and ended the strict order. What American policy did do was limit the range of 
options available to military government officials in the realm of democratization. The more 
punitive aspects of economic policy meant that MGOs focused on economic problems, not 
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democratization, during the first years of the occupation. Therefore, negative policies in one field 
often made their effects felt in different spheres. 
Ultimately, American officials in Bavaria implemented a reorientation campaign that was 
a program of political modernization. Falling back on the democratic ideas they were most 
familiar with, MGOs believed that modern and mature American ideas should replace the 
backward and immature ideas of the Germans living in Bavaria. This program was not new in 
American foreign policy and its basic ideas would continue into the Cold War. During the 
interwar era, Congress agreed to the eventual independence of the Philippine Islands after the 
Americans had finished educating the population in the ways of modernity.  Then during the 
1950s and 1960s, modernization theory, including political modernization, was exported to the 
so-called developing world. Reorientation in American-occupied Bavaria represented both a 
continuation of older American practices and a preview of early Cold War policy, but applied, in 
this case, to politically backwards Europeans in the center of the Old World.
3
 
Prelude to Reorientation 
From early on, reorientation formed a key aspect of American policy in occupied 
Germany. Democratization and denazification formed half of the so-called “Four Ds” – the other 
two were demilitarization and deindustrialization – that the victorious Allies would pursue in 
their respective zones of occupation. However, the early crises of the occupation relegated 
democratization, a positive program, to the back burner and denazification remained perhaps the 
most visible, and most contentious, aspect of military government’s quest for reorientation. 
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Indeed, the tensions inherent in pursuing a negative policy (denazification) while simultaneously 
calling for the more positive creation of democratic life in Germany produced significant 
challenges for the American occupiers. Germans, as will be seen later in this chapter, readily 
coopted American language of democratization to criticize U.S. policy and to contend for control 
over denazification.  
Early attempts at democratization, however, ran into a variety of obstacles. Most 
obviously, the crippling food and economic crises of the early postwar years limited the scope of 
democratization efforts. American officials, while they sought the spread of democracy, focused 
the bulk of their attention of addressing the major food shortages and economic chaos that 
characterized postwar Bavaria. German officials were also distracted by the enormity of the 
crises and saw democratization as of secondary importance. Beyond the distractions for both 
groups of officials, however, the plight of the Bavarian populace acted as a check on any early 
efforts towards reorientation. Even if MGOs had been inclined to start a large-scale campaign of 
democratization in late 1945 or early 1946, large swaths of the population were not interested. 
Instead, Bavarians focused on the day-to-day quest for survival, such as repairing homes, 
traveling to barter for food, or participating in other aspects of the informal economy. Faced with 
starvation, learning about democracy would have been of little importance. 
In addition, the policy of denazification acted as another limit on any potential campaign 
of democratization during the early years of the occupation. As will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next chapter, denazification was wildly unpopular throughout Bavaria. Right-wing 
politicians criticized the policy as too strict. Left-wing parties, particularly the communists, 
insisted the campaign was too lenient. Meanwhile, large swaths of the Bavarian population saw 
the policy as unfair, with minor Nazi Party members receiving harsh punishments early in the 
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occupation and major figures getting relatively light sentences in the rush to end denazification 
as the program dragged on. Denazification also presented potential problems for any campaign 
of democratization or reorientation contemplated by military government. The disconnect 
between the inherently negative, and rather undemocratic, process of removing Nazis from 
positions of power was hard to reconcile with the language of democratization, particularly when 
military government removed officials who had been elected by their communities. Similarly, 
the Army ruled postwar Bavaria in a fundamentally undemocratic manner while simultaneously 
proclaiming the goal of democratization. This disconnect was something that would challenge 
MGOs throughout the occupation.
4
 
Perhaps most significantly, however, was the challenge posed by the early policy of 
nonfraternization. Any early efforts at democratization, such as they informally existed, had to 
account for this widely publicized American policy. High-level Army and military government 
officials had worried about fraternization between Americans and Germans since before the end 
of the war. Specifically, many worried, particularly those who favored a harsh peace, that 
friendly interactions between the two populations would undermine American policy by eroding 
the idea of collective German guilt.
5
 Many Army officials feared that the soldiers’ hatred to 
Germans was only temporary and would quickly change after the war. To preempt that 
possibility, the Army published the Pocket Guide for Germany. Distributed to occupation forces 
before the entered Germany, it described all German society as unrepentantly militaristic and 
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responsible for the war. Industrialization and economic modernization, the handbook argued, 
finally allowed “the German…to contemplate…his dream of enslaving the world.”
6
 Beyond 
fears of undermining American policy, yet still based on the foundational idea of Germany as a 
totally militarized society, nonfraternization promised to keep US soldiers from being corrupted 
by Germans. If Americans could not socialize with civilians, then undemocratic German 
attitudes would not corrupt the occupation forces. 
Due to nonfraternization, limited options existed for any early efforts at democratization. 
By, in theory, severely minimizing the amount of interactions between Americans and 
Bavarians, the policy constrained any attempts to spread the ideas of democracy. Only able to 
interact with German officials during work hours and prohibited from informal interactions, the 
policy threw up an additional roadblock to reorientation. For example, the constraints on 
American actions meant that most early actions in the sphere of reorientation were largely 
negative, such as the removal of Nazi party members and “militarists” from official positions or 
the elimination of other symbols of the Third Reich like street names and statues. Such efforts 
made some progress in removing major vestiges of Nazism, but they could not promote new 
democratic values. Even if MGOs had not been preoccupied by the food and economic crises, 
nonfraternization would have made it hard to spread democracy in postwar Bavaria. 
However, the nonfraternization band quickly broke down, despite the wishes of high-
level Army officials. Soldiers, including MGOs, entering Bavarian found civilians who did not 
fit into the wartime image of a warlike population universally in support of the war. Instead, they 
found a population tired by six years of war and morose after years of living under the rain of 
Allied bombs. Bavarians, above all, wanted peace. Additionally, many Americans identified a 
sense of socio-cultural familiarity between American and German society. German houses 
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reminded Americans of home, individual Germans behaved in a familiar manner, and many 
Bavarians had even incorporated major aspects of American culture, including jazz and a 
fondness for the mythological Wild West. Therefore, many soldiers, not just German-Americans, 
“found it exceedingly difficult to hate people who reminded them so much of their own friends 
and family at home.”
7
 Beyond this sense of familiarity, an ardent desire for female 
companionship led many Americans to flagrantly violate the nonfraternization order. This aspect 
of fraternization became so prevalent that it feminized the concept. As originally issued, 
fraternization included to interactions with all Germans, but it was soon synonymous with 
relationships between American men and German women. As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
produced a growing sense of sympathy for the Bavarian populace. In the realms of food and 
economics, it pushed MGOs to mitigate the effects of American policies. When it came to 
democratization, such sympathy opened the door for more positive policies of reorientation and a 
move away from reliance on predominantly negative policies.
8
 
Ideas of Reorientation 
 When it came to reorientation and democratization, American military government 
officials in Bavaria did not operate in vacuum. Instead, they drew, at least in part, on 
contemporary academic research about how best to restructure undemocratic societies along 
democratic lines and from early writings on modernization theory. Most notably, American 
intellectuals across multiple disciplines drew on psychology and psychiatry to analyze the 
“German mentality” and to describe “the principle of re-education as a policy of cultural and 
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 Fundamentally, this argument centered on the idea that such a thing 
as a unified “national character structure” existed and that it could be changed. Based on new 
research methods in psychology, psychiatry, and other disciplines, many academics believed that 
the national character structure was a product of traditions passed on from generation to 
generation and that “manifested…in all aspects of national, social, and psychic life.”
10
 For 
Columbia neuropsychiatrist Richard Brickner, the German national character displayed the 
symptoms of paranoia, including megalomania, the need to dominate, a persecution complex 
coupled with projection, and retrospective falsification. According to Brickner, “Murder is the 
logical dénouement of its [paranoia’s] special outlook on the world.”
11
 While Brickner identified 
paranoia in the German national character, child psychoanalyst Erik H. Erikson saw German 
society as stuck in a protracted state of immaturity in which “simple patterns of hypnotic action 
and freedom from thought” replaced the “complicated conflict of adolescence.”
12
  
 Ultimately, however, these intellectuals believed that German national character could be 
changed. Brickner argued that Germany’s paranoia could be cured through a process of re-
education, but that process could not begin from within German society. “Resources or 
imagination to put into effect a programme of psychiatric rehabilitation,” he explained, “must 
come from outside – from among the victors.”
13
 Meanwhile, anthropologist Margaret Mead built 
upon her thesis that war was a social invention to argue that national character could be changed 
through education, or in the case of Germany re-education. In And Keep Your Powder Dry, Mead 
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wrote that America’s greatest asset was its national character, which both supported a democratic 
culture and was the product of that culture. Citing the process by which immigrants became 
Americans, Mead argued that national character was a product of citizenship, not race or 
ethnicity. Therefore, the German national character – or any nondemocratic national character – 
could be changed “if cultural value standards were carefully…re-adapted.” Ultimately, Mead 
believed, “[W]e must accept the responsibility of trying to eliminate in other cultures and our 




These differing ideas about how to fix Germany’s national character came together in 
1944 during a conference organized by Brickner and sponsored by the State Department and War 
Deparment. At the conference – titled “Germany After the War” – physicians, sociologists, 
psychologists, and anthropologists discussed how to modify the German national character 
during the postwar occupation. Generally, the participants agreed that change could be wrought, 
yet disagreed on how to achieve that change. Mead and psychoanalyst Thomas French believed 
that changing the institutions of German society would help the “constructive elements” of 
German mentality to overcome the destructive ones. Another group of academics led by 
Lawrence Kubie, however, insisted “that nothing but repression could control German 
aggressiveness.” Ultimately, Mead and French’s perspective largely won out and the 
conference’s report, later published in the Journal of Orthopsychiatry, called for long-term 
institutional change to German society.
15
 
                                                 
14
 Gerhardt, “A Hidden Agenda of Recovery,” 307-308; Fay, Theaters of Occupation, 21-25; Margaret Mead, And 
Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America (New York: W. Morrow and Co., 1942) in Fay, 
Theaters of Occupation, 24. 
15
 Gerhardt, “A Hidden Agenda of Recovery,” 315 & 317. 
229 
 
 The arguments of Brickner, Mead, and other academics interested in German national 
character gained significant traction among both postwar planners and in society at large. The 
wartime Committee to Reeducate the Axis Powers drew on these academic theories to argue that 
Germans would have to “unlearn” Nazi doctrine before learning about liberal democracy. 
Additionally, the Committee reinforced ideas about immature Germans advocated by Erikson. 
The “industrious, well-disciplined, peace-loving” German, according to the Committee, would 
be found when individuals “had a chance to grow from childhood outside the direct or indirect 
influence” of German militarism.
16
 Beyond postwar planning, the film Tomorrow – the World! 
(1944) popularized the idea that Germans in general, and Nazis specifically, existed “in a state of 
protracted adolescence.” In the film, a German boy indoctrinated in Nazi propaganda, Emil, 
arrives in the United States to live with his uncle. The movie then chronicles Emil’s unlearning 
of Nazi ideology and his acceptance of American society. Ultimately, the film equates German 
national character with adolescence and the American national character with maturity.
17
 
 Beyond debates about national character, American sociologists, anthropologists, and 
other intellectuals laid the foundations of modernization theory during the 1940s. For 
modernization scholars, historian Michael Latham explained, the theory “promised to unite 
different branches of social analysis” around a grand theory that could explain how states 
developed from “primitive” to “advanced” status, why Western society dominated the world, and 
provide a roadmap for “new states” embarking on the journey towards modernization.
18
 
Ultimately, modernization theorists promoted the American consensus that dominated the 
country during the middle of the twentieth century, namely support for liberal values, capitalist 
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forms, and pluralist institutions. The United States, they argued, could serve as a model for 
“backward” peoples around the globe and help states on the road to modernity. 
  Modernization theory first appeared in the field of sociology; in particular, sociologist 
Talcott Parsons, who also participated in the academic debate about the German national 
character, played a key role in developing foundational ideas. Parsons’ 1937 work The Structure 
of Social Action drew distinctions between “primitive” societies, in which family and community 
institutions played the most important roles in constraining individual action, and “advanced” 
societies, where formal legal systems and the nation-state had the greatest impact on individual 
agency.
19
 Building off Parsons, many American sociologists developed ideas about what 
constituted a “modern” personality. An appropriately modern individual was characterized by 
attributes such as “openness to new experience,” “readiness for social change,” an ability to trust 
others, and respect for the dignity of fellow humans. Meanwhile, a “traditional” person was 
passive and fearful of change. Ultimately, modernization sociologists saw the theory as an 
“analytical structure through which an entire process of social change, encompassing both the 
past of the West and the future of the ‘developing’ world, might be understood.”
20
 
 Sociologists, however, were not the only academics to embrace modernization theory. 
Political scientists developed ideas about “political development” and economists highlighted 
structuralist thinking regarding economic stagnation. In this vein of thought, economic problems 
originated not from trade relations but from “deficiencies in social values and political 
leadership.” However, English-speaking countries possessed no such problems. Americans and 
other Anglo-Saxons, Walt Rostow argued, possessed ideas about “individualism, democracy, and 
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economic opportunity that facilitated a ‘natural’ and rapid climb toward ‘modern’ social 
organization and living standards.” Striking a similar chord to scholars of national character, 
modernization theorists argued that backward societies required some kind of cultural planning 
to correct these deficiencies. Modern states and societies, therefore, could provide guidance to 
those states on the road towards modernization. 
 This belief that modern states would guide the backward towards modernity produced 
language like old imperial justifications for conquest, even though most modernization theorists 
voiced significant opposition to formal imperialism. Like imperialists from the nineteenth 
century, intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s argued for the intrinsic superiority of the West and 
the duty of Western societies to lift backwards peoples towards that superior standard. For 
example, many intellectuals argued “that the history of nations was analogous to the growth of 
organisms.” In their mind, movement towards Western civilization was a natural process; the 
only difference was the speed in which societies reached that end point.
21
 Additionally, the 
United States was held up as the peak of modernity and its history promoted as a kind of guide 
on how to reach that lofty level. Sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset argued that other countries 
“would learn a great deal if they sought to acquire the same ‘key values’ of equality and 
achievement that ‘stem from our revolutionary origins.’” America, Lipset insisted, “was 
democratic and equalitarian before industrialization” and had “led the way in these patterns.”
22
 
By following the American example, modernization scholars argued, the backward regions of the 
world could reach modernity. 
 Although the ideas behind modernization theory did not reach maturity until the late 
1950s and early 1960s, early formulations existed during the American occupation of Bavaria 
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and built upon the ideas regarding national character that academics had debated throughout the 
war. Occupation officials in Bavaria drew on the language of modernization and national 
character to describe both the civilian population and their plans to instill democracy in their 
defeated foe. In many ways, the United States experimented with the earliest ideas about 
modernization not in a “developing” country, but in the heart of the old world. MGOs in Bavaria 
would encourage the civilian population to borrow and imitate “modern” American practices, a 
practice that would later characterize the modernization campaigns of the Cold War. Within 
Germany, this practice extended beyond the purview of democratization. The Marshall Plan, for 
example, was in part based on “assumptions that America’s own historical experience might be 
replicated abroad.”
23
 The full extent of modernization theory had not yet been achieved, but the 
basic tenets emerged in occupied Bavaria.  
 While many debates about national character and modernization theory took place in 
intellectual circles, they gained influence among military government officials in a variety of 
ways. First, many MGOs and other occupation officials possessed academic backgrounds. 
Students at the School of Military Government, for example, included doctors, government 
employees, and professors who possessed familiarity with contemporary academic debates. In 
addition, training for occupation during often included instruction on the concepts of national 
character. Yale University’s Arnold Wolfers, for example, lectured MGO students on “how to 
handle Germans.” Wolfers then proceeded to describe distinctive features of the German national 
character. Germans, he argued, saw “self-restraint, politeness or even kindness as a sign of 
weakness.” Instead, only “fairness, decency and humanity” combined with “unyielding 
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firmness” would reeducate the population successfully.
24
 Occupation officials, therefore, 
possessed some background in the ideas that would undergird OMGB’s efforts at 
democratization. Beyond the experiences of MGOs, civilian academics were a common feature 
of postwar Germany. OMGB hired numerous civilian experts to help with various aspects of the 
occupation, including reorientation and school reform. These civilians brought with them 
academic theories about German national character and democratization. Beyond travel at the 
behest of military government, American academics went to Europe as part of events to spread 
American intellectual ideas. The Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, organized outside the 
purview of military government and held in 1947 and 1948, attracted major figures, including 




Ultimately, the language that would surround the reorientation campaign demonstrated 
the prevalence of these intellectual ideas. German backwardness and immaturity, some of the 
defining characteristics of the German national character identified by American academics, 
would be eradicated by the shining example of American modernity. American practices, 
customs, and ideas – the foundation of the United States’ national character – would serve as a 
model for Bavarians to imitate. Borrowing from the American academe, occupation officials in 
OMGB set out to democratize Bavarian society. 
The Youth Program: Rehearsal for Democratization 
The first major reorientation campaign conducted by MGOs focused on Bavarian youth. 
From the earliest months of the occupation, American officials in Bavaria targeted youth for 
special democratization projects. Bavarian youth had spent most of their formative years in Nazi 
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Germany and therefore needed special attention to return them to the path of democracy. As a 
result, military government and regular Army officers oversaw a wide variety of programs that 
specifically targeted German youth. Combat units worked with military government detachments 
to organize youth sporting events to teach these young Bavarians the principles of democratic 
society through sport. Military government oversaw the recreation of German youth groups, 
sponsored by both Americans and Germans, and prohibited any nationalistic or militaristic 
influences on these groups. Finally, American military government officers worked to introduce 
young Bavarians to modern and mature democratic practices, often synonymous with American 
traditions. To do so, they cooperated with combat units and Bavarian officials to sponsor youth 
forums where young Bavarians could learn from their American teachers. In the final years of 
the occupation German youth affairs often merged with the broader program of reorientation, 
particularly in the arenas of cultural exchange and film. Nevertheless, in the first few years of the 
occupation, while many military government officers were distracted by the economic crises 
plaguing Bavaria, the German youth programs served as a rehearsal for the larger 
democratization program that would come later. The Bavarian youth programs, essentially, 
served as a testing ground for approaches to reorientation. In their attempts to democratize 
Bavarian youth, American officials introduced many of the same practices and ideas about 
political modernization and maturity that would characterize their drive to democratize the wider 
German populace. 
Early interactions with Bavarian children by military government officials produced the 
same sense of sympathy that had led to challenges to American food and economic policies. 
Many Americans in Bavaria, both regular troops and occupation officials, saw youth as victims 
of both Nazism and the war. The experience of seeing Bavarian youth battle starvation in the 
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immediate postwar months led many officials to sympathize with these seemingly helpless 
children and youth. Sergeant Walter Krause recalled watching a twelve-year-old boy trying to 
steal food from a parked jeep. Although Krause initially felt he should stop the boy, he quickly 
changed his mind. “Who am I to pass judgment on this boy?” he wrote. “How do I know what 
desperation has compelled him to stoop to an act of pilferage? What really lies behind his act?”
26
 
In response to circumstances like this, American soldiers quickly ignored the nonfraternization 
order and reached out to Bavarian youth. They distributed chocolate or bubble gum, shared 
comic books, and organized informal sporting events. These informal interactions were so 
popular that it contributed to the collapse of the nonfraternization order when the ban on 
relationships with German children was lifted in early fall 1945. This process also reinforced the 
growing sense of paternal responsibility for the Bavarian populace then emerging among military 
government officials in the Land because of the food and economic crises. Not only would 
MGOs care for the physical needs of Bavarian youth, many also saw themselves as potential 
instructors in the ways of democracy. 
However, American officials did not construct a coherent youth campaign for the first 
nine months of the occupation. As a result, occupation troops and military government 
detachments organized uncoordinated youth programs that lacked any kind of coherent approach 
to democratization. These youth programs, it was hoped, would “foster democratic principles” in 
young Germans.
27
 In particular, MGOs drew a direct connection between American athletics and 
the country’s democratic tradition.
28
 Youth sports would do the same in Bavaria, supposedly 
combatting Nazism and instilling democratic values. Military Government Detachment I-364, 
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stationed in Schrobenhausen, reported to Munich the organization of two softball and two 
basketball teams by Sargent Matzen and Corporal Williams of the detachment. Captain Henry 
Bierman, the detachment commander, believed that “a good athletic program for boys and girls 
would give the coming generation a different out look in life and might prevent future wars.”
29
 
Another military government official, James Pollock, similarly proposed teaching German youth 
the American version of football. “If the Germans could understand its contributions in giving us 
some qualities the Germans have always lacked,” Pollock explained, “their younger Generation 
might be improved.”
30
 American officials also supported youth activities organized by the 
Germans themselves. Military government detachments and combat units provided excess war 
materiel for camping trips, loaned out sport equipment, and even offered transportation to and 
from youth events, a luxury in a period of major shortages.
31
  At this point in the occupation 
American officers like Bierman were not clear how these youth programs would promote 
democracy, but they continued nonetheless.  
Such uncoordinated youth programs continued into April 1946, when OMGUS officials 
ordered the creation of official American-sponsored youth activities. This new directive did not 
represent a fundamentally novel approach to the relationship between German children and 
American soldiers. Instead, it "elevated to an official level what had already existed before, 
namely the informal interaction between American soldiers and German children.”
32
 Sporting 
activities continued, as MGOs imported their favorite sports into Bavaria, particularly baseball 
and football. Beyond sports, however, Americans organized other youth activities throughout 
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Bavaria. In July 1946, for example, soldiers in the Bavarian town of Coburg held a festival for 
1,000 German children. The Americans drove children around town in Army jeeps, held a 
variety of competitions, and provided food and chocolate to the participating children. Similarly, 
MGOs organized local recreation centers for Bavarian youth and held large numbers of 
Christmas parties during the upcoming winter.
33
 As with the early, non-official youth activities, 
Americans had a challenging time justifying exactly how these activities would promote 
democracy. It was unclear how attending American-sponsored festivals and Christmas parties 
would make Bavarian children democratic. That lack of a coherent framework, however, did not 
keep the programs from growing in scope and size. 
Despite official sanction, several challenges plagued the nascent youth program. Military 
government officers complained of the lack of participation by local combat units. In one survey, 
only four of eleven detachments reported the active participation of nearby Army units. 
Additionally, demobilization and the rapid turnover of smaller units provided little stability in the 
youth program, as regular soldiers often promised assistance but were then moved to another 
region of the U.S. Zone of Occupation.
34
 The lack of coordination was exacerbated by shortages 
of equipment necessary for the youth program. Footwear, tents, hiking gear, and sport equipment 
was sorely lacking and military government detachments struggled to acquire the materials 
needed by local German groups. In August 1946, the detachment in rural Landkreis 
Feuchtwangen, complained that it was “unable to procure any sport equipment whatsoever.” 
Less than a month later, a survey of the Bavarian youth program reported that only ten of twenty-
four detachments had received any sport equipment and in Griesbach, two requisitions by 
Detachment D-378 had gone unanswered for five weeks. For occupation officials on the ground, 
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the shortages represented a major obstacle to the success of the early youth program. These 
Americans wanted to promote the democratization of Bavarian youth, but the lack of 
coordination and equipment severely inhibited their ability to do so. 
 During the summer of 1946, military government worked to provide greater coordination 
in youth affairs. At the end of May, a Bavarian-wide committee – the Bavarian Land Youth 
Committee – was established to oversee youth groups and to coordinate affairs between 
Bavarians, military government officers, and combat units. In addition, Americans encouraged 
Germans to organize more effective local control. New Kreis Youth Committees coordinated the 
activities of local Bavarian youth groups. OMGB also sped up the process of licensing these 
German youth groups. Detailed licensing applications sought to weed out undemocratic 
organizations and offered one way, even if it was largely negative, to promote democratization. 
Potential groups had to explain their activities between 1933 and 1945, along with any 
connections to the Nazi Party or its subsidiary youth organizations. In addition, youth groups 
were prohibited from political activity, from wearing uniforms, and from anything that 
resembled paramilitary activity. “Severe punishment” awaited any youth organization that 
“glorifies militarism or nationalism” or that sought to “revive or justify the doctrines of national 
socialist leaders.” Military government officials were optimistic about the success of the better-
coordinated youth program. Hans Thomsen, the Youth Activities Specialist in OMGB, predicted 
a massive increase in youth participation to Brigadier General Walter Mueller. Approximately 
175,000 Bavarian youth were involved in youth groups in the middle of August 1946. Yet by the 
end of the year Thomsen envisioned over 500 groups and as many as 1 million participants.
35
 
Considering the shortages that still plagued Bavaria – not only in equipment for youth affairs, but 
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also in food, fuel, and transportation – Thomsen’s estimates were overly optimistic. But the 
moves to better coordinate the diverse aspects that made up the youth program in the summer of 
1946 set the stage for the creation of a coherent program of youth democratization. 
 In October and November 1946 Army and military government officials finally 
developed a framework in which the Bavarian, and larger German, youth programs could operate 
and which provided some kind of argument for how Bavarian youth would be democratized. On 
October 5, the U.S. Army’s European headquarters ordered the creation of Youth Affairs 
Officers at all levels – divisional, regimental, battalion, and company – to coordinate activities 
with military government offices and local German youth groups. In American eyes, German 
youth were “disillusioned, frustrated and confused” after defeat and therefore needed American 
guidance and instruction to transition to a proper democratic society.
36
 Sports would continue to 
play a key role in the youth program, as they had since the beginning of the occupation. 
However, they would adopt a distinctly American perspective and Army officials now put forth 
an argument about how sports would serve democratization. Whereas Nazi sports “were highly 
regimented mass activities” used “as preparation for military discipline and war,” American-
sponsored sports would offer “training in fair play and teamwork.”
37
 American sport, therefore, 
was viewed as a valuable tool of democratic socialization. Militaristic sports like fencing, 
shooting, and parachuting would be replaced by those that supposedly inculcated the values 
necessary for a successful democracy.  
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However, the youth program would also have to transition beyond its primary focus on 
athletics and adopt a clear “ideological goal,” specifically democratization. Many Americans 
assumed that German youth were ignorant of the most fundamental democratic concepts. Under 
the Nazi regime German children were supposedly “trained to give unconditional loyalty to 
absolutes.” Therefore, they needed “training in critical thinking, in tolerance and in intellectual 
fair play.” American personnel would provide this instruction by “demonstrating and teaching 
democracy to German youth.”
38
 To do so, military government offices and regular Army units 
would introduce Bavarian youth to democratic concepts and provide practical experience 
through forums, discussions, lectures, and public meetings. Such events would introduce youth 
to “modern American materials and methods” and provide a chance to act out the basic concepts 
of democracy in a friendly setting. These basic ideas produced an image of infantile Bavarian 
youth, which ultimately fed into a general image of a backward, immature Bavarian population. 
After using this language to describe their efforts to democratize German children, military 
government officials found it easy to use that same language to describe the political maturity of 
the population writ large. Just as Bavarian youth were immature, the adult population “had to be 
taught how to use the power of citizenship, morally, responsibly, and democratically.”
39
 In this 
manner, the youth program ultimately previewed the general reorientation campaign of 1948 and 
1949. 
Within this new framework, American military government officers worked to 
democratize the youth living in their areas of responsibility. Throughout Bavaria, American 
officials established German Youth Activities (GYA) coordinating committees to provide 
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guidance and support throughout the region. After U.S. tactical forces were reorganized into 
military posts in January 1947, post commanders were ordered to establish contacts with the 
major military government offices in their command areas. Indeed, Major General Frank 
Milburn, commander of the First Military District which comprised all of Bavaria, ordered his 
post commanders to form coordinating committees, explaining that it was desired that “all 
units…give strong impetus to the German Youth Activities Program…”
40
 Such committees 
provided a forum for military government officers, regular Army officers, and German officials 
to coordinate larger programs and to provide assistance to smaller military government offices 
that perhaps lacked the resources, particularly personnel, to oversee the local GYA program. 
Through such coordinating committees and on their own initiative, military government 
officers used the youth program to promote democratization in Bavaria by introducing young 
Germans to democratic ideas and practices. Again, Americans operated on the assumption that 
Bavarian youth were ignorant of the fundamentals of democracy and, therefore, required 
American instruction. In particular, youth were criticized for a lack of civic and social 
responsibility. During interactions with their Bavarian pupils, Americans reminded them that 
civic responsibility was “one factor which distinguishes a community in a real sense from a 
number of people merely living close together in a certain area.”
41
 To correct this deficiency, 
American officials brought together youth from throughout Bavaria to address pressing local and 
regional issues. A youth conference in Dachau from November 22 to 29, 1947, provided one 
such opportunity. One of the avowed goals of the conference was to teach “self-help measures” 
that youth could use in their own communities. Captain Alexander Hogg reported that youth 
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from throughout the German Land discussed pressing issues, most notably the refugee crisis that 
plagued Bavaria as ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe poured into occupied 
Germany. According to Hogg, this discussion “started many of the young people thinking along 
lines of social and civic responsibility hitherto comparatively unexplored.”
42
 While Hogg’s 
report noted the success of the conference in starting a new discourse about Bavarian problems 
among the youth in attendance, it also operated under the assumption that German youth 
possessed little in the way of civic responsibility. Americans viewed the totality of Nazi 
indoctrination as an indisputable fact. As a result of living under Nazi rules for years, Bavarian 
youth needed extensive democratization; an effort that required American education and 
instruction. 
Democratization efforts, however, were not limited to large conferences designed to 
teach civic responsibility. Military government officers also provided practical experience with 
the institutions and forms of democracy, forms that often reflected American traditions. The 
Dachau youth conference in November 1947, held discussion groups on a range of topics 
including economic reconstruction, the role of the central government, and importance of a free 
press. Participants could ask questions of their American mentors and express opinions on 
“debatable question[s],” which “furnished a valuable social experience and afforded much-
needed practice in parliamentary procedure.”
43
 American officials also promoted local events to 
introduce Bavarian youth to the practices of a democracy, even after military government’s 
reorientation campaign kicked into high gear. In late 1948, Lieutenant Slade Smith organized a 
“Youth Day” in the town of Kronach. Approximately sixty German youth shadowed town 
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officials for a day and were then asked to make decisions on the issues facing the town.
44
 
Similarly, in May 1949 the Ansbach city council – with the support of the American military 
government officer, Frederick Roessler – started inviting students of the local secondary school 
to council meetings.
45
 Then in July 1949 the American office in Wolfstein held a “model 
discussion” in advance of a youth leader training camp. According to one military government 




For occupation officials, these conferences, public discussions, and youth days were a 
success once Bavarian youth apparently embraced the language and ideas of democratization. At 
the end of the 1947 Dachau youth conference it was reported that participants “stressed the need 
for greater tolerance, less emphasis on representation of party or church, and more pulling 
together as members of the same community and state.” Since Americans assumed that Bavarian 
youth possessed little sense of civic responsibility, this development was “no small 
accomplishment.”
47
 In a similar vein, a regional youth forum held in Hof in December 1948 and 
sponsored by military government ignited “a new spirit of civic consciousness…among the 
students.”
48
 Under American guidance, therefore, these Bavarian youths finally learned the value 
of civic responsibility. The actual actions of youth after they left these conferences and forums 
apparently mattered less than the language they used to describe their newfound commitment to 
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democracy. American reports, on occasion, mentioned the civic activities of German youth and 
youth groups, such as plans to establish a youth newspaper or organizing collection drives for 
blockaded Berlin during the winter of 1948-1949. However, success of the youth program was 
more often defined by youth adoption of the language and practices modeled by their American 
instructors. 
As a result, the youth program in Bavaria took on a decidedly American tone, reflecting 
American ideas, traditions, and structures. Military government officers and their superiors 
dotted their writings with references to U.S. political culture, compared Bavarian political life to 
its American counterpart, and actively promoted ideas imported from across the Atlantic. 
Debates over the role of the central government in a nation-state often adopted American 
language. At Dachau, for example, youth debated the dichotomy between federalism and 
centralism. The youth, Captain Hogg happily reported, approached the topic from the perspective 
of what limits could be placed on the central government without endangering its effectiveness 
instead of what powers of the individual states should be sacrificed to the national government.
49
 
The Bavarian youth could have easily framed their debate in this manner; Bavaria possessed a 
long tradition of opposition to central authority. If so, this debate, framed in rather American 
language, represented a success in the eyes of Captain Hogg because of the incorporation of 
American ideas. Yet even if Hogg was merely rephrasing a German debate in language his 
superiors would understand, it was symptomatic of a tendency, which became even more 
pronounced during the larger reorientation campaign, to frame German political culture in 
comparison with its counterpart in the United States. 
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Beyond reporting on the political language used by Bavarian youth, military government 
officials also promoted distinctly American ideas and structures. In May 1948, Elmer Warnke, 
head of the Field Operations Division branch headquartered in Regensburg, encouraged MGOs 
in his branch to promote the construction of municipal playgrounds for local children. A 
campaign to build a playground would bring together adults and youth in individual communities 
and create some semblance of civic pride by accomplishing a shared goal. According to Warnke, 
“What better way to get across the American democratic spirit?”
50
 A few weeks later Warnke 
again forwarded a proposal to his subordinates. This time he suggested that American officers to 
consider establishing a program similar to Junior Achievement, Inc. in the United States. Junior 
Achievement provided business training for American high school students and Warnke believed 




However, Warnke was not alone in promoting American practices. Military government 
officers encouraged German youth to adopt American ideas, traditions, and groups. In the rural 
community of Zwiesel and the surrounding Landkreis, for example, John Greeley promoted ten 
new Jungbaürngruppen, modeled after the American 4-H Club. While Greeley explained that he 
worked behind the scenes and was “careful not to superimpose any ideas upon the young farmer 
which are distinctly American,” his program was clearly inspired by the American example. 
Greeley solicited literature donations from the major agriculture universities in the United States 
and hoped that the youth groups would teach “modern methods” from America.
52
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On the surface, the creation of American-inspired Bavarian youth groups and the 
promotion of American ideas, particularly those not directly related to democratization, appear 
insignificant. However, 4-H Clubs and the adoption of American political ideas and language 
demonstrated the tendency to judge the youth program by how well it reflected American civic 
life. German youth were deemed civically responsible when they proclaimed the need to rise 
above partisan or denominational differences to solve local issues. Political debates over the role 
of government received tacit American approval when they incorporated U.S. language. And 
even youth groups that were non-political on their face aimed to introduce Bavarian youth to 
American methods. Although many military government officers like John Greeley proclaimed 
that they were not forcing Americanization upon Bavarian youth, it was impossible to escape the 
influence of American ideas and practices on the youth program, at least from the American 
perspective. Outright Americanization was not the goal, but the democratization of youth in 
Bavaria proceeded along ideas and practices exported from the United States. 
Besides youth conferences and American-inspired groups, the youth program included 
several other programs designed for democratization. The sports program continued, as 
occupation officials saw athletics as a way to draw in large numbers of youth and as a way to 
promote perceived democratic values. Soccer, baseball, softball, and basketball were particularly 
popular team sports, but U.S. officials encouraged individual activities as well. After months of 
planning, in summer of 1949 a zone-wide soap box derby would teach German boys “fair 
play…and good sportsmanship.”
53
 Beyond athletics, the youth program included youth centers in 
individual communities where children could play ping pong and other games, read books, and 
meet for discussion groups. Bavarian youth were also some of the main targets of the 
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reorientation film program that gained steam in 1947 and 1948. As will be discussed in greater 
detail later, military government officers worked with local German government and school 
officials to show a wide array of films, both commercial movies, like Mickey Mouse, and films 
made in Germany for the expressed purpose of democratization. Discussion of the reorientation 
films were viewed as particularly important, for it was through discussion that youth would see 
the true message of the movie and learn the requirements of democratic society. The discussions 
also served as yet another form of citizenship training; they were how “interest is generated and a 
competent public is created.”
54
 Just as youth conferences and hands-on experience would teach 
democratic values, so too would nearly all aspects of Bavarian childhood. 
From the American perspective, the youth programs in Bavaria represented a notable 
success. Athletic events, film showings, and festivals attracted significant numbers of children. 
By April 1949 an estimated 600,000 youth used GYA facilities per month in the American zone 
of occupation. Total membership had increased from 200,000 to 1.4 million.
55
 These figures, in a 
vacuum, seemingly demonstrated the program’s success. However, when properly 
contextualized, a new picture emerged, one in which GYA had a somewhat limited impact, both 
in terms of total participation and in the goal of democratization. Large numbers of German 
children undoubtedly participated in American-sponsored programs, but even greater numbers 
took part in non-American activities. Approximately forty percent of all youth involved in youth 
programs participated in church groups, particularly in religious Bavaria, and another thirty-two 
percent played in athletic clubs. Some surveys even showed that less than half of German youth 
even knew of the American programs. Indeed, American surveys captured a variety of reasons 
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for German participation in GYA and related activities. One such study found that forty percent 
of participants in American programs attended because they could get candy or food, while 
twenty-six percent participated to play sports and games. Just six percent of children answered 
that they came to the American-sponsored activities to learn about democracy.
56
 Additionally, 
the programs’ democratization efforts were of dubious value. In one Bavarian survey of 
schoolchildren in Regensburg, Weilheim, Pirkensee, and Burglengenfeld forty-eight percent had 
no opinion about what characterized democracy, while ten percent named Adolf Hitler as one of 
three greatest Germans in history.
57
 Not only were American programs less popular than their 
Bavarian counterparts, their success at spreading democracy among German youth was unclear. 
Ultimately, the youth program in Bavaria served as a prelude to the more expansive 
reorientation campaign of 1948 and 1949. It served as a testing ground in which military 
government officers tried out the language, practices, and ideas that they would then apply to the 
entire Bavarian population. The program was based on the same assumption that Americans held 
about most Germans, namely their general ignorance on anything related to democracy. It also 
introduced similar methods for spreading the message of democratization. Lectures, forums, and 
discussions were all used by Americans to teach the fundamentals of democracy to the Bavarian 
population, particularly through the Amerika Haus. The Americans were also concerned with 
providing practical experience for their pupils. Whereas Bavarian youth shadowed German 
officials or conducted faux-political proceedings, the later reorientation campaign promoted the 
use of town hall meetings, almost to the point of religious fervor. Occupation officials also 
promoted American-inspired groups (4-H Clubs) or ideas (the federal-central dichotomy). 
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Finally, the tendency to judge the success of the youth program by how well Bavarian youth 
reflected American democratic life previewed the trend of judging reorientation in American 
terms. For many Americans, youth were democratized when they adopted American language 
and practices. Similar attitudes would influence the later attempts to democratize the larger 
Bavarian populace. Just as German youth were politically immature and in need of instruction in 
the ways of modern democracy, MGOs adopted the same attitude towards the parents and 
grandparents of these Bavarian children and would implement many of the same programs to 
teach the supposedly modern practices of American democracy.
58
  
In many ways, American attitudes were perfectly reasonable; occupation officials merely 
drew on their experiences in the democracy of which they had the most knowledge: the United 
States. The progress of democratization among Bavarian youth had to be measured some way 
and the most obvious measuring stick was the home country of the military government officers. 
Yet Americans in Bavaria had taken the first steps in a campaign of political modernization in 
the heart of supposedly modern Europe. In the coming months and years, American instructors 
would bring Bavaria into the modern world of democracy. 
The Rise of Reorientation and Political Modernization 
The major crises of the first years of the occupation attracted the attention of most 
military government officers. The crises of the first years of the occupation and the problems 
associated with economic reconstruction (as covered in earlier chapters) held the attention of 
American officials. Occupied by the tasks of feeding Bavaria, reviving the economy, and 
mitigating the effects of American policy, there was little extra time for reorientation activities. 
Even the German population appeared uninterested. Youth participated in the American-
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sponsored youth program, but most adults remained concerned with Überleben, the quest for 
survival, as they had been during the war itself.
59
 
As these crises passed, however, military government officers increasingly turned their 
attention towards the tasks of democratization and reorientation, the most basic objectives of the 
occupation. In their efforts, Americans operated on the assumption that the Bavarian population 
was completely ignorant of democracy, both in theory and in practice. While many Germans 
resented “totalitarian methods” and the foundation of civil society existed in American-occupied 
Bavaria, individual Germans of all classes completely lacked any “understanding of what 
democracy means in practice, either as to rights or obligations.” Germans were submissive to 
authority, a tradition which grew from the “psychological and sociological patterns established 
over generations of German life.”
60
 As a result, American personnel needed to teach their naïve 
pupils the way of democracy. To do so, officials drew from their familiarity with American 
democracy and their experiences in the postwar German youth programs. Using similar 
programs and language as to what existed in their attempts to democratize Bavarian youth, 
MGOs promoted modern American beliefs and practices to overcome the political backwardness 
of Bavarians. Through lectures, discussion groups, films, town meetings, and education reform, 
American military government officers imported aspects of American political culture into 
Bavaria. Ultimately, the success of reorientation, as judged by military government officials, was 
determined by the willingness of Germans to adopt American forms and their ability to replicate 
American political culture. 
The Amerika Haus and the Film Program 
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One of the most visible forms of early reorientation efforts were the U.S. Information 
Centers. These buildings, along with their smaller branch offices, existed throughout Bavaria and 
were designed to “increase the effectiveness…of reorientation through scientific, literary, 
historical and technical materials, lectures, discussion groups, and related activities…”
61
 Located 
in major urban areas like Munich, Nuremberg, Regensburg, and six other Bavarian cities and 
towns, these Information Centers, later called Amerika Haüser (Amerika Haus in the singular), 
possessed libraries and rooms for lectures, discussions, and other meetings. The Amerika Haus 
program served several distinct functions for reorientation. Ideally, each location would be a 
place where Bavarians of all social classes could interact and help break down the traditional 
social barriers of German society. It was even hoped that the Amerika Haüser would combat any 
negative beliefs about American culture and show that Americans possessed “pride, tradition and 
good taste.”
62
 Most importantly, however, the program introduced Bavarians to American 
practices, beliefs, and traditions. By importing aspects of America into Bavaria, the Amerika 
Haüser played a key role in the step towards political modernization.
63
 
Each Amerika Haus – along with the smaller Reading Rooms that developed in rural 
communities – held lectures, discussion groups, and classes on American political society. Such 
meetings introduced American beliefs and practices and connected democratization with 
democracy as practiced in the United States, both directly and indirectly. In Munich, for 
example, nine of eleven lectures on “democratization” that occurred from August 12 to 
September 11, 1948, directly concerned the United States. Two lectures on August 12 dealt with 
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“Schools in Amerika” and “The Press in [the] USA.” Another lecture two weeks later 
highlighted “The Jury System in [the] USA.” The Amerika Haus even held a class on the 
“Principles of American Civics” which drew 672 participants. Lectures, discussion groups, and 
classes were not limited to the institutions of American democracy; they also incorporated major 
figures from American history as examples of democratic citizenship. During March 1949, the 
Amerika Haus in Regensburg and the Reading Rooms in towns of Auerbach, Neunburg von 
Weld, and Waldmünchen all held discussions and exhibitions on the life and work of the great 
American figures George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.
64
 Visiting American “experts” 
were also brought into Bavaria to share their knowledge on a wide array of subjects. In late 
August 1948 Dr. Carl Loewenstein of Amherst College presented a lecture in Munich on the 
American constitution to an audience of over two hundred. Several weeks later one Mrs. Harper-
Sibley, President of the Women’s Organization of the Council of Churches in America, 
discussed “Women’s Church Work in America.” Then in late January 1949 Wilfred Puttkamer, 
Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Chicago, lectured on “The Organization and 
Administration of American Colleges and Universities.”
65
  
Local military government officials, while not directly overseeing the activities at the 
Amerika Haüser, did participate in the activities hosted by the centers. Each Amerika Haus or 
Reading Room often shared a building with the local military government office. As a result, 
MGOs were physically close to the activities. Additionally, superiors within OMGB expected 
active participation on the part of detachment officials. A draft memo on the MGO’s 
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responsibilities, likely written by William Moran of the Field Operations Division, insisted, “The 
Military Government officer participates in all of the activities of these centers.”
66
 Beyond local 
MGOs, however, American officials also encouraged participation by regular Army troops, 
higher level military government officials, and even American families living in Bavaria. For 
example, OMGB routinely asked for the donation of additional books, magazines, and 
newspapers to the Amerika Haüser and Reading Rooms. Such donations could either come from 
a personal library or from special subscriptions purchased for the local information center. 
OMGB even created a system to award individuals who donated to the program. William Moran, 
for example, received a certificate for the VIP (Vigorous Information Program) Club of the 
Amerika Haüser in Bavaria. The certificate and club were to thank those “patriotic Americans, 
voluntarily assisting the democratization program in Bavaria.”
67
 
These lectures, discussions, and exhibitions connected democratization in Bavaria with 
the American version of democracy, both directly and indirectly. The very titles of presentations 
drew more explicit connections between the two. More subtly, however, few activities on 
democratization adopted a non-American perspective. Compared to discussions of American 
practices, the democratic practices most common to Europe received little attention. 
Additionally, the liberal tradition of Germany, particularly during the middle of the nineteenth 
century, was largely shoved to the background. The legacy of Nazism and the Weimar Republic 
fed the American assumption that Germans were ignorant of modern democratic practices. 
Additionally, official encouragement of widespread American participation promoted an 
American perspective on the democratization programs. As a result, the distinctly American 
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flavor of reorientation programs at the Amerika Haüser insinuated that only American 
democracy was the model for successful democratization. 
While occupation officials promoted an Americanized version of democratization, 
attendance at the Amerika Haüser and the Reading Rooms rose significantly throughout 1948 
and 1949. The buildings were genuinely popular, attracting large numbers of Bavarians who 
either sought a distraction for the daily struggle to survive or who simply wanted a warm place to 
spend a few hours during the day. James Clark, the Director of Bavaria’s Information Control 
Division, eagerly reported in May 1948 that several of the Amerika Haüser were “moving to 
bigger and better quarters” because of their growing popularity. The Munich center moved into 
its new location on June 14, followed by Würzburg on June 18 and Regensburg on July 1.
68
 
Attendance continued to climb over the last half of 1948. The Munich Amerika Haus reported 
just over 53,000 visitors from August 12 to September 11.
69
 Just two months later nearly 84,000 
Bavarians visited the Munich center in a single month.
70
 From November 25 to December 20, 
1948, overall attendance reached 244,099 Bavarians, compared to approximately 55,000 visitors 
during the same period the previous year.
71
 The approach of winter undoubtedly sent more 
Germans to their local Amerika Haus or Reading Room. Coal remained difficult to come by and 
the centers promised warmth during the winter months. Nevertheless, attendance continued to 
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climb as spring approached. March 1949 saw 349,810 total visitors throughout Bavaria, a 
massive increase over the 59,000 that attended in March 1948.
72
 
Despite American enthusiasm and the rapid spread of the Amerika Haus in Bavaria, 
significant problems faced the program. Financial shortages were particularly acute.  While 
attendance climbed during the summer months of 1948, Lambertus Wartena, head of the Munich 
Amerika Haus, complained of continued financial difficulties. No funds were provided “for 
conducting a program of this magnitude” and local employees rarely received their pay on time. 
Additionally, bills sometimes languished for six months without being paid for lack of funds. 
Wartena believed, “The resultant adverse publicity reflects upon American integrity.”
73
 C.S. 
Wright, director of the Amerika Haus program in Bavaria, also complained of budgetary 
shortfalls. Without additional funding, many buildings, particularly the smaller reading rooms, 
faced closure. Wright, too, believed that closing many buildings so soon after opening would 
“seriously affect the prestige of Military Government in Bavaria” and harm the reorientation 
program.
74
 The financial problems grew so problematic that on October 25, 1948, military 




  Due to the continued financial problems, the Amerika Haus program was plagued by a 
lack of materials. In particular, books and other reading materials were always in short supply. 
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The libraries, in theory, provided another way to introduce Bavarians of all stripes to American 
democracy through books, magazines, and newspapers written in both English and German. Yet 
financial problems and the continued effects of the war produced a significant shortage of 
reading materials, particularly in German. This was a significant problem in smaller communities 
throughout Bavaria. According to James Clark, “The smaller the town the less is the number of 
those who speak or read English.” The result was a near “constant cry” for more German-
language books. In the town Burglengenfeld the American Reading Room possessed a mere 
fourteen books in German for the town’s 7,000 inhabitants.
76
 Similarly, of the 600 books held by 
the Reading Room in Mallersdorf in late March 1949, just fifty-five were written in German.
77
 
Some Americans officers tried to spin the shortage of German-language literature as a positive. 
In the opinion of Charles Pearce, the prevalence of English-language books helped Bavarian 
students in Koetzting with their English studies.
78
 Despite Pearce’s attempts to portray such 
shortages as a positive, the lack of German-language literature limited the impact of the Amerika 
Haus program. After all, it would be difficult to teach Bavarians democratic practices if they 
could not read the available books, magazines, or newspapers. 
 Occupation officials worried about the shortage of democratic literature and took 
significant steps to remedy the problem. Some MGOs reached out to German communities in the 
United States or purchased German-language publications printed across the Atlantic. In the 
small community of Weiden, for example, on American official, a Mr. Lanziano, used personal 
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funds to purchase subscriptions to German newspapers in the United States.
79
 Occupation 
officials also called on Americans living in Bavaria to contribute literature to the democratization 
program. In May 1949 William Boyer asked military dependents to contribute pictorial 
magazines to the Reading Room in Passau. Since most Bavarians could not read English, Boyer 
thought that pictures of the U.S. would be more effective at spreading democracy than the 
written word.
80
 Additionally, as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, Americans officials 
placed the search for books within the framework of “ideological war.” When C.S. Wright asked 
all Americans living within Bavaria to donate reading materials, he declared that a donation to an 
Amerika Haus was “an investment in permanent peace.” Wright urged individuals to contribute 




 Despite these difficulties, American occupation officials continued to promote the 
Amerika Haus program. Although it was not within the official responsibilities of individual 
military government officers, they used their position within OMGB to promote the importation 
of American democracy. They encouraged Germans to attend Amerika Haus activities, helped 
organize lectures, coordinated their own activities with the local center, and brought the attention 
of their superiors to the problems facing the program. When the town meeting program 
developed in late 1948 and early 1949, MGOs often used the local Amerika Haus or Reading 
Room as a location for these meetings. 
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Perhaps the most popular activity associated with the Amerika Haüser, however, was the 
reorientation film program. From the beginning of the occupation, military government officials 
throughout Germany circulated American-made films throughout the U.S. occupation zone, 
including in Bavaria. Feature films, documentaries, and newsreels, according to American 
thought, would demonstrate to Germans the “military and moral superiority” of the United States 
while offering “American culture as a model for imitation.” Much like the town meeting 
program that would follow, Germans were then expected to demonstrate their democratization 
“by behaving like their wardens.”
82
 For military government officials, democracy was more than 
the mere act of voting; it was a “type of behavior” and “a public attitude” grounded in the culture 
of a society. Therefore, reorientation in Germany and Bavaria would be a success, in the eyes of 
MGOs, when their pupils engaged in the forms and actions that these Americans associated with 
the democratic culture of the United States. 
To provide this model of democratic culture, military government officials worked with 
major American movie studios to import films to Bavaria. Within a few months of the end of the 
war, film exchanges existed in Munich, Berlin, and Frankfurt to facilitate such efforts.
83
 
Hollywood features like The Human Comedy (1942) and Shadow of a Doubt (1943) were 
distributed throughout Bavaria to demonstrate the supposed benefits of American immigrant 
culture. As tensions with the Soviet Union mounted, other films such as Ninotchka (1939) served 
as anti-communist propaganda by framing communism as “the suppression of desire, affect, and 
appetite” in comparison to the consumer paradise of capitalism.
84
 In addition, war films made the 
rounds, although they were, not surprisingly, rather unpopular with the Bavarian population. 
Germans resented movies that portrayed all Germans, and not exclusively Nazis, as war 
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criminals and butchers, which most war films imported into Germany tended to do. Military 
government also distributed documentaries, the most famous being Die Todesmühlen (The Death 
Mills). The documentary highlighted the horrors of the concentration camps for all Germans and 
Americans saw the film as a way to discredit the Nazi party and Nazi ideology. In some parts of 
Bavaria, attendance at the documentary was even required to get ration cards.
85
 
By 1947 and 1948, however, military government also started production of movies 
specifically designed for reorientation.
86
 Ranging in length from ten to forty minutes, OMGUS 
often made these films within Germany. Hueter der Gesundheit (Journey into Medicine), for 
example, told the story of a young American boy’s quest to become a doctor. The film was 
highly recommended for reorientation because the “young man’s development” represented “a 
universal theme, artistically treated, with a universal appeal.” Other films combatted what 
Americans perceived as European misunderstandings of the United States. Freie Horizonte (Free 
Horizons) told the story of the American national parks system. Its reorientation value was 
deemed “very good” because it showed Americans as “people who enjoy the simple beauties of 
their great outdoors…contrary to many of the European’s set ideas about us.” And still others, 
like Ich und Mr. Marshall (I and Mr. Marshall), flirted with traditional propaganda. The film 
“honestly” portrayed the development of the Marshall Plan, including “the violent opposition of 
Russia.”
87
 The newsreel Welt im Film (World in Film) also served as significant propaganda tool. 
Shown before all feature films, the newsreel increasingly differentiated between the American 
(and Western) vision for Germany from the Soviet “in distinct binary terms.” The heavy-handed 
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propaganda was quite unpopular with German audiences, however, even though many disliked 
the Soviet Union. Numerous reports indicated that audiences, particularly in Bavaria, did not 
arrive at the theater until after Welt im Film played.
88
 
 Despite the unpopularity of some films, the distribution of both American-made features 
and specially produced reorientation films attracted ever larger numbers of Germans throughout 
Bavaria. From October 1 to October 15, 1948, there were 855 film screenings in Bavaria with an 
attendance of 109,273.
89
 By the middle of January 1949 1,680 showings over the previous month 
had attracted over 209,000 visitors.
90
 Attendance for the film program soon dwarfed other 
aspects of reorientation. On May 20, 1949, Charles Winning, Director of the Special 
Reorientation Staff Unit for Bavaria, reported 4,375 movie screenings from April 15 to May 15 
with 478,908 Bavarians in attendance. At the same time 702 speeches and lectures attracted just 
66,319 people. In total, film attendance represented over fifty-seven percent of the reorientation 
activities for that month (4,375 out of 7,589) and an impressive sixty-five percent of attendance 
(478,908 out of 729,503).
91
 
Early in the reorientation film program, particularly 1947 and 1948, American MGOs 
expressed widespread support. Edward Garrison of the Regensburg office believed “that the re-
education/re-orientation film program…will no doubt be of great benefit to the population of 
Landkreis Regensburg.”
92
 American officials in Munich recommended that the films be shown 
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to all segments of Bavarian society, from trade unions and political parties to schools and 
women’s organizations.
93
 The reorientation films, sent out in packages of fifteen to eighteen, 
presented the best opportunity to reach large numbers of Germans with the message of 
democratization. Bavarians would come to repeated movie showings and help impart the 
knowledge of democracy that the American reorientation program assumed most Germans 
lacked. They would learn universal lessons like the value of hard work and see the values of 
democratic citizenship portrayed on the silver screen. The films could also support American 
policy in Germany or work to combat resentment of the occupation. Motion pictures attracted 
large crowds, as demonstrated above, and seemingly provided visible success of the reorientation 
program as a whole. Further evidence of success came from positive German reaction to the 
films. In Kaufbeuren one anonymous German wrote to MGO John Houston, “The appearance of 
the movie care in our small village caused great enthusiasm on the part of the school 
youth…teachers and pupils will definitely be happy if our small and isolated school can be 
visited frequently with such films.”
94
 In the eyes of many American MGOs, letters like this 
proved the success of the reorientation films. 
The letter, however, hinted at another phenomenon: the films were exceedingly popular 
because they were films. In a devastated Bavaria, movies, even ones specifically designed for 
reorientation, provided a respite from the travails of everyday life. Shown in heated buildings, 
the movies offered a chance to escape harsh conditions, particularly in the winter. And in the 
rural areas of Bavaria they also attracted large crowds because of their rarity. American officials, 
for their part, increasingly recognized alternative explanations for the popularity of the 
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reorientation films. Edward Garrison, after explaining the usefulness of the films to the Landrat 
of Landkreis Regensburg, acknowledged that the films would be popular with rural Bavarians 
“who seldom have an opportunity to see current events.”
95
 The very popularity of the medium, in 
essence, diluted the impact of the reorientation films. In urban areas, the movies represented an 
escape from the ruins and continuing challenges of postwar life. For rural regions less touched by 
the war but more geographically isolated, the films offered an opportunity to hear of the outside 
world. American officials eagerly reported large attendance figures, but the figures belied the 
varied reasons for such high German participation. 
The film program, like the Amerika Haüser and the Reading Rooms, was also plagued by 
significant difficulties. Financial shortages, a lack of equipment and personnel, and growing 
German dissatisfaction steadily challenged the support for the program. The instability of 
reorientation funding meant that military government officers could not higher enough trained 
personnel to operate the projectors and show the films. Additionally, the lack of consistent 
financial support meant that projectors and films were often worn out from heavy usage. 
Bavarian projectionists often had to make significant personal investments in the program, 
including paying for transportation to travel from town to town. Indeed, some Bavarians, 
particularly those employed as projectionists, increasingly criticized the reorientation film 
program. The program was a success despite the lack of adequate financial resources and the fact 
that many of the films “were not too good” because of the “the efficient work of the 
projectionists, which saw in this program not only a job but a task to be fulfilled.”
96
 Because of 
these difficulties, some military government officials started questioning the usefulness of the 
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film program. From Zwiesel, John Greeley recommended that OMGB stop showing films related 
to the war. According to Greeley, “Most people do not want to be reminded of the war 
anymore.”
97
 In April and May 1949 the Reorientation Staff Unit at OMGB headquarters in 
Munich began “reviewing the 16 mm Film Program in order to determine its true value as a 
medium of reorientation and education.” If it could not contribute to the reorientation mission, 
“money for its support should be diverted to more critical needs of the reorientation program.”
98
 
A program that had begun with such high hopes was now apparently on the chopping block due 
to a growing suspicion that it was ineffective. 
Nevertheless, the film program survived and continued well into the summer of 1949. 
Despite their complaints about the program, German projectionists recognized wavering 
American support and worked to prove the continued utility of the reorientation films. Bavarians 
had grown use to the program and enjoyed it, regardless of its problems. According to Karl 
Oliva, who worked to organize the Bavarian projectionists, “Everybody will recognize what 
possibility this film program in [the] future can have, and what a loss it would be for the public if 
one day this program would discontinue.”
99
 American MGOs also increasingly turned the focus 
of the reorientation films to children and students. Most screenings occurred in schools because 
younger Bavarians showed far more interest than their parents and grandparents. Whereas older 
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generations “would rather see a film with more entertainment,” students showed far more interest 
in “the American way of life.”
100
 
Combined, the Amerika Haus and film programs represented one of the most important 
aspects of reorientation in Bavaria. Both programs served primarily to introduce Bavarians to 
American ideas, practices, and traditions. Drawing on the democracy with which they had the 
most experience, military government officers directly and indirectly linked democratization 
with the ideals of American democracy. Although the Americans were careful to avoid outright 
Americanization, the prevalence of American ideas in this stage of reorientation established the 
expectation that successful democratization would mean that Bavarian political life would reflect 
political life across the Atlantic. This expectation was only reinforced when MGOs took a more 
active role in teaching “modern” American practices to their “backward” pupils. 
MGOs and German “Backwardness” 
The Amerika Haüser and the film program were both beyond the official responsibilities 
of military government officers, even though they actively participated in both programs. 
Nevertheless, American MGOs also introduced American ideas and practices through their own 
reorientation activities. Bavarians were still assumed ignorant of modern democratic practices, 
even after initial democratization efforts. According to James Ott in Mindelheim, “Present 
indications are that the average German citizen in Bavaria is not fully aware of his individual 
rights and responsibilities under the Bavarian constitution.”
101
 Due to such ignorance, military 
government officers took a more active role in teaching democratic practices to their German 
pupils during the last few months of 1948 and into 1949. Unlike their attempts to address the 
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food crises or promote economic reconstruction, military government officials now avoided 
indirect methods as part of the reorientation program. Since it was assumed that Bavarian civic 
life was backward, MGOs could not leave democratization to the hands of the Bavarians. 
Instead, American officials abandoned the well-engrained practice of indirect occupation and 
directly participated in reorientation efforts. MGOs both taught their communities the 
fundamentals of democratic society to combat “immaturity” and provided practical experience in 
democratic governance through the organization of town meetings. Throughout it all, MGOs 
sought the eradication of Bavarian backwardness and immaturity through the introduction of 
American modernity. Ultimately, success was judged by the ability of Germans to accept and 
replicate traditional American practices at the grassroots of Bavarian politics. 
Many of these ideas about Bavarian backwardness and immaturity circulated in News and 
Views, the official publication of OMGB’s Field Operations Division (FOD). The publication 
was written, at least in part, by Deputy Director William Moran. Moran worked with military 
government for the entirety of the occupation and ultimately continued in Bavaria under the 
civilian Office of the High Commissioner that succeeded OMGB in 1949. Before joining 
military government, Moran earned a law degree from West Virginia University and worked for 
the F.B.I. during the war. In 1945 Moran rejoined the Army for military government service in 
Germany. He worked in a variety of different detachments in Bavaria before spending the last 
year of the occupation as the Deputy Director of FOD, where he oversaw key aspects of the 
reorientation campaign.
102
 It was FOD that exercised immediate authority over the MGOs who 
carried out the policy of democratization. Therefore, the division played a key role in developing 
the ideas that characterized much of the process. News and Views disseminated suggestions for 
reorientation activities or novel approaches to spreading the ideas of democracy. The publication 
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also shared stories of successful, at least from the American perspective, democratization efforts. 
Most significantly, however, News and Views helped spread ideas about the political 
backwardness of the Bavarian population and how to counter it with supposedly modern 
American practices. 
To combat Bavarian ignorance and immaturity, Americans throughout Bavaria 
introduced their communities to American ideas and practices. By introducing Germans to 
American practices, occupation officials believed that they could end the Germans’ political 
immaturity and lead them into democratic modernity. As a result, occupation officials instructed 
the population in proper way to behave in a democracy, from how to hold a meeting and write 
your representative to the proper way to behave in a democratic society. In late November 1948, 
for example, Gerald McMahon, MGO in Berchtesgaden, held a public forum “on the rights and 
responsibilities of the citizenship.” In a similar vein, reorientation officials in Munich 
encouraged American officials throughout Bavaria to share a list of “Things Every Chairman 
Should Know” in February 1949. Heads of local meetings were encouraged to “never start a 
meeting without an agenda,” “keep the meeting moving,” “stop aimless discussion,” and “don’t 
argue with the speaker.”
103
  
A few weeks later News and Views circulated guidance on how to write your local 
representative in the legislature. “The political maturity of a nation can often be determined by 
the number and kind of letters written to governmental representatives by citizens,” explained the 
publication. For that reason, Munich was passing on the advice of Congressman Walter Judd of 
Minnesota. According to Judd, representatives liked short but “intelligent, well thought-out 
letters which present a definite position, even if he does not agree with it.” Additionally, they 
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appreciated knowing “when he has done something of which you approve.” Representatives, on 
the other hand, did not like “letters that mere[ly] ‘demand’ or ‘insist’ that he vote for or against a 
certain bill” or which “threatened…defeat at the next election.”
104
 In these instances, military 
government officers assumed that Americans had to teach Germans about the proper structure of 
modern democracy. Additionally, if the German population was to be politically mature they had 
to mimic the superior American system, writing letters to their representatives and conducting 
town meetings in a certain manner. 
The publication’s authors did not confine themselves to importing the basic structure of 
the American political system. Military government officers worked to create a proper 
democratic personality. The March 1949 edition of News and Views published “Personality for 
Democracy” by Alice V. Keliher of New York University and encouraged all military 
government officers to share the essay with the local population. Democracy was “a positive 
faith,” according to Keliher, and “one must be a mature person to be a democratic citizen.” The 
mature democratic citizen supported the institutions of democracy, respected the opinions of his 
neighbors, and recognized that he could not be right all the time.
105
 Yet again American military 
government officers facilitated the spread of ideas about political maturity. Instead of focusing 
on political structures and activities, however, maturity also included individual personality and 
attitudes towards the larger society. While few Americans called Germans immature outright, the 
prevalence of language about maturity demonstrates that occupation officials considered 
Bavarians, at the least, politically naïve and in need of American guidance. The adoption of 
supposedly superior American ideas and practices, therefore, became the rubric which 
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determined German backwardness and maturity. Behaving like Americans and adopting the 
forms of American politics proved that Bavarians had escaped from their immaturity. 
For Bavarians to act on their new democratic practices and to provide some sort of 
practical experience, American military government officers promoted town hall meetings 
throughout occupied Bavaria. Occupation officials had held local meetings for several years to 
“answer questions…on the myriad of problems in Germany today,” but there had been no clear 
reorientation objective behind them. Now, however, the meetings became a barometer by which 
Americans determined the success of the reorientation program. According to one draft memo, 
these meetings “have been valuable in demonstrating the democratic approach to responsible 
self-government.”
106
 In Landkreis Mallersdorf, a visiting MGO, one Captain Rutledge, argued 
the program “was intended to awaken as a civic enterprise the civic and political consciousness 
of the population.” Town meetings were “very popular” in the United States, Rutlege explained, 
“this program…if properly conducted would also have a strong reaction among the Germans.”
107
 
Envisioning the idealized town meeting of US politics, military government officers operated 
under the assumption that Bavarian political life had to look like its American counterpart. A 
successful meeting might include active participation by the German population or solving a 
pressing local issue. Additionally, the willingness of Bavarian officials to participate in the 
meetings and the eagerness of Bavarian communities to participate in them would also prove the 
success of democratization. 
Beginning in September 1948, MGOs promoted German-led town meetings to facilitate 
reorientation. While American officials were not opposed to organizing meetings in the initial 
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stages, they hoped that Germans would soon take the reins. As a result, some occupation officials 
organized local committees of “energetic, farsighted, and liberal” Bavarians to take 
responsibility for the meetings in their communities.
108
 While the MGO might provide some 
assistance to this small nucleus of community leaders, the setup obscured any direct American 
involvement and, American officials hoped, would make Bavarians more likely to adopt the 
concept of the town meeting. “When the MGO remains anonymous,” explained Dewey 
Campbell in Altötting, “the German people believe the idea is their own…and they have 
indicated an eagerness, enthusiasm, and willingness to work hard…to establish a forum where 
the things of immediate interest and concern in their local lives may be discussed, problems 
solved, and projects initiated.”
109
 
Town meetings soon became the measuring stick of the reorientation program. Reports of 
local Bavarians either requesting town meetings or attending them in large numbers were 
interpreted by American officials as a sign that Bavarians had embraced modern democratic 
practices. In addition, meetings that solved pressing local issues were viewed as “concrete 
results” and “factual evidence of re-orientation progress.”
110
 In Passau, for example, the local 
population was initially suspicious of American promotion of town meetings. Yet the population 
quickly adapted to the new import. By early December 1948 the meetings were “freely planned” 
within the community and “the attitude of the persons attending the meetings has changed 
                                                 
108
 “Reorientation Program on a Kreis Level”, 31 Aug 48, to All MGOs of Area Freising, from F. Karel Wiest, 
Miscellaneous Correspondence 1948 Folder, Box 370, 662 (A1): General Records, 1947-1949, LSO Freising, RG 
260, NARA. 
109
 “Formation of German Forum or Discussion Groups”, 10 Sept 48, to Coordinator-Inspector, Branch E, from 
Dewey M. Campbell, Pg. 3, Miscellaneous Correspondence 1948 Folder, Box 370, 662 (A1): Gen. Rec., 47-49, 
LSO Freising, RG 260, NARA. 
110
 Memo, 30 Dec 48, to FOD, attn.: Mr. Moran, from Jack M. Fleischer, OMGB- Interoffice Memos Folder, Box 





 According to Charles Pearce in Koetzing, the meetings provided Bavarians 
with “a good impression about the democratic way of life.”
112
 
Yet meetings were a true success when they reminded Americans of their idealized 
experiences in the United States. For example, Russel Wickman, MGO at Traunstein, reported a 
successful town meeting during February 1949. At the meeting, local and refugee businessmen 
promised to contribute supplies and labor to finish construction of a new school. The building 
had languished since the introduction of the new West German currency the previous summer, 
but would now be completed. According to Wickman, it reminded him “of a community session 
back home.”
113
 Wickman’s report even worked its way up the chain of command to the desk of 
Murray Van Wagoner, Land Director for Bavaria, as evidence “that Germans are beginning to 
understand and realize the possibilities of town meetings.”
114
 Similarly, Lieutenant Robert Rivet 
happily reported from Wolfstein that the local community and council had finally revolted 
against “the dictatorship of the Buergermeister.” After the Bürgermeister had refused to call 
meetings, unilaterally raised his own salary, and “generally performed like a little tyrant,” the 
council finally intervened against the erstwhile official. According to Rivet, the “Revolt in Ort” 
demonstrated the “positive results” of the reorientation campaign.
115
 In both cases, success was 
not measured by German standards, but by how well the Bavarians imitated the American ideal. 
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Despite these apparent successes, military government officers also criticized Bavarians 
as backward when they failed to imitate modern American practices. For the Americans, the 
political immaturity of the Bavarian population was seen in their failure to participate in town 
meetings and the failure to question elected officials. Vincent Hurst reported from Würzburg in 
January 1949, for example, that the first town meeting held under a newly-elected mayor was 
“especially discouraging.” According to Hurst, “The audience was exceedingly apathetic” and 
failed to adequately question their new mayor.
116
 Indeed, a failure to participate in town meetings 
according to American standards was viewed as “backward” by military government officers. 
Occupation officials also praised Germans when they lived up to the “modern” American 
tradition. F.L. Roessler proclaimed from Ansbach that active local participation demonstrated 
“that the population is not backward in criticizing or speaking their mind in public.”
117
 The 
residents of Ansbach, therefore, were deemed modern because their actions imitated American 
practices. Adoption of the American-style town hall meeting and active participation in those 
meetings demonstrated Bavarian modernity in democratic politics. 
The efforts of military government officers, then, made the connection between 
democratization and American traditions even more explicit. American officials promoted 
“mature” practices such as writing elected representatives in a certain fashion or adopting a 
proper democratic personality. By learning these modern aspects of American democracy, 
Bavarians were on their way to political maturity. In addition, the town hall meeting, based on 
the idealized American image, offered an opportunity to instruct Bavarians on the modern 
methods of democracy. Backwardness represented a failure to meet American standards or to 
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participate in the meetings. Meanwhile Bavarians demonstrated modernity by using the meetings 
in a fashion familiar to their American occupiers, particularly by solving pressing local issues. 
Ultimately, the town meetings became a key benchmark for Americans measuring the success of 
reorientation. The embrace of these meetings supposedly represented the adoption of American 
democratic practices. By holding meetings on their own, the Bavarians had embraced political 
modernity. Additionally, the growing number of town hall meetings provided occupation 
officials with visible evidence of success. The larger the number of meetings held, the more 
successful democratization. 
Education Reform 
 The youth program of the first years of the occupation had provided a testing ground for 
the later reorientation program. In particular, occupation officials rehearsed ideas about the 
superiority of American traditions and instituted practices like public meetings. While the larger 
reorientation campaign targeted the larger adult population, the youth program continued in 
Bavaria. Youth groups continued to expand and Americans of all stripes still worked with 
German youth in their area. However, the push for significant education reform in Bavaria tied 
the youth program with the general reorientation mission. American officials viewed the 
Bavarian education system as backward and inherently incompatible with modern democracy. 
Therefore, they proposed reforms to the system. As with other aspects of reorientation, the 
Americans imported ideas about education from across the Atlantic, particularly the notion that 
public education should contribute to democratic socialization and create good, democratic 
citizens. The proposed American reforms did not replace the Bavarian system with a direct copy 
of public education in the United States, but occupation officials did borrow heavily from the 
American tradition, much like in other areas of reorientation. 
273 
 
 In the eyes of most Americans, the Bavarian education system was incompatible with the 
modern democracy they were trying to create. Bavarian education followed a two-track system, 
where only a small minority (usually the children of the upper classes) attended the college 
preparatory Gymnasium and even fewer students attended universities. The vast majority of 
students received only eight years of required education before attending vocational training 
schools or directly entering the workforce. Additionally, the minority of students selected for the 
university track were pulled out of the common elementary schools after four years. For the 
Americans, this created significant problems. The “democratic process” in Germany had been 
“severely retarded” under the Nazis, in part because of the faults in the education system.
118
 
Occupation officials identified several major faults with Bavarian education. The two-track 
system established “a sense of class distinction which permeates all Bavarian society.” By 
separating the future leaders of German society (the university students) from their colleagues, 
Bavarian education, according to the Americans, reinforced the class distinctions between 
officials and their constituents, thereby contributing to German political backwardness. 
Additionally, education was too narrow in scope. Outside of the university track, there was little 
that contributed toward “a broader preparation for good citizenship and effective living.” Much 
to the dismay of the Americans, there were few classes, such as social studies or civics, to teach 
Bavarians how to be good democratic citizens. This system was fundamentally “incompatible 
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 To reform Bavarian public education, American officials proposed a series of reforms 
based on American attitudes towards public education, particularly the view that the goal of 
public education was to create good, democratic citizens. “We believe that all of the people in a 
democracy,” OMGB proclaimed, “must be trained to think straight, to develop a sense of 
values.”
120
  The reforms advanced three main goals. First, provide equal education opportunities 
for all Bavarian children. Second, “to lift the educational level of the average citizen so that he is 
better equipped to exercise intelligently the rights and responsibility of citizenship.” Finally, the 
reforms were supposed to break down the class distinctions in education. To achieve those goals 
the American reforms extended compulsory education from eight to nine years (including six 
years of common elementary school for all students), eliminated tuition for all public schools, 
and opened secondary education to all by dividing it into three separate tracks (vocational 
training, commercial training, and traditional college prep). These reforms would, OMGB 
argued, assure “good citizenship training” for all Bavarian students.
121
 
 The Bavarians, however, stridently opposed the proposed American reforms. Although 
American officials in Munich tried to work through the Bavarian government to make it look 
like a Bavarian reform program, the population and the government itself both put up fierce 
opposition. As historian James F. Tent chronicled, Alois Hundhammer, the conservative 
Bavarian Minister of Culture, organized fierce opposition to the American plans, citing Bavarian 
traditions. Following Hundhammer’s lead, Bavarian officials stalled in implementing the 
reforms, blaming financial shortfalls. Then in September 1948 military government revised its 
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reforms to allow for gradual implementation of free public school tuition. Not until the 1950-51 
school year would the Bavarian government have to cover the entire cost of public education.
122
 
Nevertheless, Bavarian opposition to the reforms, still fomented by Hundhammer, remained. By 
February 1949 the Landtag appropriated a small amount of funding “to pacify the schools” but 
there were no plans to implement school reform “in the near future.” When visited by local 
Bavarian school officials, government officials in Munich took the position that the American 
reforms proposed the previous summer were a “wish” and not an order. The wider German 
populace also opposed the American reforms as an attempt to trample on long-established 
Bavarian traditions. Indeed, school reform was “the butt of many jokes” and many Bavarians 
believed that OMGB had tried to do something against superior advice.
123
 
 American officials continued to press of education reform for several months, but 
Bavarian resistance continued. The attempts to reform Bavarian education failed. Nevertheless, 
the widespread incorporation of traditional American ideas about education demonstrated the 
influence of U.S. practices on the reorientation and democratization campaign. Military 
government officers compared the Bavarian education system to its American counterpart and 
found it wanting. To correct its perceived deficiencies, they imported American attitudes towards 
public education, highlighting its role in creating democratic citizens. The Americans even 
insinuated German backwardness in education by comparing the fight over public education in 
postwar Bavaria to the American campaigns for free public education during the middle of the 
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 Just as modernizing reforms fought for better education in the United 




 As Bavaria transitioned towards partial sovereignty in the new Federal Republic of 
Germany, many Americans took stock of the progress of reorientation over the previous four 
years. In their eyes, the program of democratization had been highly successful. Whereas basic 
survival dominated the first two years of the occupation, the last two years of reorientation 
seemed a noticeable success. Bavarians were still viewed as politically immature and timid. 
Speaking to a German audience, Clarence Bolds, Deputy Director of OMGB, proclaimed, “You 
listening to me now owe it to yourselves, your children and your country to follow your own 
government closely in order that your basic rights are not violated. In my country that policy 
comes as natural to every man as breathing. Here you still must learn it.”
126
 Nevertheless, they 
had made major progress. Bavarians, MGOs believed, now routinely criticized government 
officials in public and realized that members of the government were servants to the public, not 
their master. Yet the ever-present American standard remained. The success of reorientation was 
judged by the ability and willingness of Bavarians to adopt the ideas and practices of American 
democratic society. Successful political modernization occurred when Bavarian political life 
replicated, at least partially, political life across the Atlantic. 
Bavarian Reactions 
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Bavarians reacted in diverse ways to the American campaign of reorientation and 
democratization. Many were apathetic early on as they struggled for survival and remained so 
throughout the occupation. Others remained hostile to the language of American democracy. 
Many, however, embraced the campaign and co-opted it for their own needs. Despite American 
criticisms that Bavarians had not yet reached political maturity, many Bavarians proved quite 
adept at adopting the language and forms of American democracy for their own purposes. Often, 
they co-opted American language and ideas about democracy and the threat of militarism to 
support their own partisan agendas. In other cases, Bavarians turned the language of 
democratization around to criticize the actions of their American occupiers. In this way, many 
Bavarians under U.S. control adapted to American language, talking back to their occupiers by 
appropriating the language of OMGB’s democratization campaign.
127
  
Many Bavarians used the language surrounding reorientation to promote their own 
specific goals. Politicians and political parties were particularly adept at doing so. The small, but 
active Communist Party (KPD) redefined democracy to call for economic democracy in Bavaria. 
More noticeably, the other major political parties used reorientation language to their partisan 
benefit. Both the center-right Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and the center-left Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) invoked the promise of democracy or the threat of militarism and hyper-
nationalism. The CSU, for example, vigorously protected the autonomy of Bavaria and opposed 
centralized political authority. To gain American support, the party often explained that “a 
centralized Germany might result in the re-birth of militarism, even if it happens within 50 years 
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from now.” The CSU also played on the American tradition of federalism to explain their 
political position. Instead of a strong central government, the CSU explained that it favored a 




Some Germans, particularly those who had spent time in the United States, also adopted 
the language of American modernity compared to German backwardness. This was not a new 
development in postwar Bavaria. As historian Mary Nolan noted, significant numbers of 
Weimar-era businessmen looked to the United States as the beacon of modernity. These 
businessmen emulated American practices such as the assembly line or “scientific management” 
throughout the 1920s to “modernize” German industry.
129
 The practice, in some ways, continued 
during the occupation. Writing to Sidney White, director of the Würzburg military government 
office, in January 1949, Hubertus zu Loewenstein proclaimed the superiority of American 
standards. Trying to create a “Public Health and Welfare office” in Lower Franconia, 
Loewenstein complained that German standards in public health were far behind the American. 
According to him, “To attack the problem vigorously, with the benefit of the American example, 
would serve as an important medium for educating the German population towards democratic 
initiative and self-government in the field of social responsibility.” He even spoke of 
modernizing German agriculture in Bavaria by importing “modern ways of farming” from the 
United States.
130
 Loewenstein could have legitimately believed in Bavarian backwardness or he 
could have simply adopted the language of the occupier. Regardless, his discussion of American 
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modernity demonstrates the prevalence of the language in postwar Bavaria. It was not limited to 
a few American officials but had expanded, at least somewhat, beyond the boundaries of military 
government. Loewenstein used American language to help draw attention to his proposal. 
Meanwhile, Bavarians also co-opted the language democratization to criticize the actions 
of American military government in Germany. The right-wing Bayernpartei raised the specter of 
renewed dictatorship to oppose the Anglo-American bizonal economic policies. Bizonal 
agencies, according to one Dr. Fischbacher, “effectively tried to replace former Reich 
agencies.”
131
 From the left wing, Bavarian communists insisted that democratization efforts did 
not go far enough. In addition to elections, the communists included major land reforms and state 
ownership of major industries in their definition of democracy. Many Bavarians also used the 
language of democratization to attack what they viewed as the imposition of American values at 
the expense of traditional Bavarian practices. Most notable was the reaction to OMGB’s 
proposed school reforms. Officials and civilians throughout the Land lambasted American efforts 
to force through their reforms as “undemocratic.” Military government, many Bavarians argued, 
preached about the benefits of democracy while simultaneously ignoring democratic practices in 
the administration of the occupation. In January 1949, the Landrat of Berchtesgaden explained 
that “the noble objectives of the reorientation program are senseless in that the will of the people 
actually appears to have no weight when Military Government imposes its theories upon the 
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 Similarly, surveys of German communities highlighted the belief among 
the general population “that there can be no real democracy in an occupied country.”
133
 
Many Bavarians also pushed back against the American argument that democratization 
represented a significant improvement for German society. For more cynical Germans, the 
concept of democracy became inseparable from the depravations that characterized the postwar 
era. Writing in the magazine Der Ruf, Hans Werner Richter described the irreverence with which 
Germans at a train station spoke of democracy. According to Richter, “They equate it with 
everything which in their opinion is incompetent. For them, democracy equals defeat, hunger, 
poverty, corruption and bureaucratism.” Instead of freedom and liberty, democracy meant “the 
cutting of fat ration, the registration form, the identity card, [and] the queues.” “Now we are 
democrats,” Richter wrote, “now we can starve.”
134
 For many Bavarians, therefore, democracy 
meant something quite different than what it meant for the Americans. They defined it as 
privation amidst the ruins of total defeat. In those circumstances, democratization met both 
resistance and apathy from the Bavarian civilians supposedly in need of democratic instruction. 
Initially American officials tried to place these criticisms at the feet of “nationalistic 
elements” who sought to undermine the occupation.
135
 However, military government officers 
were soon forced into somewhat awkward territory to defend their actions as consistent with the 
goal of democratization. In December 1948 Charles Lafollette argued that Germans should not 
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judge democratization by how the U.S. was unable to extend to Germans all the rights associated 
with democracy within the United States.  He explained: 
The value of the democratic ethic as a way of living should be measured by the German 
people, not by the degree in which the victors are unable to extend as victors all of the 
standards to which they adhere within their own national boundaries but rather by the 
degree to which they extend to the German people the benefit of the ethic to which they 




In a similar vein, Murray Van Wagoner responded in March 1949 to criticisms in from the 
publisher of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung in Munich, Werner Friedman. Friedman contended that 
the actions of OMGB that overturned democratically-passed laws simply because they were 
“undemocratic” were in themselves undemocratic. Van Wagoner responded that the Bavarian 
Landtag had improperly handed its legislative powers over to the executive. Military 
government’s actions, therefore, were necessary to preserve the “proper system of checks and 
balances so vital to a democratic government structure.”
137
 
 Bavarians of all stripes, then, took the language of democratization and political 
modernization promoted by the Americans and reframed it for their own purposes. In some 
cases, the language was used to promote partisan political agendas or personal projects by 
appealing to ideals of American democracy. On the other hand, many Bavarians turned the 
language of democratization around and criticized the American occupation, forcing military 
government officials to respond. Either way, Bavarian responses to reorientation demonstrated 
the quick adoption of the American language that pervaded the reorientation campaign. Many 
Bavarians were not slow learners, as their occupiers believed, but quickly incorporated the 
language of democratization to suit their own ends. 
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For American military government officers, reorientation was perhaps the most important 
objective of the occupation. If successful, it promised the elimination of German militarism and 
the inclusion of a democratic Germany, or at least a portion of it, in the free world. 
Democratization would be achieved by importing America into Bavaria. American tradition 
would guide Germans from the backwardness of their political culture to true modern 
democracy. The youth program during the first two years of the occupation provided an 
important testing ground for the broader reorientation program. Youth groups, conferences, and 
discussion groups developed the ideas and practices that American military government officers 
would implement on a wider scale. Once the general program took off, lectures, movies, and 
discussion groups at Amerika Haüser throughout Bavaria served as an introduction to ideas 
about American political culture. This way the German population could learn about the US 
constitution, the role of universities in political society, and women’s involvement in politics. 
Meanwhile, occupation officials also circulated ideas about how best to raise the political 
maturity of the towns and cities in which they operated.  Local town hall meetings provided 
Germans the opportunity to put these ideas into practice and served as a measuring stick of the 
progress of the reorientation program. The more Germans adopted the town hall meeting, in the 
eyes of the Americans, the more modern they became and the more successful democratization 
was. 
The result was a campaign of political modernization conducted in what became the heart 
of the so-called first world. After years living under Nazi rule, many Americans assumed that the 
German population needed guidance on the road towards democracy. To provide that guidance 
military government officers drew on the most important democratic model with which they had 
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experience: the United States. As a result, reorientation in Bavaria operated on the belief that 
success meant democratic life in Germany would emulate democratic life across the Atlantic. 
Reporting on a two-evening discussion at the Regensburg Amerika Haus of civil rights in 
America and Bavaria, C.S. Wright declared, “These two evenings of discussion should result in a 
complete understanding that if the Bavarians expect to have their civil rights, they must 
constantly defend them as we do in the United States.”
138
 Political maturity was therefore 
determined by adoption of American practices, such as writing legislative representatives and 
questioning public officials at town meetings. Meanwhile, a failure to participate in public 
meetings or to adequately question local officials was evidence of backwardness and immaturity. 
Unlike the Soviet Union in eastern Germany, the United States did not deploy blatant, coercive 
state power to leave their mark. Nor did Americans actively deride the German population. 
Nevertheless, reorientation in Bavaria operated on the assumption that the politically immature 
Germans needed guidance from mature Americans to emulate American democracy and create a 
truly democratic society. Reorientation was a necessity after 1945, yet in Bavaria it operated as a 
program of political modernization. 
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Chapter 5: The Occupation and the Early Cold War 
 
“The range of ideology among the [Communist] leaders was surprisingly wide and sometimes 
included recognition of private enterprise in commerce and, to a considerable extent, in 
industry.” 
- G-5 Section, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, October 19451 
 
“We…propose to attack communism and the police state before the German people…We are 
engaged in political warfare and we might as well recognize it now.” 
- Gen. Lucius Clay, 30 October 19472 
 
 
 The tasks of feeding Bavaria, reconstructing the German economy, and democratizing 
Bavarian populace represented three of the most important goals of American occupation 
officials. These duties, however, did not occur within a vacuum. While military government 
officers oversaw those tasks, the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of the Cold War complicated the American occupation of Germany. At the highest 
levels of military government concern about communism and potential Soviet subversion of 
western Germany represented a major concern after 1947. General Lucius Clay, long a 
proponent of American and Soviet cooperation, became an ardent cold warrior over the last two 
years of military occupation. As this happened, the central offices of OMGUS grew every more 
hostile to communism. The emerging Cold War, therefore, increasingly influenced the high-level 
American responses to problems within Germany. 
 At the lowest levels of the occupation hierarchy, however, the deteriorating relationship 
between East and West elicited little major concern among MGOs. During the first two years of 
the occupation, American officials in Bavaria focused on other more pressing issues, such as 
feeding a starving populace. When political activity did rise to their attention, many Americans 
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complained about the political apathy of Bavarians. Indeed, military government officers were 
more concerned about the return of individual Nazis and the lingering influence of Nazism than 
they were about the influence of German communists. Although instances of anti-communist 
activity took place, the German Communist Party (KPD) maintained relatively good relations 
with American officials from 1945 through the summer of 1947. In largely rural Bavaria few 
MGOs dealt with significant numbers of communists and the party remained a minor factor in 
the Land. If anything, the Germans themselves, particularly the officials appointed by military 
government detachments, were the more ardent anti-communists and wanted the Americans to 
take more active measures against the KPD. This general pattern of activity reflects high-level 
concern, or lack thereof, about communism. For several years, Army officers, including General 
Clay, held out hope that cooperation with the USSR remained possible. As a result, anti-
communism was relatively limited during the first two years of the occupation. 
 Beginning in the summer of 1947, however, high-level American attitudes changed as 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union mounted. As Americans and Soviet 
clashed over reparations, the fusion of the American and British zones, currency reform, the 
Marshall Plan, and the ultimate creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, military 
government officials at OMGUS headquarters adopted ever more strident anti-communist views. 
Military government officials in Bavaria reflected these high-level developments as anti-
communist sentiment increased and relations with the Land’s communists deteriorated. For 
MGOs in Bavaria, however, the emerging Cold War was a relatively distant phenomenon and 
exerted limited impact on their official duties. As with the food crises and matters of economic 
reconstruction, MGOs proved willing to question, if not challenge, the dominant themes of 
American policy in Germany. Relations with the KPD undoubtedly deteriorated and antagonism 
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increased on both sides, yet the KPD’s few bastions of strengths remained in the major cities and 
beyond the purview of most MGOs. American officials repeatedly explained that the KPD 
possessed little noteworthy influence in Bavaria and insisted that lingering Nazism remained a 
problem in the highly conservative Land. Yet even when the Cold War did rear its head, it 
remained relatively remote. Cocooned within their small local offices, many MGOs had little 
direct connection to the major international events that dominated the Cold War. The Berlin 
Blockade, widespread rumors of imminent war, German POWs returning from the USSR, and 
rising tensions on the border with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone represented the most 
significant connections American MGOs had with the emerging America-Soviet conflict. In 
general, however, the conflict that would come to dominate the globe for over four decades 
possessed limited impact on the lowest levels of American military government in occupied 
Bavaria. As a result, MGOs could, to a limited extent, resist some of the pressure to become 
ardent cold warriors. 
1945-1947: The Non-Existent Cold War 
 For the first two years of the occupation, anti-communism and other features of the 
emerging Cold War were unimportant to American military government officers in Bavaria. For 
the most part, the tasks of feeding the Bavarian populace, reconstruction, and democratization 
represented more pressing goals. Dealing with the day-to-day struggles of the average Bavarian, 
American MGOs, in their official duties, were little concerned about the relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Whenever political activity did occur, the Americans were 
not particularly worried about the influence of the KPD. Instead, the lingering influence of ex-
Nazis and Nazism remained of primary concern, particularly their potential influence on the 
center-right parties of Bavaria, including the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Economic 
287 
 
Reconstruction Party, and the Bayernpartei. Such limited concern about the influence of the 
KPD reflected the views of high-level military government officials, who sought cooperation 
with the Soviet Union and retained hope that some kind of agreement between the victorious 
powers could be worked out in Germany. 
 From the beginning of the occupation in Bavaria political activity was limited for a 
variety of reasons, including American policy and general German apathy about political issues 
in the face of starvation. Until August 27, 1945, military government strictly enforced a ban on 
political activity in Germany under the guise military necessity. As a result, the nascent political 
movements of the immediate postwar period were either shut down by the Americans or co-
opted by Bavarian administrative officials. In Munich, the Freiheits-Aktion-Bayern (FAB) 
launched an uprising as American armies approached and after the fall of the city provided 
names of prospective government employees to the newly-arrived military government 
detachment headed by Lt. Col. Walter Kurtz and Major Eugene Keller. The ban on political 
activity was quickly subjected to the ban on political activity, however. On May 17, the 
detachment ordered FAB to cease all activities and sent out officers to shut down other nascent 
political organizations such as Freis Deutschland. The Americans based ban on political activity 
on the concept of military necessity, arguing that political activity in the immediate aftermath of 
the war threatened the operations of occupying units. Many German conservatives agreed with 
the prohibition and even wanted the moratorium to last for several years while the problems of 
food, housing, and fuel were addressed. Meanwhile, more “radical elements” wanted the ban on 
political activity lifted as soon as possible.
3
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 The ban on political activity was lifted on August 27, 1945, and the formation of political 
parties authorized at the local level in the fall. Yet even then political apathy was noticeably 
present, as many Bavarians were slow to embrace the return of political organizations. In 
general, however, the pre-Nazi political parties quickly reemerged as the general building blocks 
of political life in Bavaria. The Catholic-dominated Bavarian People’s Party transformed into the 
Christian Social Union, but the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the KPD both returned in 
their old forms.
4
 Nevertheless, the only parties showing interest in political activity were the 
“left-wing” parties, notably the SPD and the KPD. By October 31 military government 
authorized forty-five local political parties, including thirty-three combined from the Social 
Democrats and Communists. The two leftist parties also “monopolized authorized political 
assembly.” In Fürth the KPD held a rally of 5,000 people in October, while both parties rallied 
2,500 each in Augsburg. The overwhelming preponderance of left-wing political activity was so 
notable that military government reports proactively cut off criticism that American officials 
were discriminating against the old center-right. In both October and November, American 
MGOs insisted that the dominance of the SPD and KPD “was the result of no discrimination” 
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 Despite the reorganization efforts of the old left-wing parties, many Bavarians remained 
apathetic about politics. An informal survey conducted Captain William Conklin and Louis 
Lochner, the chief of the Associated Press’ Berlin Bureau, found that most German officials 
opposed the early local elections that OMGUS was proposing. Additionally, local military 
government detachments reported that the population was “averse to political activity of any 
kind at the moment.”
6
 Apathy was particularly noticeable in rural areas, with more than one 
authorized political party in just one-quarter of all Bavarian Kreise by the end of November.
7
 
Bavarians cared little about political issues while they lacked the basic necessities of life. 
Nevertheless, and despite reservations by German officials, military government 
proceeded with plans to hold local Gemeinde elections on January 27, 1946. Following the lead 
of General Clay, MGOs believed that the best way to teach Germans the principles of democratic 
self-government was to have them practice it through local elections. For many Americans, high 
voter turnout in the January elections demonstrated the success of their strategy and the growing 
political awareness of the Bavarian population. Nearly 2.1 million voters, some eighty-seven 
percent of eligible voters, participated in the Gemeinde elections, which were labeled as “an 
almost complete success.” From Würzburg the American MGO reported that the “interest of the 
people everywhere was at a high pitch, but they were very serious and earnest…”
8
 However, 
occupation officials from other communities complained of continued German apathy. In 
Wolfstein, Captain Raymond Douglass reported, “In general, the population…was apathetic to 
politics, fearful of engaging in politics, [and] worried as to consequences of [choosing] the 
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 Similarly, First Lieutenant Hyman Gilberg warned from Regensburg that “the 
German people have not been able to absorb democratic elections at this time.”
10
 Additionally, 
widespread political activity in Bavaria nearly disappeared after the January elections. The 
detachment in Dachau, for example, reported minimal political activity in February. According 
to Major Albert Snow, the detachment commander, the decline of activity was because “There is 
little or no genuine interest in parties at this time.”
11
 The only parties that maintained something 
resembling regular political activity were the SPD and KPD, which both possessed a more 
dedicated core of supporters.  
Ultimately, a regular pattern settled into Bavarian politics throughout 1946 and into 1947. 
Beyond a relatively small group of politically minded Bavarians, most of the population 
remained ambivalent about politics at best and increasingly apathetic at worst. Bavarians turned 
out in large numbers to vote in the elections scheduled by military government, including the 
Landkreis elections in April 1946, the Stadtkreis elections in May, the elections for the Land 
constitutional assembly in June, and the Landtag elections in December. For example, OMGB 
reported that 86.56 percent of eligible voters participated in the May city elections.
12
 Political 
activity picked up in the run-up to each election, but quickly disappeared afterwards. The Social 
Democrats and Communists continued some activities, but the rest of the parties, including the 
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majority CSU, remained idle.
13
 Major W.B. Morrell complained from Nürnberg that the average 
Bavarian farmer was apathetic, poorly informed, and generally followed the political dictates of 
the Catholic and Lutheran churches. Interest in politics, Morrell explained, “has dropped 
considerably.”
14
 Combined with the conservative leanings of most Bavarians, there were few 
reasons to worry about the KPD or to connect Bavarian communists with the larger policy 
disagreements occurring among the occupation powers. Even in its urban “strongholds,” the 
Bavarian KPD performed poorly in the 1946 elections. The Munich Communists won a single 
seat on the city council and just 6.2 percent of the vote in May, while the Regensburg KPD 
earned just one seat on the council.
15
 Then during the December Landtag elections, the Munich 
KPD did not win a single seat in the Land parliament.
16
  
Throughout the first year of the occupation – and well into the second year – American 
MGOs had little reason to fear the influence of the KPD or the emerging Cold War. The 
Bavarian communists were a weak political force and even if they were stronger, most Bavarians 
remained apathetic about politics. Instead, American officials focused their efforts on the more 
urgent tasks of feeding a starving population, housing an expanding population, and restarting 
some semblance of economic life in Bavaria. These concerns over providing basic necessities to 
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the population occupied a significantly greater proportion of the reporting from individual offices 
than did concern about the influence of communism. 
Instead of communism, military government officials were often more concerned about 
the lingering effects of ex-Nazis and Nazism in their communities. Denazification was, at least 
theoretically, a major goal of the U.S. occupation. Several historians, however, have 
demonstrated the limits to the American policy and MGOs themselves expressed significant 
frustration with the implementation of denazification. Rebecca Boehling argued that military 
government officials at all levels, while paying lip service to the principle of denazification, were 
actually more concerned about the efficiency within the German bureaucracy and the material 
recovery of Bavarian society. As a result, they appointed career administrators or conservative 
politicians who promised to get the local government operating efficiently as quickly as possible, 
even though many had willingly cooperated with the Nazi regime.
17
 The focus on efficiency and 
recovery, therefore, undermined a thorough denazification of German society and pushed 
democratic reformers to the sidelines in postwar Germany. 
Nevertheless, American MGOs in Bavaria were not completely indifferent to concerns 
about the influence of ex-Nazis in German society. As denazification dragged on and it was 
steadily weakened throughout the occupation, military government officials in Bavaria still 
expressed trepidation about the lingering impact of Nazism. Meanwhile, the influence of 
communism and the KPD remained a minor issue for the first two years of the occupation. 
During the summer of 1945, for example, official reports emphasized the prominent role of 
denazification military government activities. OMGB reported in August that “denazification 
was a prime determinant in all efforts to reestablish civilian governmental agencies, industry, and 
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 After the announcement of Military Government Law No. 8, which prohibited former 
Nazis from any type of work above manual labor, Captain Douglass of Wolfstein insisted that 
implementation of the law represented the most pressing issue in the Landkreis.
19
 Finally, the 
military government detachment in Munich reported that they shut down the operations of the 
local Portuguese consulate, which was supposedly helping ex-Nazis escape to Brazil.
20
 Such 
reports, of course, do not capture the full reality of denazification in postwar Bavaria. American 
MGOs often did turn a blind eye to cooperation with the Nazi regime in the name of efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the goal of denazification retained a prominent place in the early actions of 
military government detachments throughout the Land. Ultimately the policy may have failed, as 
historians like Boehling have persuasively argued, but the Americans remained concerned about 
the issue in the initial stages of the occupation, far more so than they feared the influence of 
communism in Bavaria. 
Beyond the actual process of denazification, MGOs in Bavaria worried about the possible 
influence of former Nazis on the center-right political parties of the Land, in particular the 
Christian Social Union, and the general conservatism of the Bavarian population. As early as 
November 1945 OMGB speculated that the CSU’s strength was due to “its silent exploitation by 
various conservative forces on which the former Nazis and their [sympathizers] were the most 
sinister.” Specifically, the Americans worried about the influence of former Minister-President 
Fritz Schäffer and the faction of the CSU known as the Bavarian People’s League, which 
comprised the far right of the party. Military government officials warned of Schäffer’s “over-
                                                 
18
 G-5 Section, Historical Report, August 1945, Pg. 1, G-5 Section Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 
45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA. 
19
 “Historical Report for Month of November 1945,” 3 Dec 45, Det. H-310, to OMG Det. E-201, thru Dir., OMG 
Det. E-204, from Capt. Raymond Douglass, Pg. 2, Historical Reports Folder, Box 966, 753 (A1): Corres & Rpts, 45-
49, LSO Wolfstein, RG 260, NARA. 
20
 G-5 Section, Report of Operations, November 1945, OMGB, Pg. 9, G-5 Section Reports of Operations 9 May 45-
30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA. 
294 
 
conservative tendencies” and hoped that the more moderate factions of the party, led Josef 
Müller, could moderate the far-right influence.
21
 Meanwhile, American MGOs expressed worries 
about the conservativism of the Bavarian populace. After the CSU’s resounding victory in the 
April 1946 election, Major Albert Snow explained, “It appears to the undersigned that the 
election victory was more than social, as the majority of people in this Kreis are not only 
extremely conservative but ardently Catholic and reactionary.”
22
 
American concern about the CSU culminated during the late spring and early summer of 
1946. In May OMGB speculated that some of the center-right party’s strength “springs from the 
favor it has carried with former Nazis and their cohorts.” Fritz Schäffer remained a problem 
since his speeches had “strong national socialist leanings” and was ordered to “discontinue 
political activities.” Yet other controversies raised American concern about the lingering 
influence of Nazism in Bavaria. On May 24, the local detachments suspended chairman of the 
CSU in Würzburg because he appointed a man who had been a member of the Nazi Party since 
1933 and had joined the SA in 1937. Despite the suspension, the local party unanimously re-
elected the party chairman. Local military government, therefore, suspended the Würzburg CSU 
for endorsing actions that contradicted the denazification laws. Similarly, the MGO in Landkreis 
Schwabmünchen warned of a divided CSU. On the one hand, the left-wing of the party included 
liberals, or even socialists, who did not want to join the Social Democratic Party for religious 
reasons. However, the other wing was far more conservative, including “‘reactionary’ middle 
class entrepreneurs, farmers soaked in tradition, and Nazis who are permitted by current politics 
to join a political party.” In Schwabmünchen the CSU “seems to include only people of the latter 
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kind.” As evidence, the detachment cited the activities of the Landrat, Max Weis. He provided 
jobs to Nazi relatives, had used concentration camp labor in his business during the war, and 
opposed denazification. Even the more moderate members of the Land party proved frustrating. 
Dr. Müller and other CSU leaders “stubbornly resisted” the implementation of strict 
denazification laws throughout Bavaria and had refused to share clear membership lists for 
months.
23
 For many Americans in OMGB, the reluctance of the moderate CSU leadership 
demonstrated that they too approved of former Nazis joining the party. 
Beyond the activities of the CSU, American MGOs also cautioned about the conservative 
influence of the Catholic Church. For example, Bavarian bishops composed a pastoral letter that 
was then read from all Catholic pulpits over Eastern weekend in 1946. According to OMGB, the 
letter was a “thinly veiled defense of Nazis” and a direct contradiction of the U.S. policy of 
“purging the German national life of Nazis.” While many Bavarians disliked political speeches 
coming from the pulpit, former Nazis had supposedly become regular church attendees “since 
they have discovered in the Catholic Church such a strong ally.”
24
 The conservatism of Bavarian 
Catholicism, therefore, represented a significant concern for American military government. 
Combined with the CSU’s ambivalent, if not welcoming attitude, towards former Nazis, MGOs 
feared that former Nazis would regain positions of power in postwar Bavaria.  
Beyond the CSU, however, other political parties also presented concerns to military 
government officials. The Economic Reconstruction Party, under the leadership of Alfred Loritz, 
rose to prominence in several communities during the summer of 1946. In Dachau, the party 
denounced the major parties and politicians, although it did not gain significant support in the 
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city. According to Major Snow, the ERP was unpopular because its “abuse, slander, and 
vilification is reminiscent of the early rants of the Nazis.”
25
 Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel 
Eugene Keller and the Munich detachment addressed the impact of Loritz and the ERP in 
August. Keller described a meeting of the ERP with approximately 5,000 attendees where Loritz 
launched broadsides against the city’s Oberbürgermeister Karl Scharnagl and the CSU in a 
“Hitler style” of promising “everything to everyone.” At another meeting on August 20 Loritz 
again used the “Hitlerian method” of speaking, which the MGO described as an “impersonation 
of Goebbels.” Loritz and the ERP, Keller warned, were “greatly similar to the NSDAP.” The 
party was “critical of every person, critical of every establishment of the state” but possessed “no 
basic program for work and reconstruction.”
26
 The ERP represented another facet of American 
concern about the lingering influence of Nazism in postwar Bavaria. Beyond the conservative 
beliefs of many Bavarians, Keller, Snow, and MGOs worried about the impact of “Nazi 
methods.” Such right-wing populism could potentially undermine efforts at denazification and 
democratization. 
Throughout the early years of the occupation, then, communists and the KPD remained 
of minor concern for military government officials in Bavaria. When the KPD was a problem, it 
was due to reports that former Nazis or former officeholders joined the party in an attempt to 
regain power.
27
 Instead, MGOs fretted about the continuing influence of former Nazis in 
Bavarian society, the general conservatism of Bavarians, and the practice of populist, Nazi-like 
methods. Such developments received significantly more attention in military government 
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reports than did any concerns about Bavarian communism or the emerging Cold War. American 
military government ultimately favored center-right “experts” and administrators due to their 
preference for material recovery and efficiency in local government. However, that does not 
mean they were indifferent to fears about former Nazis regaining political power. MGOs 
repeatedly expressed their concerns about Nazi influence in Bavarian society throughout the first 
stages of the occupation. 
Meanwhile, Bavarian communists and the KPD did not receive significant attention from 
military government. The party was not immediately viewed negatively by many MGOs and 
while there were instances of antic-communism, most Americans expressed little concern about 
the party during the first two years of the occupation. The KPD was not a particularly strong 
political party in Bavaria, with its strongest support coming from urban areas. As a result, MGOs 
in rural areas often had few interactions with communists. In fact, German officials and the 
Bavarian population expressed greater distrust towards the KPD than did the Americans. After 
years of warfare against the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda, Bavarians remained 
suspicious of communists and feared a new war between the Western Allies and the Soviet 
Union at an early date. 
From the beginning of the occupation, American officials in Bavaria expressed little 
concern about the state of communism in the Land. As early as July 1945 OMGB recognized 
that Bavarian politics tended towards the center-right and that the KPD’s only notable strength 
came from a handful of industrial centers.
28
 The observation was borne out in the local elections 
conducted throughout Germany in the first six months of 1946. Even in Munich and Nürnberg, 
major industrial cities, the communists polled poorly, often failing to win more than a single seat 
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on the city council. In Regensburg, the KPD earned just 1,626 votes out of a total nearly 38,000 
total votes and won just one council seat.
29
 In more rural areas, the party faired far worse. For 
example, Major Snow reported from Dachau that the KPD made no significant gains in the April 
1946 elections because the KPD was “distrusted” and “linked with [Russia] in the minds of the 
people.”
30
 Additionally, communist party membership remained minimal in communities beyond 
the major urban centers. In January 1946, the KPD of Landkreis Karlstadt possessed a mere 
thirty-seven members. By the following November, the local party had increased its 
membership, but to just sixty-five members.
31
 Similarly, the KPD in Altdorf, located near 
Nürnberg, possessed sixty members out of a total population of approximately 5,000.
32
 
While MGOs recognized the limited influence of the KPD, they also initially expressed 
either ambivalence about the party or, in some instances, admiration. Many early reports 
centered on the relationship between Bavaria’s communists and social democrats. For example, 
they both seemed committed to the “elimination of Nazism and militarism” and the 
reconstruction of Germany “on democratic principles.”
33
 This apparent commitment to working 
with the SPD limited concern about communism among many military government officials in 
Bavaria. In October 1945 OMGB noted, “The range of ideology among the leaders was 
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surprisingly wide and sometimes included recognition of private enterprise in commerce and, to 
a considerable extent, in industry.”
34
 Similarly, the detachment in Munich described Bruno 
Goldhammer, the Secretary of the local party, as “a powerful, proletarian figure” who promoted 
democratic collaboration among all anti-fascist political parties. The Nürnberg party made 
similar calls of democratic unity in the name of improving the lives of workers. MGOs did not 
always accept these professions at face value. In Nürnberg, for example, the detachment 
questioned, “How much of this liberal view was spontaneous and how much was a matter of 
disguised Party policy, dictated possibly by higher headquarters, remains to be seen.” 
Nevertheless, many MGOs “were inclined to accept the professions of Communist loyalty to 
democratic principles as no less sincere than those of the Social Democrats.”
35
 
This is not to say that American military government officials embraced the KPD in 
Bavaria or that no instances of anti-communism occurred during the first two years of the 
occupation. Before the ban on political activity was lifted and political parties approved, 
intelligence reports warned about the “secret” activity of left-wing parties, including the KPD. 
Additionally, MGOs viewed the Antifa (Anti-Fascist) committees that operated during the first 
months of the occupation with suspicion, in large part because communists made up sizable 
portions of the committees. More specifically, Americans sometimes targeted communist 
officials for removal. In Munich, for example, military government forced the removal of Dr. 
Alfred Kroth from the cabinet of Minister-President Wilhelm Hoegner and from a position in the 
city’s administration. Kroth, a long-time KPD member, had joined the Nazi Party as spy before 
the war. Military government officials confirmed the story, but the communist was still removed 
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 Nevertheless, communism and the KPD remained a relatively remote 
concern form MGOs in Bavaria. For those officials interacting with German society on a daily 
basis, the limited party membership and unsuccessful elections demonstrated the clear limits on 
communist influence in conservative Bavaria. 
In fact, it was the Bavarians themselves who expressed the more ardent anti-communism 
in the early years of the occupation. Bavarians of all stripes expressed fear and distrust of the 
KPD and American officials took note of their repeated denunciations of the party. If anything, 
the Bavarians, during the first two years of the occupation, pushed the Americans to embrace a 
harder line in dealing with the Land’s communists. As early as August 1945 German 
conservatives in Munich warned that denazification would drive nominal Nazis “into the ranks 
of the communists” and ultimately undermine American policy.
37
 A month later the Munich 
detachment again reported that churches in the city were urging their parishioners to be 
politically minded, largely out of fear “that Communists would benefit from the general political 
apathy of the people.” The official American recognition of the KPD brought a new wave of 
questions to the MGOs in Munich, such as “What is the best party to join to fight the 
Communist?” and “How can I found an Anti-Communist Party?”
38
 For conservatives throughout 
Bavaria, then, communism posed an early threat to Bavarian society. The KPD, they feared, 
would take advantage of the postwar chaos to advance their agenda. 
                                                 
36
 Boehling, A Question of Priorities, 150; “Annual Historical Report from Military Government SK-LK Munich,” 3 
July 46, to Director, OMGB, from Lt. Col. Eugene Keller, Pg. 18, Historical Reports 1945-1949 Folder, Box 406, 
669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA. 
37
 “Annual Historical Report for Military Government SK-LK Munich,” 3 July 46, to Director, OMGB, from Lt. 
Col. Eugene Keller, Pg. 13, Historical Reports 1945-1948 Folder, Box 406, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO 
Munich, RG 260, NARA. 
38
 “Annual Historical Report for Military Government SK-LK Munich,” 3 July 46, to Director, OMGB, from Lt. 
Col. Eugene Keller, Pg. 14 & 19, Historical Reports 1945-1948 Folder, Box 406, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO 
Munich, RG 260, NARA. 
301 
 
The rout of the KPD in the elections of 1946, however, did not ease fear about the 
influence of the party among Bavarians. In fact, German anti-communism expanded throughout 
1946 and 1947. Early returnees from Soviet prisoner of war camps shared their often-horrific 
experiences with their communities and the stories quickly gained “a wide circulation among the 
populace.” Additionally, news stories from the Soviet zone of occupation inflamed anti-
communist sentiment. The Süddeutsche Zeitung published “Behind the Iron Curtain,” which 
painted a stark picture of life to the east, just days before the May 1946 elections.
39
 Most 
significantly, the growing assertiveness of the KPD, particularly in pushing for a union of 
communists and social democrats, instilled greater fear of communism. The KPD labeled 
Bavaria the “breeding place” of fascism and “the powerhouse of opposition toward socialism.” 
They also launched numerous broadsides against SPD leadership for not making common cause 
with the KPD against the Nazi regime.
40
 In response, Bavarian conservatives stepped up their 
denunciations of communism. Speaking to a meeting of the CSU in March 1947, Alois 
Hundhammer proclaimed, “We have to make up our minds whether we want Europe to be 
dominated by the Hold Cross or by the Red Flag. It is our duty to oppose Communism.”
41
 Social 
Democrat leadership joined the growing German anti-communist chorus as well. Speaking at a 
conference in Nürnberg, Kurt Schumacher, the head of the West German SPD, vowed that 
“Germany will [never] adopt Russian ideology” and that “the suppression and persecution” of 
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the SPD in the Soviet zone was “a question of world democracy.”
42
 Bavarian leaders, then, saw 
the KPD as a significant threat from the earliest days of the occupation and ramped up their anti-
communism well before American MGOs would embrace the dichotomy of the Cold War 
struggle. 
These local developments – American concern about denazification and relatively good 
relations with German communists – reflected the higher-up concern, or lack thereof, about 
communism. For the elites within American military government, the Soviet Union was not a 
significant threat to U.S. goals in Germany for the first two years of the occupation. Instead, the 
other allies, most notably the French, posed the greatest headache and American commanders 
like General Clay believed they could reach an agreement with the USSR. One of Clay’s goals in 
restarting German political life was to set up a centralized German administration under the 
authority of the Control Council. However, Clay’s plans ran in to stiff opposition from the other 
occupying powers, particularly France and the Soviet Union. At the Potsdam Conference, the 
leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain discussed a wide array of 
postwar issues, but focused primarily on the treatment of occupied Germany. On paper, the 
Potsdam Agreement adopted several aspects of Clay’s vision. The allies agreed to the uniform 
treatment of the German populace “so far as is practicable” and promoted the rapid restoration of 
local self-government. Additionally, the agreement declared that “central German administrative 
department…shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communication, 
foreign trade and industry.” Along similar lines, the allies proclaimed that occupied Germany 
would be treated as single economic unit. While the Americans made several concessions to the 
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Soviet Union, particularly in the field of reparations, the Potsdam Agreement, at least on paper, 
bore a remarkable resemblance to Clay’s hopes for Germany.
43
 
When the Allied Control Council finally formed on August 30, however, disagreements 
limited the effectiveness of the council. All decisions required unanimous approval of the four 
occupying powers and it became apparent that the occupiers had diverging goals and policies in 
Germany. Clay, who often represented Eisenhower at meetings, found French obstructionism 
especially frustrating. The French vehemently opposed any kind of centralized administration of 
occupied Germany. Instead, the French representative on the council favored the decentralization 
of Germany and even the removal of economically important regions, such as the Rhineland, to 
destroy German militarism. By late 1945 American officials in German saw France, and not the 
Soviet Union, as the primary impediment to the creation of a centralized administration. The 
differing opinions on the treatment of defeated Germany, coupled with poor economic conditions 
and a “hurt complex,” produced, in the eyes of most Army officers, noticeably strained Franco-
American relations.
44
 In fact, Clay repeatedly complained to the Department of State about 
French hostility and to request that American diplomats put pressure on Paris to cooperate. The 
State Department, however, applied little pressure on the French due to concern about domestic 
politics in France. OMGUS subsequently complained, “Inside Germany, Russian cooperation 
seemed a continuing probability, with all the rich implication for the unity of Europe and peace 
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of the world. Yet despite their dependency on the United States, the French were being allowed 
to destroy the project.”
45
 
On the other hand, Americans initially saw Soviet actions as merely the continuation of 
the traditional Russian goal of securing a defensive buffer zone along its borders. In the wake of 
two world wars, Army intelligence analysts argued, Soviet policy was perfectly reasonable. 
Eisenhower even hoped that American officials could do “something” so that U.S. personnel 
“may understand…what the Russians have been through.”
46
 Additionally, American 
commanders in Germany maintained a strong relationship with their Soviet counterparts. 
Eisenhower and Clay were close with Marshal Georgy Zhukov, built in part on a mutual respect 
for their wartime accomplishments. Clay, in particular, chose to ignore the revolutionary 
ideology of the USSR and instead focused on their shared interests in Germany.
47
 Concerned 
with the day-to-day challenges of administrating a devastated nation-state, Clay and other 
military government elites were generally less worried about the influence of the Soviet Union 
and communism in Germany. 
Nevertheless, American and Soviet disagreements over policy slowed the initial work of 
the Allied Control Council and frustrated Clay’s goal of establishing a central administration in 
Germany. Part of the problem, Eisenhower told George Marshall, lay with the rigid policies of 
the home governments, which limited the ability to convince the other representatives of the 
soundness of propositions. As a result, only by a “spirit of joint accommodation” – which was 
increasingly rare – could the Control Council agree on any policy of substance.  Eisenhower and 
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Clay both agreed that the United States had to prepare for the possibility that quadripartite 
government would fail. However, Clay remained wary of taking any definitive steps towards 
autonomous or tripartite administration of Germany because it could “lead to practical if not 
actual dismemberment.” Despite opposition, Clay continued to press for a centralized 
administration. When the Level of Industry Committee, for example, could not reach an 
agreement on German steel production, Clay pushed for a compromise solution in the Control 
Council. After several contentious meetings, Clay brokered a compromise of 5.8 million tons of 
production with a capacity of 7.5 million tons. The steel agreement, however, was one small 
success amidst a larger pattern of failure.
48
 
Despite these disagreements, Clay worked for years to achieve some kind of agreement 
with the USSR in Germany. Following Clay’s lead, OMGUS believed that economic 
concessions, specifically over reparations, would push the Soviets towards more moderate 
positions on political and social issues. After all, the western zones possessed most German 
industry, so any significant reparations would have to come from the American, British, and 
French zones of occupation. Negotiations on a final reparations deal, however, collapsed during 
the spring of 1946 and Clay responded by stopping the delivery of reparations from the 
American zone. Yet even now the American general tried to maintain good relations with the 
USSR by painting the French as the main culprits. Even as the United States and Great Britain 
hammered out the details for the merger of their two zones, and took the first major step towards 
the division of Germany, Clay refused to sever the relationship with the Soviet Union. He 
approved informal discussions between his deputy William Draper and Soviet officers over 
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reparations and uniform level of industry in postwar Germany. Clay still believed that the 
Russians were so desperate for reparations that they would make significant concessions on their 
economic and political agenda in Germany.
49
 
Clay’s generally accommodating attitude toward the Soviets spread throughout much of 
OMGUS, even as the USSR imposed more radical political and social policies within their zone. 
After the sound defeat of the KPD in U.S. zone elections in early 1946, the Soviets embarked on 
an increasingly authoritarian control of their zone of occupation. Most famously, they forced the 
merger of the SPD and the KPD into the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The Russians also stepped 
up harassment of centrist and center-right political figures, particularly those from the Christian 
Democratic Union, and exerted more control on the press. Within OMGUS there was some 
concern to these Soviet measures, but it was not extensive. For the most part, Clay and his 
immediate subordinates blamed the Russian actions on the immobilized Allied Control Council 
and believed that an active council would moderate the situation in the Soviet zone by providing 
an incentive to cooperation. On the other hand, State Department officials, including George 
Kennan, saw Soviet actions in Germany as a threat. Kennan insisted that the United States faced 
two choices in Germany: unification of the country within the Soviet sphere of influence or 
division of the country to maintain American influence.
50
 Clay and other high-level military 
government officials, however, did not quietly accede to the State Department’s wishes. Instead, 
he insisted throughout 1946 and in to 1947 that an accommodation with the Soviets over 
Germany was possible. While many in Washington, especially within the Department of State, 
increasingly embraced the Cold War, military government officials in Germany refused to do so 
well in to 1947. 
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Therefore, the experiences of military government officials at the lowest levels in Bavaria 
reflected the attitudes of their superiors in the OMGUS bureaucracy. Communism was of little 
concern throughout the first two years of the occupation. American MGOs quickly recognized 
the limited influence of the KPD in conservative Bavaria. Even if Bavarian communists had 
possessed more influence, U.S. officials were either ambivalent about the KPD or even 
expressed limited admiration for the left-wing party. Additionally, MGOs focused more on the 
lingering influence of Nazism in Bavaria, particularly within the center-right political parties and 
through the existence of “Nazi methods” in political activity. Perhaps most importantly, the 
persistent food and economic crises dominated the activities of most American officials during 
the initial stages of the occupation. As described in previous chapters, MGOs used whatever, 
limited, means available to them to feed the Bavarian populace and revive economic activity. 
During a period when starvation threatened, concern about communism was relatively 
unimportant. Instead, it was the Bavarians themselves who expressed the greatest fear of 
communism, often warning of its potential influence while the Americans remained unperturbed.  
Even if MGOs had been inclined to embark on an active anti-communist campaign in 
1945, 1946, or early 1947, the inclinations of their superiors served as a check on their behavior. 
As long as Clay believed an agreement with the Soviet was possible, open anti-communism was 
not accepted within OMGUS or OMGB. At times MGOs did discriminate against members of 
the KPD, but there was no “active, consistent, or aggressive anticommunist campaign in the US 
zone during the critical opening years, from 1945 until at least early 1947.” Faced with 
immediate crises and leadership that maintained good relations with their Soviet counterpart, 





 The State Department and civilian officials in Washington moved towards the 
Cold War framework, but it remained relatively unimportant in the American zone, including 
Bavaria, during the first two years of the occupation.
52
 
1947-1949: The Remote Cold War 
 By the middle of 1947, the emerging Cold War was harder to ignore. Deteriorating 
relations with the Soviet Union and rising international tensions signaled the breakdown of the 
old wartime alliance. At the highest levels of military government this development elicited a 
rapid turn of direction. Once the loudest voice defending the relationship with the Soviets, 
General Clay became one of the most vocal cold warriors. Within OMGB, however, the 
emerging Cold War was of little concern to most MGOs. Fear of communism was most 
pronounced in cities like Munich, Nürnberg, and Regensburg, but the weakness of the KPD 
elsewhere in Bavaria limited concern about the Cold War. When the Cold War did rear its head, 
it often did so through indirect or minor channels. Rumors of imminent war almost constantly 
circulated throughout Bavaria, particularly in rural areas close to the border with the Soviet zone. 
The clash over Belin during the blockade did provide a stark example of the Cold War, but its 
impact on Bavaria was limited. The return of German prisoners of war from Soviet camps fed 
anti-communist sentiment and was interpreted by MGOs as evidence of Russian malevolence. 
Finally, the increased tensions along the borders with the Soviet zone and Czechoslovakia 
produced a series of minor border incidents, which were the most direct experience most MGOs 
had with the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Cold War remained a relatively remote development 
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for American officials at the lowest levels of military government. Focused on reconstruction 
and democratization, there was little they could do to influence the relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
 General Clay had spent much of the first two years of the occupation defending the 
American-Soviet relationship in Germany, despite increased Soviet hostility and opposition from 
civilian policymakers. The events of 1947 and 1948, however, transformed Clay and other high-
level military government officials into ardent cold warriors. For many Americans at the top of 
OMGUS, the event that precipitated the conversion to anti-communism was the Moscow 
Council of Foreign Ministers during the spring of 1947. Concerned about economic recovery in 
Western Europe above all, American policymakers, particularly those from the State 
Department, had effectively embraced the division of Germany. Marshall, Kennan, and other 
civilians believed that the economic reconstruction and integration of Western Europe, including 
western Germany, was of fundamental importance to the United States. As a result, they made 
their own position nonnegotiable and refused to consider Soviet demands, particularly for 
reparations from industrial production in the western zones. The Moscow conference ended in 
acrimony, in large part due to the hardline American negotiating stance, and State Department 
officials returned to the United States blaming the Soviets for its failure.
53
 
Clay and the Army initially pushed back against this anti-Soviet turn in American policy; 
even conservatives in OMGUS believed a deal was still possible with the Soviet Union. 
Ultimately, however, Clay acquiesced and embraced the Cold War framework, particularly after 
Secretary of State George Marshall called for economic assistance to Europe in his 
commencement address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. The failure of the Moscow CFM 
and Marshall’s address also produced more provocative Soviet behavior, which further moved 
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Clay and OMGUS towards the Cold War framework. The Cominform, organized in September 
1947, seemed to prove that the Soviets were indeed committed to the export of revolutionary 
ideology to Western Europe, including Germany. Additionally, increased suppression of the 
center-right parties within the Soviet zone, notably the Christian Democrats and the Free 
Democrats, and interference in the Berlin city government provided another example of apparent 
Soviet aggression. As the historian Carolyn Woods Eisenberg noted, “For those Americans who 
were seeking confirmation of Russian malevolence, the evidence was ample.”
54
 
Clay was, increasingly, one of those Americans. By the fall of 1947 he worried 
incessantly about the threat of Soviet propaganda throughout all western Germany, not just in the 
U.S. zone. He feared a slow American response to communist propaganda and called on 
Washington to increase the supply of newsprint to western Germany. Clay explained, 
“We…propose to attack communism and the police state before the German people…We are 
engaged in political warfare and we might as well recognize it now.”
55
 Clay feared the effects of 
Soviet propaganda to such an extent that he pleaded with Washington to take no actions that had 
the possibility of making the German populace more susceptible to communism. In May 1948, 
for example, he urged Washington to return German artwork, which was removed in the 
aftermath of the war, to Germany. According to Clay, “Any failure to return these articles 
now…would play into the hand of the Communists with their constantly reiterated propaganda 
of American exploitation.” When a group of senators proposed a delay in returning the artwork, 
Clay again stressed his fear that doing so would undermine the U.S. occupation.
56
 
Beyond concern about communist propaganda, high-level military government officials 
also perceived a Soviet threat to the American goal of economic reconstruction of both western 
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Germany and Western Europe. While many within military government had long supported 
some basic level of recovery due to their preference for practical solutions to serious issues, they 
now embraced the State Department’s call for full-fledged reconstruction. Economic recovery in 
Germany was important, many economic officials believed, because it would save western 
Germany from “chaos and communism” and because “a communistic Germany is almost certain 
to result in a communistic Europe.” Increasingly, Americans viewed relations with the Soviets in 
Germany and Europe more broadly as “a war of nerves.”
57
 The United States could not give in to 
Soviet demands, the argument went, because it would produce a new round of appeasement and 
doing so would make the reconstruction of Germany even more difficult. According to Clay, 
“subtle changes” in the Soviet attitude during April 1948 led him to conclude that war in Europe 
“may come with dramatic suddenness.”
58
 The Soviets were no longer considered a problematic 
nuisance in the administration of occupation.  Instead, communism was now perceived as one of 
the most significant threats, along with food and fuel shortages, to the zones of the western allied 
powers. 
Disagreements over currency reform provided one impetus for the new perceptions of a 
Soviet threat. By late August 1947 Clay reported the growing necessity of a new currency.  
Financial reform had become an “inescapable necessity” to avoid economic chaos in western 
Germany. “The dam may break at any time,” Clay ominously warned.
59
 Discussions of currency 
reform between the western allies and the Soviets held earlier in the year produced little 
agreement. The Americans wanted to print the new currency in Berlin, while the Soviets sought 
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to print the new marks within their own zone at Leipzig. February 1948 saw new negotiations on 
currency reform and on February 12 Clay reported that the Soviet agreed to print the new 
currency in Berlin with sixty days to work out the details. Clay, however, remained pessimistic 
and expected the negotiations to fail. Ultimately, Clay’s pessimism was proven correct when the 
negotiations broke down in the following months.
60
 As a result, the western allies moved quickly 
to introduce their own marks in the western zones. On June 18 OMGUS announced the new 
currency for western Germany. Jack Bennett, financial adviser to Clay, stretched the truth when 
he announced that the decision for a western currency was made only after quadripartite 
negotiations failed. Nevertheless, Bennett expected that “there is no reason why we should not 
see immediately a great stimulation in productive activity” throughout Germany. As many 
American occupation officials saw it, Soviet obstructionism in currency reform proved that 
communism was indeed a threat to Western Europe.
61
 
If the battle of currency reform did not convince all occupation authorities of the Soviet 
threat, then the restriction of access to and from Berlin, which began in April 1948, was the 
proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. The so-called “mini-blockade” did not limit the 
importation of foodstuffs and fuel. Instead, it primarily targeted incoming American, British, and 
French military transport, while also limiting nearly all traffic outbound from Berlin. The Soviets 
claimed the right to board US Army trains to “insure the safety of freight shipments.” Following 
orders from Washington, Clay held all U.S. trains for the time being, but he emphasized, “There 
is no middle ground which is not appeasement.”
62
 Ultimately, Clay believed that the U.S. could 
effectively supply Berlin, although it would require a “substantial increase” in air lift capacity. 
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The cost of maintaining the American presence in Berlin, however, was immense. OMGUS 
officials estimated that costs for Berlin went beyond $150 million per year, including $75 to 
$100 million for food and $33 million each for coal and other commodities.
63
 Nevertheless, Clay 
argued, the United States could not abandon western Berlin. “If we mean that we are to hold 
Europe against communism, we must not budge,” he explained. “We can take humiliation and 
pressure short of war…without losing face.”
64
  
When the Soviets shut off access to the entire city, Clay pushed Washington to take a 
hardline against the Russians. He pushed for an expanded airlift into the city, which gained quick 
support among civilian policymakers. More aggressively, he called for armed convoys to 
challenge the blockade on the ground, a proposal which even the most ardent cold warriors in 
Washington were loath to accept.
65
 Perhaps most significantly, OMGUS also increased its 
support for the Parliamentary Council drafting a constitution for a West German government in 
Bonn by smoothing over the differences between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, while also keeping 
anxious European governments (especially the French) at bay.
66
 High-level military government 
officials, in addition, believed “the most vital force in western Germany” – the leadership of 
West Berlin – could strengthen “the wobbly Bonn experiment.” As Eisenberg observed, “Thus to 
U.S. Military Government, the division of Berlin had become nearly as attractive as the division 
of Germany itself. And as they were making no concessions to avoid the latter, they were 
becoming increasingly firm about the former.”
67
 Berlin, in the eyes of Clay and other American 
officials, had become a symbol of American intent throughout Europe and abandoning the city 
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would severely damage U.S. credibility. The hard progress made by military government could 
not be abandoned in the face of the perceived Soviet threat.
68
 
Throughout the final two years of the military occupation, high-level officials within the 
military government bureaucracy, particularly General Clay, embraced the Cold War. Their 
vision of cooperation with the Soviet Union gone, reports from Germany now warned of 
numerous Russian misdeeds in Germany. Suppression of center-right political parties, 
interference in the Berlin city government, opposition to the Western-style currency reform, and 
the blockade of Berlin all served as evidence of Soviet aggression and malevolence. If the United 
States truly sought economic reconstruction, these events convinced Clay and his colleagues of 
the need for a divided Germany. Once the most ardent defender of allied cooperation and a 
united Germany, Clay now emerged as “the most zealous Cold Warrior of all.”
69
 
Despite the overwhelming priority of the emerging Cold War for high-level military 
government officials, the West-East conflict was relatively remote for most MGOs in Bavaria. 
The KPD remained a minor party in the conservative Land, with little strength in rural regions. 
As a result, the spread of communism was only an issue in urban centers like Munich, Nürnberg, 
and Regensburg. Even then, the KPD possessed little noteworthy influence in Bavarian politics 
or society. Nevertheless, tensions with Bavarian communists did increase throughout the last two 
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years of the occupation as Americans, non-communist Germans, and communists developed 
increasingly antagonistic relations. 
The KPD, in particular, ramped up its attacks on the United States and its defense of the 
Soviet Union as Cold War tensions mounted. Bavarian communists attacked American policy in 
Bavaria, including denazification, and the nagging food crisis that plagued the western zones. 
The Nürnberg KPD was particularly active. For example, the city party ordered all party 
members to resign their posts on the city’s denazification tribunals, the Spruchkammern, to 
protest “an unjust implementation of the Denazification Law.”
70
 In a similar vein, the city’s 
communists insisted that fascism was on the rise due to American actions. Ignoring long-
standing U.S. policy, the KPD argued that youth groups in the U.S. Zone supposedly wore 
uniforms and carried rifles as an “industrial police.”
71
 Yet much of their effort was devoted 
towards defending Russian practices in eastern Germany. On November 6, 1947, Otto Buchwitz, 
a member of the SED and president of Saxony’s Landtag, answered questions from party 
loyalists in Nürnberg. Addressing the issue of forced labor at the uranium mines in Saxony, 
Buchwitz insisted that conditions had improved and that food rations were so high for the miners 
that they had to turn away volunteers. He also attacked Germans fleeing to the western zones as 
“former SS guards” and people who “do not want to work.” Buchwitz then concluded his time in 
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Nürnberg by insisting that food rations “are still better with us than they are here” and that 
“every factory which was dismantled is again on the way to its reconstruction.”
72
 
As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union mounted, the KPD seemed 
more active and the attacks of Bavarian communists grew more strident. There were, for 
example, renewed calls for the merger of the KPD and SPD in the American zone. On March 14, 
1948, a KPD-dominated conference met in Nürnberg to call for “socialist unity.” For Lieutenant 
Colonel James Barnett, the conference was clearly “a new attempt to create some sort of unity 
party” after the prohibition of the SED.
73
 Beyond the particularly active Nürnberg KPD, other 
local parties followed a similar path. In the rural town of Mallersdorf, for example, the local 
chairman attacked the influence of capitalist “money-sacks” in the bizonal administration and 
argued that stories of Soviet aggression and the threat of war were an invention of anti-USSR 
propaganda.
74
 According to the Mallersdorf office, the local KPD exploited the “strained 
political and economical conditions” in an attempt to discredit the Western powers. In addition, 
the Burglengenfeld party criticized Ludwig Erhard, the minister of economics for the bizone as 
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American military government officials responded to the increased hostility of Bavarian 
communists with a campaign of anti-communism. As previous scholars have noted, military 
government increasingly used its power to favor the mainstream democratic parties throughout 
Germany, including in Bavaria. In addition, the military government bureaucracy attacked 
anything that smacked of communism, whether big or small. On January 23, 1948, for example, 
OMGB forwarded a message from OMGUS to its subsidiary offices that forbid the authorization 
of any political activities by the Volkskongress, a political movement that originated in the Soviet 
Zone. According to OMGUS, the Volkskongress represented “a deliberate attempt to the 
organizers to circumvent the policies of Military Government to ensure that political activities 
are conducted honestly and openly.” It was also “the same kind of deception” that had been tried 
in the attempts to form the SED in the American zone.
76
 A strike staged by the Bavarian Trade 
Unions on the same day in the Landkreis of Lohr worried military government officials, who 
thought the strike “was mainly propagated by communists.”
77
 In a climate of rising tensions, any 
communist activity could look malevolent to the Americans in Bavaria, whether it as a 
movement originating in the Soviet zone or a more mundane strike. 
American MGOs also warned of both overt and subversive political activity by 
communists throughout Bavaria. Increased communist activity often brought dire warnings from 
military government officials, especially from communities where political apathy reigned 
supreme. In Landkreis Wolfstein, Captain Robert MacWhorter reported that the KPD had gained 
the most influence among all political parties due to the “apathy and self-confidence” of the CSU 
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 MGOs worried that the apathy of many Bavarians would enable the more committed 
communists to gain considerable influence in Germany. Additionally, military government 
reports throughout 1948 and 1949 increasingly referenced “subversive political activities.” For 
example, in Mallersdorf the KPD employed “all kinds of secret propaganda and agitation” such 
as spreading rumors, threatening employers who may dismiss communists, and blaming the 
Western Allies for the current conditions in Germany.
79
 In Sulzbach, meanwhile, the MGO 
warned of a possible KPD spy at the local Reading Room. One Josef Wimmer, MGO Sherwyn 
Ehrlich reported, had visited the Reading Room, which was in the same building as the military 
government offices, “virtually every day” for two months. Wimmer was a member of the local 
KPD, supposedly a close friend to party chairman, and was a refugee from the Russian zone. For 
those reasons, Ehrlich warned that “it is at least possible” that Wimmer “has been coming to the 
American Reading Room for the specific purpose of spying on Military Government.” In 
response, the Americans rearranged the Reading Room to guard against the possibility that 
Wimmer had been spying.
80
 Even when no “subversive activity” existed to report, MGOs still 
noted so in their reports, demonstrating that it was a growing concern for military government 
officers. 
For American officials, then, Bavarian communists seemed a significant threat to the 
occupation. The increasingly strident criticisms of American actions in Germany and the 
perceived threat of communist subversion led to suspicious attitudes towards anything 
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communist or Soviet-leaning. At the headquarters of the Munich Military Post, Army officers 
identified five major security threats, four of which were related to the Soviet Union or 
communism. The most significant threat were KPD groups, especially if they penetrated other 
organizations, such as labor unions, and fomented strikes or demonstrations. Displaced persons 
were also a potential threat since they could be scattered with “foreign agents.” Similarly, 
refugees at nearby Dachau might undermine the occupation, since many originated from the 
Soviet Zone and the satellite states of Eastern Europe. Finally, returning POWs constituted 
another potential security concern as they may “have been thoroughly [indoctrinated] with the 
Communist ideology.” The only potential threat that was not at least tangentially related to 
communism were former Nazis.
81
 
Despite this vocal concern, MGOs also recognized the limited influence of communism 
in postwar Bavaria. While warning about communist subversion, American officials 
simultaneously highlighted the weakening position of the KPD even as the Cold War escalated. 
In particular, military government officers throughout the Land noted the stagnating and often 
declining membership of local communist parties. By late 1947 and early 1948 MGOs 
recognized the languishing membership numbers of the local KPD. Even in Nürnberg, with its 
active party, membership peaked at approximately 5,000 in August 1947 and then slowly started 
to decline. Communist propaganda efforts, Lieutenant Colonel Barnett observed, no longer got 
much of a response from the populace.
82
 Similar patterns emerged throughout Bavaria. During 
the last three months of 1947 KPD membership declined from 173 to 167 in Dachau and from 
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643 to 626 in Regensburg.
83
 By early to mid-summer 1948, local parties showed no signs of 
stopping, let alone reversing, the decline in membership figures. The Regensburg party saw its 
membership decline by nearly ten percent from July 1947 through June 1948. The KPD in 
Landkreis Wolfstein suffered even more severe drops. It lost forty-seven members in the past 
twelve months, roughly twenty-two percent of its membership.
84
 Then in early 1949 the KPD of 
Landkreis Miesbach lost nearly six percent of its members, including a communist Kreistag 
member, in just one month from January 27 to February 27.
85
 The hemorrhaging of members 
continued throughout the rest of the occupation. As the Cold War developed and anti-communist 
sentiment emerged, the Bavarian KPD struggled to retain existing members, let along attract new 
ones. 
 One significant reason for the KPD’s exacerbated struggles in Bavaria after 1947 was the 
attitude of large segments of the Bavarian population. As discussed earlier, the Land was already 
conservative and not inclined to accept communism. The rise of the Cold War simply 
exacerbated this tendency. Even German newspapers, which had previously been a bastion of the 
more liberal aspects of Bavarian society, expressed significant anti-communist sentiment. 
Writing in the Süddeutsche Zeitung in late November 1947, Werner Friedmann attacked Soviet 
propaganda while also trying to find a third way for Germany. The Soviets, Friedmann argued, 
started a propaganda war to which the Americans were forced to respond, enlisted newspapers in 
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their own zone in the struggle, and interfered with the free distribution of Western newspapers in 
the East. Nevertheless, Friedmann sought a third way for a united Germany. Recognizing that 
“the front-lines of both propaganda drives run straight through the heart of our country,” he 
called on West German newspapers to maintain German unity and promote a way out of the 
emerging ideological struggle.
86
 For Werner, then, Soviet aggression represented a significant 
challenge, but he remained committed to the unification of Germany. 
Other Bavarians, however, possessed less nuanced views about communism. Instead, 
many took increasingly strident anti-communist positions, including left-wing social democrats. 
After a KPD meeting in Nürnberg on March 5, 1948, for example, SPD members in attendance 
accused the communist speak of lying about conditions in the Russian zone of occupation, 
pointing to documented stories about mistreatment of workers, poor economic conditions, and 
discrimination against non-communist parties.
87
 Stories about the “numerous crimes committed 
by Russian soldiers” including “tales of rape and robbery and even murder” fed significant anti-
communist sentiment in Bavaria.
88
 In particular, rural communities grew increasingly 
antagonistic towards the KPD. The military government office in Mallersdorf reported that most 
Germans “were sufficiently enlightened” about Bolshevism by reports of Russian conduct and 
therefore resisted communist propaganda.
89
 Similarly, young anti-communists in Riedenburg 
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attended a KPD meeting at the end of July 1948 for the sole purpose “to contradict everything 
the KPD speaker would say.”
90
 Unemployed Bavarians and a handful of refugees sometime 
expressed sympathy with communist ideas, but a significant majority of the population remained 
suspicious, if not outright hostile, to the machinations of the Bavarian communists. 
With Bavarians rejecting the KPD by themselves, MGOs continued to fret the return of 
former Nazis and far-right politics. At this point in the occupation, however, concern about the 
right-wing Bayernpartei replaced the fear of potential Nazi influence on the Christian Social 
Union. The party held its first Land-wide convention in Passau on June 19, 1948, where it 
elected Josef Baumgartner, the former antagonistic Minister of Agriculture, as president. A series 
of speeches by prominent leaders repeated the same attacks: “centralism” was dangerous to 
Europe, the CSU was not protecting Bavarian interests, Bavaria should have more independence, 
and non-Bavarians should be removed from Bavaria.
91
 Military government observers warned 
that the Bayernpartei represented a continuation of far-right politics and made not-so-subtle 
comparisons to the Nazi Party. According to one report, the party would attract “those radical 
elements who are busy nursing revenge and power feelings.” The conference also revived “the 
hatreds and prejudices” of the Nazis: “One gullible delegate who [dared] to use ‘Bavarian and 
German’ in one breath was almost kicked out. ‘German’ here had the same effect on a group of 
organized beings as ‘Jew” on the hatred-laden masses listening to [Julius] Streicher. There was 
very little difference.”
92
 The persistence of far-right politics, even as Cold War tensions 
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increased, worried American MGOs. The existence of “Nazi methods” and rampant nationalism 
represented a significant concern. However, the American-Soviet rivalry subsumed this concern 
under the more pressing needs of anti-communism; it remained, but was less important than the 
new Cold War struggle. 
The early years of the Cold War, then, saw a rise in anti-communist sentiment among 
American MGOs. An increasingly antagonistic Bavarian KPD played a significant role, as the 
party stridently attacked many facets of the U.S. occupation. As a result, military government 
officials adopted an open policy of anti-communism and worked against the activities of the 
KPD. Nevertheless, fear of communism operated within a specific context. The Bavarian 
communist party had never possessed significant strength in the rural, conservative Land, a 
reality that MGOs had noted since the beginning of the occupation. The apparent communist 
threat, therefore, remained limited. Some Bavarians expressed a general fear of the KPD, but 
most rejected communist propaganda and developed an antagonistic relationship towards the 
party. Additionally, the local parties experienced significant drops in membership as the conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union heated up. For American officials at the lowest 
levels of military government in Bavaria, the threat of communism was not as pronounced as it 
was for those at the top of the hierarchy like General Clay. This is not to say that MGOs ignored 
the KPD or did not embark on a campaign of anti-communism. On the contrary, they warned 
about communist influence and took actions to stymie the Bavarian party. Yet they also 
recognized the limited influence of the KPD and its minimal impact in Bavaria. 
In a similar vein, as tensions between the United States and the Soviet mounted, the 
emerging Cold War remained remote for most American officials in Bavaria. Ensconced in small 
communities in southern Germany, there was little direct connection to the major international 
324 
 
events that characterized the early Cold War, apart from the Berlin Blockade. Instead, the Cold 
War initially manifested itself through the spread of rumors among the Bavarian populace, 
particularly the persistent rumor that war between the former allies would break out at any 
moment. War rumors existed at times in the first years of the occupation, but as relations 
between the former allies deteriorated rumors of imminent conflict grew more prevalent. In 
Landkreis Mallersdorf, for example, the military government office reported widespread war 
rumors throughout late spring and early summer 1948. The local population exchanged stories 
that Soviet divisions mobilized along the Czechoslovakia border and would invade within four 
weeks or that the Russians produced new rockets that would destroy London and New York in a 
matter of days. Overall, the population was “very much afraid of a Russian invasion.”
93
 The 
German clerk for the Mallersdorf Office, E. Hans Krista, was not sure who to blame for the 
spread of war rumors. On the one hand, he blamed the communists for spreading the rumors. At 
the same time, however, he criticized the press for “greatly contributing” to the “war-psychosis” 
of the population. “Even minor events or differences among the Allied,” Krista explained, “are 
being inflated by the press so that they appear as being at least a new cause for war.”
94
 
Rumors of imminent war persisted throughout 1948 and into 1949. In late October 1948 
Mallersdorf was again gripped by the rumor that Russian units massed along the Czechoslovakia 
border and would invade within four weeks.
95
 Then in early February 1949 the military 
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government office in Landkreis Eschenbach reported rumors that Bavaria was to be surrendered 
to the Soviets in the event of war. Instead of defending the Land, the Western Allies would 
establish their defensive line behind the Rhine River. Bavaria, in that case, would become 
“General Clay’s nobody land.”
96
 This fear of abandonment in the event of war manifested 
throughout Bavaria. Some wealthy citizens in Mallersdorf, for example, tried to win over the 
sympathy of the local KPD by donating to the party. According to their rationale, they wanted 
“to be secured when the Bolsheviks…come.”
97
 In other communities, dark humor expressed the 
expectation of abandonment. The MGOs of Kelheim and Neunburg vorm Wald both reported the 
circulation of a joke about a teach asking her students what foreign language they wanted to 
learn. The first student wants to learn English to visit an aunt who lives in England (or America). 
The second says they want to learn French because an uncle (or a father) works in France and 
wants to visit. The final student replies, “Russian, because I want to remain in Germany.”
98
 
American military exercises seemingly reinforced this concern. Maneuvers by the First Infantry 
Division at Grafenwöhr in September 1948 to see if one division could resist an attacking army 
while retreating to the Rhine frightened the populace. Local residents interpreted the exercises as 
evidence that the United States would surrender Bavaria in the event of war.
99
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In addition to the spread of war rumors, military government officials also worried about 
German attitudes towards the declining relationship between the occupying powers. The crisis 
over Berlin represented a particular point of concern for MGOs. Warnings from German 
officials, such as the Landrat of Freising, made it clear that events in Berlin caused “uneasiness 
among the people” who thought that “another war would be the worst disaster.”
100
 In Munich the 
city police described significant pro-Western sentiment among the population. The population 
followed events in Berlin with “very great interest” and hoped that “the political and economic 
strength of the US will enable the Western Powers to stop the powerful Russian drive for 
expansion.”
101
 Negotiations with the Soviets were “generally appreciated” but Munich residents, 
according to the police, also worried that any concessions to the Russians would come “at the 
cost of the German people.”
102
 As with the spread of war rumors, fear of abandonment by the 
Western Allies, at least as interpreted by the Americans, comprised a key aspect of the Bavarian 
attitude towards the Cold War.  
American officials also worried that this fear of abandonment would benefit communists 
in Bavaria, especially among those segments of the population still suffering from postwar 
conditions. William Corbett warned that a “great deal” of unrest existed among refugees and 
expellees in Miesbach due to poor living conditions and a lack of work. As a result, the local 
KPD had succeeded in fomenting “dissatisfaction” with the Bavarian government and the actions 
of the Western Allies. Refugees supposedly welcomed a Russian invasion and claimed that the 
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Bürgermeister would “be the first to hang.”
103
 Similarly, the sudden proliferation of pamphlets 
by the so-called Society for Prevention of World War III in late 1948 and early 1949 worried 
military government officials. Donald Shea, the director of OMGB’s Intelligence Division, 
requested that MGOs offer their thoughts on the pamphlets, including if they consider the 
literature “communistic” or “detrimental to the Occupation.” From Miesbach MGO Corbett 
reported that the pamphlets “indirectly…lean to Communism” and “undermine confidence in the 
present leadership.” As a result, it would be dangerous if the pamphlets got into Bavarian 
hands.
104
 The MGO in Wolfstein, First Lieutenant Robert Rivet, agreed with Corbett. The 




Therefore, one of the most pressing concerns about the early Cold War for American 
officials at the local level in Bavaria was the impact that it would have on the local populace. 
Fear of renewed war and the prospect of increased communist influence seethed through the 
Bavarian society. MGOs tried to counteract such anxiety by demonstrating US commitment to 
the reconstruction and democratization of Germany, particularly by touting the Marshall Plan. 
However, it was not until the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that Bavarian 
public opinion calmed down. According to many MGOs the Atlantic Pact represented, in the 
eyes of many Germans, a clear commitment to defend Europe and was therefore met with “great 
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relief” by the population.
106
 Similarly, Riley Gilley, the MGO for Landkreis Cham, reported that 
the local populace viewed the pact as “the most formidable block to avert war.”
107
 In Kötzting 
locals, according to MGO Charles Pearce, believed that the pact had neutralized the Soviet threat 
to Western Europe and that they had no reason to fear a “reign of terror” in Bavaria.
108
 
American MGOs, then, had to face an increasingly fearful Bavarian populace as tensions 
escalated between the United States and the Soviet Union. After six years of war, the experience 
of aerial bombardment, and living amidst the reality of total defeat, Germans were 
understandably wary of a new conflict. In addition, many quickly understood that they would 
have the most to lose in the event of war, as fighting armies would once again ravage Bavaria. 
Military government officials noted the rising unease of the local populace, but there was little 
they could do about it. Far from the halls of power, they observed the early Cold War from the 
cities and rural communities of Bavaria and continued their efforts at the reconstruction and 
democratization of postwar Germany. 
Beyond the prevalence of war rumors and concern about the views of the German public, 
the emerging Cold War remained relatively remote for most American officials in Bavaria. With 
a few exceptions, however, these MGOs did experience elements of the American-Soviet rivalry. 
For example, OMGUS tasked military government officers with overseeing the implementation 
of periodic bans on the sale and distribution of Soviet-authorized publications in the American 
zone. On May 20, 1948, OMGUS temporarily shut off the flow of newspapers, books, magazine, 
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pamphlets, and other literature produced in the Soviet zone of occupation. The move was a 
response to Soviet discrimination against Western publications. Enforcement lay with German 
officials, but MGOs would observe the process and report any violations to higher 
headquarters.
109
 This initial ban was short-lived. On June 4 OMGUS revoked the prohibition 
after Soviet authorities gave “assurances” that they would ensure the “free exchange of 
publications” between the zones.
110
 However, the ban was reinstated at the end of September as 
the crisis over Berlin dragged into its fourth month.
111
 
American officials also experienced the Cold War through local efforts to assist the 
residents of West Berlin during the Berlin Blockade. By late July 1948, MGOs in the Augsburg 
area had made several requests about how to send food to Berlin at the request of the local 
populace. Donald Root, the area commander, expressed his satisfaction at “the interest shown by 
the people” of the nearby communities and encouraged the donation of rational coupons and 
money to assist the beleaguered Berliners.
112
 In Landkreis Kempten the local MGO, Joseph 
Montgomery, assisted local Germans and Air Force officers in the organization of a “Help 
Berlin” week from November 8 through 14 to provide aid to Berlin children. During the week, 
all deer killed in the community were turned over the German Youth Activities for shipment to 
Berlin. Additionally, a benefit dance raised DM 2,130 for relief, while nearby Kaufbeuren Air 
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Base donated another DM 2,300. Approximately 900 pounds of food and clothing was collected 
from the local populace and ten tons of potatoes purchased for shipment to the city.
113
 
The two most significant ways in which American officials in Bavaria interacted with the 
Cold War, however, were the return of German prisoners of war from the USSR and escalating 
border incidents along the boundary with both the Soviet Zone and Czechoslovakia. German 
POWs had slowly returned over the first two years of the occupation, often bearing horrific 
stories of their treatment at the hands of their Soviet captors. Such stories played a key role in 
fomenting early anti-communism amongst the Bavarian populace. As tensions between the 
former allies escalated, however, military government interest in their stories spiked. Returning 
prisoners often reported to the local military government office to acquire the papers (ration 
cards, residence permits, etc.) necessary to live in postwar Bavaria. At these meetings MGOs and 
their German assistants sometimes interviewed the POWs on their experiences in the Soviet 
Union. During the summer of 1948 reports of these interviews suddenly took up significant 
space in the weekly reporting of several local offices. These reports emphasized the horrific 
treatment of German POWs in Soviet camps, highlighting terrible living conditions, wretched 
food, and hard labor. In the context of the early Cold War, here were supposedly concrete 
examples of Soviet malevolence that could be used to rally opposition to communism in postwar 
Germany.  
Military government offices throughout Bavaria made these reports, but two of the most 
committed offices were Riedenburg and Kelheim, both located near Regensburg. Beginning in 
early July both offices spent weeks forwarding the experiences of numerous German prisoners as 
they arrived at their homes. One POW returning to Riedenburg, for example, was captured in 
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1944 and confined near the Ural Mountains with some 15,000 to 17,000 other prisoners. Within 
the first six months, thousands had succumbed to malnutrition, illness, and the cold, yet the 
Soviets still forced the prisoners to work at blast furnaces around the clock.
114
 In Kelheim 
returning German soldier Johann Meier, captured in 1943 near Kiev, reported that he had worked 
for years in a factory producing cement. The German prisoners had to sleep on boards, were 
given just one blanket for three men, and were infested with lice. Meier himself lost thirty-five 
pounds due to malnutrition over the course of his imprisonment.
115
 Martin Kohlmann returned to 
Kelheim on August 7 and described his time in two separate Soviet camps. The first camp, 
located near Riga, held 12,000 prisoners even though the normal capacity was just 4,000. In 
1946 Kohlmann was transferred to a second camp near Katiewka to work in a coal mine. The 
camp held 1,500 Germans when he arrived but approximately 1,100 had died since then. 
According to Kohlmann, most died due to malnutrition; however, the camp commandant also 
ordered POWs beaten to death when they collapsed. Similarly, Albert Hoffmann claimed that at 
the coal mine he was sent to each prisoner had to dig six tons of coal per day and that Russian 
guards beat any prisoner that did not accomplish their daily quota. As a result, up to one hundred 
POWs died per day at the worst part of his imprisonment.
116
  
The experiences of these former prisoners were not unique in the reports of military 
government offices. Reports throughout Bavaria emphasized the horrific treatment of German 
POWs at the hands of the Soviets, whether it was horrific living conditions, the proliferation of 
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disease, malnutrition, or abuse by Soviet soldiers. These stories all carried a common theme: the 
malevolence of the Soviet Union. The proliferation of these reports during the summer of 1948 
offers a few insights into how the early Cold War operated in postwar Bavaria. First, it shows 
that the Americans in military government possessed interest in the experiences of POWs, most 
likely as evidence of Soviet misdeeds and to use as part of the American anti-communist 
campaign. Second, it also demonstrates how Bavarians still shaped American attitudes about the 
USSR. During the first two years of the occupation, the German populace and government 
officials embraced a more ardent anti-communist line than the United States. Even now, as 
Americans and military government embraced the Cold War, some German employees of 
military government used the experiences of former prisoners to push a narrative of suspicion 
towards the Soviet Union. German employees conducted many of the interviews and composed 
many of the reports that emphasized Russian malevolence. By choosing to emphasize the horrific 
experiences of German POWs, these employees were continuing the pattern set during the first 
two years of the occupation: Bavarians pushing their Americans overseers to take a harder line 
against communism. 
Beyond looking for examples of Russian malevolence, the return of POWs also touched 
the Cold War in another way, namely concern that returning prisoners were indoctrinated with 
communist ideology. This fear emerged from reports that the Soviet authorities forced German 
POWs to attend political courses during their imprisonment. Often the classes were taught by 
German collaborators, such commanding officers, or members of Russian intelligence. The 
courses talked “disdainfully” about Americans and emphasized the success of Soviet 
communism.
117
 In Munich it “[could not] be denied” that many returning POWs made pro-Soviet 
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comments due to their “corresponding training.” There was some concern that such comments 
would undermine the American occupation or popular support for the Bavarian government. Yet 
it was largely accepted that the prisoners returning to Munich “only plead for the communist idea 
because they fear the power of Russia.”
118
 Military government offices in other regions of 
Bavaria also reported reluctance from former prisoners to spread the Soviet line. Most had 
shown little “Communist minded attitude” and believed that any German with communist 
sympathies would be disabused of those ideas if they worked in the Soviet Union for a month.
119
 
As a result, concern about the impact of communist-trained POWs remained minimal. The return 
of German prisoners, then, was one way in which the early Cold War did reach American 
military government officials, even though its impact was limited. 
Heightened tensions along the borders with both the Soviet zone and Czechoslovakia 
represented the final way in which MGOs experienced the Cold War. Border tensions had 
existed since the beginning of the occupation; American officials within OMGUS, for example, 
often complained that Soviet authorities did little to stem the flow of refugees and expellees 
arriving in the U.S. zone of occupation. However, as Cold War tensions escalated between the 
former allies, clashes at the border became more common. For military government officials in 
border Landkreise these incidents, as well as dealing with civilians illegally crossing the border 
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to flee the Soviets, were the most concrete way American officials at the local level interacted 
with the Cold War. 
Border tensions increased noticeably during late 1947 and early 1948, even before the 
Berlin Blockade solidified the split between the United States and the Soviet Union. On 
December 5, 1947, First Lieutenant Paul Wakeman, the Public Safety Office in Landkreis 
Wolfstein, reported that a new Russian garrison at Schwarzenberg, Austria, had essentially 
closed the border. The lone Soviet officer ordered that only passes bearing Soviet approval be 
accepted at the border checkpoint.
120
 Similar complaints emerged in July 1948 during the early 
weeks of the Berlin crisis. After the start of the blockade Soviet authorities would not recognize 
round trip interzonal passes issued in the American, British, or French zones for travel to West 
Berlin. Instead, Russian officials insisted that all individuals traveling through the Soviet zone 
possess a travel pass approved by Soviet military government. OMGB, however, ordered its 
officials not to comply with Soviet demands, citing quadripartite agreements. Instead, they were 




The Cold War at the border, however, was not limited to administrative disputes between 
American and Soviet authorities. A series of escalating clashes at the border between American, 
German, and Soviet forces provided concrete evidence of the deteriorating relationship between 
the former allies. On August 5, 1948, for example, Russian soldiers temporarily detained two 
military government officials for briefly crossing into the Soviet zone of occupation. On the day 
in question First Lieutenant Sherman Turner, MGO of Bad Kissingen, and Rowland Myers of the 
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Nürnberg office approached the border crossing near the town of Euẞenhausen in Landkreis 
Mellrichstadt during a routine inspection. Turner and Myers exited their car inside the U.S. zone 
and walked roughly twenty-five meters into the Russian zone. At that point, the two Russian 
soldiers surprised the American officials, searched them for weapons, and led them to the town 
of Meiningen.
122
 The incident bothered American officials, but there was little they could do 
about it, especially since Turner and Myers had passed two clear signs that marked the border. 
Other incidents drew more concern, particularly when it was Czechs, Germans, or Soviets 
violating the border of the American zone. On October 20, 1949, two Czech policemen illegally 
crossed in to Landkreis Wolfstein and were spotted approximately two and a half kilometers 
inside Bavaria. Two German policemen approached the Czechs and ordered them to surrender. 
One complied and was jailed in the town of Freyung. The other Czech, however, fled towards 




As the Berlin crisis dragged on into 1949 and the Western zones moved towards the 
creation of the Federal Republic, reports of Soviet activity along the borders grew more 
antagonistic. On February 17, 1949, a railroad engine guarded by two Russians and six East 
German border policemen entered Bavaria and stole thirty-one damaged freight cars near the 
town of Burggrub in Landkreis Kronach. According to MGO Lynn Keck, the freight cars were 
located approximately 150 meters inside the U.S. zone when stolen by the Russians. 
Additionally, the Soviets then ordered the removal of 120 meters of track inside their zone, 
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thereby severing that railroad link between the two zones of occupation.
124
 Around the same time 
Edward Garrison, the MGO of Regensburg, was threatened by Soviet soldiers during a visit to 
the border crossing at Kappel. Accusing Garrison of taking pictures of them, four Russians 
crossed into the U.S. zone, threatened the American official with loaded pistols, and ordered him 
to accompany them across the border. The whole incident lasted for approximately thirty minutes 
before the Soviets backed down and Garrison resumed his journey.
125
 For American officials far 
away from the major center of power, such increased antagonism along the border represented 
one of the few ways in which they interacted directly with the emerging Cold War. 
Additionally, military government reports from throughout Bavaria warned of an 
increasingly militarized border. Russians and Czechs, according to MGOs, were fortifying the 
border with machine guns, mines, and road blocks. In late March 1949, for example, Riley Gilley 
reported from Landkreis Cham that Czech soldiers were closing border crossing points and 
laying mines along the border. A few weeks later Gilley again warned that Czech soldiers cut 
down trees and erected a barricade at a border crossing near the Bavarian town of Furth im Wald. 
The testimony of a fleeing refugee seemingly confirmed reports that the Czechs and Soviets 
blocked all paths leading into Bavaria with felled trees and barbed wire.
126
 Then in late April 
Bavarian border police reported a new camouflaged machine gun nest near the Hof border 
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crossing, which brought the total up to eight nests.
127
 American officials did not express any 
significant alarm at the increased militarization of the border. Instead, such reports largely served 
as a concrete reminder of the rapidly deteriorating relations between the former wartime allies. 
Minefields, barricades, and machine gun nests made it clear that the Cold War was in full swing, 
at least along the borders of Bavaria. 
The border provided another way for American military government officials to interact 
with the Cold War: through so-called “illegal border crossers” fleeing the Soviet zone of 
Germany or other countries in Eastern Europe. These border crossers and refugees fulfilled much 
the same purpose as returning German prisoners of war, namely by providing evidence of Soviet 
malevolence in the regions under the control of the Red Army. Usually MGOs reported such 
border crossers in general terms. First Lieutenant Rivet, for example, explained why twelve 
Czechs and twenty-four Germans illegally crossed the Bavarian border in October 1948. 
According to the Czechs, “The pressure from the Communist party became too strong. All 
persons refusing to join the Communist party are apt to [lose] their job or even their liberty.” 
Meanwhile, the Germans fleeing the Soviet zone of occupation did so to avoid deportation to the 
uranium mines in Saxony.
128
 Such explanations for crossing the Bavarian border became so 
commonplace that they were soon called the “typical reasons.”
129
 
Other times, however, military government officials highlighted the experiences of 
individual refugees, as when Captain George Jacobson of Dachau reported the experience of one 
Siegried Sobieski, who was found passed out on the streets of Dachau in late March 1948. Frau 
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Sobieski’s husband, Thaddeus Sobieski, had worked as an interpreter for Russian military 
government in Silesia for several years after the war. Both husband and wife were arrested in 
November 1947 for allegedly providing information to Western intelligence agencies. Her 
husband was executed in the following February as Soviet soldiers forced Frau Sobieski to 
watch. In her interview with American military government Sobieski recounted numerous 
horrors visited upon her during her imprisonment, which Captain Jacobson reported in detail to 
OMGB. According to Sobieski five to six Soviet soldiers raped her nearly every day of her 
imprisonment. They also allegedly killed her seven-year-old niece in front of her before she 
finally escaped. Captain Jacobson whole heartedly believed Sobieski. Writing to OMGB he 
explained, “The undersigned frankly believes that if there is no truth to these statement then Frau 
SOBIESKI is the greatest actress the world has ever seen.”
130
 
Whether the experiences of Frau Sobieski and other border crossers were true was almost 
beside the point. Their stories of communist mistreatment and malevolence provided evidence to 
counter the KPD message that conditions in the Soviet zone were superior to those in Bavaria. 
Stories of mistreatment at the hands of Russian soldiers, of forced labor, or of political 
discrimination helped local MGOs counter communist propaganda. Additionally, dealing with 
border crossers and others fleeing Eastern Europe represented one of the few direct interactions 
most military government officials had with the emerging Cold War. While much of the Cold 
War occurred at the highest levels of policy, collecting and reporting the experiences of these 
refugees, along with addressing growing border tensions and the return of German POWs, 
allowed some MGOs to more actively participate in the new conflict between the Western Allies 
and the Soviet Union. 
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Even then the Cold War remained remote for most military government officials in 
Bavaria. The deliberations at Bonn for the creation of a West German government, for example, 
were of little concern to local MGOs. One of the most momentous events of the Cold War was 
largely absent for the reports of military government detachments until the spring of 1949. 
Beginning in April 1949, however, officials within OMGB significantly expanded their reporting 
on the activities in Bonn. According to Donald Shea, the director of OMGB’s Intelligence 
Division, most the Bavarian press appeared “to favor a federal West German republic.” In 
addition, military government officials tracked growing Bavarian frustration with the social 
democrats over their resistance to a weak federal government and limits to “popular 
sovereignty.” There was some concern that the SPD could torpedo the Bonn negotiations and 
that their failure “would be considered a victory of Moscow.”
131
 Such reports, however, were the 
limit of American interaction with the work of the parliamentary council in Bavaria. This is not 
to say that MGOs were unaware of the constituent assembly at Bonn; far from it. Yet the 
negotiations for a West German constitution remained a remote event for most military 
government officials in OMGB. At the lowest levels of military government, far from the 
policymakers of Berlin, Washington, or London, these Americans had little reason to interact 
with this major event of the early Cold War. 
Over the last two years of the occupation, then, rising tensions between the former allies 
took a more prominent place in the responsibilities of American MGOs in Bavaria. Mirroring the 
transformation that took place among OMGUS elites like General Clay, military government 
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officials in OMGB adopted a harsher line towards Bavarian communists. Supported by the 
German officials and the populace, an overt campaign of anti-communism took place in the US-
occupied Land. Even then, however, the early Cold War remained a remote phenomenon for 
many American officials. The Bavarian KPD, despite warnings to the contrary, was a weak 
political party and MGOs recognized this reality even as they embarked on an anti-communist 
campaign. Additionally, the major events of the Cold War, such as the Berlin Blockade, had little 
direct impact on American officials in Bavaria. Instead, the Cold War manifested through a 
variety of minor events. Persistent rumors of war among the Bavarian population, for example, 
highlighted the rising tensions between East and West. The return of German POWs from Soviet 
camps and the experiences of refugees escaping communist rule in Eastern Europe represented 
another avenue by which MGOs interacted with the early Cold War. Stories of Soviet depravity 
and mistreatment circulated in reports from military government detachments, cited as evidence 
of Russian malevolence and aggression. Finally, incidents along the borders with the Soviet zone 
and Czechoslovakia offered another opportunity for some MGOs to participate in the rising 
tensions between the former allies. Nevertheless, the Cold War was a remote phenomenon for 
most American officials in OMGB. Located in small local offices, they possessed few, if any, 
opportunities to interact with the larger framework of the emerging Cold War. 
Conclusion 
 For the many American military government officials in Bavaria the early Cold War was 
a remote development, one that was acted out in the halls of power in Moscow, Washington, 
London, and Berlin, but not in the small offices of military government detachments. Ensconced 
in their cities, towns, and Landkreise, the American-Soviet drama, while certainly important in 
the broader context, possessed limited influence on the lowest levels of Bavarian military 
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government. Compared to the pressing tasks of feeding a starving population, rebuilding 
Bavarian cities, restarting economic life, and overseeing a campaign of democratization, the 
relatively remote events of the early Cold War seemed far away and less important. Additionally, 
MGOs at the bottom of the military government hierarchy simply possessed minimal influence 
on the course of events that led to the Cold War, further contributing to the remoteness of the 
emerging struggle. 
 During the first two years of the occupation, the Cold War, which many civilian 
policymakers in Washington and London had already embraced, was largely nonexistent in 
Bavaria. Reflecting the attitude of their OMGUS superiors, who still clung to the wartime 
alliance and hoped for an agreement with their Soviet counterparts, MGOs in Bavaria cared little 
about communism or any Soviet threat that civilians in the Department of State perceived. The 
Bavarian populace, wracked by hunger and living amidst ruins, cared little for politics and 
widespread apathy existed. When Germans did participate in party politics or vote, it was quickly 
clear that the Bavarian KPD was a weak party, even in its supposed strongholds. As a result, 
American officials ambivalently tolerated the KPD and in some cases cautiously admired for its 
long track record of anti-Nazism. The potential return of ex-Nazis and the persistence of “Nazi 
methods” drew considerably more concern in the conservative Land, especially fears that former 
Nazis could take over the center-right Christian Social Union or far-right parties like the 
Bayernpartei. Discrimination against Bavarian communists did occur from 1945 through 1947, 
but there was not yet a coordinated campaign against the KPD from the Americans. The 
Bavarians themselves, both officials and the general populace, were more ardently anti-
communist than their American occupiers at this point in the occupation. The rising tensions 
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between the former allies identified by civilian policymakers, therefore, had a minimal impact on 
the Bavarian occupation during the first two postwar years. 
 The emergence of the Cold War during the second half of the military occupation, 
however, was difficult to ignore. General Lucius Clay and other high-level officials in OMGUS 
quickly transformed from defenders of the American-Soviet relationship to the most zealous cold 
warriors of all. Bavarian MGOs mirrored this changing attitude and embarked on a campaign of 
overt anti-communism. American officials, with German assistance, harassed communists, 
openly favored the non-communist parties, and spread anti-communist propaganda. Citing 
increased KPD antagonism, many MGOs felt the campaign justified. At the same time, however, 
these military government officials challenged the dominance of the Cold War paradigm on 
policy in Germany. These officials recognized, and consistently reported, the continued 
weakness of the KPD in Bavaria. The real worry was not a communist takeover, but the KPD 
subverting American goals and civilian morale. Even as American officials both expressed more 
concern about Bavarian communists and questioned aspects of American policy, the rising 
tensions between East and West remained a remote phenomenon. MGOs possessed few 
opportunities to directly interact with the early Cold War. Most of the major events of the Cold 
War, such as the Berlin Blockade, occurred far away from the small towns and villages of 
Bavaria. As a result, the most prominent sign of rising tensions was the proliferation of war 
rumors and a general sense of dread among the Bavarian populace. American officials in Bavaria 
participated in the early Cold War in few minor ways. For example, MGOs interacted with 
returning German prisoners of war and refugees escaping communist rule in Eastern Europe. 
Americans highlighted their stories of Soviet brutality and oppression as evidence of Russian 
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malevolence. Additionally, military government officials in border Landkreise dealt with border 
incidents as relations between the former allies deteriorated from 1947 to 1949.  
The early Cold War was undoubtedly more important during the last two years of the 
military occupation; it would have been impossible to ignore its emergence. However, the Cold 
War remained remote for most American officials in Bavaria. Working in small Bavarian 
communities, the events of Berlin, Moscow, or London appeared far away. These military 
government bureaucrats also possessed limited agency in the struggle. They interacted with the 
new conflict in a few minor ways, but could not fundamentally alter the course of relations 
between the wartime allies. Instead, MGOs focused their attention on more practical issues, first 
feeding the population and restarting economic activity, then spreading democratic values. The 





 In the seventy-plus years since the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
undeniable success of the democratic experiment that originated in Bonn shapes our view of the 
past. The emphasis on the end result makes the occupation look like a pre-determined success, as 
if a democratized West Germany was destined to emerge from the horrors of the Second World 
War and then be unified after the conclusion of the Cold War. This perspective can obscure the 
challenges that accompanied the birth and maturation of the Federal Republic. It also produces a 
focus on the major policy decisions and important policymakers who helped create a democratic 
West Germany, from Germans like Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard to Americans like 
General Lucius Clay. Such a focus makes sense; after all, Adenauer, Erhard, Clay, and other 
policymakers were some of the most important individuals in the successful creation of West 
Germany. They also represented some of the most important institutions in postwar Germany, 
such as the Christian Democratic Union and the American Office of Military Government. Yet 
this also obscures the actions of other individuals. In the case of OMGUS, Clay was the 
dominant figure, but low level bureaucrats and officials also played a significant role by shaping 
the implementation of the policy derived by American, British, French, and German 
policymakers. These military government officers faced the challenge of reconciling policy 
directives with the major crises of postwar Germany, the proscribed and un-proscribed limits on 
their authority, and a changing international political situation. One cannot adequately 
understand American policy towards Germany from 1945 through 1949 without examining how 
those tasked with implementing it put that policy into action. 
 In the case of the U.S. Army’s occupation of Germany, this means a focus on the military 
government officials who staffed the Land and Kreis offices of the American military 
345 
 
government bureaucracy. The occupation of Bavaria offers one opportunity to explore such a 
bottom-up institutional history. Bavaria, the largest Land of the American occupation zone, was 
in many ways both unique and representative of the challenges facing the U.S. occupation. The 
Land contained major industrial centers and was often the first stop for ethnic Germans expelled 
from Eastern Europe and other refugees entering West Germany. It was also predominantly 
agricultural, which made it overwhelmingly important to feeding not just the American zone, but 
all Western Germany. Conservatives dominated Bavarian society, complicating and shaping 
attempts at democratization. Finally, Bavaria bordered Soviet-controlled territory, a reality that 
grew in importance with the onset of the Cold War. Through the challenges of occupying 
postwar Bavaria and the American response to such difficulties, however, one can see how 
MGOs interacted with and implemented American policy in Germany.  
This dissertation argued that American officials interacted with official policy in a variety 
of ways. Early in the occupation, many MGOs quickly recognized the major problems plaguing 
Bavaria and tried to mitigate the effects early American policy towards Germany, which was 
based on the assumption of collective German guilt and was inherently deconstructive. Military 
government officials worked to feed the Bavarian populace and promoted early forms of 
economic reconstruction. As the occupation progressed, however, MGOs took fewer steps to 
push back against official policy, in large part because civilian and military policymakers had 
finally changed policy and embraced the reconstruction of West Germany. Occupation officials 
in Bavaria now largely worked within the confines of policy, but still adapted those policies to 
meet the requirements of the Land. This attitude emerged somewhat in the democratization 
program, but truly developed during the rising tide of anticommunism. For example, MGOs in 
Bavaria towed the OMGUS anti-Soviet line, but in largely conservative Bavaria they remained 
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more concerned about the revival of far-right politics. In the end, therefore, Bavarian military 
government carried out a changing relationship with U.S. policy, first challenging its broad 
outlines and then implementing new policy based on the somewhat unique context of Bavaria. 
 To limit the effects of U.S. policy in the first half of the occupation, military government 
officials possessed limited options. Most obviously, American policy and their location within 
the institutional hierarchy of military government acted as a constraint on MGO action. Located 
largely in the lowest levels of OMGB/OMGUS, these officials could not directly challenge 
American policy, no matter how sympathetic they were towards the Bavarian populace. Beyond 
that, however, an institutional cultural preference for indirect means of governance further 
constrained the avenues of intervention open to MGOs. Years of prewar military planning for the 
next occupation and the Army’s built-in dislike for nonmilitary tasks produced an approach to 
military government that emphasized indirect rule and returning authority to local, regional, and 
national officials as rapidly as possible in Germany. This approach meant the Army did not have 
to administer every detail of the occupation, but it also limited the means available to address the 
major crises that characterized postwar Bavaria. Unwilling to intervene directly, MGOs relied on 
the actions of their Bavarian counterparts, a process that often produced tensions and conflict 
over the direction of the occupation. 
 The quest to feed both Bavarians and the population of the western zones demonstrated 
both the willingness to challenge American policy by MGOs in Bavaria and the constraints on 
their ability to do so. Local MGOs grew increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the civilians 
living in their Landkreise. They expressed alarm at the prospect of widespread starvation and 
frustration with the early American policy that opposed economic reconstruction. Living 
amongst a people suffering from food shortages, economic disaster, and ruined housing, many 
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military government officials, like Kenneth Ingwalson, worked to mitigate the effects of 
American policy and to feed the Bavarian populace. Their methods, however, were quite limited. 
Committed to turning over responsibility to Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible, MGOs 
rarely intervened directly to address the food crisis. Instead, they preferred indirect methods, 
such as observing and reporting on the food situation from their detachment offices. Many also 
took personal actions to alleviate the suffering of local Bavarians, such as providing food to 
German girlfriends or children and participating in the informal economy, which included the 
black market. High-level American officials may have decried the black market as a diversion of 
goods away from the formal economy and issued orders against participation in this informal 
economy, but individual Americans, both regular soldiers and MGOs, eagerly participated. They 
often possessed ulterior motives such as personal enrichment, but many also saw it as a means to 
alleviate the suffering of some Bavarians. 
 American policy towards Germany changed by 1947, as civilian official embraced 
German reconstruction as a step towards European recovery and a valuable tool in the emerging 
Cold War. Despite the change in policy, notable limitations remained on military government 
actions. The Army’s institutional preference for turning over authority to local officials as 
rapidly as possible continued. MGOs still avoided direct intervention in the Bavarian economy, 
instead promoting German responsibility for solving the persistent food shortages. When 
Americans did intervene more directly, it usually produced a backlash from Bavarians. Among 
American and German officials there was significant competition to define the scope and 
severity of the food crisis. American military government representatives believed the crisis so 
severe that Bavaria had to make significant contributions through food exports. Bavarian 
officials, on the other hand, pushed back and insisted that too much was asked of Bavaria while 
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other Länder did not pull their own wait. Farmers also resented delivery quotas and low official 
prices, which limited their purchasing power. As a result, many Bavarian farmers resisted both 
indirect and direct American involvement by withholding food deliveries and participating in the 
black market. Frustrated with the seemingly endless crises, Bavarian officials and farmers 
possessed their own views on the severity of the food shortages and challenged American 
conceptions of the problems. This further limited American actions in Bavaria, even though the 
biggest inhibition towards reconstruction, American policy, had been removed. No matter how 
sympathetic to the plight of Bavarian civilians, MGOs could only do so to address the food crises 
that plagued Germany throughout the occupation.  
 Economic reconstruction also represented an arena where military government officials 
sought the mitigation of American policy but possessed limited means to do so in Bavaria. The 
same general sense of sympathy drove MGOs towards economic reconstruction, yet many 
obstacles stood in the way. Much like the response to the food crisis, American policy and the 
location of MGOs within the OMGB hierarchy represented the most significant obstacle. No 
matter how sympathetic to the plight of Bavarians, military government officials could take only 
a handful of tentative steps towards reconstruction. Military government, and the Army more 
broadly, accepted economic reconstruction as a matter of military necessity. As a result, MGOs 
took steps to restart basic economic life but avoided any actions that could be interpreted as full-
blown reconstruction. For example, they reopened businesses to serve the needs of the 
occupation army, employing Bavarians to repair American trucks or produce needed goods like 
telephones or beer. Yet even that limited recovery was constrained by the demands of the 
occupying forces. Army demands for Bavarian production and labor often diverted valuable 
resources away from the regional economy at a time when they were badly needed. Additionally, 
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the continued desire to turn responsibility over the German officials as rapidly as possible 
restrained the actions of MGOs, while a series of interrelated challenges – labor shortages, the 
housing crisis, and the influx of ethnic Germans – further limited the impact of military 
government. Beginning in 1947 U.S. policy towards German recovery changed, yet the 
constraints on low-level military government remained. American officials were largely confined 
to indirect methods of promoting economic reconstruction. They reported problems, offered 
moral encouragement, encouraged German businessmen, and generally sounded a positive 
message. Perhaps more than anything else, however, economic reconstruction highlighted the 
limits on American military government, particularly at the lowest levels of the military 
government hierarchy. Constrained by both external forces and internal decisions, MGOs could 
do little to promote economic recovery and implement American policy. 
 While military government officials sought the mitigation of American policy regarding 
the food crises and economic reconstruction, they largely worked within the confines of official 
policy when it came to democratization and the early Cold War. Democratization and 
reorientation represented the most direct method of military government involvement in Bavaria. 
In one major way MGOs challenged U.S. policy regarding democratization. Early in the 
occupation American officials and GIs both undermined the official policy of nonfraternization, 
which was supposed to limit contact between occupying forces and the German populace. This 
policy, however, came crashing down as Americans largely ignored the order and began 
relationships with large numbers of Bavarians, particularly women and children. Besides that 
challenge to American policy, MGOs largely worked within the structures of official policy 
regarding democratization. Military government detachments actively participated in 
denazification early on and even retained influence over the program after Germans took control. 
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Most significantly, American officials also participated in democratization efforts targeted at 
several different segments of the Bavarian population. Youth programs were the first major arena 
of reorientation. German Youth Activities organized youth groups, sporting events, discussion 
groups, youth centers, and other activities for Bavarian children. Often coordinated by Army or 
military government officials, GYA viewed Bavarian youth as fundamentally naïve and in need 
of American instruction in the ways of modern democracy. OMGB also pressed for full-scale 
reforms to the Bavarian education system. Hoping to make the system more “democratic,” 
military government officials pushed for free school tuition, free books, and changes to the two-
track system. These youth programs ultimately served as a testing ground for the general 
democratization campaign. It was here that MGOs developed the methods and language they 
would apply towards the Bavarian populace as a whole. Finally, MGOs embarked on a general 
campaign of reorientation during the last year-and-a-half of the occupation. Through the Amerika 
Häuser and town hall meeting programs OMGB officials promoted the adoption of “modern” 
American practices by the “backwards” Bavarians.  
Yet even with democratization limits existed on military government. Low-level officials 
did not want to come across as imposing American practices. Instead, MGOs spent considerable 
time trying to convince Bavarians of the superiority of the U.S. system. Even when they ran into 
opposition, military government officials resisted using force to impose American ideas. Many 
officials recognized the inherent tension between a fundamentally undemocratic military 
occupation and attempts to democratize Bavarian society. Additionally, Bavarian resistance to 
American-led reorientation also limited the impact of military government. Perhaps most 
notably, Bavarians of all stripes voiced major opposition to American plans for school reform. 
Politicians, bureaucrats, priests, professionals, and even some workers rallied to defend the 
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traditional education system for American involvement. By dragging their heels German officials 
stalled OMGB’s major reform effort. Ultimately the changes mandated by military government 
were relatively minor and fitted into the postwar pattern of German elites slowly opening society 
to more democratic participation. Bavarians also co-opted American language of 
democratization to promote their own agenda, whether it was to gain American support or to 
criticize military government action as undemocratic. Therefore, even in the arena of 
democratization, where military government took its most direct role, notable limits of military 
government existed. The actions of MGOs aided democratization to an extent. Yet ultimately 
success rested with the Bavarian officials and population that embraced democracy after years of 
Nazi rule. 
 When it came to the early Cold War, military government officials generally followed 
official policy instead of challenging it as they had done when it came to the food and economic 
crises of the immediate postwar years. At times, however, MGOs adapted Cold War policy to 
meet the context of Bavaria. Nevertheless, the nature of the nascent conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union produced significant constraints on the actions of military 
government. For most American officials in Bavaria the Cold War was a remote phenomenon. 
Generals and major civilian policymakers decided key points in places like Berlin, Washington, 
and London. Ensconced in the rural Landkreise of Bavaria, the American-Soviet rivalry seemed 
far away and possessed little direct impact on the MGOs. Americans viewed communism as a 
threat and subsequently embarked on an anti-communist campaign, but they also recognized that 
the Bavarian KPD possessed minimal influence in the overwhelmingly conservative Land. As a 
result, the communist threat was minor. Instead, many American officials expressed concern 
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about the revival of far-right politics in Bavaria, even as OMGUS ratcheted up the 
anticommunism in 1948 and 1949.  
MGOs ultimately interacted with the Cold War through a variety of limited methods: 
anti-communism, persistent war rumors, returning German prisoners of war, and escalating 
incidents along the border with the Soviet zone and Czechoslovakia. American officials did not 
necessarily make decisions to limit their involvement in the new Cold War. Instead, the 
fundamental structure of the American-Soviet clash placed the key developments well outside 
the purview of the average military government official. As a result, little could be done to 
challenge that remote structure, so MGOs worked within that framework, adapted policy to meet 
the Bavarian context, and did their part to fight the Cold War within the confines of military 
government. 
 American military government officials, then, sought to mitigate what many saw as the 
worst effects of US policy in Bavaria while working within the confines of those policies that 
they saw as vital to the occupation mission. Increasingly sympathetic to the postwar plight of 
Bavarian civilians, many MGOs viewed official policy that limited economic recovery as 
impractical from the earliest days of the occupation. However, their ability to challenge 
American policy was often limited, whether by institutional culture, a preference for indirect 
rule, or other problems that emerged in the Land. Nevertheless, the MGOs of OMGB worked 
within these limits as best they could to lessen the impact of negative U.S. policies during the 
first two years of the occupation. After official policy changed, most military government 
officials transitioned to working within the parameters of those policies but still experienced 
notable limitations. When it came to economic recovery, for example, MGOs openly promoted 
the goal of reconstruction but still refrained from direct intervention due to the continued 
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preference to transfer responsibility to Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible. In other policies, 
such as reorientation or anticommunism, Americans in Bavaria rarely challenged policy but 
instead reflected the priorities of higher level occupation officials. 
 What remained consistent throughout the occupation, however, were the limits on 
American military government. At times, they imposed such restraints willingly, as with their 
preference for indirect rule. Other times the constraints came from outside forces such as overall 
American policy or the basic framework of the early Cold War. Many worked within these 
limitations as best they could, driven by their sympathy for a Bavarian populace that lived 
through years of bombing and then faced a postwar world in which many lacked basic housing 
and faced the prospect of starvation. Sometimes American officials took steps towards direct 
intervention, but they remained largely committed to hand responsibility over to their German 
counterparts. Instead, MGOs served as a liaison between Bavarian officials and citizens and the 
larger military government bureaucracy, explaining the American position to bewildered or 
confused Bavarians. They implemented of American policy as best they could based on their 
local conditions, reported on the progress of the occupation, and encouraged their German 
counterparts. Throughout the occupation low-level military government officials in Bavaria 
recognized the limits of their power. They knew that the success of the occupation rested on the 
actions of the occupied. American MGOs played a significant role in the success of the West 
Germany, but it was the commitment of nearly all segments of German society that made the 
Federal Republic a true success. 
 The experience of low-level military government officials implementing policy in 
Bavaria demonstrates the importance of possessing a well-rounded understanding of policy 
formation and implementation. Familiarity with the decision-making process among elite 
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officials is undoubtedly important. Such individuals wield the most power in institutions; they 
make key decisions, shape institutional culture, and interact with key individuals from other 
organizations. Therefore, it is understandable why most policy histories of the American 
occupation focus on this perspective. These histories have provided valuable analysis of the 
shifting goals behind U.S. policy towards Germany, who shaped that policy, and what impact 
those decisions had on American foreign affairs, particularly with the Soviet Union. Yet a focus 
on elites, even on an issue like policy where elites possess outsized influence, does not provide a 
complete picture. High-level officials can make important decisions and set the general outline of 
a policy approach, but it is up to the individuals at the bottom of the bureaucracy to implement 
those decisions. 
 For that reason, it is important to understand how low-level officials put policy into 
action. Non-elites do not possess as much power as their superiors, but they remain 
fundamentally important to the implementation of policy. They are, after all, the individuals 
charged with taking the broad directives of their superiors and putting them into action. As a 
result, they possess the ability, however limited, to challenge, influence, and shape official 
policy. From 1945 through 1949, MGOs in Bavaria used their positions to adapt some policies to 
the Bavarian context, while mitigating the effects of others. They were not always successful and 
often faced significant obstacles throughout the occupation. Regardless of success, studying the 
bureaucratic actions of low-level officials is important to understanding how policy was 
implemented. Policymakers cannot simply make decisions, order their decisions be carried out, 
and expect complete success. Institutions filter those decisions through numerous layers of 
bureaucracy before a low-level official is tasked with implementation. Therefore, it is vitally 
important to understand not just what policy decisions are made, but how those policies are put 
355 
 
into action. By doing so, one can gain a better understanding of how the lower levels of an 
institution shaped the outcome of certain decisions or how relatively minor officials challenged 
the dictates of their superior. This perspective provides better insight into the implementation of 
policy; it demonstrates the influence of institutions, the limits on the power of decision makers, 
and how policy is often shaped and influenced by those outside the bureaucratic elite. 
 Consideration of non-elite perspectives in policy histories is particularly important due to 
the limits of historical memory surrounding the American occupation of Germany.  The success 
of the Federal Republic – during both the Cold War and as a unified country – warps historical 
memory. It is easy to look at the success of postwar Germany and conclude that the imposition of 
democracy can occur elsewhere with little trouble. After all, before American occupation 
Germany was decidedly undemocratic, militaristic, and expansionist. Under the Nazi regime, the 
country plunged the world into a global war that killed tens of millions. Seventy years later, 
however, the country serves as a bastion of liberal democracy in Central Europe. Clearly, the 
argument may go, the United States can, and should, impose democracy on recalcitrant countries 
or former enemies. During the early 2000s, many individuals in the George W. Bush 
administration, including the president, promoted such an argument regarding Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, for example, promoted “a kind of de-Nazification” of 
Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party.
1
 President Bush promoted the 
Iraq-Germany comparisons in a March 2003 speech to the American Enterprise Institute: 
Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our 
own. We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. America has made 
and kept this kind of commitment before – in the peace that followed World War II. After 
defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies; we left constitutions and 
parliaments. We did not leave behind permanent foes; we found new friends and allies. 
                                                 
1
 Susan L. Carruthers, The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace (Cambridge, MA: 




There was a time when many said that the culture of Japan and Germany were incapable 
of sustaining democratic values. They were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. 
They, too, are mistaken. The nation of Iraq – with its proud heritage, abundant resources 





Based on this line of thinking, the ultimate success of Germany – and of Japan – proved that the 
United States could impose the values of democracy and liberalism on other countries around the 
globe. Democratization succeeded in Germany; therefore, it would succeed in Iraq. 
 Yet a critical study of history and the context of the postwar occupation demonstrates the 
limits of such thinking. Germany suffered total defeat; with its cities destroyed and the country 
occupied by millions of Allied troops – contrary to President Bush’s assertion – there was no 
questioning the country’s loss in war. Additionally, Germany possessed a modern industrial 
economy that would facilitate recovery after it was rebuilt. Despite the years of militarism and 
Nazi rule, the country also possessed considerable experience with democracy and the 
intellectual traditions of liberalism. Finally, the exigencies of the Cold War provided further 
incentive to accept democracy. These factors did not exist in either Iraq or Afghanistan, yet the 
expectation of easy success reigned supreme. Historical memory within the Bush administration 
and American society focused solely on the result, ignoring the laborious steps required to reach 
that result. 
 This failure of historical memory originated from a variety of avenues. Susan Carruthers’ 
The Good Occupation explored the process by which the postwar occupations were “made 
good.”
3
 After years of frustration with the occupations, Carruthers argued, Americans 
increasingly saw the occupation as a net positive. Visions of American altruism and 
                                                 
2
 Quoted in Carruthers, The Good Occupation, 2. 
3
 Ibid., 10. 
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domesticated bliss, in part a product of the rising Cold War, quickly outweighed the unpopular 
dimensions of occupation, such as disdain for Army life and homesickness after years overseas. 
This, Carruthers insisted, let American society ignore the widespread unpopularity and concern 
about the occupations that dominated the immediate postwar years. Yet historical memory also 
failed, in part, due to the focus of policy analysis on elite-centric methodologies. By focusing on 
the policy debates and decisions dominated by key decision makers such as General Lucius Clay 
or John J. McCloy, these methodologies relegate the actual implementation of policy to the 
backburner. Based on this approach, elites make policy decisions, communicate those decisions 
to the appropriate institutions, and those institutions implement the policy. This approach, 
however, often ignores how the lower levels of institutions, and the people who comprise them, 
implemented the decisions of their superiors. In the case of Bavaria, MGOs and other American 
officials in the Land faced a variety of challenges that complicated their attempts to execute U.S. 
policy. As a result, they pushed back on policy when necessary and towed the line when 
possible. Without understanding how policy was carried out, it is difficult to understand what 
made the occupation of Bavaria, and Germany, work. It also provides an incomplete historical 
record, one that misses the many difficulties experienced by military government officials and 
that makes the task of occupation seem simpler than it was. 
 Therefore, institutional and policy histories that move beyond an elite perspective provide 
a more complete historical memory. Beyond the intellectual goal of telling a more complete 
history, important practical considerations exist. If nation-building and democratization remain a 
possibility in the future of American foreign policy, it is vital to provide a thorough 
understanding of one of the most cited examples of success. Looking to the past for guidance on 
current policy issues is commendable. However, that guidance will be incomplete if it is based 
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on a white-washed version of history and, as was seen with the war in Iraq, can produce tragic 
results. For that reason, it is important to move beyond the level of policymaking and to better 
understand how Americans in Bavaria interacted with and implemented the policies made in 
Washington, Berlin, and Frankfurt. 
 Ultimately, the postwar occupation of Germany was a success, as judged from the 
perspective of seven decades distant. A stable, liberal Federal Republic of Germany emerged in 
central Europe, just as American policymakers hoped. High-level officials within both civilian 
agencies and the Office of Military Government played a significant role in the occupation. 
However, military government officers at the bottom of the American bureaucracy contributed to 
that ultimate success. These MGOs faced major food crises, economic catastrophe, limits on 
their authority, questions of how to democratize the German populace, and rising tensions 
between the former Allies. In their daily interactions with U.S. policy, these challenges shaped 
their responses, enforcing policy when required, molding it to meet their circumstances, and 
challenging it when they believed necessary. Nevertheless, the final success of the occupation 
rests upon the shoulders of the occupied. After twelve years of Nazi rule and six years of ruinous 
war, Germans embraced reconstruction and created their own form of democracy. American 
officials played a key role as the vehicle of U.S. policy, but the ultimate importance of German 
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